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Document 675 12th Novemmber 1975 
AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twentieth-First Ordinary Session 
Paris, 1st-5th December 197 5 
I. Political Questions 
1. Western Europe and the evolution of the 
Atlantic Alliance - consideration of current 
problems 
2. Conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe 
3. Northern European countries and the 
prospect of European political union 
II. Defence Questions 
1. European and Atlantic co-operation in the 
field of armaments 
2. Developments in the Iberian peninsula 
and the Atlantic Alliance 
3. Air forces on the central front 
III. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. The European aeronautical industry 
2. United States-European co-operation in 
advanced technology 
3. Second-generation nuclear reactors 
4. The International Institute for the Manage-
ment of Technology 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
I. Budget of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1976 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 
1974- The Auditor's Report and Motion 
to approve the final accounts 
V. Relations with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Lemmrich on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou on behalf of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf 
of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Document 676 28th November 1975 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
Paris, 1st-5th December 1975 
MONDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Morainr 9 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
11 a.m. 
Meeting of the Presidential Committee. 
Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Meetings of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives and of the Liberal 
Group. 
Afternoon 2 p.m. 
Meeting of the Socialist Group. 
3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session. 
5. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee. 
6. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance - consideration of current problems : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
3.30 p.m. 
Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. 
Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy. 
Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance - consideration of current problems. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
I. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
11 
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11 a.m. 
Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 - The 
Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft texl8. 
3. Second-generation nuclear reactors: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technologi-
cal and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. The International Institute for the Management of Technology : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
11.15 a.m. 
Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on tke draft recommendation. 
2. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
THURSDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
10 a.m. 
I. The European aeronautical industry : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on tke draft recommendation. 
2. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on tke draft recommendation. 
5.30 p.m. 
Vote on tke draft recommendations not already voted upon by the Assembly. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
FRIDAY, 5th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
Air forces on the central front : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION 
I3 
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for the Financial Year 1914 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1914 
General 
1. The following financial statements, together 
with an explanatory memorandum, were sub-
mitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1974 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 1974 
(Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1974 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix II). 
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(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of 
Western European Union budget for 
1974 (Appendix III). 
(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1974 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
Summary of Income and Expenditure 
(.Appendix I) 
3. The approved original and supplementary 
budgets provided for expenditure of F 5,070,900, 
of which F 40,900 was expected to be covered 
by miscellaneous receipts. 
4. Actual miscellaneous receipts amounted to 
F 42,732 making, with the F 5,030,000 of con-
tributions requested and received, a total income 
for the year ofF 5,072,732. Expenditure, includ-
ing an excess over the budget authorisation for 
Head II (F 19,211), amounted to F 4,910,984, 
leaving a surplus ofF 161,748 which comprised 
the budgetary surplus of F 159,916 (as shown 
in Appendix II) and the surplus of miscellaneous 
receipts amounting to F 1,832. 
5. The budgetary surplus of F 159,916 arose 
mainly on Head I (F 120,853) under which sup-
plementary provision had been made for 
increased staff expenditure expected to result 
from a salary review. The Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Government Budget Experts did not 
complete their consideration during 197 4 and no 
enhanced payments were made in the year. The 
President states that it seems certain that new 
salary scales will take effect from 1st July 197 4. 
Under Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of 
the Assembly the surplus of F 161,748 for 1974 
should now be reimbursed to the Council of 
Western European Union, but the Council's 
Budget and Organisation Committee are cur-
rently considering whether the Assembly should 
exceptionally be allowed to carry forward to 1975 
unexpended credits relating to staff salary com-
mitments. Should the Council approve this pro-
cedure, the Assembly's surplus to be reimbursed 
to the Council would be reduced accordingly. 
Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure 
and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II) 
6. The total expenditure on Head II (Expendi-
ture relating to the sessions of the Assembly), 
F 803,211, exceeded the budget total for that 
head by F 19,211. Head II contains only one 
sub-head (Sub-head 3) and transfers effected 
between items within that sub-head left the excess 
expenditure recorded against the provision for 
interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly. 
7. The transfers between sub-heads within the 
same head of the budget, shown in this state--
ment, were duly authorised in accordance with 
Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These 
15 
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regulations contain no provision for the autho~i­
sation of transfers between heads, but m 
accordance with the procedure adopted by the 
Assembly in 1973 the Council were informed and 
took note of the anticipated over-expenditure on 
Head II for 197 4. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
8. Since 26th July 1972 the assets of the pro-
vident fund of the Assembly have been main-
tained in six different currencies and amal-
gamated with the holdings of the provident funds 
of the other organs of Western European Union 
in joint deposits administered by the Office of 
the Secretary-General. In my report on the 
accounts for 1973 I recorded that the Office of 
the Secretary-General, acting on the advice of an 
advisory panel representing all the interested 
parties, had decided that the French franc would 
be used as the accounting unit for the provident 
funds and that the joint deposits would accord-
ingly be valued in that currency, at market 
rates of exchange, on 25th July 1973 and at the 
end of each accounting period thereafter. Any 
capital gains or losses thus disclosed would be 
credited or debited to staff members' accounts, 
with special adjustments for staff members leav-
ing during the course of an accounting period. 
The valuation at 25th July 1973 disclosed a loss 
of 4.002189 % of the book value of the joint 
deposits and the accounts of the staff members of 
the Assembly were accordingly adjusted with 
effect from 26th July 1973, to reflect the 
Assembly's share (F 107,181) of the total loss 
incurred. 
9. During 1974 the Office of the Secretary-
General, taking account of further advice from 
the advisory panel that fluctuations in the 
market value of the joint deposits were only of 
significance when a member's account was closed 
on termination of service, decided to reverse the 
entries made in the accounts of staff members 
as a result of the valuation of the joint deposits 
as at 25th July 1973. Accordingly an amount of 
F 106 723 was credited to the accounts of those 
Assem.'bly staff members remaining in post at 
30th September 1974. The Office of the Secretary-
General also apportioned F 366,211 to the 
Assembly during 1974 as their share of interest 
received on the joint deposits for the period 
26th July 1973 to 31st December 1974. This sum 
was credited to the Assembly staff members' 
accounts proportionately. 
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10. Therefore, the balances of the Assembly staff 
members' accounts as at 31st December 1974, 
shown in Appendix IV as totalling F 3,317,552, 
do not reflect any variation between the book 
and actual value as at that date of the Assembly's 
share of the joint deposits administered by the 
Office of the Secretary-General. I have been 
unable to verify directly that the assets held by 
the Office of the Secretary-General were in fact 
sufficient to meet the balances at 31st December 
197 4, but I have received from that Office a 
statement that the balance in their books stand-
ing to the credit of the Assembly's provident 
fund at 31st December 1974 was F 3,317,551.66. 
A valuation of the joint deposits at that date 
showed a gain of over F 440,000, of which 
F 102,600 related to the accounts of the staff of 
the Assembly. 
11. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the 
Assembly during my audit. 
D. B. PITBLADO 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
16th June 1975 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President to the Auditor of 
the Assembly in connecUon with the financial year 
1914) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1974 (Appendix I) ; 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix III) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 159,916 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
16 
expenditure was F 161,748. The difference 
between these two figures, F 1,832, represents : 
F F 
- Bank interest . . . . . . . . 19,660 
- Sundry receipts . . . . . . 8,828 
- Sale of publications . . 14,244 
- Less receipts for 197 4 
estimated in the bud-
get ............... . 
42,732 
40,900 
1,832 
3. Nevertheless, an amount of F 114,604 in 
Head I mainly represents unexpended credits in 
respect of staff expenditure connected with the 
1974 general review of emoluments. The negotia-
tions on this review are still continuing in the 
Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts and it seems certain that the new salary 
scales will take effect from 1st July 1974. Since, 
however, under the financial regulations of the 
Assembly, the funds can only remain available 
until 31st l\farch 1975, the cost of the general 
review relating to that financial year will have 
to be charged to the 1975 accounts. The members 
of the WEU Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee have been informed of the problem and 
the decision of this Committee will be submitted 
to the Council for approval. 
Transfers 
4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 47,696 
has been met by transfer between heads. Never-
theless, an amount of F 19,211 relating to 
expenditure on the recruitment of interpreters 
for Assembly sessions could not be covered by 
transfer within Head II and this excess expendi-
ture has been deducted from the overall amount 
of unexpended credits in Head V. In accordance 
with the recently-introduced procedure, the 
Council was duly informed of this.1 
0 ontrt."butions 
5. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 197 4. 
I. Document A/WEU/BA (75) I. 
Provident fund 
6. The Assembly's funilll are incorporated with 
those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
7. The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and .from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in United States dollars, French francs 
pounds sterling, Dutch guilders, Deutschmar~ 
and Swiss francs with the International West-
minster Bank Ltd., London. 
8. An amount of F 107,181 was charged to 
the accounts for 1973 for the fluctuation in 
exchange rates. It was decided in 1974 to cancel 
17 
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this entry. In future, fluctuations in exchange 
rates will only be charged to individual accounts 
as and when a staff member leaves WEU ana 
withdraws his provident fund account. 
9. The balance of the fund on 31st December 
1974, as shown in Appendix IV, was F 3,317,552. 
Interest was distributed to individual accounts 
on 30th September and 31st December 1974. 
10. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
28th April1975 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1914 
(in French francs) 
Per ~ statement 
Assessments of member States (see Appendix III) 
Contributions not requested 
Miscellaneous 
Bank interest 
Sundry receipts .............................................. . 
Sale of publications .......................................... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II) ....... . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head II ..... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Assets 
Financial position as at 31st December 1914 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ............................................ . 
Advances to temporary staff .................................. . 
Accounts receivable ......................................... . 
Less: 
Liabilities 
Supplementary insurance ..................................... . 
Insurance premiums payable ................................... . 
Accounts payable ............................................ . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Certified correct : 
19,660 
8,828 
14,244 
4,891,773 
19,211 
310,345 
61,025 
10,411 
43,841 
2,515 
173,677 
APPENDIX I 
5,030,000 
42,732 
5,072,732 
4,910,984 
F 161,748 
381,781 
220,033 
F 161,748 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HUMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly 
Andre DEQuAE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing Summary of Income and Expenditure and the Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these Statements are correct. 
16th June 1975 
Signed: P. B. PrTBLADO 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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APPE~ 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE ANI 
Total budget for 
DETAILS 19741 
HEAD I - ExPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 2,122,200 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
Band C), including travelling expenses and French 
social security 7,000 
Sub-Head 2 AUowancea, social charges, etc. 
(A) AUowancea 
(a) Head-of-family allowance 71,400 
(b) Children's allowance 103,200 
(c) Expatriation allowance 186,300 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 10,000 
(e) Overtime 12,000 
(/) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-
French staff 
(g) Education allowance 22,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses 1,800 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 135,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 80,300 
(c) Provident fund 285,600 
(0) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination 
papers 1,600 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 1,500 
(c) Removal expenses 3,000 
(d) Installation allowance 4,500 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 5,000 
(/) Medical examination 2,000 
Total of Head I 3,054,400 
1. Documents 621, 634 and 647. 
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DIX II 
UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1974 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credite 
+ -
2,122,200 2,053,122 69,078 
2,382 9,382 9,382 -
71,400 69,539 1,861 
103,200 96,353 6,847 
186,300 175,979 10,321 
10,000 5,382 4,618 
12,000 7,483 4,517 
22,000 21,010 990 
1,800 840 960 
135,000 131,922 3,078 
80,300 77,278 3,022 
285,600 276,288 9,312 
1,600 268 1,332 
1,500 398 1,102 
3,000 ll4 2,886 
2,682 1,818 1,258 560 
300 5,300 5,300 -
2,000 1,631 369 
2,682 2,682 3,054,400 2,933,547 120,853 
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DETAILS 
HEAD II· EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Bub-Head 3 1. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. Linguistic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 
4. Installation of equipment and hire of otficeB 
for the sessions 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
Total of Head II 
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Bub-Head 4 Premises 
Bub-Head 5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head III 
22 
Total budget for 
1974 
256,000 
98,000 
90,000 
200,000 
3,300 
114,000 
22,700 
784,000 
108,000 
10,000 
118,000 
APPENDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
10,090 245,910 245,910 
-
208 98,208 117,419 I 19,211 I 
8,219 98,219 98,219 
-
2,358 202,358 202,358 -
297 3,003 3,003 
-
5,371 108,629 108,629 -
4,973 27,673 27,673 -
-
15,758 15,758 784,000 803,211 I 19,211 I 
2,012 105,988 92,411 13,577 
2,012 12,012 12,012 
-
2,012 2,012 118,000 104,423 13,577 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 
Sub-Head 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents 
Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official car 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V • OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
Travel a.nd subsistence allowances and insurance fol" 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Com-
mittees and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
I TOTAL 1 ........ .. 
Total budget for 
1974 
175,000 
105,000 
500,000 
16,000 
20,000 
500 
816,500 
50,000 
70,000 
2,000 
95,000 
35,000 
23,000 
15,000 
2,000 
6,000 
298,000 
5,070,900 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1974, a.JJ 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
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Francis 
Clerk ofO 
APPENDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
22,876 152,124 152,124 -
11,500 116,500 116,500 -
15,421 515,421 515,421 -
3,803 12,197 12,197 -
242 19,758 18,668 1,090 
500 64 436 
26,921 26,921 816,500 814,974 1,526 
323 49,677 28,596 21,081 
70,000 63,420 6,580 
2,000 1,201 799 
95,000 90,481 4,519 
35,000 30,967 4,033 
23,000 18,630 4,370 
15,000 13,786 1,214 
323 2,323 2,323 -
6,000 5,425 575 
323 323 298,000 254,829 43,171 
47,696 47,696 5,070,900 4,910,984 159,916 
dd for up to 31st March 1975, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
[UMBLET 
ABBembly 
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Andre DEQUAE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary .AffairB and .AdminiBtration 
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APPENDIX III 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1974 
Budget surplus Budget 1st supplemen- 2nd supplemen- Net Member States 600ths ta.ry budget ta.ry budget contributions from 1973 for 1974 for 1974 for 1974 required 
F F F F F 
Belgium 59 (578) 437,583 45,528 11,505 494,038 
France 120 (1,177) 890,000 92,600 23,400 1,004,823 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (1,177) 890,000 92,600 23,400 1,004,823 
Italy 120 (1,177) 890,000 92,600 23,400 1,004,823 
Luxembourg 2 (19) 14,834 1,544 390 16,749 
Netherlands 59 (578) 437,583 45,528 11,505 494,038 
United Kingdom 120 (1,177) 890,000 92,600 23,400 1,004,823 
600 (5,883) 4,450,000 463,000 117,000 5,024,117 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1974 
F F 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1974 2,887,865 Withdrawals 21,805 
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of 
Western European Union 414,433 
Repayments of loans by staff members 103,347 Loans to staff members 540,200 
Interest received during year 366,211 
Cancellation of the loss due to monetary fluctuations 
as at 26th July 1973 106,723 Payment to common fund 134 
Gain on valuation by staff who left the Organisation 
after 26th July 1973 978 
Reimbursement by bank of loss of interest 134 Accounts of staff members as at 31st December 1974 3,317,552 
Edmond NESSLER 
PreBident of the Assembly 
3,879,691 
Francis HUMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly 
3,879,691 
Andre DEQuAE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of 
my audit, that in my opinion this Statemant ia oorreot. 
16th June 1975 
D. B. PITBLADO 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1974 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1974 1 . 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 1 
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1974, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. MemberB of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; 
Lord Selsdon (Substitute: Sir John RodgerB), Mr. Legaret 
(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens (Substitute: Wende), 
Alber, de Bruyne (Substitute: AdriaenBilns), Castellucci, 
Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : Spautz), Kauffmann, de 
28 
Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, Prearo, Schleiter, 
Talamona, Vohrer, Waltma.ns, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute: 
Kemp{kr). 
Also prll8ent : Mr. Mart. 
N. B. The namll8 of Reprll8tl'f6tatWil8 who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
Document 678 20th October 1975 
BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 11 
by Mr. Deqaae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1976 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1916 
Details 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............ . 
Head III: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ . 
Head IV : General administrative costs ........................... . 
Head V : Other expenditure .................................... . 
ToTAL EXPENDITUBE ••••••••.••••••••••• 
TOTAL RECEIPTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Estimate for 1976 
F 
3,939,000 
1,073,500 
210,000 
1,036,000 
338,000 
6,596,500 
37,500 
6,559,000 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and approved 
unanimously by the Presidential Committee. 
Hengel (Substitute : Spautz), Kauffmann, de Koster, Lewis, 
Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, Prearo, Schleiter, Talamona, 
Vohrer, Waltmans, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute: Kempfler). 
2. Members of the Oommitt66: Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; 
Lord Selsdon (Substitute: Sir John Rodgers), Mr. Legaret 
(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens (Substitute: Wende), Alber, 
de Bruyne (Substitute : Adriaensena), Castellucci, Depietri, 
29 
Also pr68ent: Mr. Mart. 
N. B. The nam68 of Repr68entativ68 who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
DOCUMENT 678 
Allocation of Expenditure rmder Heads and Sub-Heads 
Details 
Head I - EXPENDITURE FOB STAFF 
Sub-Head I: Salaries of permanent establishment .............. . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances ................................ . 
(B) Social charges ............................. . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials ............. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I ...................... . 
Head II- EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 : I. Temporary staff ............................. . 
2. Linguistic staff .............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions ....... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD II ..................... . 
Head III- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : Premises ....................................... . 
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment .............................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD III 
Head IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents, typewriters, etc. . ................... . 
Sub-Head 7 : Paper, stationery and office supplies ............. . 
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ... . 
Sub-Head 9 : Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . .... . 
Sub-Head 10 : Official cars .................................... . 
Sub-Head II: Bank charges .................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 
Head V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
Chairmen of Committees, Rapporteurs and Represen-
tatives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential 
Committee and joint meetings .................. . 
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ....................... . 
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information ..................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for ................................... . 
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes ........................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD v ..................... . 
30 
Estimate for 1976 
F 
2,734,000 
525,000 
660,000 
20,000 
331,000 
557,000 
4,500 
147,000 
34,000 
153,000 
57,000 
250,000 
125,000 
620,000 
18,500 
22,000 
500 
55,000 
80,000 
3,000 
125,000 
20,000 
30,000 
15,000 
3,000 
7,000 
3,939,000 
1,073,500 
210,000 
1,036,000 
338,000 
Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
DOOUMENT 678 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate : F 2, 734,000 
Estimate : F 2, 725,000 
Rank WEU Grade 
The Clerk ............................................ . Hors cadre 
The Clerk Assistant .................•.................. Hors cadre 
Counsellors ............................................. . A5 
First Secretaries .............................. , ........ . A4 
Secretary .............................................. . A3 
Secretaries-Translators /Publications ...................... . 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator A2 
Chief Accountant ...................................... . B6 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . B4 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 
Switchboard Operator .................................. . B3 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................ . C6 
Messengers ............................................ . C3 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and French social security 
No. Total F 
1 98,000 
1 173,000 
5 826,000 
2 288,000 
1 120,000 
3 283,000 
1 94,000 
4 281,000 
6 362,000 
l 61,000 
1 56,000 
2 83,000 
28 2,725,000 
Estimate : F 9,000 
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Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHABGBS, ET<l. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
Estimate : F 525,000 
(a) Household allowance Estimate : F 95,000 
Rank WEU No. Grade 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... Hors cadre 1 
Counsellors .............................................. A5 4 
First Secretary ......................................... A4 1 
Secretary ............................................... A3 1 
Personal Assistants ...................................... B4 3 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .............................. B3 3 
Messenger .•...........•..•.................•............ C3 2 
15 
(b) Children's allowance Estimate: F 132,000 
4,560 F per year per child : 4,560 x 29 .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . .. .. . F 132,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance Estimate: F 234,000 
Rank 
Counsellors .............................................. 
First Secretary ......................................... 
Secretary ............................................... 
Secretary-Translator /Publications 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator .............. 
Personal Assistants ...................................... 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .............................. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
32 
' WEU No. Grade 
A5 3 
A4 1 
A3 1 
A2 2 
B4 2 
B3 2 
11 
Estimate : F 10,000 
Estimate: F 14,000 
Estimate : F 38,000 
Estimate : F 2,000 
Total 
F 
10,000 
39,000 
9,000 
7,000 
13,000 
11,000 
6,000 
95,000 
Total 
F 
97,000 
29,000 
26,000 
30,000 
27,000 
25,000 
234,000 
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(B) SOOIA.L CHARGBS 
Estimate : F 660,000 
(a) Social Security Estimate: F 180,000 
27 officials F 180,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate : F 112,000 
3.55 % of total emoluments X 3,136,000 F F 112,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate : F 368,000 
14% of basic salaries X 2,627,000 F F 368,000 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ABBIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFIOIALS 
2 - Ill 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and 
cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure 
of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Insta.llation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(/) Medical examination 
33 
Estimate: F 20,000 
Estimate: F 1,600 
Estimate: F 1,500 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Estimate: F 4,500 
Estimate: F 7,000 
Estimate: F 2,400 
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Head II - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
EBiimate: F 1,073,500 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STA.Fll' 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Paris: 10 days 
Function Daily Total 
remuneration No. 
F F 
Head of the sittings office .............................. . 383 Ia 5,800 
Heads of sections ...................................... . 291 2a 24,200 
383 4b 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 330 1 b 4,000 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................ . 270 2a 13,300 
330 2b 
Precis writers .......................................... . 270 4a 26,600 
330 4b 
Verbatim reporters ..................................... . 330 14 b 71,300 
426 4c 
Assistants ............................................. . 215 4b 91,300 
205 23 b 
160 6a 
148 10 a 
Head ushers ........................................... . 100 2a 2,400 
Ushers ................................................ . 90 16 a 15,900 
Roneo /Assemblers ...................................... . 90 18 a 16,200 
117 271,000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
Travelling expenses .............. F 60,000 
c. Recruited as free-lance staff. 331,000 
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2. LINGUISTIC STA.FI' 
(A) Interpretation Servicu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function Total 
No. 
F 
Interpreters ............................................ 12 140,000 
12 
Travelling expenses ........ F 11,000 
F 151,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions ...... F 130,000 
(B) Translation Servicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Estimate I 
Function remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisers ................................................ 391 3a 95,000 
584 3b 
Translators .............................................. 303 4a 102,000 
474 4b 
ABBistants .....................................••......•.. 160 4a 70,000 
215 3b 
148 3a 
205 2b 
26 267,000 
1. Based on 30 days for the revisers and translators. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
Travelling expenses .•.......•••• F 9,000 
F 276,000 
3. INSURANOE FOR TEMPORARY STA.FI' 
EBiimate : F 4,500 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment ................ F 117,000 
- Installation of telephone booths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 13,000 
- Installation of tape-recorders and a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the 
Press Service .................................................... F 10,000 
- Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7,000 
Estimate: F 147,000 
5. MISOELLA.NEOUS EXPENDITURE DUBJllfG SESSIONS 
- Removal expenses ............................................... . F 8,000 
- Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse) ................................ . F 4,500 
- Hire of typewriters and technicians ............................... . F 4,000 
- Servicing of lifts ................................................. . F 5,000 
-Cleaning ........................................................ . F 6,500 
- Miscellaneous ...............................................•...... F 6,000 
Estimate: F 34,000 
Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate: F 210,000 
Sub-He,ad 4 
PREMISES 
- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
- Joint overheads for the premises ................................... F 133,000 
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture F 8,000 
Estimate : F 153,000 
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Sub-Head 5 
C.Al'ITA.L EQUIPMENT 
- Replacement of 2 IBM typewriters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Purchase of a guillotine machine ......................... F 18,000 
- Purchase of an electric stapling machine .................. F 31,000 
Estimate : F 57,000 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
Estimate: F 1,036,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGBAPB OHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
- Telephone ............................................... F 80,000 
- Telegrams ............................................... F 6,000 
- Transport of documents ................................. F 14,000 
Estimate : F 250,000 
Sub-Head 7 
P Al'ER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 
Estimate : F 125,000 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, 
minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
-Brochures 
Estimate : F 620,000 
Sub-Head 9 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate: F 18,500 
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Sub-Head 10 
Oll'li'IOIAL OARS 
- Hire of official oars ...•.......•.•..•...................... Estimate : F 22,000 
Sub-Head II 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate : F 500 
Bead V - Other expenditure 
Estimate : F 338,000 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL .AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOB THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, 
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate : F 55,000 
l'Jub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOB REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate : F 80,000 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
Oll'li'IOIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE Oll'li'IOE OJ' THE CLERK 
Estimate : F 125,000 
Sub-Head 16 
BXPENSES Oll' EXPERTS AND THE .AUDITOR 
Estimate : F 20,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate : F 30,000 
Sub-Head 18 
BXPENSBS FOB GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate: F 15,000 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHEBB PROVIDED FOB 
Estimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate: F 7,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
l. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 6,559,000. The budget for 1975 amounted 
to F 6,065,000. The difference is therefore F 494,000, i.e. 8.15 %-
2. Head I - Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 309,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1975 in basic salaries and payments to the 
provident fund, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supple-
mentary insurance ; 
(ii) annual increments; 
(iii) an estimated 9% rise in salaries and other emoluments in 1976 to meet the rise in the cost of 
living. 
3. Head II - Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Temporary staff 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly 
applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied 
by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) - Interpretation services 
The increase (F 31,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in 
the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations in respect of salaries and daily allowances payable 
to interpreters. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B) - Translation services 
The increase (F 12,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the scales applied in the 
Council of Europe. 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for the sessions 
The increase (F 77 ,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of installing 
equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
Sub-head 3.5 - Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
The increase (F 6,000) in the estimate for this sub-head, covering two part-sessions held in Paris, 
is to meet certain expenses affected by the rise in the cost of living. 
4. Head III- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4 - Premises 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is partly to meet the higher cost of main-
tenance for the premises at 43, avenue du President Wilson, and partly to cover the cost of installing simul-
taneous interpretation equipment for committee meetings held outside Paris ; it also covers allowances 
for the technicians responsible for operating the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU com-
mittee rooms. 
Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum ofF 57,000 is for the replacement of two unserviceable machines in the roneo department 
which were purchased in 1960, and two typewriters purchased in 1965 and 1970. 
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5. Head IV - General administrative COBts 
Sub-head 6 - Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents 
The increase (F 27,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in the cost of 
telephone rental and calls and a rise in postal rates. 
Sub-head 7 - Paper, stationery and office supplies 
The increase (F 7,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of paper 
and office supplies. 
Sub-head 10 - Official cars 
The increase (F 2,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of hiring cars. 
6. Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 5,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The reduction (F 36,000) in the estimate for this sub-head has been possible since the 1975 budget 
had to cover the expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk travelling to Bonn for the session. This 
estimate also takes account, however, of an increase in daily allowances and travelling expenses. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 2,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to cover fees paid to the auditor and the 
expenses of experts. 
Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts in 1976 include: 
(i) sale of publications ; 
( ii) bank interest ; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave. 
(a) Basic salaries 
Head I -Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SAT.ARTRS OF PBBJU.NBNT ESTABLISHMENT 
Estimate for 1976 ....................................................... F 2,725,000 
Budget for 1975 ...................................•.................... F 2,525,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 200,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling 
expenses and French social security 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 9,000 
Budget for 1975 ........................................................ F 8,000 
Net increase ................ F 1,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff. 
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Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 95,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 89,000 
Net increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 132,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 116,000 
Net increase .................. F 16,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 234,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 217,000 
Net increase .................. F 17,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
2' - Ill 
(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 14,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 14,000 
Estimate unchanged 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................... : ............. F 38,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 28,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 2,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
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(B) SOOIAL OJUBGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1976 F 180,000 
Budget for 1975 ................................................•......... F 161,000 
Net increase ................... F 19,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1976 ................................•....................... F 112,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................•.. F 101,000 
Net increase 
This calculation is based on 3.55 % of total emoluments. 
(c) Provident Fund 
Estimate for 1976 
F 11,000 
F 368,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . F 340,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 28,000 
This calculation is based on 14% of basic salaries. 
(0) EXPENSES BBLA.TING TO THE BBOBUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFIOIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened 
for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estim11-te for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . F 1,600 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,600 
Estimate unchanged 
(b) Reimbursement oftravelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 1,500 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
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(c) Removal expenses 
Estima~e for 1976 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • F 3,000 
Budget for 1975 .........................................................• F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(d) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1976 ..................................................•..... F 4,500 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 4,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 7,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
Net increase ................. F 1,000 
This estimate takes account of increased fares. 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1976. 
(/) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,400 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,400 
Estimate unchanged 
Head II - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
l. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................................... F 331,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 335,000 
Net decrease ................. F 4,000 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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2. LINGUISTIC STAJIT 
(A) l'l&terpretation Servicu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 151,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 130,000 
Net increase .................. F 21,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 130,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 120,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(B) Translation Servicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 276,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 264,000 
Net increase .................. F 12,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANCE FOB TEMPORARY STAFF 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,500 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOB THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 147,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 70,000 
Net increase .................. F 77,000 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
5. :MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 34,000 
Budget for 1975 • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 28,000 
Net increase ................. F 6,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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Bead III - Expendtture on premises and equipment 
Sub-B«Ml 4 
PREMISES 
Estimate for 1976 • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 153,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 143,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
hire of committee rooms. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sub-B«Ml 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 57,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Net increase ................. F 47,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Bead IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-Bead 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH OIIARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 250,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 223,000 
Net increase ................. F 27,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 7 
PAPBR, STATIONBRY AND Oli'FIOB SUPPLIES 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 125,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 118,000 
Net increase .................. F 7,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISliiNG OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 620,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 620,000 
Estimate unchanged 
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Sub-Head 9 
PURORASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETO. 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18,500 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 18,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 10 
OFFIOIAL OARS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 22,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20,000 
Net increase .................. F 2,000 
In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. 
driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK OHARGES 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 500 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 55,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 55,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 80,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 75,000 
Net increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Sub-Heacl 14 
COMMITTBB STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 2,000 
Net increase ................. F 1,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OJ!' MEMBERS OJ!' THE OFFICE OJ!' THE CLERK 
Estimat~ for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 125,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 161,000 
Net decrease ................. F 36,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Heacl 16 
EXPENSES OJ!' EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Heacl 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Heacl 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OJ!' THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Bub-Heacl 19 
OONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
Estimate for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Heacl 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate for 1976 ........................................................ F 7,000 
Budget for 1975 .......................................................... F 7,000 
Estimate unchanged 
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European union and the defence of Europe 
RESOLUTION 55 
adopted by the Presidential Committee 
on 11th September 1915 
The Assembly of WEU, 
11th September 1975 
Stressing the fact that it is the only European parliamentary assembly with competence in 
the defence field and that this competence stems from Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
signed by seven of the nine member States of the European Community; 
Noting that in its report on European union the Commission recalls that "matters relating 
specifically to defence are dealt with at NATO and in Western European Union"; 
Recalling the fact that in accordance with Article XI the modified Brussels Treaty is open 
to accession by all democratic States, including the two member States of the EEC which are not 
parties to the treaty ; 
Anxious to ensure that the undertakings entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty are res-
pected and the means of action maintained as long as defence matters are only a field of " poten-
tial " competence for the European union ; 
Agreeing with the abovementioned report that the creation of the union might be facilitated 
by " periodic discussions on defence problems... in a truly European framework with the participa-
tion of all the member States " and that " another major step forward would be the development 
of a common policy on arms and equipment, possibly involving the setting up of a •European Arms 
Agency'", 
URGES THE PRIME MmlsTER oF BELGIUM, Mr. L:Eo TINDEMANS, RESPONSmLE FOR suBMITTING A 
REPORT ON EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CoUNcn.. 
I. When considering defence, to take account of the fundamental provisions of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols, i.e. : 
- the guarantee of "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" by the WEU 
member countries in the event of any of them being the object of an armed attack in Europe 
(Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty) ; 
- the undertakings entered into by the member countries concerning their forces and armaments 
(Protocols Nos. II, III and IV), these undertakings being a model of freely-accepted discipline ; 
- the existence of the WEU Council "organised so as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" 
and able to "be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult 
with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise" (Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty) ; 
- the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee which is in a position to make a major con-
tribution to the preparation of a joint European policy in the field of armaments and equipment 
and thus to pave the way for the creation of a "European Arms Agency"; 
- the parliamentary supervision exercised by the WEU Assembly of the activities of the Council 
and thus more genera.lly of measures taken to ensure the security of Western Europe (Article IX 
of the modified Brussels Treaty) ; 
II. To consider carefully the possibilities now offered by the modified Brussels Treaty until such 
time as the European union shall have the necessary powers and means of action for exercising 
responsibility in the defence field ; 
III. To facilitate the exercise by the WEU Assembly of its responsibilities in the defence field by 
recommending that the European Council seek its opinion on any plans it may draw up for the 
defence of Europe. 
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~estern Europe and the euolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
Consideration of current problems 
..,.........-
~ORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur ? 
. , 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
23rd October 1975 
on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance- consideration 
of current problems 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur 
I. Towards an adult Europe 
II. Prospects of political union 
III. European defence 
IV. WEU's role in the interim period 
V. Evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
VI. Discussion in Committee 
APPENDIX 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna 
1. Adopted in Committee by 9 votes to 0 with 8 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chair-
man) ; Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens, 
Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, 
MM. Brugnon (Substitute : Forni), Cermolacce, Fioret, 
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Fletcher, Mrs. Goclin.ache-Lambert (Substitute: de Bruyne), 
MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, 
Peijnenburg, PBridier, Portheine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, 
Steel, tlrwin, Van Hoeylandt. 
N.B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
- consideration of current problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the 
eS8ential guarantee of European security ; 
Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its 
report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union ; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence respon-
sibilities ; 
Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country 
called upon to take part in a European union ; 
Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to 
exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing 
the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the stan-. 
dardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266) ; 
Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear 
strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and conse-
quently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159), 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
1. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the 
Assembly, and in particular : 
(a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time 
as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence res-
ponsibilities ; 
(b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions 
of the union ; 
2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its parti-
cipation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters ; 
3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified Brussels Treaty, 
particularly in the field of arms policy ; 
4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy 
to be implemented by the forces of the member States ; 
5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans 
it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur) 
I. Towards an adult Europe 
(i) Closer union 
1. Since the first Prague coup in 1947, and 
above all since the signing of the Atlantic 
Alliance in 1949, soon followed by the Warsaw 
Pact, free Europe has lived in the shadow of 
the two blocs under the balance of terror. While 
belonging to one of these blocs, Western Europe 
(in the geographical sense extending beyond the 
seven members of WEU) sought in varying 
degrees but untiringly to define its own identity 
and promote the union. The Council of Europe 
(or greater Europe), Western European Union 
which replaced the stillborn European Defence 
Community, and the European Economic Com-
munity each in turn provided the appropriate 
framework. 
2. Although the first two have stood still while 
continuing a steady dialogue and collaboration 
between their members in their own specific 
fields, it has become increasingly clear since the 
summit meetings in The Hague, Copenhagen and 
Paris that the Economic Community, since 
enlarged to nine, has set a closer union as its 
goal which some believe to be resolutely political 
and defensive but which is discreetly called Euro-
pean, which leaves a wide enough margin for 
future developments. 
(ii) Beyond the two blocs 
3. This emerging Europe, while sheltering 
below the American nuclear umbrella, quickly 
understood that it had to move cautiously and 
gradually extend beyond the two blocs to create, 
in a shape yet to be defined, a political, economic 
and strategic group. The bipolar world of the 
fifties has since become five-fold, if not more, 
since China made its entrance on the world stage 
and Japan has become an economic power to be 
reckoned with. 
4. Today, the outstripping of the blocs is more 
satisfactory than twenty years ago. Following a 
variety of events, the United States has read-
justed its commitments abroad. Here reference is 
made not only to the disturbances caused by the 
tragedy in South-East Asia and the internal 
unrest in that great country but also to the 
effects of the upsurge of the European States 
within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly since 
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1967 : the opening towards the East, policy of 
detente, attempts to achieve balanced force reduc-
tions leading towards the inter-German agree-
ment, the Helsinki agreement and the MBFR 
negotiations. 
5. Further, the Soviet Union's European policy 
seems to have developed towards a more defensive 
concept, having guaranteed the status quo of its 
conquests in Europe, in order to be able more 
easily to guard the Asian front. Or such, at 
least, is the general feeling in Europe in spite 
of warnings of caution which are sounded 
regularly. 
(iii) Europe with world-wide responsibilities 
6. The will to outstrip the blocs - which might 
also be called a need for European self-asser-
tion - has been considerably strengthened by 
Europe's vast economic expansion, however 
shaken it may at present be by a dangerous 
depression. An economic community which alone 
represents 20 % of the gross social product of 
the whole world, 41 % of international trade and 
about 50 % of world monetary reserves - an 
economic giant - cannot deny its world respons-
ibilities in establishing peace and social justice. 
With the exception of the United States' posses-
sion of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, 
Europe's responsibilities towards the world as 
a whole and towards the southern hemisphere in 
particular are at least equal to those of the 
United States. Seen from Washington, political 
Europe may seem parochial- according to Mr. 
Ball - because of its mosaic of peoples, nations 
(large and small), languages and national reac-
tions. However this may be, Europe contributes 
generously and without political bias to the 
development of the southern hemisphere and 
shoulders its share of the heavy burden of joint 
defence. 
7. Satisfaction may be derived from the state-
ment by Mr. Ortoli in the European Parliament 
on 18th February 1975 : 
"Europe must behave as an adult and never 
forget that it is a profound moral reality at 
the same time as a great commercial power." 
8. But what Europe is lacking is political 
stature. The major task of our governments is 
to shape this without delay with the enthusiastic 
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support of public opinion in our various 
countries. 
D. Prospects of political union 
9. In a report published in J·une 1975, the 
Commission of the European Communities out-
lines what a European union might be and 
possible ways of achieving it. 
(i) The proposal 
10. There is a fairly clear picture of the future. 
The Commission (paragraph 3) states that: 
"the possibility of a number of independent 
and parallel organisations must be excluded." 
It also rejects (paragraphs 7 and 8) the type of 
union based on : 
"a network of special agreements involving 
all or only some of the member States 
depending on the subject" 
which it considers contrary to the concept of a 
European identity. 
11. It believes the union's responsibilities should 
include foreign policy and defence policy 
~paragraphs 59, 60 and 61). 
12. Admittedly (paragraph 74) : 
"The Atlantic Alliance plays and will con-
tinue to play a decisive role in the security 
of Western Europe, but the security of the 
union, its long-term cohesion and solidarity 
between its peoples cannot be truly 
guaranteed if defence matters are purely and 
simply left on one side when the union is 
being established." 
13. Moreover (paragraph 87) : 
"In the field of external relations, only a 
single organisation is capable of guarantee-
ing the necessary degree of consistency 
between the various aspects of a policy of 
international co-operation. In addition, it 
would make the union's own personality 
stand out more clearly at international level" 
which, moreover : 
"does not mean that the institutions of the 
union act in all their fields of competence 
in accordance with the same legal rules." 
14. Finally, in paragraph 76, the Commission 
states that for a European defence policy to be 
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considered and accepted by the peoples of the 
union: 
"the European institutions will have to be 
recognised as authoritative and represent-
ative of a sufficiently high degree of solidar-
ity between those peoples." 
Consequently, (paragraph 77) : 
"A period of strengthening the union will be 
necessary before all these conditions can be 
met." 
(ii) Fields of competence 
15. These various considerations bring the Com-
mission to consider the field of defence (para-
graph 77) as : 
"a field of potential competence for the 
union, which would thus not be endowed 
with powers and means of action in this field 
from the outset." 
16. The competence and potential competence of 
the union shall be laid down in the act of constitu-
tion (paragraph 12). The member States would 
thus have to enter into an undertaking in 
principle in this field which would have some 
immediate repercussions. Thus, (paragraph 78) : 
"As a potential competence would be 
involved, the member States would be bound 
not to engage with non-member countries in 
action.~ which might endanger the security 
of another member State or compromise the 
union's long-term cohesion." 
17. The Commission further suggests (paragraph 
79) : 
"periodic discussions on defence problems 
and the defence effort held in a truly Euro-
pean framework with the participation of 
all the member States'' 
and (paragraph 80) : 
"a systematic comparison of the strategic 
planning of the various countries with the 
aim of arriving at a common view, taking 
account of the specific interests of Europe." 
18. Finally, the Commission recalls the Paris 
communique stating that the European union 
must be set up "with the fullest respect for the 
treaties already signed". It considers that this 
should not be construed to mean that no institu-
tional change is desirable or even necessary but 
that fullest respect for the treaties implies 
(paragraph 93) : 
"that the institutional system of the union 
should be based on the existing institutions." 
(iii) The present situation 
19. There now exists a European Community 
as defined in the EEC, ECSC and Euratom 
treaties. These treaties attribute certain specific 
responsibilities to the Community and conse-
quently to the Commission. In other fields, their 
responsibilities are concurrent with those retained 
by the member States. Lastly, there are potential 
fields of competence, i.e. areas not yet attributed 
to the Community but which are destined to be 
entrusted to it at a time and in conditions which 
are to be the subject of a subsequent decision. 
20. This is the head under which the Commis-
sion's report envisages the future European 
union's defence responsibilities and hence all 
foreign policy questions connected with defence. 
However, drawing on its experience of the Euro-
pean Community, the Commission made the 
following comment (paragraph 22) : 
"In sectors where there were no Community 
instruments or rules, or where they were 
inadequate, governments have not been 
capable on their own of bringing into being 
and maintaining with the necessary con-
tinuity the will to act on their national 
structures and guide development towards 
common objectives." 
21. However, as matters now stand, nine-power 
political consultations have developed outside the 
strict framework of the Community and this 
experience has led the Commission not to retain 
this type of framework for the model European 
union. It states (paragraph 65) : 
"Hitherto, political co-operation has seldom 
led to anything more than the Community 
reacting to events. If these objectives are to 
be achieved, the first thing to be done is to 
complete the elimination of the frequently 
artificial distinction between Community 
activities and matters for political co-opera-
tion. This distinction makes it impossible to 
deal with our problems in context or to act 
as effectively as we should, while our 
partners are faced with a multitude of inter-
locutors none of whom is really in a posi-
tion to speak for Europe. It is not enough 
to try and remedy the situation through 
co-ordination of the two structures. In the 
European union, all questions of common 
interest must be considered in a single 
institutional framework." 
53 
DOCUMENT 680 
22. However, the extension of such a framework 
to defence and foreign affairs raises difficulties 
which are underlined by the Commission 
(paragraph 66) : 
"The union would invoke its competence 
only when necessary, so that certain matters 
might, for a very long period and perhaps 
indefinitely, be dealt with solely by the 
member States." 
23. Thus, as the Commission admits (paragraph 
23) : 
"There may be areas which fall within the 
general competence of the union but where 
the union cannot or need not yet be given 
powers of its own. Here it would be useful 
to organise co-operation within the union. 
Such co-operation could, moreover, help to 
promote agreement on certain basic options 
and so, in appropriate fields, lead at a later 
stage to the union being given powers of its 
own." 
(iu) The aims 
24. The Commission's aims in the fields of 
foreign affairs and defence are thus defined 
(paragraph 63) : 
"The general political aspects of interna-
tional relations are dealt with under the 
system of political co-operation established 
between the nine member States of the Com-
munity. 
Matters relating specifically to defence are 
dealt with at NATO and in Western Euro-
pean Union. 
These various forms of collaboration will 
have to be organised coherently and given 
a new dimension in the union." 
And (paragraph 66) : 
"As regards the distribution of fields of 
competence between the union and the 
member States, the final objective is a com-
mon policy with direct attribution of powers 
to the union institutions in all areas where 
the member States acting alone cannot have 
as effective a voice as would the union acting 
as one, or where the absence of a common 
policy would make it impossible for the 
union to pursue the objectives of its internal 
development or to contribute to internatio-
nal actions of interest to the union." 
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m. European defence 
(i) A question evaded for too long 
25. The question of European defence underlies 
all discussions on European union and the cohe-
sion of the Atlantic Alliance. But the roots of 
the question are rarely tackled whether by the 
European countries or in the Atlantic Alliance. 
The question is possibly evaded for two reasons : 
because it might elicit doubts about the sincerity 
of the adhesion of the European countries to the 
Atlantic Alliance and because for Europe to have 
a defence system of its own might eventually 
lead to a political organisation completely inde-
pendent of the United States. 
26. In 1973, Mr. Jobert, then French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, had the courage to raise 
the problem in the WEU Assembly. At the time, 
his speech evoked reservations in many Euro-
pean capitals not because of the hint of Euro-
pean self-assertion but because of fears of opening 
the door to an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. 
There has since been no mention of the subject, 
at least officially, but it is still obviously a 
topical matter and WEU is the appropriate 
framework for discussing it. 
27. European defence is indubitably a matter 
for the European union which the Nine have 
set as an objective, as they affirmed at the 
summit meeting in Paris in December 1974. There 
can be no question of political unification, even 
limited to loose, flexible confederal links, if a 
start is not made on integrating the means of 
defence. Some independent integrated defence 
capability is, moreover, the firmest guarantee for 
a clearly distinguished political entity. 
(ii) Faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance 
28. What is also mandatory is that the imple-
mentation of the joint defence system for nine-
power Europe cannot weaken the Atlantic 
Alliance but should strengthen it. 
29. Is it necessary to recall the solemn declara-
tion in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 in which the 
nine governments affirmed that there was no 
alternative to the security afforded by the nuclear 
armament of the United States and the presence 
of American troops on our continent ? As far as 
is known, none of the members of WEU expres-
sed reservations in endorsing the Ottawa declara-
tion. 
30. In preparing to integrate their means of 
defence, the Nine must clearly confirm that they 
remain faithful to the Alliance, particuJarly since 
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this will afford them protection from disagree-
able surprises during the process of progressive 
integration. 
31. Should it eventually be possible to achieve 
the military integration of the Nine, it will be 
just as essential to maintain the Alliance for 
obvious geographic and military reasons. The 
fact is that the area covered by the Nine is 
lacking in depth, is too drawn out geographically 
and, above all, there is such an enormous differ-
ence between the Franco-British nuclear arsenal 
and that of the USSR that the United States 
nuclear guarantee will still be essential. 
32. It has been said that joint European defence 
might disturb the Soviet Union and thus 
endanger the policy of detente. It is clear that 
the Soviet Union has always frowned upon any 
form of European unification, even the Common 
Market. But in all honesty it cannot feel 
threatened by a political and military change 
which, although strengthening the defensive cohe-
sion of the Alliance, changes practically nothing 
in the ratio of forces. 
33. Incidentally, it should be underlined that 
the EEC Commission in its report of 25th June 
1975 sees defence as a potential competence of 
the European union, while affirming that this 
defence must be placed in the Atlantic frame-
work. 
(iii) A first firm step 
34. Over and above the studies and discussion 
which will arise, some definite progress must be 
made without delay. This calls to mind the views 
expressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs - inter alia in the WEU Assembly on 
5th December 1974 and 28th May 1975 - on 
a joint armaments and materiel policy. This 
would be a small but essential step. A European 
defence system will be possible only insofar as 
Europe has an independent arms and materiel 
production capability. This implies first a joint 
approach and second a reshaping of the arma-
ments industries which moreover would improve 
the chances where trade with the United States 
and Canada is concerned. 
35. At a future European Council meeting, it is 
therefore important to work out a truly Euro-
pean defence concept which takes account of the 
requirements of the Atlantic Alliance. 
(iv) The deterrent 
36. A European union fully competent in defence 
matters cannot exclude the possibility of having 
its own strategic and tactical nuclear arms, at 
least in the long run. Public opinion's aversion 
to this weapon of destruction in our different 
countries is acknowledged. But today there can 
be no effective defence without the deterrent and 
the European union would be a third class poli-
tical force if it excluded for ever the possibility 
of ensuring its own defence by nuclear means. 
37. Countries such as France and the United 
Kingdom (whose political and economic power 
cannot be compared with that of the United 
States and the USSR) provided themselves with 
independent nuclear means because they con-
sidered they could not lower their guard in the 
absence of an effective world-wide organisation 
which could ban or limit nuclear weapons. A 
political confederation which included these two 
countries and which inherited French and 
British nuclear weapons would automatically 
become a nuclear power. It is inconceivable for 
these two countries to agree to join a European 
political union which eliminated the deterrent. 
On the other hand, it is equally inconceivable for 
the nuclear arms the European union would 
inherit to remain exclusively under French and 
British command, at least in the final stage of 
the union. After a period of transition, the 
French and British deterrents should therefore 
take their place in a European defence system 
capable of defining its own strategy. To those who 
morally might not be able to subscribe to this the 
following question might be put : what distinction 
is there between nuclear defence ensured by the 
United States and European nuclear defence, 
other than a thin coating of hypocrisy Y The 
only valid argument is the high cost of nuclear 
means, but it is evident that, as with French or 
British nuclear defence systems, the European 
union's strategy would never go further than 
what is strictly necessary to deter a possible 
enemy. 
38. For the time being and as long as the United 
States is firmly committed in the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance to applying a joint 
strategy which meets in full the defence require-
ments of Western Europe, the organisation of a 
European strike force is not an immediate 
necessity. But now is the time to prepare for the 
future particularly if it were to transpire that 
NATO could not indefinitely remain Western 
Europe's only resort for its security. 
IV. WEU's rate in the interim period 
39. As the formation of a European union will 
certainly be a long drawn out task, it will be 
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necessary to preserve what now exists in the field 
of defence and political co-operation and also 
to make WEU's mission converge with that of 
the future European union in which WEU will 
eventually be absorbed. 
(i) Preserving what exists 
40. It should be recalled that the Brussels Treaty 
is a treaty of alliance with wide-ranging com-
mitments, which, if diluted, would have most 
serious repercussions on the security of Europe. 
Conversely, there are certain discriminatory 
aspects to this treaty which cause the govern-
ments of several member countries to accept it 
only with reluctance. This is the case for 
Germany, because of the bans imposed on it, the 
United Kingdom, because of the commitment to 
maintain a large force on the continent of 
Europe, and the other countries of continental 
Europe which have to submit to verification of 
their forces as a whole. 
41. However this may be, in the end all the 
members of WEU are affected by these discrimin-
atory clauses which consequently are not really 
discriminatory but are rather concessions from 
which each country draws some advantage. To 
renounce the treaty or even its discriminatory 
clauses- which would mean calling in question 
the work of the treaty as a whole- would put 
an end to the only instrument which exists for 
preparing the European union in the field of 
defence and foreign policy. 
42. However, the application of the treaty is 
proving to be hardly satisfactory at the moment 
because the Council is no longer meeting at 
ministerial level and, whatever it may claim, the 
Council at ambassadorial level is taking absolutely 
no initiative, even in WEU's own specific field. 
Thus, in reply to Written Questions 158 and 159, 
the WEU Council said that these questions : 
"relate to recent developments in the United 
States' nuclear strategy and their conse-
quences for NATO defence planning. The 
Council are not in a position to appraise 
these matters." 
43. Such a position is contrary to all the 
Council's commitments to the Assembly and, 
because of its implications, helps to weaken the 
prospects of European union in the form 
envisaged by the Commission of the Communities. 
It should further be recalled that the WEU 
Council was itself set up under the Brussels 
Treaty and to allow it to become dormant would 
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be making the treaty dormant, which would be 
tantamount to abandoning one of the essential 
foundations of European union. 
44. Some ground has also been gained bilaterally 
and this must be preserved and extended insofar 
as possible. Most characteristic of this is possibly 
the Franco-German treaty with the compulsory 
and detailed consultations it has introduced. 
Although this treaty may not have produced 
identity of views between France and Germany 
on many essential matters, it has at least allowed 
these two countries to hold regular detailed 
consultations on all the matters which interest 
them, and particularly those affecting foreign 
policy and defence. This could serve as a model 
ior the future European union. 
(ii) Preparing the European union 
45. WED can also offer a number of instru-
ments for preparing this union, the first being 
the Standing Armaments Committee, referring 
to which the Council recalled, in reply to Recom-
mendation 266, that 
"the Council are at present discussing the 
possibility that Western European Union 
might undertake additional work connected 
with the_ standardisation of armaments in 
Europe." 
46. This reply, to which the seven member 
governments subscribed, seems to meet the con-
cerns expressed by the EEC Commission in 
paragraph 81 of its report : 
"Another major step forward would be the 
development of a common policy on arms and· 
equipment, possibly involving the setting up 
of a "European Arms Agency", which would 
bring about a more rational use of available 
funcls and the industrial and technological 
potential of the member States. Experience 
has shown that the lack of a common policy 
in this field has meant that a number of 
industries are excessively dependent on 
sources outside the Community. 
This situation not only adversely affects the 
production of military equipment, and hence 
Europe's scope for independence, but also 
certain non-military industries." 
4 7. Because of the responsibilities entrusted to 
it under the modified Brussels Treaty, and inso-
far as the activities of both the Agency and the 
Standing Armaments Committee are closely 
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supervised by the WED Council, the latter con-
tinues to have an important role to play in 
preparing for a European union which would 
include these activities and it should be recalled, 
as the Assembly has done on many occasions, that 
WEU is not a closed shop but meets the wish 
of the EEC Commission as expressed in para-
graph 10 of its report which recalls that the 
European union must : 
"be open to the accession of other European 
countrit>s which have a democratic pluralist 
political system and are able to assume the 
burdens and respon~ibilities that go with 
membership of the union. It seems reason-
able that the conditions for the accession of 
such countries should be similar in character 
to those set out in the present treaties, one of 
which is the unanimous agreement of the 
member States." 
48. One of the main roles of the WED Council 
would also be to meet the view contained in 
paragraph 18 of the report of the Commission 
that member States : 
"would clearly be bound, once the union was 
established, to refrain from any action which 
in the long term could jeopardise the union's 
exercise of its competence." 
49. Regarding procedure, the Council, in its own 
particular field and during the interim period in 
which this task would be entrusted to it, might 
play the role which the Commission assigns to 
the institutions of the union which (paragraph 
73) 
"will have the task of preparing and imple-
menting joint positions and actions." 
This would correspond to a proposal which has 
already been made on many occasions by the 
WEU Assembly but which the Council has never 
taken into account. 
50. Finally, by virtue of the amended Brussels 
Treaty, the WEU Assembly still has respons-
ibilities pursuant to the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, i.e. the activities of the Council, the 
Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee. 
If it is desirable for these duties to be transferred 
one day to a true European parliament, it is 
essential for the WED Assembly to continue to 
exercise its duties as long as the parliament of 
the European union has not been officially 
entrusted with the responsibilities incumbent 
upon the WEU Assembly by virtue of the 
Brussels Treaty. 
(iff) The WEU Assembly's duty 
51. Insofar as it is considered, as set out 
explicitly by the EEC Commission in paragraph 
2 of its report, that WEU is the present expres-
sion of Europe in foreign policy and defence 
matters, the policy pursued by the governments 
in the framework of the WEU Council must 
correspond to that defined by the Commission 
for the future European Community. In the 
twenty years of its existence, the Council has 
seen the exercise of its cultural and social activ-
ities handed over to the Council of Europe and 
political consultations and the co-ordination of 
member States' policies in the United Nations 
and specialised world agencies transferred to 
nine-power consultations. This was probably very 
reasonable. But at a time when the joint activ-
ities of the Nine are to be reviewed, the Council 
should at least keep in close touch with the EEC 
bodies exercising responsibilities falling within 
its purview. 
52. Several times the Assembly has recom-
mended that the WEU Council, pending a true 
nine-power political union, should take over the 
political and defence aspects of Europe and open 
its doors to the Common Market countries which 
are not members of WEU. 
53. Since the European Council, as the result of 
several decisions reached at summit meetings, is 
in the process of becoming the nucleus of the 
European union, WEU's main ambition should 
be to play its full role in the interim period 
until the treaty of the union is ratified and its 
institutions established. The achievement of the 
union will moreover be facilitated by regular 
discussions on defence problems in a purely 
European framework as recalled in the resolution 
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 11th 
September 1975. 
54. The WEU Assembly cannot give up its com-
pelling commitment to impress upon the Council, 
which is too often indifferent, the need to make 
full use of the possibilities afforded by the 
Brussels Treaty with an eye to the future Euro-
pean union. 
V. Evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
(f) The threshold of a third stage ? 
55. The first twenty-six years of the Atlantic 
Alliance may be roughly divided into two stages : 
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(a) from the beginning until December 1967, 
when the West's defence system was 
being set up against the military giant 
in the East for, as Mr. Spaak said, "we 
were afraid". During the first fifteen 
years, NATO made this fear recede and 
even disappear ; 
(b) from December 1967 until the Helsinki 
conference in July 1975, following the 
Harmel report on the future tasks of the 
Alliance, a policy of detente replaced 
the cold war. 
56. The main question now is : will the CSCE 
introduce a third stage, that of entente in the 
part of the world which includes Alaska and 
Vladivostok, since, because of the Helsinki agree-
ments, security and co-operation in Europe 
include the whole northern area of the globe ? 
57. If this is so, Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals might gradually break away from the 
fixed role in which it provides two banks, each 
of which is used as a military base by one of 
the two superpowers. 
58. The stage of the two blocs must be left 
still further behind. Even if the division of the 
old continent into two well-defined areas - East 
and West - continues, the military alliances of 
both sides will probably be affected, particularly 
if the MBFR talks are successful and SALT II, 
which may be considered as the cornerstone of 
detente, avoids the vague and general provisions 
of SALT I in 1972. 
59. How will the Atlantic Alliance evolve during 
this third stage ? The form proposed by Presi-
dent Kennedy in 1971, i.e. an Alliance based on 
two pillars, one on each side of the Atlantic, has 
not been achieved. The Alliance is still under the 
hegemony of the United States but responsibility 
for this also rests with the Western Europeans 
who, in a quarter of a century, have been unable 
to agree on a form of political unification or on 
a joint defence concept. 
60. In recent years, there have been vast changes 
in the international situ.ation, mainly through the 
development of relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The two great 
powers first sought shelter from nuclear war, on 
the one hand by technical negotiations on the use 
of nuclear weapons and on the other by intensify-
ing consultations on all world problems. Follow-
ing the agreement reached in the framework of 
the CSCE, the SALT negotiations might lead to 
a second agreement, whereas the MBFR talks 
have resumed after a long period of marking time. 
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61. There has been a sharp drop in East-West 
tension, in which the Atlantic Alliance was born, 
and the emergence of a spirit of detente has 
transformed the nature of relations between the 
members of NATO and has roused a section of 
public opinion against the military paternalism 
of the United States. 
62. Moreover, there have been a number of 
internal problems in the Atlantic Alliance. 
France's withdrawal from the integrated military 
structure is no longer so serious as it was a few 
years ago since relations between France and its 
partners in defence matters have been organised 
on a new ba..~is. However, the development of 
French nuclear weapons - particularly tactical 
weapons - has aroused new problems between 
France and its neighbours. 
63. The yet uncertain direction of developments 
in Portugal raises serious problems for the 
Alliance as a whole, for the Azores constitute a 
bridge between the United States and Europe. 
64. In summer 197 4, there was a serious crisis 
in relations between Greece and Turkey which is 
still far from a solution and which considerably 
weakened the Alliance's defence capabilities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
65. Finally, the bilateral agreements between the 
United States and Spain also concern the Euro-
pean members of the Alliance. 
66. It is manifest from these various factors that 
the Atlantic Alliance depends more than ever on 
the United States now that United States security 
seems to depend less on the Alliance than on 
its direct relations with the Soviet Union. 
Admittedly, Europe is still an essential part of 
American defence policy, as President Ford 
confirmed in Brussels earlier this year, but it 
tends to take second place to direct relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
(ii) A strategy which meets Europe's requirements 
67. The initial doctrine on which Western 
Europe's defence was based was that of massive 
retaliation, which meant that the United States 
would intervene with its full strategic nuclear 
force against any power invading Western 
Europe. But as Soviet nuclear strength developed, 
Europeans and Americans began to wonder 
whether it was conceivable for the United States 
to run the risk of a nuclear exchange which 
would destroy its own territory for the sole 
purpose of defending its allies, however important 
58 
it might consider the civilisation or economic 
and commercial strength of Europe. 
68. NATO thus had to make a major effort in 
the sixties to build up sufficient conventional 
forces to meet a pos.~ible attack without neces-
sarily leading to a nuclear exchange and 
American forces in Europe were armed with 
tactical nuclear weapons intended to raise a 
second screen in front of the strategic deterrent 
of the United States. A number of these weapons 
were subsequently made available to the armed 
forces of several NATO member countries under 
a two-key system which made those concerned 
€Ven more dependent on the strategy defined in 
Washington. 
69. The aim of this new strategy of flexible 
response was to allow the Americans, on the 
territory of mainland Europe and with the 
assistance of their European allies, to meet any 
attack and at the same time still retain the 
possibility of negotiating in order to avoid 
recourse to strategie nuclear weapons which 
might result in mass destruction on their own 
territory. However rational from the American 
point of view, a serious drawback of this strategy 
is that it might make Europe a battlefield in 
which conventional weapons might be used - in 
themselves capable of wreaking considerable 
havoc - or so-called tactical nuclear weapons 
which even so would be capable of completely 
destroying the densely-populated territory of 
Western Europe. 
70. This strategy, implying the possibility of war 
being waged on European territory, was 
distasteful to the European nations but, lacking 
adequate strength of their own, they had to bow 
to the strategic wishes of the United States for 
fear lest the Americans should abandon Europe. 
71. Everything indicates that, as matters now 
stand, for lack of a union Europe will have to 
accept this situation. American opinion, keenly 
aware of the importance which Western Europe 
attaches to the presence of American forces on its 
territory as a guarantee of American deterrence, 
is exerting growing pressure on the United States 
Government to use the threat of withdrawing 
its forces in order to induce Europeans to 
adapt their own forces to the requirements of 
American strategy. Moreover, the European 
countries have progressively relaxed their defence 
effort as "fear" receded, whilst at the same time 
relying on the strength of the United States. 
72. Since European forces are deployed in a 
NATO framework to implement a strategy about 
which European public opinion knows very little 
and likes even less, the governments are 
experiencing growing difficulty in making the 
conventional military effort NATO demands. The 
share of the gross national product which most 
Western European countries earmark for defence 
is constantly shrinking and many governments 
are ·criticised for their defence efforts by some 
sections of public opinion. They are accused of 
jeopardising what is considered more rational 
and urgent action to meet the economic crisis. 
Furthermore, in recent years there have been 
signs of demoralisation in the armies of several 
European countries and servicemen are now no 
longer certain that the defence system of which 
they are a part really serves the security of their 
countries, with the result that they lack con-
fidence in themselves and in the possibility of 
collective defence. 
73. The only strategy to suit Europe is one 
based on massive retaliation. This does not mean 
that Europe need not have conventional forces 
or even tactical nuclear forces. It would be 
unthinkable for Europe to have to resort to 
strategic nuclear weapons in order to meet a 
minor or limited attack. In that event it would 
be practically powerless in face of such an attack 
and thus incapable of deterring it. But Europe 
cannot lose sight of the essential principle that 
the aim of European strategy must be to deter 
a possible aggressor. It is therefore important to 
restrict the means available to what is absolutely 
essential for meeting a minor attack so that the 
deterrent, i.e. the strategic nuclear force, comes 
into play at the very start of an international 
crisis and precludes the possibility of recourse 
to conventional war or tactical nuclear weapons. 
74. Since it is impossible for Western Europe 
to make such views prevail with the United 
States, the only solution at this stage is to 
maintain NATO as the shield for our security 
and freedom and invite the Americans to prepare 
with us a strategy which meets Europe's vital 
requirements. The chances of this will be enhanced 
if European co-operation is developed in all 
aspects of defence until such time as an effective, 
truly European defence system eventually takes 
over from American military hegemony in 
Western Europe. 
VI. Discussion in Committee 
75. There was a lively and detailed discussion 
on this report at the meeting of the General 
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Affairs Committee in Copenhagen on 23rd Octo-
ber 1975. It was finally adopted by only 9 votes 
to 0 with 8 abstentions. The abstentions were 
directed not so much towards the text of the 
recommendation but stemmed rather from serious 
reservations on the part of certain Committee 
members on several trends followed by your Rap-
porteur. However, not all the reservations were 
of the same nature, nor did they all relate to 
the same points. They must therefore be clas-
sified, account being taken of their impact com-
pared with the report as a whole. 
76. (i) One Committee member considered the 
report to be too biased in favour of the United 
States. Feeling that alliance with the United 
States is still essential for European security, 
he feared that in such an alliance Europe might 
have difficulty in choosing the course to be fol-
lowed in economic and social terms. He also 
thought that the presence of American forces 
was not essential for European security. 
77. (ii) Other Committee members, on the con-
trary, expressed the fear that your Rapporteur 
was underestimating the magnitude of the Soviet 
threat and exaggerating the importance of the 
results of the Helsinki conference. This view 
was qualified by some members who drew a 
distinction between the Soviets' unrelenting 
political aggressiveness and their military aggres-
siveness which appeared to be slackening off to 
some extent, at least in Europe. 
78. (iii) Some members feared that progress 
towards European union might serve to separate 
Europe from the American guarantee: their 
view was that to extend purely European co-
operation to defence matters would eventually 
weaken NATO. For them, American paternalism 
was not the danger but rather nascent isolation-
ism in the United States. 
79. (iv) Several Committee members expressed 
the wish that the European union should keep 
away from nuclear matters which they con-
sidered should remain the prerogative of the 
superpowers. However, none of them specified 
what should become of French and British 
nuclear weapons in the event of a European 
union being formed in the field of defence. 
80. (v) Other members joined the latter in 
rejecting the concept of massive retaliation, 
preferring the strategy of flexible response, i.e. 
they were satisfied with present American 
thinking. 
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81. (vi) Some members found the Rapporteur 
had not taken due account of the new possibil-
ities open to nuclear weapons since the sea now 
afforded nuclear forces a second strike capability 
which enhanced the deterrent effect of such 
forces. Your Rapporteur is quite prepared to 
accept this criticism, although he does not feel 
it has any great effect on his line of thought. 
82. (vii) Your Rapporteur was criticised for 
using the word hegemony in defining the special 
position of the United States in the Alliance. 
Your Rapporteur attaches no derogatory mean-
ing to this word, which he considers perfectly 
appropriate to the present situation in the 
Alliance. There is no denying that the United 
States plays a primordial role, demonstrated by 
the fact that it is responsible for appointing 
the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces. 
Is this not the very role which, since the days of 
ancient Greece, gives a very precise meaning to 
the word hegemony ? 
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83. (viii) Some Committee members considered 
that political union was not at all a preliminary 
to joint European defence but could only be 
the result. Others felt a debate on European 
defence was not expedient at this stage. 
84. (ix) One Committee member underlined that 
any progress towards European union required 
prior strengthening of the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament and its election by universal 
suffrage. 
85. (x) Another Committee member was anxious 
to avoid any conclusion which sought to streng-
then WEU. 
86. Since your Rapporteur has set out his own 
ideas on these various points in earlier chapters, 
in what he hopes are measured but unambiguous 
terms, he feels there is no call to enter into 
further controversy here and trusts he has 
managed to sum up in a generally-acceptable 
manner the views put to him in Committee. 
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APPENDIX 
MBFR negotiations tn Vienna 
The negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) (covering the terri-
tories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg) began in Vienna on 30th October 
1973. The participants are all seven of the 
Warsaw Pact States and twelve of the fifteen 
NATO nations (France, Iceland, Portugal are 
not negotiating). The allied negotiators in 
Vienna are bound, on questions of policy and 
strategy, by guidance elaborated in the NATO 
Council. 
The main elements of the western position 
are: 
1. The overall result of MBFR should be a 
common ceiling on ground force manpower of 
both sides in the area of reductions of approxi-
mately 700,000 men on each side, in order to 
correct the existing disparity in ground force 
manpower between the two sides in the area 
(ca. 925,000 WP men to NATO's approximately 
777,000; 15,500 WP main battle tanks in active 
units to NATO's 6,000). 
2. There should be no separate national ceil-
ings on individual States since this would 
inhibit force rearrangement within the area of 
reductions and give the WP a droit de regard 
over NATO's internal affairs. 
3. The common ceiling should be reached in 
two phases ; in the first phase only United 
States and Soviet forces would be withdrawn 
(a Soviet tank army of five divisions including 
some 68,000 soldiers and 1,700 main battle tanks 
as well as 29,000 United States soldiers) ; in the 
second phase the forces of the remaining direct 
participants (nations with territory or troops in 
the area of reductions) would be addressed. 
The principal elements of the eastern posi-
tion are: 
1. The "existing correlation of forces" (i.e. 
existing imbalance in WP favour) is to be main-
tained; the two sides would reduce first by equal 
amounts and then by equal percentages: specif-
ically, in 1975 the direct participants would 
make a "symbolic" reduction of 20,000 men on 
each side followed in 1976 by a 5 % reduction 
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on each side and in 1977 by a 10 % reduction 
on each side (the East thus opposes the common 
ceiling ; it is interested in imposing national 
ceilings on forces of allied direct participants, 
particularly the Federal Republic of Germany). 
2. Air and nuclear forces should be included 
in the reductions (both sides agree that naval 
and amphibious forces should not be included). 
3. The two sides should negotiate the reduc-
tion of forces of all direct participants simulta-
neously from the outset (the East rejects the two-
phase concept and is especially interested in 
early reductions in the Bundeswehr). 
In almost two years of hard negotiating, 
there has been no fundamental change in the 
position of either side. The East has advanced 
some procedural, non-substantive rearrangements 
of its basic proposal. In addition, the East at 
one point proposed that all forces in the area 
be frozen prior to reductions. NATO rejected 
this since it would have frozen the very dispar-
ities which the Alliance is attempting to elimi-
nate in these negotiations ; also, thus far, the WP 
has refused to engage in a data exchange, with-
out which a freeze would be highly illusory. For 
its part, NATO has proposed that there be 
separate freezes on the ground and air man-
power of each side between phases to prevent 
possible circumvention. The East has not made 
a definitive response to this proposal. 
The negotiations, which are now in recess, 
are scheduled to resume in Vienna on 26th Sep-
tember. There has been much speculation in the 
press that the Alliance is considering an offer 
to introduce nuclear elements into the negotia-
tions this autumn. There have even been press 
reports in the past few days that the Alliance 
has in fact decided on such an offer. These 
particular reports are speculative and erroneous. 
The allies are continually reviewing the pros-
pects for progress in the MBFR negotiations. 
In this context, several possibilities have been 
examined and remain under consideration. 
However, no decisions of any kind have been 
taken with respect to the possible introduction 
of new proposals in the coming round of nego-
tiations. 
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Amendment No. 1 
1st December 1975 
Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance 
- consideration of current problems 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Van Hoeylandt on behalf of the Socialist Group 
At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the words : "but excluding 
nuclear forces ;". 
Signed : Van H oeylandt 
1. See 9th Sitting, 2nd December 1975 (Amendment negatived). 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr • .O.lorme, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. This report covers the period May to 
November 1975. The texts of interventions in the 
parliaments of member countries communicated 
to the Committee secretariat are given in Col-
lected Texts 22. 
2. In accordance with Rule 42bis of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, the Committee 
met in Bonn on 29th May 1975, at the close of 
the Assembly's session, to select the texts adopted 
by the Assembly which it considered should be 
debated in the parliaments. It selected recom-
mendatio:ns : 
- 266 on the political activities of the 
Council; 
- 269 on the state of European security ; 
- 270 on European union and WEU ; 
- 272 on the European aeronautical indus-
try and civil aviation. 
3. These four recommendations were transmit-
ted officially to the Presidents of the parlia-
ments of member countries. The Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments is drawing the atten-
tion of the seven parliaments to the texts which 
it considers likely to arouse their interest and be 
discussed. 
4. It regrets that for some time now the texts 
it has selected for transmission to parliaments 
have not received the attention they deserve. All 
the texts adopted are now issued in the booklet 
entitled texts adopted for transmission to 
national parliaments. The Committee considers 
this title should be changed to: "Texts adopted 
and brief account of the session". 
5. Above all, it wishes the texts it selects to be 
discussed more often and with greater conviction. 
I. Reports on the activities of WEU 
submitted to the parliaments of 
member countries 
6. In its previous report, your Rapporteur 
mentioned the reports prepared in the German, 
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Netherlands and French parliaments. The Com-
mittee secretariat has now received a document 
from the German Delegation reporting to the 
Bundestag on the Assembly's session held in 
December 197 4 and giving at appendix the text 
of Recommendation 257 in German (Bundestag 
document 7/3338), the half-yearly report by the 
Federal Government to the Bundestag on the 
activities of WEU during the period October 
1974 to March 1975 (Bundestag document 
7/3707), the report by the French Delegation on 
the activities of the WEU Assembly in 1974-75 
(National Assembly document 1724 and Senate 
document 255) and the report by the Italian 
Delegation on the activities of the WEU Assem-
bly in 1974, submitted to the Italian Senate by 
the Committee for European Community Affairs 
(Senate document XIX, 2, 2bis, 3 and 3bis A). 
7. The Committee expresses its gratitude to the 
delegations which have concurred with the wishes 
expressed in Order 44 and asks the other dele-
gations also to prepare information reports for 
their parliaments on the activities of the WEU 
Assembly. It invites all the delegations to follow 
the example of the German Delegation and 
include at appendix to the report in their own 
languages the text of recommendations transmit-
ted to parliaments after selection by the Com-
mittee. 
8. Finally, a new initiative is to be noted in 
the Italian Senate : the report by Senator Ariosto 
on the activities and problems of the EEC and 
the verbatim report of the debate in the Senate 
were published together in a convenient-sized 
book entitled Europa, ultima speranza. This idea 
could easily be followed by other member parlia-
ments to show the electorate what parliaments 
are doing for the unification of Europe. 
D. Action taken on texts adopted 
9. Despite the parliamentary recess, your Rap-
porteur has noted a total of twenty interventions 
between 1st June and 1st October. Several sug-
gestions were made in the previous reports 
(Documents 653 and 665) and the Committee 
would be happy if delegations were to imple· 
ment them. 
Recommendations 263, 264, 268, 269 and 270 
10. Senator Bonaldi put written questions on 
these five texts to the appropriate Ministers on 
24th June 1975 1, but has not yet received a 
reply. 
Recommendation 272 
11. On 11th June 1975 2, Mr. Valleix put an oral 
question in the French National Assembly on the 
possibility of creating a European aviation 
agency. Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister, replied, 
outlining French policy in the aeronautical field 
and indicating the studies soon to be started in 
liaison with European airlines. 
12. A few days later, on 27th June, in a speech 
in the debate on foreign policy, Mr. Valleix again 
proposed the question of creating a European 
aviation agency 3• Mr. Sauvagnargues, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, informed him that a 
working party would be set up in his Ministry to 
study the merger of European airlines. 
Other interventions 
13. In the general policy debate in the French 
Senate on lOth June 1975, Senator Legaret made 
a lengthy reference to WEU, and Mr. Chirac, 
Prime Minister, replied during the same debate 4 • 
The Committee welcomes this important state-
ment, the first in the French Senate for ten 
years. It hopes that French senators will take 
a continuing interest in the work of the WEU 
Assembly. 
14. In the National Assembly, Mr. Krieg 3 , 
rather dissatisfied with the reply by the WEU 
Council of Ministers to his written question, 
turned to the French Government. He is still 
awaiting a reply from the Minister concerned. 
15. Finally, the British Delegation tabled a 
motion in the House of Commons congratulating 
the WEU Assembly on its twentieth anniver-
sary s. 
'* 
'** 
1. See Collected Texts 22, page 11. 
2. See Collected Texts 22, page 7. 
3. See Collected Texts 22, pages 8-9. 
4. See Collected Texts 22, pages 2-7. 
5. See Collected Texts 22, page 9. 
6. See Collected Texts 22, page 12. 
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16. In the previous report (Document 665), your 
Rapporteur mentioned that after the adoption 
of Mr. Small's report, several· members of the 
WEU Assembly put questions on the position of 
ratification of the various conventions on third-
party liability in the field of nuclear energy 
signed in 1960 and 1963. Although, in reply to 
a written question put by Mr. Portheine, Mr. 
Cornelissen, Mr. van Ooijen and Mr. Waltmans, 
the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. den Uijl, 
said on lOth January 1975 that bills would be 
tabled shortly, to date (15th October 1975) the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has not 
received the text of any such bill. 
17. On the other hand, Mr. Minnocci, who put 
a question to the Italian Government on 
28th January 1975, has not received a reply but 
his government ratified the 1960 Convention on 
17th September 1975. 
18. The Paris Convention of 1960, which came 
into force in 1968, has now been ratified by 
twelve countries, including the following mem-
bers of WEU : Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. The Brussels Convention of 31st Janu-
ary 1963, which came into force on 4th Decem-
ber 197 4, has been ratified by seven countries, 
including France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom. 
19. It would be useful for members from the 
countries not mentioned as having ratified these 
conventions to put further questions. 
.. . 
20. At the meeting on 27th October 1975, mem-
bers of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments decided to put similar questions in all par-
liaments of member countries on Resolution 55 
on European union and the defence of Europe, 
insisting that replies be given before the WEU 
Assembly's next session in December 1975. 
m. Activities of the Committee 
21. On 27th and 28th October 1975, the Com-
mittee visited the Netherlands Parliament and 
the Interparliamentary Consultative Council of 
Benelux, formed as a result of the economic 
union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg, which, in addition to economic matters, 
discusses matters concerning foreign policy, cui-
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tural affairs and the unification of law in the 
three countries 1• Finally, the Committee heard 
an address on the decentralisation of administra-
tion in the Netherlands 2• 
IV. The Assembly's session in Bonn and 
its impact on the German public 
(a) Preparatory work 
22. On 2nd April, German and foreign 
journalists in Bonn, and many other represen-
tatives of the press, were sent a printed five-
page letter by the Press Counsellor of the WEU 
Assembly describing WEU, the main items on 
the agenda and the draft order of business ; on 
15th May, they were sent a follow-up letter and 
a number of documents; finally, just before the 
session, they were sent the German version of an 
information booklet prepared by the Press 
Counsellor to which the press appears to have 
responded particularly favourably since it knew 
little about WEU. 
23. Prior to the session, the Press Counsellor 
met, in addition to journalists having requested 
an appointment, key members of the German 
press : the DP A press agency and diplomatic 
editors from the three main newspapers, the 
three television channels and the radio. 
24. The press conference on Friday, 23rd May, 
certainly had a favourable psychological impact : 
more than sixty journalists were present for the 
whole forty minutes, on which occasion informa-
tion material was handed out. 
25. Your Rapporteur feels that the standard of 
the information made available at the right time 
impressed the German press and the press con-
ference made it realise that the WEU Assembly 
leads an active existence. 
(b) The resulta 
26. A hundred and thirty journalists applied for 
press cards and regularly came to fetch docu-
1. See also Document 600, Proceedings, June 1973, 
Volume I, pages 99 and 103. 
2. See Appendix III (b). 
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ments. The week before the session, the German 
press hailed it with sometimes heavy comments 
about the uselessness of WEU whose treaty 
discriminates against Germany. From the begin-
ning to the end of the session, the reactions of 
the German press developed in a most interest-
ing manner. Hostile indifference tinged with 
sarcasm gradually gave way to curiosity, tribute 
subsequently being paid to the Assembly by 
important observers (Die W eZt, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung). At the end of the se~ion, 
the Assembly's contribution was considered to be 
constructive and distinct from the work of the 
Council of Europe and the European Parlia-
ment. Some observers went so far as to wonder 
whether WEU (at ministerial level) might not, 
after all - if the French insisted - be useful 
in starting to organise European defence. 
27. As for the reactions of radio and television, 
many sources have indicated that there were 
widespread reports and comments on the session. 
For at least two evenings, the session was the 
first item on the radio news. The week before 
the session, the Deutscklandfunk broadcast a 
quarter-hour documentary on WEU and the 
Westdeutscker Rundfunk had a seven-minute 
programme on the Bonn session. 
(c) The political impact of the session 
28. Insofar as the purpose of holding a session 
in Bonn was to make the Assembly known in 
Germany, and thus demonstrate the positive 
aspects of the institution in serving Europe, this 
objective has been achieved. 
29. The WEU Assembly has shown the German 
people that it serves a specific purpose without 
duplicating the work of the European Parliament 
or the Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
30. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments suggests to the Assembly and its Presi-
dential Committee that every two years a session 
be held away from the permanent seat of the 
Assembly. 
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Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
t> 
;::l 
Recommendations "§» ~ ~ adopted in ~ Q) g. a ~ "' >. 0 
"6b ~ ~ s <a ] Q) Q3 i~ ..., o:S t-t ~ z 
r;:.. 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 2 13 2 7 0 2 
Total 53 136 170 225 13 75 
Annual average 2.65 6.8 8.5 11.25 0.65 3.75 
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t 
~ Total 
't1 
~ p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
1 27 
187 859 
9.35 6.14 
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APPENDIX II 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1973 
d 
.s"' 
~ 8 
.9 ..1:1 
i .g~ ~ i i ~.~ ·I ]~ l & ~~ ! 3 0 ~ ] .sl l~ l~ ] 0 l al 1-1 ~ E-i 3i !'l.l ~ C) ~l:lo CD ~ f'r.l p 
233 -
234 -
235 1 1 
June 236 1 1 4 
1973 237 1 1 
238 X 1 1 
Res. 52 X -
239 2 2 
240 -
Nov. 241 X 2 2 
1973 242 -243 - 9 
244 -
245 X 2 2 
Other action 2 1 3 
246 1 1 
247 2 2 
248 X 2 2 
249 -
June 250 - 15 
1974 251 1 1 
252 2 2 
253 2 2 
254 2 2 
255 X 1 2 3 
256 -
Dec. 257 X 1 1 
1974 258 2 2 4 
259 -
Other action 1 1 
260 -
261 -
262 2 1 2 5 
263 1 1 
264 1 1 
June 265 -
1975 266 X - 27 267 -
268 1 1 
269 X 1 1 
270 X 1 1 
271 -
272 X 2 2 
I 
Other action 2 10 2 1 15 
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APPENDIX III 
(a) Visits to parliaments by the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-1st November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd May 1973 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Heller (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
15th-18th October 1973 Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th October 1975 
Palerme (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
(b) Address by Mr. de Menthon Bake on the 
decentralisation of administration tn the Netherlands 
Like all countries, the Netherlands has its 
specialities. Its tulip fields and silverware are 
well known, but perhaps a less well-known 
speciality is the country's administration. The 
Netherlands, whose mayors are appointed by the 
Crown and who are therefore the leading citizens 
in their communes, often arouses astonishment 
and jealousy. Finally, the Netherlands commune 
itself is perhaps also a speciality of the country, 
since it is more independent than elsewhere and 
has equal powers whether it has 700 or 700,000 
inhabitants. 
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This is easily understood : well before the 
State was created, the communes already existed, 
as did the provinces, and they have only rarely 
and under duress relinquished their birthright. 
They are not often forced to do so : the 
independence of the communes and provinces is 
part of the Constitution, which does not perhaps 
carry tremendous weight juridically but it 
certainly does politically. 
In recent times, the commune as a 
decentralised territorial unit has experienced dif. 
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ficulties because of changes in various fields, and 
I am sure such changes have also occurred in 
your countries. 
Before going further into this matter, I must 
tell you that I attach great significance to the 
idea of territorial decentralisation. I consider it 
allows the territorial authorities fairly wide 
administrative liberty, the degree of which may 
vary from one case to another. 
Now let us turn to the changes. To start with, 
there is the fact that socio-economic development 
does not stop at the boundaries of the commune. 
Often established more than a century ago, these 
boundaries no longer correspond to social, econo-
mic or cultural units. If you take a bus from 
The Hague to Delft, you will not notice - and 
nor do the Dutch - that you are crossing the 
boundaries of the communes of Rijswijk and 
Voorburg. 
The commune has become dependent on its 
neighbour for reasons of administrative 
efficiency. From time to time, this prevents the 
necessary measures being taken and often also 
raises difficulties from a democratic point of 
view. For instance, in the sixties the Rotterdam 
municipal council had to take major decisions 
on the extension of the port area which were of 
fundamental importance for the wellbeing and 
life of the inhabitants of the surrounding com-
munes although the latter had absolutely no say 
in the matter. 
These stumbling-blocks in communal admin-
istration due to communal boundaries have 
further increased because of the changing 
dimension of the life of the nation. With the 
enormous development of movement and trans-
port and the prosperity which has allowed 
people to acquire the most modern means of 
transport, the area in which people live, work 
and relax has extended considerably. Living, 
working and recreational areas have also 
increased in size. 
There is a correlation here with another 
phenomenon : the marked increase in surface 
area needed for efficiently-operated and econo-
mically-justifiable projects, many of which, for 
instance a football ground or an educational 
guidance centre, require large investments, 
qualified staff and hence more "customers" -
more than can be drawn from the population of 
most Netherlands communes. But more and more 
people think they are entitled to ask for such 
insta.Uations. 
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Progressive urbanisation and a levelling-out 
of the difference between town and country and 
closer acquaintance with the living conditions of 
others foster such installations and this has led 
to increased centralisation. Many requirements 
have become so general that the central adminis-
tration is blamed and it feels responsible or at 
least jointly responsible for meeting these 
requirements. 
Centralisation may take several forms. There 
is the conventional form : for instance, in national 
legislation everything is arranged so that there 
is nothing left for the provinces and communes 
to do, or else their tasks are regulated in such 
detail that it is no longer possible to speak of 
freedom of decision. This might be called direct 
centralisation and can be seen by all. There is 
also a variation on this theme : theoretically, 
there is a margin for decision-taking, but super-
vision of implementation by State departments 
specially delegated for the purpose (inspections, 
for instance) is often so tight that in reality 
there is no room for manoeuvre. Here, centralisa-
tion is already more difficult to see. The legal 
system is not at fault but those responsible for 
applying it, and such shortcomings are very 
often more difficult to eliminate than legislative 
shortcomings. 
Then there is indirect centralisation in the 
form of the central administration financing 
projects. To make this clear, I must say a few 
words about the general way in which communes 
and provinces are financed. Communes and 
provinces in the Netherlands obtain most of their 
finances from subsidies from the central admin-
istration. Income from taxes is not negligible for 
the communes since they have been allowed to 
tax property, but such income is still relatively 
small. Subsidies may be general ( decentralised 
bodies being free to use them as they wish) or 
specific (for a definite project and often subject 
to very detailed conditions of implementation). 
But this is not the only way in which they 
hinder the freedom of communes. They are not 
subject to the consideration of priorities by the 
municipal council. However paradoxical it may 
seem, that is why they are often asked for by the 
local administration. It is not unpleasant, for 
instance, for the mayor's deputy responsible for 
cultural affairs not to have to fight with his 
colleagues each year for projects within his 
purview when the budget is drawn up. 
Both direct and indirect centralisation are 
based on what the smallest commune can do, or 
APPENDIX III 
rather on what it cannot do. Thus, the weakest 
link in the chain of communes determines the 
point at which the central administration may 
introduce centralisation. 
This phenomenon dates neither from today 
nor yesterday ; a solution to the problems it 
creates has been sought for tens of years. At 
the start it was thought - and some still think 
- that the solution had been found with the 
merger of communes, but this has not proved 
flexible enough and in large urban areas impos-
sible to apply logically. Too inflexible in that 
overnight all powers were transferred to the 
largest commune, even those which the smallest 
could easily have retained. In addition, in large 
urban areas around Rotterdam, The Hague and 
Amsterdam, for instance, territorial cohesion 
would have required the creation of such vast 
communes that their merger would have had to 
be followed immediately by intracommunal 
decentralisation. 
As criticism of the magic formula of merger 
became louder the idea arose that intercommunal 
administration was needed, enforced if necessary, 
and in 1950 the law on joint regulations was 
voted. But although some provisions have been 
applied at technical level resentment against this 
form of intercommunal co-operation became 
increasingly evident. 
Resentment was mainly on democratic 
grounds since the administration of the co-
operative bodies was usually entrusted to local 
government officers who do not meet in public. 
There was therefore no public and political 
supervuuon, although management of the 
purposes for which joint regulations were estab-
lished involved additional expenditure for the 
communes- they were nearly always responsible 
for deficits in relation to the number of 
inhabitants - without the municipal councils 
being able to make up for this expenditure in 
other ways. 
This situation gave rise to the idea of 
gewesten, administrative units which were larger 
than communes but smaller than provinces, which 
are not only responsible for one or more tasks, 
as provided for in the classical joint regulations, 
but have a number of tasks and powers. 
Many gewesten were formed on a voluntary 
basis : there are now more than fifty in the 
Netherlands. But only very few have powers 
other than consultative and the map of the coun-
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try shows many blank spaces where it has not 
been possible to form a gewest. 
To put and end to this rather confused 
situation and more quickly form strong gewesten, 
the De J ong government tabled a bill based on 
the former situation and the voluntary formation 
of gewesten but giving the central administra-
tion the power to impose their formation and to 
avoid the formation of gewesten with too few 
powers. 
The bill was not well received in the 
Chamber, which considered that: 
( i) the creation of strong gewesten was 
too dependent on the good will of the 
communes; 
( ii) there was insufficient guarantee that 
viable communes would be maintained ; 
(iii) from a financial point of view, gewesten 
were too closely linked with communes ; 
( iv) there was not sufficient guarantee of 
democracy in that there was no specific 
provision for the direct election of 
members of the gewest council ; 
( v) insufficient account had been taken of 
administrative problems as a whole, 
and particularly the question of pro-
gressive centralisation. 
Finally, the Chamber considered that the 
administrative structure would become too com-
plicated in view of the small area of the country 
if a fourth administrative level were added to 
those which already existed : State, province and 
commune. 
Before the Biesheuvel government had man-
aged to decide whether it would accept this 
dubious inheritance or not, it was replaced by the 
Den Uijl government, whose Minister of the 
Interior quickly prepared a new bill, the pre-
liminary text of which was published in July 
1975. 
This was truly a new bill : to avoid a fourth 
level, gewesten and provinces would be merged 
into new-style provinces. 
The communes would transfer some of their 
powers to the new-style provinces, while the 
latter would take over the intermediary tasks of 
the former provinces, such as planning, co-
ordination, supervision and appeals in respect 
of administrative disputes. 
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These are mainly measures of application 
which the communes themselves may find it dif-
ficult to carry out either because their surface 
area is insufficient (for instance, creation and 
management of a public health department) or 
because the tasks extend beyond the interests of 
a single commune (for instance, creation and 
operation of large ports and surrounding areas). 
To avoid the new-style provinces accomplish-
ing their tasks without reference to the popula-
tion (also in the most literal sense of the word), 
the preliminary text provides for a redivision of 
the territory of seven of the eleven provinces, 
making a total of twenty-six new provinces. 
These reduced-size provinces would never-
theless provide a basis compatible with direct and 
indirect centralisation for the simple reason that 
population differences would be considerably 
diminished, which would allow specific subsidies 
to be transformed into general subsidies. 
The preliminary text was not very specific 
about this decentralisation trend ; it is still at 
the stage of declarations of intention. 
The preliminary text was sent to a number 
of provincial and communal authorities for an 
opinion, and everyone is expressly asked to give 
an opinion even if they have not been approached 
directly. It is hoped that all opinions will have 
been received by the end of the year, whether 
solicited or not, and that a bill will be submitted 
to parliament in spring 1976 taking them into 
account. 
First reactions are not very favourable. The 
broad lines of the selected structure are generally 
being accepted, but the large-scale transfer of 
communal tasks to the provinces has not been 
welcomed, particularly as the text gives no 
assurance that the State too might transfer some 
of its powers. 
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Account must certainly be taken of these 
grievances, but it is doubtful whether this will 
lead to any great reduction in the tasks which 
communes will transfer to provinces. In fact, 
many communes, even after reshaping, would 
still be too small to carry out these tasks, although 
the disappearance of the joint regulations is one 
of the aims of the bill. On the other hand, I 
think it will be possible to include more proced-
ure for negotiations between provinces and com-
munes so as not to deprive the latter of every 
possibility of intervening in the implementation 
of these tasks. 
Moreover, I am not optimistic about the 
decentralisation of State powers as provided for 
in the bill. In particular, the technical Ministries 
responsible for public services, i.e. Ministries 
which, unlike the Ministry of the Interior or of 
Finance, feel directly responsible for meeting 
specific material or spiritual needs of citizens, do 
not always hold a very decentralised view and 
furthermore many laws form a whole of which 
part just cannot be cut out. But it would be a 
big step if the government managed to convince 
the population that it is really prepared to 
decentralise State powers as well. 
If these conditions are met, the situation will 
be reminiscent of the comedy "The marriage-go-
round" by L. Stevens in which two university 
professors, husband and wife, managed to achieve 
very valid results in their lectures on marriage 
starting from diametrically opposed ideas. 
Results will obviously not be evident immedi-
ately the law is promulgated : provinces will first 
have to be redivided and communal and State 
departments and staff transferred. Only then 
will it be seen that this is a tremendous operation 
which will take ten to fifteen years. But once this 
operation is completed the Netherlands admin-
istration will have a new look ; it will be younger 
and capable of handling the needs of the day. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on deuelopments in the Iberian peninsula 
and the Atlantic Alliance 
(i) Aware that the undiminished military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries, in particular the 
continued modernisation and world-wide operations of the Soviet fleet, call for an adequate defence effort 
based on a viable economy; 
(ii) Believing that NATO and the European Community are the twin institutions through which the 
countries of WEU, by pooling their resources, can retain their freedom and secure decent living standards 
for their people ; 
(iii) Believing further that the strength of NATO and the European Community lies in the freely-expressed 
support of the peoples of the exclusively pluralist democracies that compose them, and that membership 
of countries with totalitarian regimes should not be tolerated in the future ; 
(w) Expressing its support for the present government in Portugal, stressing the importance of Portugal's 
membership of NATO and its contribution to the defence of Europe, and expressing the hope that close 
links can now be established between Portugal and the European Community ; 
(v) Welcoming the growing public expreBSion of demands for political freedoms in Spain, and believing 
that the Spanish people must shortly take their place in NATO and the European Community, to both of 
which they can make a valuable contribution ; 
(vi) Recognising that formal defence agreements between NATO or the member countries and Spain 
could provide ephemeral practical advantages, but believing that any such agreements concluded before 
the emergence of democracy in Spain would so alienate public opinion both in the NATO countries and in 
Spain that the very existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement with Spain 
would be jeopardised, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
1. State clearly that although, unlike the Soviet Union, the western democracies will never intervene 
by force to change the internal regimes in any country, it is of importance to them that democracy should 
flourish in all countries that are naturally part of Western Europe; 
2. Urge member countries to ensure through their representatives in the European Community and in 
NATO: 
(a) that no formal agreements are concluded with totalitarian regimes in Western Europe; 
(b) that full support is provided for the present government in Portugal; 
(c) that an examination of the problems of the Alliance's naval forces command structure in the 
IBERLANT and NAVSOUTH areas be made ; 
(d) that diplomatic advice be provided from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Your Chairman finds himself in great dif-
ficulty in endeavouring to comment on a situa-
tion so changeable as that of the Iberian 
peninsula at present. Spain is universally thought 
to be on the brink of change ; there is a crisis 
of authority in Portugal ; but the great 
importance of the Iberian peninsula to the coun-
tries of Western Europe, and the need for both 
countries to maintain and strengthen their links 
with the rest of Europe, make it essential that 
the Assembly, if it is to discharge its political 
responsibility, should be enabled to debate a 
report on the Iberian peninsula at the December 
session. 
2. A Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Jung, 
visited Madrid for the first time in October 
1973, and the Committee reported on the situation 
in Spain in Document 624. Otherwise the Com-
mittee had had no direct contact with the two 
countries of the Iberian peninsula, as it is not 
the policy of the Committee as a whole to seek to 
visit Western European countries that are not 
pluralist democracies. 
3. Following the decision of the Presidential 
Committee to refer the subject of the present 
report to the Committee, your Chairman visited 
both Madrid and Lisbon in September. In Madrid 
he was received most courteously by Mr. Cortina, 
the Foreign Minister, by his senior officials and 
representatives of the General Staff. In Lisbon 
the visit coincided with the formation of the 
present government. Nevertheless, your Chair-
man was able to meet leaders of the three poli-
tical parties now in the government, a senior 
official of the Foreign Ministry, and the Com-
mander at the NATO IBERLANT headquarters. 
Your Chairman was thus well placed to comment 
on the situation in September ; he has sought to 
extrapolate his impressions to take account of 
more recent events. He expresses his thanks to 
all those who received him. The views expressed 
in this report are those of the Committee, unless 
expressly otherwise attributed. 
I. Spain 
(a) Defence policy and the significance of Spain in 
the context of European security 
4. For its size and considering that it does not 
maintain very large overseas garrisons, Spain 
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maintains relatively large armed forces of 302,000 
men, largely conscripts serving for 18 months. 
The army, by far the larger service, numbers 
220,000 of which 170,000 are conscripts. The 
much smaller navy (47,000) still relies heavily 
on conscripts (35,000) as does the air force 
(34,000) to a much lesser extent (8,400). But 
Spain spends only a modest 1.9 % of its GNP on 
defence. 
5. For modern equipment Spain relies heavily 
on the United States, especially for tanks, air-
craft and air defence equipment, but has also 
concluded agreements with France for the supply 
or production under licence of Mirage III air-
craft, AMX-30 tanks and some submarines, and 
acquiring eight British built Harrier aircraft 
from the United States. Spain produces small 
arms and some artillery and light armoured 
vehicles. 
6. Spanish air defence forces have for some 
time been equipped with Nike and Hawk mis-
siles, but emphasis is laid first on the need to 
modernise much land and naval air defence and 
communications equipment, and secondly on the 
need to replace the older M-47 tanks. The 
AMX-30 tank is produced in Spain but probably 
only in limited quantities as yet. 
7. Spanish defence policy has been based 
chiefly on the defence agreements with the United 
States, due to expire in 1975. At the end of 
September agreement was reached in principle 
on their renewal, but details remain to be worked 
out concerning the supply of military equipment 
to Spain. Under these agreements, the United 
States enjoys the use of air bases at Torrej6n, 
Zaragoza (weapons training) and Moron, and of 
the Rota naval base for Polaris submarines. 
8. Spain in exchange obtains modern equip-
ment from the United States and the assurance 
of direct defence links with the United States, 
which fall short, however, of those that a formal 
treaty would provide - Congressional support 
for such a treaty has not been forthcoming. Spain 
can also claim indirect links with NATO through 
the United States-Spanish joint defence com-
mittee, established under the defence agreements, 
to which the Commander of United States forces 
in Europe acts as military adviser. That Com-
mander, at present General Haig, is SACEUR 
when wearing his other hat. Spain also has 
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defence links with France through a protocol of 
collaboration which provides for staff talks and 
joint exercises. 
9. While the Spanish forces have some modern 
equipment, and receive proper training in its 
operation, there is undoubtedly a feeling of isola-
tion and of exclusion from the latest military 
thinking in the NATO countries. 
10. The Spanish armed forces are anxious to 
secure much wider access to modern defence con-
cepts, through pragmatic links with the NATO 
military structure, and find inexplicable the 
reluctance of France to participate fully in a 
defensive system to full membership of which 
Spain was unable to aspire. 
(b) Spain and NATO 
11. Speaking in London recently, Admiral 
Stanfield Turner, Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Forces Southern Europe, said it would be a "big 
help" to have Spain in NATO - Spanish forces, 
especially the naval forces, would be a valuable 
asset, and Spanish membership would close an 
important gap in the Mediterranean 1 • 
12. Some press reports gave the impression that 
the possibility that Spain join NATO was aired, 
and rejected, at the time of the NATO summit 
meeting in May 1975. Without doubt a military 
case for Spain's inclusion within the Alliance 
can be made out. The adherence of Spain to 
NATO would be a powerful physical and 
psychological reinforcement. However, Franco's 
Spain was unacceptable to several members of 
NATO: the eventual inclusion of post-Franco 
Spain will depend on the progress that country 
will make in the direction of a recognisable par-
liamentary democracy. 
13. Meanwhile, the explanation offered by the 
Spanish Government in September 1975 of the 
events of May at the NATO summit meeting is 
as follows: 
14. Spain was not seeking to enter NATO either 
by the back or by the front door. There are at 
present two defence systems: the United States-
Spanish alliance; and NATO. The United States 
acts as a link between them, but the systems are 
"juridically different". Spain sought recognition 
1. Guardian, 31st October 1975. 
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by NATO that the two defence systems were, 
in fact, related, that both defence systems pursue 
the same end, namely the defence of Western 
Europe. The complementarity of the systems 
should be recognised, and pragmatic arrange-
ments worked out. Spain should in some way be 
allowed to take part in routine daily discusions. 
Spanish forces should have access to modern 
training methods. Other Spanish suggestions for 
closer co-operation between Spain and NATO 
include: 
( i) the Spanish Military Attache in Brus-
sels might receive information from the 
NATO headquarters. NATO was 
believed to have considered this idea 
in the past but feared lest other non-
NATO countries seek similar access ; 
( ii) Spanish participation in manoeuvres 
on a multilateral basis - not only 
bilaterally as at present ; 
(iii) participation of Spanish officers in 
multilateral military courses. Officers 
attending military courses under bila-
teral arrangements as at present were 
excluded when NATO matters were 
discussed; 
~_iv) the presence of Spanish observers at 
NATO manoeuvres. 
15. United States support for some gesture to 
Spain in the North Atlantic Council summit 
communique of 30th May 1975 was, however, 
strongly resisted by other NATO countries, and 
the agreed text omits any mention of Spain. The 
communique issued by the Defence Planning 
Committee after its meeting at the level of 
Ministers of Defence on 23rd May 1975 contains 
only the rather negative reference : 
"5. The United States Secretary of Defence 
informed his colleagues of the present state 
of the bilateral agreements on the use by 
the United States forces of military facilities 
in Spain, it being understood that these 
arrangements remain outside the NATO 
context." 
16. For some years, official Spanish statements, 
while studiously maintaining that Spain is in 
no way a suppliant, have asserted that Spain 
is naturally a part of, and can make a special 
contribution to Europe, and must take its 
appropriate place in a future European union. 
Most recently, in a speech in Paris on 25th June 
1975, Mr. Cortina, the Foreign Minister, speci-
fically mentioned defence : 
"A European structure which did not allow 
the problem of defence to be solved would 
be yet another idle dream. And without 
the participation of Spain, the defence of 
Europe, considered as a whole, does not 
seem easy for, in the present context, secu-
rity is indivisible. This is a matter which has 
already been raised in Brussels after having 
been raised at the level of Spanish-American 
relations because of its implications for 
Atlantic defence, on which the Spanish 
Government has adopted a very clear posi-
tion ... " 
(c) The internal situation 
17. It is not possible at the time of writing to 
comment on post-Franco Spain under Prince 
Juan Carlos as provisional Head of State since 
30th October, and probably shortly to be pro-
claimed king. 
18. Franco Spain since the civil war has been 
a totalitarian and often harshly repressive 
regime. Yet Spain has remained a largely 
"open" society that cannot be compared with the 
closed, almost prison, societies of the communist 
countries. The importance to Spain of large-
scale tourism from the Western European coun-
tries, with relaxed or non-existent visa or entry 
controls, would have made it impossible to insul-
ate the Spanish people from external events. 
Although individual issues of particular papers 
may occasionally be seized, the western press is 
freely sold on the street - another striking 
contrast with the communist countries. 
19. Today, more than ha,l:f the population has 
been born since the civil war; political expression 
in the country, while stifled, shows many para-
doxes. In a move away from the single-party 
system of the Falange, the Government of Mr. 
Arias introduced the law on "political associa-
tions", promulgated on 12th January 1975, 
whereby political groups and individuals which 
supported the Constitution could apply to the 
Council of the National Movement (successor to 
the Falange) for registration as approved poli-
tical associations. These associations would be 
entitled to stand for election to local authorities 
(which in turn elect one third of the Cortes). 
But only persons already identified with the old 
Falange appear to have applied for registration, 
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including the Association for Spanish Social 
Reform (ARSE) under Mr. Canterro del Cas-
tillo - a Falangist. 
20. A good deal of semi-public political activity 
outside the :framework of the political association 
law appears to have been tolerated by the 
authorities since the summer of 1974 when Prince 
Juan Carlos :first assumed provisional power as 
Head of State. A number of different Christian 
Democrat movements and a Social Democrat 
movement are referred to in the press, and the 
main socialist party, PSOE, once dominated by 
exiles, has a new younger leadership in Spain. 
These various parties :formed the "Platform :for 
Democratic Convergence" which published a 
manifesto on 17th July 1975. An elitist grouping 
of civil servants and businessmen under Mr. 
Fraga Iribarne, the Spanish Ambassador in 
London, formed a political research centre as a 
limited company, FEDISA, in August 1975, 
having earlier toyed with official registration. 
21. Beyond the pale of present toleration are 
the exile-based communist party which is still 
believed to have the largest following of any 
left-wing party in Spain, and the small splinter 
socialist party PSP which together announced 
the formation of the "Junta Democratica" in the 
summer of 1974, but failed to attract the PSOE. 
22. While all these groupings argue the case for 
political reform through the Spanish or :foreign 
press as the case may be, violence has been 
resorted to by the Basque separatist movement, 
ETA, and indiscriminate assassinations by the 
anarchist, Maoist terrorist group, FRAP. These 
developments led, in the closing days of the 
Franco regime, to the harshly repressive anti-
terrorist decree of August 1975, under which the 
recent executions were carried out. The public 
and official outrage expressed in Western 
Europe did not always single out the objection-
able features of Spanish practice - the absence 
of any recognisable trial of the accused, and 
the impossibility under the Franco regime for 
the Basque movement to put its case in non-
violent ways. It is only fair to recognise that 
FRAP would in all probability be outlawed as 
terrorist in any democratic society. 
23. Any moves towards democracy the new 
regime may make will be judged by the breadth 
of the political spectrum that will be permitted 
to contest elections. As there seem no prospects 
of the communists being recognised, the final 
touchstone may be the official attitude to the 
PSOE. 
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U. Portugal 
(a) The problems of government 
24. Following changes in the Council of the 
Armed Forces Movement which brought more 
moderate elements to power, reflecting opinion 
throughout Portugal rather than that of the 
Lisbon area alone, a new government under 
Admiral Azevedo took office on 19th September. 
At the time of the government's formation, two 
factors held out hopes of more effective govern-
ment and more moderate policies than those of 
the previous shortlived governments that had 
held office while communist elements had 
appeared to dominate the Armed Forces Move-
ment. 
25. First, the composition of the new govern-
ment reflected the realities of power and elec-
toral strength in Portugal: five members, includ-
ing the Prime Minister, were from the Armed 
Forces Movement : the remaining portfolios 
were distributed among the three parties that 
had secured most votes in the April elections 
to the Constituent Assembly, and the distribution 
reflected the proportion of votes secured by each 
party: Socialists (PSP) 37.87% - 4 ministers; 
Popular Democrats (PPD) 26.38% - 2 min-
isters ; Communists 12.53 % - 1 minister. The 
government was not however described as a 
coalition, participation was on a personal basis. 
26. Secondly, the formation of the government, 
apparently for the first time, had been preceded 
by agreement on an outline programme, includ-
ing measures to deal with the severe economic 
crisis; measures to secure proper working of 
the media including rearrangement of newspaper 
printing facilities to provide each party in 
government with one newspaper, and supervision 
of radio and television programmes by a council 
drawn from the three political parties ; the hold-
ing of local government elections (which, if car-
ried through, could have been expected to reduce 
communist influence in many local authorities). 
In political circles in Lisbon it was widely 
expected that the Constituent Assembly would 
complete its work on the drafting of the consti-
tution by the end of the year, and that legis-
lative elections would be held early in 1976. 
27. Events since the formation of the govern-
ment, however, continue to cast doubt on its 
ability to impose its authority in a situation 
where the armed forces themselves are as divided 
as the political parties. 
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28. While it had been hoped at the time the 
government was formed, that communist partici-
pation and prior commitment to an agreed policy 
would secure civil support for the government 
from a broad spectrum of the population, it is 
far from clear whether the communist leadership 
is loyally supporting the government, or, indeed, 
whether the leadership has sufficient authority 
over its local party organisation. Opponents of 
communist participation in government have 
pointed out that the Portuguese communist 
party, unlike the French, Italian and Spanish 
communist parties, continues in its party policy 
statements to reject democratic pluralism, elec-
tions and coalition government, in favour of 
continuous revolution. Communists are numerous 
in the civil service and in local authorities in 
many parts of the country and thus wield an 
influence out of all proportion to their electoral 
strength. 
29. Yet given the present political facts of life 
in Portugal, it is unlikely that a more moderate 
government, or one more favourably disposed 
to the Western European countries, could be 
found. It is important therefore that the govern-
ment should receive all possible moral and eco-
nomic support from the European Community 
and NATO countries to deal with the enormous 
internal problems it faces, over and above the 
prior problem of authority. There has been a 
reduction in real terms of between 8 and 10 % 
of the gross national product and a 6 % reduc-
tion in industrial production. Three hundred 
thousand unemployed in July, representing 10% 
of the working population, has been swollen by 
the arrival of nearly 400,000 evacuees from 
Angola. 
(b) Defence policy and attitudes to NATO 
30. Defence policy does not appear to have been 
actively discussed during the formation of the 
present government - too many other problems 
have priority, and the Portuguese role in NATO 
has to some extent been a passive one, concerned 
chiefly with the provision of certain facilities 
referred to in Chapter III. As far as the political 
parties are concerned, active support for NATO 
appears to have come only from the Social 
Democrats (CDS), the largest party outside the 
present government, which secured 7.65% of the 
votes in the April elections. The Socialist Party 
is said to be sympathetic to NATO and con-
cerned to respect existing commitments, although 
some spokesmen have taken an anti-American 
and anti-NATO line. As the strongest opponent 
of the Communist Party in Portugal, the social-
ists probably view membership of NATO as a 
useful demonstration that Portugal belongs to 
t~e .West. The ~opular Democrats (PPD) appear 
si~larly committed to respect for existing com-
mitments, and membership of NATO as a means 
of identifying with the West. At the same time 
there is an inclination to view the post-Helsinhl 
world as one in which the two military blocks 
can eventually dissolve. The communists have 
not found Portugal's membership of NATO an 
obstacle to their participation in government. 
31. Portugal up to 1974 has been spending some 
5.8 ~ of its GNP on defence - a higher pro-
portion than that of any WEU country. The 
armed forces numbered some 217,000 including 
158,300 conscripts ; the army is by far the largest 
service, the navy having only 19 500 and the 
air force 18,500 personnel. Compa~d with Spain 
for example, much of the Portuguese equipment 
must appear obsolete, recent procurement having 
been devoted largely to counter-insurgency 
heli~opters. and light aircraft of use chiefly 
agamst a hghtly-armed or internal enemy during 
the colonial wars. 
32. With the withdrawal of over 100,000 troops 
from the former colonies, the Portuguese armed 
forces, if they overcome their present problems 
of discipline and authority, must in future face · 
problems of motive and objective. There were 
conflicting reports in Lisbon as to whether any 
substantial demobilisation had got under wav 
following the withdrawal from the former col~­
nies, ?'et the army is clearly too large for any 
conceivable external defence role. It is tempting 
to think that although in the past Portuguese 
forces have not been directly assigned to NATO 
a smaller streamlined force with more mode~ 
equipment might make a useful contribution to 
some particular NATO function such as the ACE 
mobile force, or other mobile reserves - such 
projects could provide useful training objectives 
for a modern professional army. In the present 
situation there is no sign of political support 
for any increased or high-profile contribution to 
NATO. 
33. The most that can be expected in the 
foreseeable future is the maintenance of present 
Portuguese undertakings. Portuguese naval for-
ces continue to participate in NATO exercises 
in the Atlantic, and the NATO IBERLANT 
headquarters outside Lisbon has continued to 
function undisturbed by any hostile demonstra-
tions. If future Portuguese policy reflects the 
results of the April elections, Portuguese member-
ship of NATO will not be a political issue. 
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(c) Priority in external relations 
34. Following the change of regime on 25th 
April19~4, Por~ugal immediately sought to open 
diplomatic relatiOns with all countries, and Por-
tugal has sought to play a wider role in the 
United Nations and the specialised agencies that 
were closed to it under the totalitarian regimes. 
Ambassadors have now been exchanged with 
several Warsaw Pact countries. Decolonisation 
was very rapidly negotiated but has left as yet 
u;nso~ved problems in Timor and Angola - ter-
ritories where there are more than one local 
independence movement. 
35. Portugal is seeking actively to establish 
clo~er !inks with the European Community on 
whiCh It must rely for economic assistance in the 
immediate future. A new trade agreement with 
the EEC is desired, together with associate 
status with the European Parliament but full 
1?-embership of the European Comm~ity is un-
likely to be requested in the present economic 
situation of Portugal. 
36. As far as relations with the United States 
are concerned, there has been some resentment 
at American initiatives which were seen at one 
time as designed to exclude Portugal from full 
membership of NATO. The agreement with the 
United States on the use of military bases in 
the Azores has expired and Portugal is seeking 
~conomic assistance, but not military equipment, 
m exchange for a renewal of the agreement. 
Meanwhile, the United States continues to enjoy 
normal use of the Azores for NATO-related 
purposes, but it does not seem that the facilities 
would be available in the future for operations 
such as the resupply of Israel. 
m. Defence problems of the Iberian area 
and the NATO IBERLANT Command 
37. The Iberian peninsula as a whole is impor-
tant to the West, both as a base for naval forces, 
and as a staging area for air reinforcement. It 
is also important for a proper balance of forces 
to be maintained and to be seen to be maintained 
in the Western Mediterranean to ensure that 
the increasingly effective Soviet fleet is not in 
a position to exercise political pressure on the 
countries along the southern shores. 
38. The NATO Atlantic Command (SACLANT 
in Norfolk, Virginia) has a subordinate head-
quarters outside Lisbon known as the Iberian 
Atlantic or IBERLANT Command, responsible 
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for the sea area from the Portuguese coast to 
20° West longitude, and covering 600,000 square 
miles of sea. Two-thirds of Western Europe's 
imports pass through this sea area, including 
two-thirds of oil imports, of which one third 
pass through the Mediterranean, and the 
remainder round the Cape. Surveillance of the 
area by maritime patrol aircraft is important 
and various NATO headquarters have a peace-
time function of co-ordinating patrol operations 
by the air forces of the various participating 
countries. There are three NATO-financed air-
fields in Portugal, which are the most southerly 
airfields available to NATO, and make a valuable 
contribution to the maritime patrol function, 
although it is felt that not all of the airfields 
are being used as effectively as possible. Nor are 
all participating countries making patrol aircraft 
available to the command as readily as its res-
ponsibilities require. 
39. In addition to the maritime patrol aircraft, 
the chief units earmarked for assignment to 
IBERLANT are anti-submarine warfare units, 
and there are important NATO-financed infra-
structure installations in Portugal for the resup-
ply of such forces operating in the area. There are 
also important NATO communications installa-
tions which, in addition to servicing the 
IBERLANT headquarters, play a vital function 
in NATO naval planning. 
40. Spain provides an important base at Rota 
for the United States Polaris submarines operat-
ing in the Mediterranean which provide that 
part of the strategic deterrent assigned to 
SACEUR. The United States navy also flies 
maritime surveillance flights from the Rota air-
field. Gibraltar with its very limited runway 
makes little contribution to long-range surveil-
lance, but can still provide useful coverage of 
the Straits. The Committee has reported earlier 
on the political situation in Gibraltar and the 
dispute with Spain 1 ; the situation remains 
unchanged. The usefulness of Gibraltar would 
be enhanced if the dispute were settled. On the 
other hand, if Spain were to become a full 
member of NATO, Gibraltar would cease to be 
militarily relevant. 
Command 
41. The NATO military command structure has 
always suffered from a number of anomalies 
1. Document 624, Security and the Mediterranean, 
Rapporteur Mr. Jung, 7th November 1973, paragraphs 
60-63. 
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where the nationality of commanders reflects 
considerations of political prestige rather than 
the reality of the military situation. In the 
Western Mediterranean, which in recent years 
has witnessed a considerable increase in the activ-
ities of the Soviet navy, a gap in the command 
structure has been left by the withdrawal of 
France which previously provided the Western 
Mediterranean commander (COMEDOC) under 
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe in Naples 
(NA VSOUTH) and earmarked naval forces 
which were responsible for the sea area between 
the Italian naval command extending West to 
Sardinia and the Gibraltar area which extends 
only a little way into the Mediterranean. The 
Spanish navy could undoubtedly make a valuable 
contribution to the NATO naval forces available 
in the Western Mediterranean, and a Spanish 
commander could logically take his place in the 
Mediterranean naval command structure. The 
overriding political objectives at the present time 
are dealt with in the conclusion. 
42. At present the Gibraltar command, under 
NA VSOUTH, appears an isolated relic of the 
command structure that was coherent only when 
France was part of the military structure. It 
is suggested that a more logical rearrangement 
of command would be to extend SACLANT's 
responsibilities eastwards into the Mediterranean, 
and for Gibraltar to become a subordinate com-
mand of IBERLANT. 
Political advisers 
43. The Committee in the course of its visits 
to most NATO military headquarters in recent 
years has noted the presence of political advisers 
belonging to the Foreign Service of the United 
States at certain headquarters where the com-
mander is a United States officer. There do not 
appear to be political advisers as such in other 
headquarters, although in the case of Allied 
Forces Northern Europe in Kolsas, near Oslo, 
there is a civilian information officer of the 
nationality of the host country, who no doubt 
is in a position to provide the commander with 
political advice. The Committee recognises the 
need for NATO commanders in politically sensi-
tive posts (and what post is not) to be able to 
call upon diplomatic advice. The Committee pro-
poses in the draft recommendation that instead 
of the present limited ad hoc arrangements, 
diplomatic advice should be institutionalised in 
NATO military headquarters, and the political 
authority of the Secretary-General, Chairman 
of the North Atlantic Council, should be recog-
nised at the same time. Your Chairman suggests 
that the Secretary-General should assign political 
advisers to all NATO headquarters, and that 
administratively they should come under the 
political affairs division of the NATO inter-
national staff. 
Conclusion 
44. In 1973, following the visit to Madrid by 
Mr. Jung, Rapporteur, the Committee adopted 
a report on security and the Mediterranean 1• 
After debating this report, the Assembly adopted 
Recommendation 254, in the preamble of which 
it expressed the hope " ... that at an appropriate 
time, it will be possible to associate Spain with 
the defence of Europe" 2 • 
45. Since that recommendation was adopted, 
significant changes have occurred in several 
NATO countries. The Committee recognises in 
the foregoing chapters devoted to Portugal and 
Spain that both countries of the Iberian penin-
sula can and do make an important contribution 
to European security as a whole. In Portugal, 
the political composition of the present govern-
ment reflects the results of free elections held 
in April this year although the Christian Demo-
crat and Liberal Parties were prevented from 
standing. The Committee recommends that full 
support be provided for that government which 
is faced first and foremost with a crisis of 
authority. 
46. The Committee is also aware that the policy 
of Franco Spain was to seek closer links both 
with NATO and the European Community, and 
to assert that Spain must logically be considered 
as an integral part of Western Europe as a 
whole. In a remarkable letter dated 2nd June 
1975, to The Times'\ the Spanish Ambassador 
in London, Mr. Manuel Fraga Iribarne wrote : 
" ... I think it is generally agreed that the 
Iberian peninsula is a key point in the 
defence of Europe and of the Northern and 
Southern Atlantic, and it is obvious that 
were the peninsula to lend its support to 
the eastern bloc, the Mediterranean could 
be closed and the entire defensive system 
of Central Europe placed in serious jeop-
1. Document 624, 7th November 1973. 
2. Adopted on 20th June 1974. 
3. Published in The Times, 7th June 1975. 
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ardy. In such a situation, this new danger 
would in fact arise from an area that today 
gives logistical support and depth, so neces-
sary for its effectiveness, to that defensive 
system. 
Instead of seeking a solution to these prob-
lems and of supporting a normal evolution 
in Spain in harmony with the rest of 
Western Europe, in certain quarters there 
appears to exist a desire to isolate her by 
demanding a rigid code of democratic purity 
that, quite obviously, has not in the past 
and is not now being applied by the Atlantic 
Alliance to other countries of the so-called 
southern flank. In my view, this lack of 
understanding can only favour the extrem-
ists of both right and left, and will con-
tribute nothing towards a constructive 
solution based on a moderate centre which, 
I believe, is what a majority of the Spanish 
people wish and Europe needs. 
Let me say that it is not a question of 
alternatives: Spain or Portugal. My govern-
ment's point of view is quite clear : Spain 
ought to be either in or out of the western 
defensive system. With the backing of 
public opinion, Spain is prepared to play 
her part in western defence, but either she 
does so fully or not at all. In each case she 
is aware of the consequences. This does 
not preclude any bilateral arrangement that 
may be thought appropriate ... " 
47. In spite of the material advantages to 
defence arrangements that could accrue from 
Spanish participation, however, the Committee 
believes that the political disadvantages of 
associating Spain with NATO prior to the 
emergence of democracy in that country, would 
be overwhelming. Public support for the Alliance 
would be undermined in the present member 
countries, and emerging political opinion in 
Spain on which a future democracy can hope-
fully be based would thereby associate NATO 
with the policies of the despised and defunct 
regime. In Greece, it should be noted, NATO 
is now suffering from the reaction of public 
opinion to the inappropriate attention paid to 
that country by United States commanders dur-
ing the period of the Colonels' regime ; the 
prudence of the Secretary-General of NATO in 
not visiting that country while democracy was 
in abeyance has passed unnoticed. 
48. By a remarkable series of coincidences, the 
past two years have witnessed the complete 
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disappearance of totalitarian regimes from NATO 
countries. As a result of these developments, 
NATO has been transformed into a defensive 
alliance based exclusively on democracies, and 
the period has coincided with United States 
disengagement from the Vietnam war, for which 
there was insufficient public support. Signifi-
cantly, the rate of conscientious objection in the 
NATO countries that practise conscription has 
fallen over the same period. 
49. The conclusion is inescapable - in the 
western democracies, public support for the 
defence effort and commitment to the Alliance 
is a precondition of an effective and credible 
defence. 
50. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia to depose the Dubcek regime, Mr. Brezhnev, 
speaking to the Polish Communist Party Con-
gress on 12th November 1968, enunciated what 
came to be known as the Brezhnev doctrine : 
" ... When the internal and external forces 
hostile to socialism seek to turn back the 
development of any socialist country to 
restore the capitalist order, when a threat 
emerges to the cause of socialism in that 
country, a threat to the security of the 
socialist commonwealth as a whole, this is 
no longer a matter only for the people of 
the country in question, but it is also a 
common problem, which is a matter of con-
cern for all socialist countries. 
It goes without saying that such an action 
as military aid to a fraternal country to 
thwart the threat to the socialist order is 
an extraordinary, enforced that is, last 
resort measure. It can be caused only by 
the direct actions of the enemies of socialism 
inside the country and beyond its boundaries 
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- actions which create a threat to the 
common interests of the socialist camp ... " 
51. Advantage should now be taken of the 
disappearance of totalitarian regimes from the 
NATO countries to make a contrasting declara-
tion which the Committee sets out in paragraph 1 
of the draft recommendation : 
" ... that although, unlike the Soviet Union, 
the western democracies will never intervene 
by force to change the internal regimes in 
any country, it is of importance to them 
that democracy should flourish in all coun-
tries that are naturally part of Western 
Europe;" 
Such a declaration would follow logically from 
the "Declaration on principles guiding relations 
between participating States" signed at Helsinki 
on 1st August 1975, whereby : "the participating 
States ... will also respect each other's right freely 
to choose and develop its political, social, eco-
nomic and cultural systems ... ". The important 
feature is the right "freely to choose ... " There 
can be no freedom of choice where there is no 
democracy based on free elections. 
52. In application of such a declaration, every 
effort should be made by the western demo-
cracies to urge Spain in the direction of demo-
cracy. The Alliance should make it clear that 
full membership of NATO is open to Spain as 
soon as that country shows evidence of fulfilling 
the democratic conditions of membership. 
53. The Committee's reasons for advocating in 
paragraph 2 (c) of the substantive recommenda-
tion certain modifications in the IBERLANT 
Command area are set forth in paragraph 42 
above. The recommendation concerning diplo-
matic advice in paragraph 2 (d) is explained in 
paragraph 43 above. 
Document 682 
Amendment No. 1 
2nd Deeember 1975 
Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Sir John Rodgers and others 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "Community" to 
the end of the paragraph and insert : 
"rests upon the freely-expressed support of the peoples of their member States;" 
2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble and insert: 
"(iv) Stressing the importance that it attaches to Portugal's contribution to the defence of Europe 
as a member of NATO and wishing to further the development in Portugal of a truly democratic 
system of government;" 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert: 
"(b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging 
progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government;" 
Signed : Rodgers, V edovato, Amrekn, Duncan-Sanilys, Okannon, Leynen, Bettiol, Radius, de 
M ontesquiou, Lemmrick 
1. See 12th Sitting, 3rd December 1975 (Parts 1 and 2 withdrawn; part 3 adopted). 
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Amendment No. 2 
3rd Deeemher 1975 
Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Scholten and others 
In line 3 of pa.ra.gra.ph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after the word "would" 
insert "be in contradiction with the aims of NATO a.nd". 
Signed: BchoUen, Peijnenburg, Reijnen, Voogd 
I. See 12th Sitting, 3rd December 1975 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 3 
3rd Deeemher 1975 
Developmenfll in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Critchley and Mr. Roper 
In line I of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after the word "Portugal" 
insert the words "as a first step towards a fully-democratic government". 
Signed: Critchley, Roper 
1. See 12th Sitting, 3rd December 1976 (Amendment adopted). 
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Addendum 
3rd December 1975 
Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Noting the accession of H.M. King Juan Carlos of Spain, 
Draws his attention to Recommendation ... 
1. Adopted in Committee unanimously. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Chair-
ma.n); MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Substitute: de Niet) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Averardi, Beauguitte, Bizet, Boulloche, 
Buck, Haase, Hardy, Kempinaire (Substitute : Duvieuaart), 
Konen, de Koster, Laforgia., Lemmrich, Menard, 
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Pawelczyk, Pendry (Substitute: Sir Harwood Harrison), 
Pumilia, Rea.le (Substitute: Magliano), Richter, Rivibre, 
Roper, Scholten, Schugena, Tanghe, Vedovato. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in 
the vote are printed in italics. 
1./. I 
Document 683 17~ Nove~ 1975 
/(:onference on security and co-operation in Europe 
/ 
-:;:-REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee_J 
by Mrs. von Bothmer, Rapporteur 7 
, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mrs. von Bothmer, Rapporteur 
I. General 
II. Aims of the participants 
III. The baskets 
IV. Conclusions 
V. Discussion in Committee 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 3 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt 
(Chairman) ; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Abena, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett (Substitute: 
Ohannon), Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute: Schwencke), 
MM. Brugnon, Cermola.cce, Fioret (Substitute: Pecoraro), 
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Fletcher, Mrs. Godina.che-Lambert (Substitute : de Bruyne), 
MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnoooi, Nessler, de Niet, 
Peijnenburg (Substitute: Voogd), Peridier, Portheine 
(Substitute : de Koster), Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel, 
Urwin, Van Hoeyla.ndt (Substitute: de Stexhe). 
N.B. The names of Repruentativea who took part in the 
oote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the conference on aeeurity and eo-operation 
in Europe 
Hoping that the Final Act of the Helsinki conference may lead to considerable progress in detente, 
understanding and co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe ; 
Noting furthermore that the principles set out in that text concern relations as a whole between 
all the signatory countries ; 
Deploring that the positions adopted by,the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Warsaw 
Pact in the months following the conference indicate an excessively restrictive interpretation of certain 
principles laid down in the Final Act ; 
Underlining the need to reach early agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction in the level 
of forces of the two alliances in Central Europe ; 
Considering nevertheless that the balance of military forces remains the principal guarantee of 
security and peace in Europe for the foreseeable future, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Ensure the maintenance of continuing consultations between its members on all matters raised by 
the application of the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe; 
2. Ensure furthermore that any negotiations on force reductions do not lead to a weakening of Western 
European security ; 
3. Ask member governments to define, for instance in the framework of nine-power consultations, a 
joint position for its members on matters raised by the third basket of the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe ; 
4. In no event accept any principle contrary to that of the sovereignty of States defined in the Final 
Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ; 
5. Ensure that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin is strictly applied. 
88 
DOCUMENT 683 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(aubmitted by Mra. von Bothmer, Rapporteur) 
I. General 
1. The General Affairs Committee has suffi-
ciently studied the various steps in the prepa~a­
tion and progress of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe to have to devote 
too much time to the history of the conference 
and its developments in this report. It is merely 
recalled that from the legal viewpoint at least 
the absence of a peace treaty between Germany 
and the victorious powers of the 1945 war led 
to thirty years of uncertainty and instability 
regarding the frontiers and regimes of Central 
Europe. The division of Europe into two b;ocs 
and areas of influence has never been the subJect 
of an agreement between those concerned other 
than vague exchanges of remarks between the 
three great powers in Yalta. It has neverthe-
less become an established fact which, in the last 
thirty years, has determined the political, 
economic and social regimes of each European 
country to an even greater extent than the will 
of the people. One way or another, the balance 
of terror has blocked all developments between 
East and West which were bound to change the 
status quo. 
2. In 1954 the Berlin conference of Ministers 
for Foreign 'Affairs examined the possibility of 
an agreement on collective security and the 
establishment of joint institutions to keep a 
watch on the future of Central Europe. But the 
idea of a conference on European security rose 
in a way with the 1969 Budapest conference. 
The suggestions emanated from the Soviet Union 
and its allies up to that time (e.g. Bucharest 
1966) were suspected by the western powers as 
means only to consolidate the Soviet positions 
acquired by force in 1945 ; the Soviet Union 
would confirm its positions at the expense of 
the German people's right to self-determination 
and hence at the expense of real security for 
the European peoples. But Budapest found a 
sympathetic echo both with the Federal Republic 
and NATO. 
3. In fact in 1969 the Federal Republic felt 
itself being more or less isolated : the western 
powers sought solutions in limite~ problems 
concerning the balance of peace m Europe 
where they themselves seemed to be involved. 
But none of them cared much about the feelings 
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or powers of the Federal Republic as it had not 
shown much capability to deal with its own 
problems concerning its attitude towards its 
eastern neighbours. 
4. Gradually the two big powers began to 
move towards a bilateral relationship between 
themselves. This the United States and the 
Soviet Union developed in particular with . 
regard to the limitation of strategic arms. T~e 
SALT I negotiations were a result of their 
respective efforts. This new constellation no 
doubt formed a positive condition for the Ost-
politik pursued by the Federal Government 
under Chancellor Brandt. In the same way the 
Ostpolitik itself actively stimulated the balance-
finding efforts of the western powers as well 
as the reactions of the Soviet Union and its 
allies. It is quite certain that the results of the 
SALT I negotiations were largely instrumental 
in making the conference possible because the 
agreements reached by the Americans and 
Soviets had rled to a sharp reduction in tension 
in relations between the two great powers 
although they made no claim to having found 
any solution to truly European problems. 
5. However, the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe would probably have 
come to naught if the Soviet Union had not 
shown more flexibility in recent years, as the 
United States did in a similar way. For the 
Soviet Union very probably two reasons may 
be looked at as a motive for changing its atti-
tude : its economic situation and its increasing 
problems concerning China. As in 1971, when 
the Soviet Communist Party Congress debated 
the Soviet West Union this had a positive 
influence on the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik. 
The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe was encouraged by the fact that 
the 1976 Soviet Communist Party Congress 
is likely to raise the question of changes among 
Soviet leaders. It was important for the present 
leaders to attend the congress fortified with 
the prestige conferred by major successes in 
the field of international policy and the success-
ful conclusion of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe might be an essen-
tial element when accounting for their activities. 
6. Thus a preparatory conference was held in 
Helsinki in November 1972 which led, in July 
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1973, to a declaration on the principles which 
should govern the work of the conference. In 
September 1973, the second stage started in 
Geneva, and for almost two years experts re-
examined and went into the details of the guide-
lines laid down in Helsinki and prepared a 
document which was the subject of a summit 
conference in Helsinki in July 1975. A lengthy 
text was then adopted on 1st August 1975 as 
the Final Act of the conference. 
D. Aims of the participants 
7. It is evident that the eastern and western 
countries approached the conference with 
widely-divergent aims based on positions of 
force and ideology which were hard to reconcile. 
Of course there were differences of views within 
each bloc as well. 
8. However this may be, over and above their 
differences all participants were anxious to 
obtain the maximum possible guarantees against 
recourse to force to solve disputes. This was 
abundantly clear since the countries whose 
frontiers had suffered most from the war -
and first and foremost the two German States 
- well knew that they would be in the front 
line of any hostilities, particularly if fighting 
in Europe led to the use of nuclear weapons, if 
only tactical nuclear weapons ! The immediate 
effect would be the most total destruction of the 
battle area. 
9. Strategic nuclear weapons have given each 
side a deterrent of such magnitude that the very 
idea of solving a conflict by force defies the 
imagination. As was shown by the SALT nego-
tiations, neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union was anxious to place its own fate in the 
balance. Finally, a solution to the German prob-
lem which appeared satisfactory to the majority 
of the German people would be difficult for 
the other European powers to defend outside an 
all-European framework. Apart from these 
general considerations, each country or group 
of countries embarked on the conference with 
its own aims. 
(i) The Soviet Union was certainly seeking: 
(a) to obtain greater freedom of action 
outside Europe, particularly in Asia, 
at a time when its conflict with China 
was developing, by giving expression 
to detente in Europe ; 
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(b) to evade the constant threats to its 
domination of Central and Eastern 
Europe. The challenges since the war 
to improve its negative reputation as 
an oppressor of its a:llies and the pro-
test when the occupation of Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia took place were of 
an international dimension. Your 
Rapporteur cannot say whether the 
Soviet Union was afraid of an even-
tual intervention by the western coun-
tries on behalf of the Central Euro-
pean nations which were questioning 
Soviet hegemony. That there was no 
such intention on their side your 
Rapporteur looks at as a fact. In any 
case the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe follows the line 
of the Brezhnev doctrine although the 
Final Act contains none of the terms 
of that doctrine ; 
(c) to obtain legal recognition of the terri-
torial advantages it acquired in Central 
Europe immediately after the war. The 
very list of participants in the con-
ference on security and co-operation in 
Europe in a way constituted recogni-
tion, as did the accession of the two 
German States to the United Nations. 
The inclusion of the principle of the 
inviolability of frontiers in the Final 
Act means recognition of the territorial 
status quo; 
(d) to accelerate its economic development 
by greater economic co-operation with 
the western countries. It is character-
istic that most of its political agree-
ments with western countries in recent 
years have been accompanied by impor-
tant measures for increasing co-opera-
tion without which it would be diffi-
cult for the Soviet Union to make the 
investments necessary to develop the 
industrial aspects of its power and 
hence maintain its . hegemony in 
Eastern Europe ; 
(e) to stop the formation of a political and 
military union in Western Europe. 
( ii) The smaller Eastern European powers -
and here moreover they fell in with certain non-
aligned countries - considered that the easing 
of tension in East-West relations might increase 
their freedom of action and that the emergence 
of multilateral institutions outside the Alliance 
systems would wllow them to play a greater part 
in the settlement of European problems in the 
future. 
(iii) Bearing in mind its strength the United 
States played a relatively secondary role at the 
beginning of the conference, probably because 
it deliberately wished to allow Europe to 
handle its own affairs when America's vital 
interests were not at stake, but also because 
it must have seen this conference, called for 
by the Soviet Union, as an instrument for 
limiting its influence in Europe. The develop-
ment of its bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union and its concern for detente in other 
areas, particularly the Middle East, drew 
the United States out of its initially rather 
negative or, to say the least, quite sceptical 
attitude. Consequently it entered into more 
active consultations with its allies on possible 
joint positions in the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe and these matters 
became the subject of continuing consultations 
in the framework of NATO. 
( iv) Of course there were differences among the 
Western European countries. However these 
referred mainly to tactical matters. Your Rap-
porteur particularly wants to put stress on the 
fact that the Western European countries 
showed remarkable unity in their efforts to keep 
open every ·possibility for progress and econo-
mic, political and military integration in the 
framework of the EEC. Here, the nine-power 
politica;l consultations, whatever criticism may 
be levelled at them otherwise, played an 
extremely important role and on occasion one 
or other of the participating countries was 
authorised to speak on behalf of them all. Inter 
alia, the EEC countries were particularly 
attentive to the special concerns of the Federal 
Republic which wished to avoid anything final 
which might prejudge a future peace treaty. 
10. Considering the overall concerns of the 
participants, it may be said that the conference 
on security and co-operation in Europe allowed 
everyone to voice his views and, above all, 
allowed everyone acceptable compromises to be 
reached which in your Rapporteur's view can 
be looked at as a hopeful base for future develop-
ment : nobody had to give up essential inter-
ests, everybody obtained a measure of common 
understanding concerning all sorts of relation-
ships. Though which could not surprise anybody 
the Final Act shows a lot of shortcomings 
because of its whole character as a compromise. 
But the result is that the political situation in 
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Europe is not altered. Nobody could possibly 
expect more than this act of open agreement. If 
one considers the great number of participants 
and their entirely different motives for joining 
the conference as was pointed out above the 
generally agreed alteration the intense efforts 
towards solving a wide number of problems in 
multilateral and bilateral agreements do indeed 
rectify to speak of a positive result. Of course 
your Rapporteur is aware of the fact that 
opinions in the Committee vary in judgment 
concerning the results of the conference. 
m. The baskets 
11. Probably because of the great number and 
diversity of interests the conference organised 
its work in the context of four baskets. The very 
multiplicity was certainly a reason for its suc-
cess because it led to a wide range of compro-
mises in the various fields and the establishment 
of a certain balance between these fields. It is 
characteristic that different coalitions were 
formed in respect of each series of problems and 
that the conference was not merely a confronta-
tion between East and West but rather a search 
for a series of compromises on matters which 
sometimes divided the two sides. 
12. However, this method and the rather vague 
wording of many of the provisions of the Final 
Act leave a wide scope for interpretation and 
the weeks following the conference showed that 
many problems remained in spite of the length 
of the document drawn up jointly. 
13. (a) The first basket sets out ten principles 
covering the acts which the participating parties 
undertake to renounce and those which they 
undertake to carry out for the peaceful develop-
ment of relations between European States and 
to intensify co-operation. Most of these prin-
ciples are expressed as moral standards and in 
many respects they fall short of a more pres-
criptive text such as the United Nations 
Charter. 
14. Nevertheless, the value of these principles 
is undeniable insofar as any government which 
fails to make its policy conform with the declara-
tions of intention might find itself in a most 
uncomfortable moral position, even in the eyes 
of its own public opinion. Thus, these principles 
hardly reach the roots of the problems but they 
point to the ways of dealing with matters which 
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are the cause of disputes and their adoption 
makes recourse to force difficult. 
15. There will of course be differences over the 
interpretations of these principles. They have 
already started in respect of the binding nature 
of the Helsinki agreements, particularly when 
the Soviet Union refused the immediate applica-
tion of the Helsinki provisions to Soviet would-
be emigrants or western journalists living in the 
Soviet Union whom it reminded that the 
Helsinki meeting had merely defined principles 
whose application was subject to bilateral agree-
ments which would perhaps not be drawn up 
for some time to come. Moreover, it may be noted 
that as far as is now known the issue of Ameri-
Qan visas to foreigners who are communist party 
members is still encountering difficulties. The 
Helsinki agreements instituted no court of arbi-
tration, compulsory reconciliation body or 
appeals procedure for prejudice due to a 
signatory not applying the agreements. 
16. In another respect, the NATO countries 
have always attached primordial importance to 
an agreement on military problems which they 
consider to be the cornerstone of the notion of 
security. For a long time, they thought of link-
ing acceptance of the conclusions of the Helsinki 
negotiations with the successful conclusion of 
the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. 
Finally, they dropped this precondition and, in 
the field of confidence-building measures, set 
out the principle that manoeuvres involving 
more than 25,000 troops held within a certain 
area would be notified to the signatories of the 
Final Act and observers from the other side 
invited to attend. From the military point of 
view these clauses are of only secondary interest 
of course. But from the political point of view 
they were looked at as highly important. How-
ever in the two months following the adoption of 
the Final Act in Helsinki, the NATO countries 
notified two series of manoeuvres to the members 
of the Warsaw Pact. Observers from the Soviet 
Union and other Warsaw Pact countries were 
for the first time invited to attend the NATO 
manoeuvres "Certain Trek" beginning in Bava-
ria on 14th October 1975. Conversely, no 
manoeuvres have been notified by the eastern 
countries. There are indications of large-scale 
manoeuvres in Eastern Europe but in staggered 
order so that no single operation involved more 
than 25,000 troops. Thus the Warsaw Pact did 
not have to notify the manoeuvres or invite 
observers and technically the letter of the agree-
ment was not violated. But this was an extreme-
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ly restrictive interpretation of the fundamental 
principle that manoeuvres were to be the subject 
of prior notification. 
17. The treaty of friendship between the Soviet 
Union and the German Democratic Republic 
which was concluded on the 26th anniversary 
of the founding of the GDR has to be looked at 
as an adjustment of the already-existing treaties 
of friendship between the Soviet Union and the 
GDR of the years 1955 and 1964 to the political 
situation in 1975. 
18. The intention of the newly-adopted treaty 
of friendship, co-operation and mutual assist-
ance of lOth July 1975 is to emphasise those 
principles of the CSCE Final Act which are of 
special interest for the Soviet Union as well as 
for the GDR by incorporating them into a 
bilateral treaty. Its partiality is underlined in 
particular by the opposition that can be dis-
cerned to the linking of West Berlin to the 
Federal Republic. It might be possible that this 
treaty should serve as a model for the relations 
between the Soviet Union and its Eastern Euro-
pean allies in the period after the conclusion of 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe. 
19. One of the remarkable elements of the 
treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union 
and the GDR is the bilateral shifting of the 
balance of the Helsinki principles. The clauses 
concerning the inviolability of frontiers are 
particularly emphasised whereas the principles 
of modifying frontiers by peaceful means in 
agreement with international law are not men-
tioned at all. This proceeding meets the basic 
interest of the Soviet Union as well as of the 
GDR. It is necessary for the follow-up agree-
ments between Eastern and Western European 
nations to avoid such a shifting of emphasis and 
balance. 
20. In any event, the great merit of this clause 
was to show the importance of problems con-
cerning the deployment of forces and arms 
control for detente. Of obviously far greater 
value is the declaration endorsing the principle 
that a balance of forces or even a reduction in 
the troops deployed and their arms and the 
possibility of real controls would constitute a 
basis for peace in Europe, which is written down 
in the Final Act (2, II). 
21. With regard to the principle of the inviol-
ability of frontiers called for by the eastern 
countries, as compared with the possibility of 
modifying frontiers by peaceful means as 
requested by West Germany and the EEC coun-
tries by virtue of the solidarity implied by 
the prospect of European union, a generally-
satisfactory compromise was found thanks to 
the clause which placed all the principles on an 
equal footing, thus including the inviolability of 
frontiers and the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. However, Mr. Honecker, General Secre-
tary of the German Democratic Republic, 
recently gave an interpretation of the Final Act 
which seems to deny this clause in that he said : 
"Security, and particularly the inviolability 
of frontiers, have been the key questions of 
our era and the heart of the conference. 
They must be placed at the top of the 
agreements reached. Recognition of this 
principle is and remains the touchstone for 
ascertaining whether a policy really serves 
peace and hence the interest of mankind." 
Such an interpretation is obviously contrary to 
the letter of the Helsinki agreement. 
22. Finally the tenth principle - concerning 
the bona fides implementation of commitments 
entered into in accordance with international 
law - raises a number of difficulties because 
the notion of international law is not very clear. 
A recent article in Izvestia by Mr. Georgi A. 
Arbatov, Director of the Institute of .American 
Studies in the Soviet .Academy of Sciences, casts 
doubt on Soviet intentions in this field. He pur-
ports that the enemies of detente are endeavour-
ing to use the spirit of Helsinki to interfere in 
the internal affairs of the socialist countries and 
stir up a campaign of provocation in order to 
give the impression that the Soviet Union is not 
respecting its undertakings. He wrote : 
"The Soviet Union and the socialist coun-
tries, in recommending the principles adop-
ted in Helsinki, have not undertaken to 
maintain the social status quo throughout 
the world nor to halt the process of class 
struggles and national liberation stemming 
from the objective laws of historical devel-
opment." 
After underlining that "the ideological war 
must be pursued in conditions of detente", the 
Soviet academician continued: 
"It would be a serious mistake to believe 
that the Soviet Union is going to throw its 
frontiers wide open to anti-Soviet works 
which preach violence, pornography and 
inter-racial hate." 
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Any such interpretation of the principles set 
out in the first Helsinki basket falls far short 
of the United Nations Charter since it allows 
the principle of proletarian internationalism to 
assert itself as a basis of law. 
23. It is an interesting fact that Mr. Giscard 
d'Estaing during his recent visit to the Soviet 
Union- and he was the first and only one to 
do so - urged that the agreement in the light 
of the conference should as well be extended to 
ideology in a way to stop the Soviet ideological 
war. It seems as if this was not appreciated by 
his hosts. The interpretation of what really 
makes out the principles has been very difficult 
and will also be in future, as this evidently 
shows. 
24. (b) The second basket probably raised the 
fewest difficulties. It sought to increase econo-
mic co-operation and trade in accordance with 
the wishes of the Soviet Union, its partners and 
the Western EUil'opean countries, the former in 
order to speed up their industrial development 
and compensate for certain shortfalls in their 
agricultural production, and the latter in order 
to find new markets for their output, which was 
particularly urgent because of the sharp econo-
mic recession which started in the West at the 
end of 1973. 
25. Nevertheless, the Soviet request for the 
most-favoured-nation clause to be extended to 
all participants could not be agreed to insofar 
as it would have called in question most of the 
reciprocal advantages of Common Market 
membership. Moreover, it was difficult to define 
a balanced system of reciprocal commitments in 
view of the great difference in the economic 
systems. The future development of East-West 
economic relations will probably therefore be on 
a multilateral as well as on a bilateral basis. 
26. In this period of economic crisis, even limit-
ed development in this field can have a major 
stabilising effect, and in any event the develop-
ment of economic and trade relations between 
East and West can but be a slow process of 
which the Helsinki agreements are only one 
stage. Here too the follow-up of the conference 
will be of the greatest importance. 
27. (c) The third basket meets a condition 
imposed in 1970 by the NATO countries con-
cerning their participation in the conference. 
The western concept was that the development 
of international relations must be linked with 
the liberalisation of exchanges of information 
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and increased possibilities of contact between 
societies and peoples. This stemmed from 
humanitarian concern for those wishing to leave 
the Eastern European countries for family, 
political or personal reasons, and a more general 
desire for a wider exchange of ideas throughout 
the world. 
28. These were the matters to which the Soviet 
Union and some of its allies were most clearly 
opposed since it is certain that they considered 
them to be a step towards western instrusion in 
the internal affairs of the communist countries. 
Although they gave in on the principle itself, 
there is every indication that they are prepared 
to apply the principles defined in the Helsinki 
Final Act only in a most restrictive manner, of 
which there already have been some examples. 
In this connection, the fate of Soviet Jews 
wishing to emigrate will be a test. 
29. However, extreme caution must be shown 
in insisting on the practical application of these 
principles. If detente started in a system of 
democratic societies, and opened up the eastern 
countries it might have a disquieting effect. 
Though it might as well help democratic socie-
ties to stabilise their own system in a positive 
way: your Rapporteur's opinion is that a coun-
try taking part in detente and genuine partner-
ship on a wide scale should be prepared to 
review and if necessary improve the effec-
tiveness of its own system. In any case there 
must not necessarily arise repercussion on 
security and peace : this eventual danger was 
included in the risk of the conference of which 
everybody could be aware in advance. Likewise 
it is not unknown that in the eyes of the Soviet 
Union peaceful coexistence is based merely on 
the renunciation of military means for imposing 
a type of society. The Western European coun-
tries are aware of the fact that the Soviet Union 
and its allies have no apparent interest in reduc-
ing political and ideological tension between the 
liberal and the communist societies. This is not 
peace as the Western European countries under-
stand it and surely it must not be forgotten that 
the Helsinki agreement is not a peace treaty. 
30. Nevertheless the British proposal for all 
countries to allow journalists freer access was 
accepted and allowed considerable hope of pro-
gress towards the opening of frontiers. However, 
in practice the Soviets have so far refused any 
requests in this sense, arguing quite fairly that 
such opening was subject to bilateral agreements 
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and the Helsinki Final Act had only defined 
principles. 
31. (d) The fourth basket concerns follow-up 
action. Until the last moment, the western 
powers were extremely reserved about creating 
any follow-up body, fearing in particular that 
an all-European body for political co-operation 
might - in practice and above all in the eyes 
of public opinion - vie with the bodies already 
existing in Western Europe for co-operation. 
They probably also feared that the prospect of 
a continuing body might encourage the inde-
finite postponement of a number of matters 
which they considered should be settled at the 
conference itself. lt was mainly the smaller 
Eastern European powers and the neutral coun-
tries which were anxious to set up such a body 
because this would give them a possibility of 
continuing to play a role in European policy. 
32. Finally, it was a Danish proposal which led 
to the compromise accepted by the conference. 
This was to postpone for two years a decision 
on the type of action to be taken further to the 
conference. During this time, it would be pos-
sible to examine the problems raised by the 
application of the Final Act and prepare a 
decision on action to be taken. 
33. Your Rapporteur feels that it will be 
essential to pursue multilateral consultations 
on the consequences of the Helsinki con-
ference, on the one hand because it will be neces-
sary to set up bodies responsible for ensuring 
application of the principles set out in the first 
part of the Final Act, with particular regard 
to the arbitration of disputes, and on the other 
hand because co-operation itself, in so far as it 
develops, will raise new difficulties and disputes. 
The inevitable sources of friction must not im-
mediately take on an air of East-West confronta-
tion ; they must be dealt with from a technical, 
not a political standpoint. Thus one might con-
sider setting up a number of committees with 
strictly limited terms of reference for each of 
the fields of co-operation, such as already exist 
moreover in certain bilateral relations between 
eastern and western countries. 
34. When all is said and done, the fears expres-
sed by the West about a follow-up organisation 
now seem quite exaggerated whereas on the 
contrary there is an evident need for constant 
precisions to be given concerning an agreement 
which is in many respects far too vague. The 
very nature of the Helsinki agreements leaves 
little likelihood of real competition between all-
European co-operation and co-operation between 
the Western European countries which is now 
leading towards a real European union. From 
the beginning no sympathy was shown by the 
Soviet Union for the EEC, but recently this 
attitude seems to be changing and the Final Act 
of the conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe gives it no new leverage for opposing 
it. 
35. It should be recalled that Western Europe 
has every interest in the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe being more than 
recognition of the status quo coupled with a 
declaration of principles which is not binding. 
On the contrary, it has everything to gain in 
finding means of showing constantly in which 
fields, to what extent and in which frameworks 
these principles could and should be applied. 
36. Therefore it is important to point out that 
the baskets should be estimated strictly equal. 
Any- follow-up bodies will have to keep that 
carefully in mind. 
37. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe constitutes a whole and its very 
balance is the result of compromise which 
required long and arduous preparation. To upset 
this balance would give precedence to recogni-
tion of territories and frontiers over all the 
clauses concerning co-operation or the situation 
of persons, which is absolutely contrary to the 
aim constantly pursued by the western countries. 
IV. Conclusions 
38. (i) Most of the wealthy industrialised coun-
tries of the northern hemisphere gathered in 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe and jointly defined a code of interna-
tional behaviour. This must not lead to a kind 
of coalition between the industrialised countries 
of the northern hemisphere in face of the devel-
oping countries of the southern hemisphere, and 
the changes in the principles of international 
law being called for by the third world must 
not run up against a coalition of conservative 
powers. 
39. (ii) Although the Helsinki conference recog-
nised the territorial facts emerging from the 
second world war and consequently gave the 
eastern countries the satisfaction they required 
for their security, the West must also receive 
the guarantees which it needs for its own 
security. 
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40. In this context your Rapporteur wants to 
point out the somehow frail situation of Ber-
lin. The way Berlin is fitting in in the whole 
framework of agreements must be looked at 
with a careful eye. 
41. It is not a question of recognising regimes 
or frontiers but of the possibility of reducing 
military expenditure and numbers of armed for-
ces without endangering Western Europe. This 
implies full implementation of the results of the 
mutual and balanced force reduction talks and 
of all the undertakings entered into by the 
nuclear powers in the framework of the non-
proliferation treaty and the test-ban treaty. 
42. The United States has just shown its desire 
to bring the talks on mutual and balanced force 
reductions to an early close by agreeing to in-
clude tactical nuclear weapons in the scope of 
the talks. This should facilitate the search for a 
means of effecting a comparable reduction in the 
forces of both sides and establishing a balance 
of forces in Central Europe since the West, 
which is in a position of conventional inferiority, 
is in a strong position as regards tactical nuclear 
weapons in Central Europe. The Soviet Union's 
response to this major concession will thus be 
followed with interest. 
43. (iii) Clearly the western countries, in the 
same way as the Soviet Union, have much to 
gain from the development of economic co-oper-
ation and trade. It is evident that this is a 
guarantee of the maintenance of peaceful co-
existence and peace. 
44. ( iv) While the western countries reproach 
the Soviet Union for wishing to maintain its 
political, economic and social regime and impose 
it on the Eastern European countries, they must 
not, in the name of European security, hold up 
all economic and social developments on their 
own territory. The opening which the Soviet 
Union has been asked to make must not be a 
one-way affair and the guarantees obtained by 
both sides in the security field should allow the 
free evolution of societies in both West and East 
since this evolution should not jeopardise the 
balance of forces in Europe. 
45. (v) The conference on security and co-ope-
ration in Europe obviously did not establish 
lasting peace overnight. But it would be a mis-
interpretation to consider it as the start of a 
process of "Finlandisation" leading eventually 
to the end of democracy in the West. It would 
be pointless to join Solzhenitsyn in accusing the 
DOOUMBNT 683 
West of relinquishing the values it claims to 
uphold by agreeing to deal with the Soviet 
Union. There is no alternative to coexistence 
and this of course implies that everyone must 
have the right to adopt the political, economic 
and social regime which suits him. 
46. The conference met a common desire to 
bring a dangerous confrontation to an end and, 
merely by setting out principles concerning rela· 
tions between the European States, it has redu-
ced the causes of mistrust and uncertainty which 
might have led to hostilities. The continuation of 
its work and the progressive explanation of the 
provisions of the Final Act can but add to the 
effect of this instrument of collective security. 
The security gained by both sides should lead to 
frank intercourse, to genuine detente. 
V. DiBcuBsion in Committee 
47. This report was adopted by the General 
Affairs Committee on 17th November 1975 by 
15 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. 
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48. ·(i) During the discussion, many members 
of the Committee felt the Rapporteur was over-
opthnlidic regarding the prospects afforded by 
the Helsinki conference. They emphasised that 
the Final Act was not a peace treaty and that 
it was not being applied sufficiently by the mem-
bers of the Warsaw Par.t both in respect of 
advance notice of military manoeuvres, given 
by neutral countries and by NATO but not by 
the Warsaw Pact, and everything included in 
the third basket. 
49. (ii) One member of the Committee, however, 
said that in his opinion the tone of the report 
suited the WEU framework, where it was pri-
marily a question of promoting detente, but 
there were other places, such as the Council of 
Europe, which were more suitable for denoun-
Cing the cases in which the USSR and its allies 
failed to apply the Final Act of the Helsinki 
eon:ference. 
50. (iii) Another member of the Committee felt 
that the report did not show enough confidence 
in detente. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou 
2nd December 1915 
l. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Underlining the need to achieve a progressive reduction in the level of forces throughout Europe;" 
2. After the fourth paragraph, insert : 
"Considering that such a reduction should not result only ·from a compromise between the United 
States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries;" 
3. In line l of the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "nevertheless" and insert "further". 
4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add: "and the creation of further 
imbalance in that area ;". 
Signed: de JJ.iontesquiou 
1. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1975 (Part 1 negatived; parts 2, 3 and 4 adopted). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Vedovato 
2nd December 1975 
In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, replace the word "sovereignty" by "sovereign 
equality". 
Signed : V edovato 
1. See lOth Sitting, 2nd December 1975 (Amendment adopted). 
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by Mr. Steel, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Steel, Rapporteur 
Foreword 
I. Basic facts 
II. Defence problems 
III. Economic problems 
IV. Political problems 
V. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschrnidt 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice. Chairmen); 
MM. Abens, Arnrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett (Substitute : 
Ohannon), Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute: Schwencke), 
MM. Brugnon, Cennolacce, Fioret, Fletcher (Substitute : 
99 
Lord Beaumont of Whitley), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert, 
MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler 
(Substitute: Bizet), de Niet, Peijnenburg (Substitute : 
Voogd), Peridier, Portheine (Substitute: de Koster), Preti, 
Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel, Urwin, Van Hoeylandt. 
N. B. The namea of Re;presentativea who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
DOCUMENT 684 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on Northern European countries and the prospect 
of European political anion 
Considering that by their civilisation, culture and political, economic and social system, the Scan-
dinavian countries belong to Western Europe; 
Noting that economic, political and military factors imposed by the situation of Northern Europe 
now prevent these countries taking their place in a European union with responsibilities which include 
foreign policy and defence matters ; 
Considering that the European Community (which includes Denmark) cannot wait for these countries 
to be in a position to take part in the undertaking before forming a union, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
l. Consider, in the framework of its study on "the possibility that Western European Union might 
undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe", how countries 
of Northern Europe might be associated with this undertaking both in the Atlantic Alliance and in WEU; 
2. Invite the Scandinavian countries to send observers to an ad hoc meeting to study any project for 
the joint production of armaments. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(aubmitted by Mr. Steel, Rapporteur) 
Foreword 
1. This report was drafted after the visit by 
the General Affairs Committee to Norway and 
Denmark from 21st to 24th October 1975. Dur-
ing its visit, the Committee was addressed by the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Chiefs-of-
Staff of Denmark and Norway, and was received 
at the NATO Command covering the northern 
area of Europe. It also had talks with a number 
of parliamentarians, members of the Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committees of the Storting 
and Folketing. 
2. Your Rapporteur obtained most useful 
information during these visits and wishes to 
express the gratitude of the General Affairs 
Committee to the Norwegian and Danish author-
ities for their welcome and the frank and very 
detailed way in which they gave their coun-
tries' points of view. 
3. However, the visits did not allow your 
Rapporteur to deal with all the problems aris-
ing in Northern Europe. He was able to visit 
neither Sweden, nor Finland, nor Iceland. It 
must therefore be borne in mind that this report 
is based on direct information for only part of 
the subject assigned to your Rapporteur. 
I. Basic facts 
4. By their civilisation, economic structure, 
political traditions and culture, the Northern 
European countries are very close to the coun-
tries of Western Europe. They definitely belong 
to the western and European community. How-
ever, there are differences in respect of defence 
and membership of international organisations. 
An additional fact is that in spite of wide unity 
in their civilisation, circumstances have made 
individual Northern European countries follow 
different courses and they have a different 
approach to their relations with the countries of 
Western Europe. 
5. However, despite these differences, which 
relate to membership of specific organisations 
or accession to specific treaties, your Rapporteur 
feels that there is far greater similarity between 
the behaviour of these countries at international 
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level than might appear at first sight. This is 
mainly due to their geographic situation. 
6. The Scandinavian world looks quite dif-
ferent depending on whether one looks at a map 
of Europe and a map of the world drawn up 
in accordance with Mercator's projection, or at 
a map having the North Pole as its centre. In the 
first case, the Scandinavian countries and their 
dependencies look like a sort of northern flank 
to the European and Atlantic world, a very 
extensive one at that, which can immediately 
be seen to be a weak point of western defence. 
In the second case, the Scandinavian world 
appears to be a portion of the polar area hem-
med in by North America and the Soviet Union. 
It controls the majority of the ice-free pas-
sages between the Soviet Union and the Atlantic 
and therefore occupies a crucial strategic posi-
tion. Moreover, the countries of which it is 
composed are, together with Turkey, the only 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to 
have direct frontiers with the Soviet Union and, 
because of the maritime area which they control, 
they are in contact with the Soviet Union over 
vast expanses. 
7. A relief map shows other aspects of the 
problem. Extending over more than 3,000 km. 
from Denmark's southern frontier to the tip of 
Spitzbergen, these countries have particularly 
difficult communications problems. Norway's 
relief, which is mountainous and intersected by 
deep fjords, and its particularly harsh climate, 
make north-south overland communications very 
difficult for much of the year. The very jagged 
coastline, strewn with numerous almost uninha-
bited islands, makes it extremely difficult to 
defend Norway's coast and the islands in the 
Norwegian Sea. Norway's coastline measures a 
total of some 28,000 km., but only 2,800 if no 
account is taken of the indentations. 
8. Norway is extremely vulnerable. It stretches 
about 1,800 km. from north to south but is very 
narrow, in one place measuring only 7 km. 
across. Aerodromes are rare and most of its 
population of 4 million live in the southern 
coastal area. Agricultural land accounts _ for 
only a little more than 3 % of the territory and 
forests slightly over 21 %, the rest being uncul-
tivated and sparsely populated. 'l'he islands in 
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the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean are even 
more vulnerable, particularly Spitzbergen. 
9. Denmark is in a rather different position. 
It has a slightly larger population but a much 
smaller area. Communications are easier and its 
land links with the Federal Republic bring its 
economy and defence policy into far closer 
contact with those of Central Europe. But Den-
mark has a number of islands separating the 
three straits commanding the entrance to the 
Baltic Sea. Two of them are entirely within 
Danish territorial waters and the Sund is shared 
by Denmark and Sweden. Denmark therefore 
occupies a commercial position on which its 
wealth has been based for many centuries, but 
it also occupies an important strategic position. 
The island of Bornholm in the Baltic controls 
the entry to these straits. 
10. Sweden, which is more highly populated 
and above all more industrialised than Norway, 
is also more isolated from the rest of the western 
world. 
11. Finally, Finland is closely hemmed in by 
Soviet territories and almost its only means of 
communication with the rest of the western 
world is by sea. 
II. Defence problems 
12. The geographic considerations mentioned 
in the previous chapter obviously govern all the 
security problems facing the Northern Euro-
pean countries. To varying degrees, all these 
countries felt particularly threatened by the 
development of Soviet power following the 
second world war. They all felt rather isolated 
in face of this threat, so each country adopted 
a security policy covering both foreign and 
defence policy which took account primarily of 
their own specific situation. In no case did they 
hand over their security to an alliance system 
in which they would obviously not have been 
able to play a decisive political role and which 
might have considered as secondary matters 
which they felt to be vital. These problems can 
however be divided into two categories : the 
Baltic and the North Sea and Arctic Ocean. 
(a) The Baltic Sea 
13. The Baltic Sea is wholly dominated by the 
military, air and maritime strength of the Soviet 
Union and its allies, Poland and the GDR. 
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NATO is hardly in a position to offset this 
power since Denmark and the Federal Republic 
are the only Baltic States belonging to NATO. 
Finland, which found itself with less territory 
after the second world war and lost its outlet to 
the Barents Sea, could base its security only on 
neutrality and its 1948 treaty with the USSR, 
allowing a balance of western and Soviet 
influence on its territory. Even its internal 
policy is largely based on its concern not to 
risk a conflict with its overwhelmingly powerful 
neighbour. It is therefore unable to take part 
in any economic, political or military system 
which would associate it with the West. 
14. Sweden too has adopted a policy of neu-
trality but the relative importance of its popu-
lation, its high standard of living and the 
importance of its industries, particularly in the 
field of metallurgy and branches requiring the 
most advanced technology, have allowed it to 
support this neutrality with a very considerable 
military force. Sweden is still one of Europe's 
leading producers of military equipment and 
armaments, but its outlet possibilities now seem 
to be rather limited. The Swedish army is not 
large enough to allow enough of its indigenous 
production of arms to be sold at reasonable 
prices. Outlets abroad are gradually becoming 
closed to military equipment from neutral coun-
tries. Possible buyers prefer to procure their 
equipment from their allies or powers likely to 
offer them political or military advantages, 
which is obviously not the case of Sweden. It 
may therefore be wondered whether Sweden's 
defence policy will not have to evolve in the 
coming years, Sweden either drawing closer to 
the countries of the Atlantic Alliance in an 
attempt to retain outlets for its arms industries 
there or on the contrary giving priority to 
neutrality even if this means letting its military 
strength decline. 
15. Finally, Denmark has very few armed forces 
and could not defend itself for long in the 
event of a land, sea or air attack. It therefore 
chose to accede to the Pact as soon as the 
Atlantic Alliance was created in 1949. However, 
Denmark plays only a very limited part in the 
integrated defence structure which came into 
being in 1952. Admittedly, in wartime Den-
mark's territory and forces would come under 
NATO integrated command, but in peacetime 
Denmark has not authorised the stationing of 
either foreign military forces or nuclear weapons 
on its territory. It pursues its defence policy as 
a national policy, merely accepting combined 
manoeuvres intended to prepare for a possible 
passage from the peacetime system to the war-
time system. 
16. The main problem for Denmark's defence 
policy stems from the Danish straits. Inter-
national law allows Denmark to decide on the 
conditions for authorising warships to pass 
through these straits. Here Denmark has laid 
down two principles : first, submarines must 
surface to pass through the straits; second, no 
foreign power may have more than three war-
ships in the straits at the same time. It may 
however be wondered to what extent Denmark 
would apply these principles if faced with firm 
pressure from a very great power. It is doubtful 
whether it would run the risk of war during 
which it might, with no means of retaliating, 
suffer considerable damage in order to ensure 
respect for a principle for whose application it 
is the only judge. Nevertheless, the problem 
of the straits is still the hub of Denmark's 
defence policy. Denmark's naval forces are 
relatively strong and are mainly concerned with 
controlling the straits. Its land and air forces 
are smaller, but the volunteer element is larger 
and the Danish Government is aiming at increas-
ing it still further in the coming years. This 
means that the Danish army appears better 
adapted to meeting a limited attack effectively 
and rapidly than to taking its place in a vast 
interallied framework. 
17. All things considered, NATO appears to 
provide Denmark with reassurance, represented 
essentially by American deterrent power, but 
the country is apparently almost unanimous in 
wishing to remain the sole master of its own 
defence. However, Denmark has authorised the 
United States to install bases in Greenland, 
whose defence it can hardly ensure itself. 
18. In the circumstances, it can be seen why 
Denmark is very reticent towards appeals for 
integration in a European defence system. It is 
not very attracted by the prospect of nine-
power European union in which it would not 
have full freedom of action in the defence 
field, and the possibility of joining Western 
European Union appears out of the question at 
present. 
(b) The North Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
19. The North Sea and the Arctic Ocean con-
stitute a potential area of hostilities. Already 
during the second world war the maritime routes 
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to the north of the British Isles and of Norway 
were of considerable importance which increased 
further with the development of submarine 
fleets, strategic aircraft and even ballistic mis-
siles. Murmansk is now the main Soviet naval 
base and it is reported that some fifty of the 
seventy Soviet strategic nuclear submarines 
belong to the Soviet northern fleet. The range 
of Soviet nuclear missiles is still less than that 
of American missiles which compels the Soviet 
Union to send its submarines quite a long way 
away from their base in order to come within 
range of United States territory. This prompts 
the USSR to extend its control as far as possible 
in the Arctic Ocean. 
20. Consideration of the Soviet fleet's outlets 
towards the Atlantic Ocean shows that there 
are only two : one passing through the Nor-
wegian Sea and the North Sea and the other 
lying between 'Scotland, Spitzbergen and Green-
land. The islands belonging to Norway and 
Denmark therefore allow the Soviet outlets 
towards the Atlantic to be controlled. But these 
islands are very sparsely populated and Norway 
has little means of defending them. They are 
also of great importance for the countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance since, in the event of 
world war, it would be essential to close the 
northern outlets to this ocean to ensure the 
security of maritime communications between 
the United States and Europe. Denmark and 
Norway therefore occupy positions which are 
absolutely crucial for the security of the whole 
western world. 
21. Since the end of the war, Norway has had 
to face pressure to ensure Soviet control over 
these islands or at least prevent the West 
installing military bases. In 1944, Mr. Molotov, 
the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked 
Norway to revise the Spitzbergen Treaty signed 
in Paris on 9th February 1920 and confirmed 
by the Act of 17th July 1925. These agreements 
gave Norway the Spitzbergen archipelago sub-
ject to its remaining demilitarised and practising 
an economic open-door policy. Molotov then 
insisted on the Bear Islands being ceded and 
a Soviet/Norwegian condominium for Spitzber-
gen, as well as abolition of the demilitarisation 
system. This would have meant a Soviet strangle-
hold on the northern outlet from the Atlantic. 
These negotiations were unsuccessful, but when 
the war ended the Soviet Union installed itself 
on the Kola peninsula, taken from Finland, 
and in Lapland it now has a frontier of about 
200 km. with Norway. 
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22. The Soviet Union is afraid that the Arctic 
Ocean may be denied to its submarines at the 
level of Greenland because of the overwhelming 
strength of the United States air force in this 
area and perhaps also because of the stationing 
of United States aircraft carriers near its own 
bases around the Aretic Ocean. Soviet interest 
in the islands of the Arctic Ocean has remained 
at a high level and as recently as in September 
1975 there have been reports of increases in 
Soviet forces massed in the Kola peninsula and 
large-scale military manoeuvres close to N orwe-
gian territory. 
23. To meet Soviet threats, Norway has adopted 
a policy intended to ensure both American sup-
port and the possibility of pursuing a concilia-
tory policy towards the Soviet Union. In 1949, 
Norway therefore joined the Atlantic Alliance 
but, like Denmark, refused to have foreign 
forces and nuclear weapons on its territory. 
However, its particular interests, which coincide 
with those of the Atlantic Alliance, led it to 
allow an early warning system and the NATO 
headquarters responsible for allied defence in 
Northern Europe to be set up on its territory. 
Finally, Norway has encouraged the develop-
ment of the NATO mobile force and more inter-
allied manoeuvres on Norwegian territory with 
the participation of Norwegian forees. Because 
of the length of its coastline, communication 
difficulties and the relatively small population 
and army, it would hardly be possible for 
Norway alone to meet any form of attack. Its 
security therefore depends on the possibility of 
its allies bringing in forces very rapidly, such 
forces being if not very numerous at least pro-
perly equipped and trained for combat in the 
country's particular geographic and climatic 
conditions, the north of the country, it must not 
be forgotten, being the most threatened. Tribute 
should be paid to the special expertise of the 
Norwegian forces in the far north, on which 
the rest of the Alliance is very dependent, 
espMially since there is an extremely sensitive 
balance to be maintained between forces in the 
north of Norway and the Soviet Union with 
Sweden and Finland playing their part in 
between. 
24. Finally, it should be added that the recent 
extension of territorial waters, the discovery of 
new oil resources round Spitzbergen, the exploit-
ation of oil in the North Sea and the Norwegian 
Sea and certain incidents with unidentified sub-
marines in Norwegian fjords have led to the 
development of a definite feeling of insecurity 
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in Norway in recent years. Furthermore, a new 
defence problem has arisen in the North Sea: 
the vulnerability of oil wells off both the Norwe-
gian and Scottish coasts to attack by interna-
tional terrorist groups. A binding factor may 
however be the necessity for oil and gas in the 
Norwegian sector of the North Sea to be landed 
in Britain and Germany because of the deep land 
fault between certain of the fields and the 
Norwegian coast. 
25. All these considerations mean that, like 
Denmark, Norway's security can be ensured only 
by a combination of a degree of independence in 
its foreign policy and the reassurance offered by 
NATO. Finally, the special strategic position of 
Iceland must be noted from the point of view 
of communications between Northern Europe 
and the United States and also for monitoring 
Soviet aviation or fleet movements towards the 
Atlantic Ocean. Although Iceland is a member 
of NATO, it has no armed forces which means 
its security depends entirely on the United 
States. 
26. But in the case of Norway this reassurance 
is given mainly by the American fleet deployed 
in the Northern Atlantic, by American bases in 
Greenland (which is Danish territory) and the 
NATO mobile force. Indeed, the question whether 
the Americans would use nuclear weapons to 
help Norway in the event of a limited attack 
hardly arises, for it cannot be thought that a 
great power would run the risk of nuclear war 
for such sparsely populated territories. In this 
case, NATO conventional forces therefore play 
an essential role. 
27. On the other hand, a European defence 
organisation, if ever one were set up, would 
probably not be able to offer Norway the equiva-
lent of what the United States offers in the 
security field. Your Rapporteur felt that while 
Norway was prepared to show very real interest 
in any efforts to set up a European political 
and military union, it was not thought that 
Norway had a place therein. 
m. Economic problems 
28. The countries of Northern Europe have very 
varied economic activities. Everywhere, agri-
culture plays an important role- a primordial 
one in the case of Denmark - and the exploita-
tion of natural resources is essential to the 
economy of Norway, Sweden and Finland: oil 
in Norway, iron in Sweden and wood in all three 
countries. Finally, industrial activities are parti-
cularly important in Sweden. But all these 
countries need to import a large part of what 
they consume and the products they need for 
their equipment. Their balance of payments and 
industrial activities therefore imply the export 
of a large part of their domestic production, so 
that trade is particularly active ; in Norway, 
maritime activities are very important. Both 
Norway and Iceland draw considerable revenue 
from fishing. 
29. In such circumstances, the countries of 
Northern Europe have every interest in securing 
the freest possible access for their goods to Euro-
pean and world markets. However, while much 
of Finland's trade is with the Soviet Union, 
Denmark's markets for its agricultural produce 
are mainly within the EEC, Sweden and above all 
Norway, whose trade, on the other hand, is very 
diversified, almost 50 % of which being with the 
EEC. 
30. l\Iany specific economic problems are now 
facing the countries of Northern Europe. 
(a) Fishing 
31. Where fishing is concerned, Iceland is in 
the centre of one of the richest fishing areas 
and, together with Norway, its constant aim is 
to extend the fishing area reserved for its 
national industry. The recent extension of this 
area to fifty miles off the coasts of Iceland stir-
red up a serious crisis in its relations with the 
maritime powers of Europe but this did not 
prevent Iceland deciding in July 1975 to extend 
its reserved fishing areas, as from 15th October, 
to two hundred miles off its coasts. Such a 
measure would seriously jeopardise the interests 
of the other countries of Western Europe and 
in particular those of the United Kingdom and 
Germany. 
32. 1\Ioreover, Norway is envisaging extending 
its reserved fishing area to fifty miles off its 
coasts. 
33. Such a matter cannot be settled unilaterally 
since it calls in question the law of the sea as a 
whole, the revision of which is to be the subject 
of an international conference in 1976. There 
are indications however that Europe could 
obtain a more reasonable attitude from Iceland 
and Norway if, for its part, it were to open its 
frontiers more freely than heretofore to imports 
of Icelandic and Norwegian seafoods. 
4* - Ill 
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34. Fishing accounts for more than 80 % of 
Iceland's exports. This country, whose strategic 
position makes it essential to the defence of the 
North Atlantic, may well be tempted to benefit 
from this situation to obtain the advantages it 
is calling for in the fields of fishing rights and 
although juridically its position has its weak 
points it cannot be overlooked by its allies. 
(b) Oil 
35. After the second world war, it became prob-
able that there was a major oil layer under the 
North Sea, and in 1958 the United Nations 
adopted principles governing the division of the 
continental shelf into national areas for the 
extraction of ores and oil. In 1963 and 1964, the 
North Sea countries adopted a convention by 
Yvhich this division would be made in accordance 
with the half-way line principle. In 1964, the 
United Kingdom granted concessions in its area 
which now cover 112,000 sq.km. and concern 
about 75 oil companies. So far, drilling has taken 
place on about 15 % of this surface. Norway 
granted 78 concessions in 1965, 14 in 1969 and 
2 in 1973, representing a total of 38,000 sq.km. 
Some of these concessions have already come 
back into the hands of the Norwegian State. 
36. Since then, traces of oil have been detected 
in the Norwegian Sea and in the area of Spitz-
bergen. No systematic research or, of course, 
drilling, has yet taken place and no international 
agreements yet exist north of the 62nd parallel. 
The continental shelf is particularly vast in this 
area. Prospecting is made difficult by the depth 
of the water and it is to be expected that it will 
be many years before exploitation can start. 
37. In the Norwegian part of the North Sea, 
known reserves >amount to about 400 million tons 
of oil and 600,000 million cu.m. of natural gas. 
Total exploitable reserves in the Norwegian part 
of the North Sea are estimated at 1 or 2,000 mil-
lion tons of oil and 1 or 2,000 million cu.m. of 
gas. No estimate has yet been made of reserves 
in the Norwegian Sea and round Spitzbergen. 
38. In 1975, Norway will produce about 900 
million tons of oil, which slightly exceeds its 
consumption. 'l'he same applies to natural gas. 
On the basis of known reserves, an output of 
35 million tons of oil and 30,000 million cu.m. 
of gas may be expected in 1978, and 50 million 
tons of oil and 50,000 million cu.m. of gas per 
year as from 1!)81. Even if new discoveries were 
to be made in the coming years, it is unlikely 
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that output would increase considerably before 
1982. This means that by about 1981 or 1982 
Norway will produce from 1 to 2% of the 
world's oil. From then on, output from oilfields 
now known will decline, at least in the case of 
oil, but the output of natural gas will be able to 
continue for far longer. It is thought that 
further discoveries will lead to an output of 
100 million tons of oil by about 1985. 
39. However, it is hard to make estimates 
because the Norwegian Government, which is 
not anxious for its economy to be revolutionised 
too suddenly, wishes to maintain its oil revenue 
at not too high a level. But it is known that when 
discoveries are made, technical, economic and 
political reasons make it difficult to limit exploi-
tation. It is therefore a matter of preventing the 
over-rapid development of prospecting, which 
leaves the Norwegian Government in the dark 
as to the oil future ofrthe country. 
40. Oil exploitation has already led to a con-
siderable transformation in Norway's economy 
since it will shortly become Europe's leading oil 
exporter. The increase in the gross national 
product and State income will be considerable. 
But Norway, which has only 4 million inhabi-
tants, might lose its economic independence to 
oil companies and witness a brutal change in the 
structure and breakdown of its population if the 
State fails to exercise strict control over oil out-
put. 
41. That is why there is widespread discussion 
in Norway on the extent to which the increase 
in prospecting and production of oil should be 
limited. Decisions proposed by the Norwegian 
Government and adopted by the Storting provide 
for output to be limited to about 90 to 100 mil-
lion tons per year. 
42. In support of a rapid increase in output 
is the fear that alternative sources of energy 
will take the place of oil by the year 2000, which 
would thus reduce the value of Norway's 
reserves. The purpose of limiting output is 
naturally to prolong the period of exploitation 
but above all not to increase unduly the wealth 
of a country which wishes to retain its interests 
in the maritime, agricultural and industrial 
fields and not sacrifice its traditional economy 
for the sake of developing oil. Already with an 
output of 90 million tons per year the Norwegian 
economy would be incapable of absorbing all the 
revenue, much of which would have to be invest-
ed abroad. So far Norway has refused to join 
OPEC but intends to apply the tariffs establish-
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ed by that organisation which may bring it into 
conflict with the interests of many other Euro-
pean countries. 
43. In fact, the oil problem has major repercus-
sions on Norway's external relations. First, it 
is to be feared that the resources discovered in 
the Norwegian Sea may encourage the Soviet 
Union to resume with renewed vigour its long-
standing claims to Spitzbergen and the islands 
of the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean. Second-
ly, converging interests have led Norway to 
develop its relations with the OPEC member 
countries. Like them, it would be to its advantage 
to regularise oil output and prices throughout 
the world and certainly also to fix these prices 
at a level which would have to be high because 
the cost price of North Sea oil is considerably 
higher than that of Middle East oil. This is 
already a point on which Norway's interests do 
not coincide with those of the countries of main-
land Europe, although they resemble those of 
the United Kingdom. 
44. At the same time as Denmark and the 
Un~ted Kingdom, the Norwegian Government 
held negotiations for its accession to the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Various factors, 
among which economic considerations connected 
with Norway's oil interests certainly played an 
important part, resulted in the Norwegian 
people rejecting, in a referendum, the accession 
of their country to the European Community. 
45. This decision is now considered final by the 
very people who, at the time of the referendum 
in Norway, campaigned in favour of accession 
to the European Community. It is a reality 
which it appears impossible to reverse in the 
coming years. With the oil question, Norway 
seems in the economic field to be turning far 
more towards the outside world than towards 
Europe, and its evolution may take it farther 
and farther away from the EEC. Thus, it did 
not agree to take part in the International 
Energy Agency in which in any event it would 
have run up against the views of the consumer 
countries of which the agency is composed. 
(c) Trade agreements with the EEC 
46. For the abovementioned reasons, the coun-
tries of Northern Europe were far more satisfied 
with the EFT A system than with that of the 
EEC. 
47. The prospect of the United Kingdom joining 
the European Community was the only reason 
why some of them changed their attitude because 
they were afra~id of two vast markets being set 
up in Europe, one in the East and the other in 
the West, whose protectionism they feared and 
which would have left them on one side. 
48. Since then, the situation has changed. Den-
mark has joined the European Economic Com-
munity, which has the considerable advantage 
of associating it closely with the two principal 
customers for its agriculture : the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic. However, Den-
mark has always been anxious that its wide-
spread economic and trade relations with the 
other countries of Northern Europe should not 
be weakened because of this. 
49. Furthermore, free trade agreements for 
industrial products have been concluded between 
the EEC and all the countries of Northern 
Europe. These are bilateral agreements con-
cluded along the same lines but with implications 
which vary somewhat from one to another. The 
EEC has had such agreements with Sweden 
since 1st January 1973, Iceland since 1st April 
1973, Norway since 1st July 1973 and Finland 
since 1st January 1974. The agreements aim at 
maintaining these countries' trade relations with 
their former EFT A partners, the United King-
dom and Denmark, and bringing their trading 
conditions into line with those of the six original 
members of the EEC in accordance with the 
EFTA system. Joint committees between the 
EEC and each of these countries meet twice 
yearly in order to supervise the application of 
these agreements. The agreements therefore con-
tribute to the formation of a vast trade organisa-
tion covering the whole of Western Europe. 
50. But co-operation between the EEC and the 
countries of Northern Europe does not include 
agricultural produce or, above all, joint policy. 
However, in the Nordic Council, of which Den-
mark is a member, a number of efforts have been 
made to align the economic and social develop-
ment of the various Scandinavian countries and 
there is in fact a degree of economic and social 
community in Scandinavia whose links with the 
EEC are ensured by the presence of Denmark 
in both organisations. 
51. This arrangement appears to work satisfac-
torily for the countries of Northern Europe but 
gives rise to problems, and would give rise to 
still more if the European Community were to 
move at an early date to a closer union and the 
development of joint policies, in the energy or 
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monetary fields for example. In such circum-
stances, it may be wondered whether Denmark 
would be able to fulfil the role of bridge between 
the EEC and the Nordic Council, thus continu-
ing its twofold membership. 
IV. Political problems 
52. In the political field, the countries of 
Northern Europe seem to hold very similar views 
but use very varied means to apply them. On 
the one hand, they are all very reserved about 
any integration in an international community, 
whatever it may be, which would limit their 
sovereignty and freedom of action in the politi-
cal, defence or economic fields. At the same time, 
none of them wishes to remain outside the 
western world and a Europe which is tending 
to become organised. This led them to join 
various organisations : the EEC for Denmark, 
NATO for Denmark, Iceland and Norway, the 
Council of Europe for all these countries plus 
Sweden, and the OECD for all of them. Gener-
ally speaking, they apparently find the present 
situation in Europe and the West fairly satis-
factory precisely because it allows them to choose 
the membership that suits them. 
53. They are probably not wholly satisfied 
because the countries of Northern Europe often 
feel that their points of view do not receive due 
attention from their partners. For instance, they 
would welcome consideration of their special 
problems in the framework of negotiations on 
balanced force reductions in Europe. This desire 
not to be absent or ignored, even by organisa-
tions to which they do not wish to belong, has 
been shown inter alia by the frequent presence 
of Danish or Norwegian parliamentary observers 
at the WEU Assembly. 
54. The following are among the different 
organisations in which the northern countries 
participate in different ways. 
(a) The Nordic Council 
55. The Nordic Council, set up in 1952, groups 
all five Scandinavian countries. Some of its 
originators considered it to be the starting-point 
for very far-reaching integration of all the 
Nordic countries, but their desire to retain the 
individuality of their policies, particularly in the 
defence field, led some of the member countries 
to oppose an extension of the responsibilities of 
the Nordic Council. Sweden, for instance, would 
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consider dealing with defence matters in this 
framework only if defence were based on the 
principle of permanent neutrality, which neither 
Norway nor Denmark could accept. Similarly, 
Finland has tried in recent years to have the 
Kekkonen plan for establishing a denuclearised 
zone in Northern Europe accepted, but this did 
not suit either Norway or Denmark. Further-
more, a plan for a Nordic economic union put 
forward in 1968-69 came to nought. 
56. Centrifugal forces, stemming either from 
history - and above all the recent history of 
the Scandinavian countries - or from the 
influence of external powers, have thus prevent-
ed the Nordic Council going as far as its instiga-
tors hoped. However, this Council has achieved 
worthwhile results, particularly with regard to 
the harmonisation of economic, social and uni-
versity legislation and regulations. A number of 
its concrete achievements deserve that the EEC 
study them closely and use them as a basis. 
57. In the foreign policy field, the Nordic 
Council, which meets twice yearly, has also 
achieved results in the fields with which it has 
been able to deal, i.e. mainly its members' co-
operation in the United Nations and the CSCE. 
58. Norway has a rooted objection to the word 
"union" in any context, arising out of its 
previous submergence in union with Sweden. 
(b) The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe 
59. This conference was followed with particu-
lar interest by the countries of Northern Europe 
which attach considerable value to the two basic 
principles defined in Helsinki : sovereignty of 
States and non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of States, which is inter alia the main 
basis for Finland's independence. Moreover, 
guaranteed frontiers are of special importance 
for the Soviet Union's neighbours, and particu-
larly Norway with the prospect of an extension 
of territorial waters in the Barents Sea. The 
prospect of sub-Arctic oil being exploited as 
from 1977 may in fact give rise to disputes 
between Norway and the Soviet Union about the 
limits of the continental shelf in that area. More-
over, Sweden and Norway have a special interest 
in the clauses concerning notification of military 
manoeuvres near their frontiers and it is noted 
how important it would be for these countries 
if the planned force reductions in Central 
Europe were to be extended to Northern Europe. 
Thus, the Helsinki conference probably improv-
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ed the security of the Northern European coun-
tries. The latter played an important role at 
the conference, particularly Denmark, which 
proposed the basis on which agreement became 
possible on the fourth basket. This means that 
matters relating to the pursuit of the CSCE, 
which the Scandinavian countries want, will be 
followed very closely by them. 
(c) The International Energy Agency 
60. The International Energy Agency, which 
groups the oil-consuming countries, does not 
include Norway, which is probably anxious not 
to find itself bound by undertakings with the 
other partners whose interests obviously differ 
from its own where oil is concerned. At all 
events, Norway has shown great interest in the 
international energy conference to be held in 
Paris, precisely because it seems to meet the 
country's wishes which are, apparently, to recon-
cile its interests as an oil producer with its 
interest in the economic stability and develop-
ment of Europe. 
(d) Nine-power political consultations and the 
European Council 
61. When Denmark joined the European Com-
munities, it was on the basis of the Rome Treaty, 
i.e. the Danish referendum was taken to mean 
a choice in favour of Denmark's economic inte-
gration with the rest of the European continent. 
Since then, the nine-power Community has 
declared its intention to make rapid progress 
with the harmonisation of the member States' 
foreign policies by means of nine-power political 
consultations. Denmark's membership of the 
Community is thus involving it in a course with 
which it is not very satisfied. There is in fact 
a risk of its solidarity with the other Scan-
dinavian countries being called in question since 
they cannot or do not wish to bring their foreign 
policies into line with those of a European com-
munity. Denmark is therefore proving most 
hesitant about the prospect of European union, 
particularly in the political field. Some Danish 
leaders feel that another referendum would be 
necessary should this union become a reality, and 
they do not conceal the fact that the result of 
the referendum might be negative. 
62. Inclusion of defence in the responsibilities 
of the European union would probably not be 
accepted by Denmark. Doth Denmark and Nor-
way consider security to be based on a national 
defence policy with the support of NATO and 
American strength. A truly European organ-
isation is of little interest to these two countries, 
which fear that such an organisation might make 
the United States move away from Europe. In 
fact, if the matter is looked at squarely, it may 
be wondered to what extent any form of Euro-
pean defence organisation whatsoever could 
contribute to the security of Denmark and parti-
cularly Norway. 
63. For all these reasons, political integration 
is rejected by all the countries of Northern 
Europe. Denmark has specific reservations 
(recently reduced) even about electing the Euro-
pean Parliament. On the other hand, the 
Scandinavian countries seem anxious to streng-
then the role of the Council of Europe because 
they feel it could form a bridge between Com-
munity Europe and Northern Europe. 
(e) The diversity of commitments 
64. This twofold concern not to let Europe come 
into being without them but not to lose their free 
will has induced the countries of Northern 
Europe each to seek fields of co-operation with 
Community Europe, provided such co-operation 
does not affect their sovereignty in any way. 
Thus, Denmark and Norway were associated 
with Belgium and the Netherlands in the affair 
of the "deal of the century", and Norway is co-
operating with the Federal Republic in the joint 
production of an air-to-air missile in the frame-
work of the NATO Eurogroup. The multiplica-
tion of projects, programmes and achievements 
of all kinds is probably the form of co-operation 
which the countries of Northern Europe desire, 
but its development requires great flexibility on 
the part of their partners. 
V. Conclusions 
65. The prospect of union, and particularly a 
European political union, obviously brings into 
contrast the federalist views which appear to 
dominate the report submitted by the Commis-
sion in Brussels in June 1975 and the special 
situation of the countries of Northern Europe, 
which cannot and do not want to accept real 
integration. But it is impossible to consider 
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forming a Europe which leaves out the Scandi-
navian world, essential to its security and 
internal balance. It also seems difficult to insist 
that the countries of the European Community 
scale down their progress towards integration to 
a level acceptable to their Scandinavian partners, 
i.e. practically nothing. 
66. Ways must therefore be found of associating 
Scandinavia with Community Europe without 
letting the countries of Northern Europe hold 
up all progress in the field of Community inte-
gration. Europe should therefore : 
( i) pursue progress on political union 
without worrying about what pos-
sibilities the countries of Northern 
Europe might or might not have of 
taking part, leaving them free to 
follow at a later stage ; 
( ii) abstain from insisting that these coun-
tries accede to treaties which they do 
not find satisfactory. The WEU As-
sembly has frequently underlined that 
the modified Brussels Treaty remains 
open to any European and democratic 
countries wishing to accede to it. This 
is certainly very desirable, but there 
is no point in going further and 
insisting that Denmark, in particular, 
join WEU; 
(iii) set up structures which are sufficient-
ly flexible to leave open the possibility 
of a la carte participation. From this 
point of view the report drafted by 
the Commission of the European 
Economic Community in June 1975 is 
too rigid and over-simplified in that 
it rejects such a la carte participation. 
In any event, it must be considered 
that for a long time to come such 
rigidity in the institutions will exclude 
any Scandinavian participation in the 
activities of such a union. Partial 
agreements on trade between the EEC 
and the countries of Northern Europe 
already exist. Such a la carte develop-
ments seem particularly easy and 
desirable in the field of joint pro-
duction of armaments. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the International Institute for the 
Management of Technology 
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Noting with regret the failure of the International Institute for the Management of Technology 
which was established in Milan in 1971 ; 
Considering this failure as a step back on the path of European collaboration and wishing to rescue 
as much as possible of this joint venture; 
Conscious of the fact that Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have not signed the convention setting 
up the International Institute for the Management of Technology but participate in the European Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study, together with all the governments concerned, the possibility of using the institute's premises 
and other assets in Milan for alternative purposes in the interests of Europe ; 
2. Submit the findings of its study to the European Council for implementation. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Ever since the Deanville Conference in May 
1967 on the technological gap between Europe 
and the United States, the Committee has paid 
the closest attention to studies in European 
and Atlantic frameworks on the possibilities of 
narrowing the gap by establishing an internatio-
nal institution for training European executives 
to a standard comparable to that of their Ame-
rican counterparts. 
2. The OECD was instrumental in setting up 
the international institute for the management 
of science and technology in both industrial and 
government sectors - the term "management" 
being used in the widest possible sense. 
3. Several of your Rapporteur's predecessors 
had contacts with competent national authorities 
and members of the OECD working party. The 
Committee followed with interest the setting 
up of the International Institute for the Manage-
ment of Technology, which has its seat in Milan. 
4. The convention on the establishment of the 
International Institute for the Management of 
Technology was concluded in 1971, whereupon 
the institute could start work. According to 
Article 1 of the convention, a joint intergovern-
mental and private non-profit educational and 
scientific institute was to be established with 
the principal object of providing advanced train-
ing for managers in industry and qualified 
teachers and facilities for associated research 
in the management of technological innovations. 
5. The institute's teaching and research activ-
ities were to be developed in close collaboration 
with industry in the member countries and a 
central part of the institute's policy was to 
strengthen collaboration between the industrial, 
government and university sectors. 
6. At the request of the Italian Government 
the institute was established in Milan where th~ 
city authorities, with the support of the Italian 
Government, undertook to provide fully-equip-
ped premises, rent free. A sixteenth century 
convent near the centre of town was to be con-
verted and modernised to provide accommod-
ation for 100 people (originally 350), lecture 
roo~, meeting rooms, a library, computer labo-
ratories and offices. 
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7. Your Rapporteur visited the institute in 
Milan on 22nd August 1975 and was very 
impressed with the renovation of the central part 
of the former Collegia della Stelline. However, 
work on modernising the other two parts of the 
building stopped a year ago. 
8. From the very beginning the institute and 
its leadership had great difficulty in securing 
support from industry. Failure to attain a satis-
factory number of industrial members was a 
major weakness in the institute's development. 
The result was that its income was much lower 
than anticipated and far less young prospective 
managers were interested in following its courses. 
I. Reasons for the failure 
9. Although the city of Milan and the Ita-
lian Government were very anxious for the 
institute to be located there, it took them three 
years (much longer than anticipated) to pro-
vide acceptable accommodation for the institute 
and its officials. It was not until 1974 that the 
international institute could begin working in 
its own premises. Prior to that it had to hold 
its seminars in makeshift meeting rooms or hotel 
rooms outside Milan. This of course did not 
help to build up confidence in the institute. 
10. Moreover, political and economic trends took 
a wholly new turn from the position in 1971 ; 
instead of a continuing interest in the techno-
logical gap, interest shifted radically to sub-
jects dealt with in publications such as those 
of the Club of Rome, zero growth, environmental 
problems, and the 1974 economic and energy 
crisis. Less than before was industry inclined 
to send its executives - particularly junior 
ones - to seminars on the management of 
technology. Although the leadership of the insti-
tute canvassed for new industrial membership, 
its efforts had no success in attracting new 
members. In view of the attitude of their natio-
nal industries the governments concerned were 
reluctant to make up financial deficits. When 
the institute was created it was thought that 
one-third of the costs would be borne by the 
governments, one-third by industry and one-
third met from fees paid by participants in the 
seminars. With two-thirds uncertain, a financial 
crisis arose. 
11. Italy, as well as other countries, was suf-
fering from serious inflation and the purchasing 
power of contributions based on 1971 monetary 
values fell sharply. 
12. In the summer of 1974, a large deficit 
became inevitable and the governments felt that 
the programme of the institute could not be 
continued. A reduction in expenditure had to 
be made and, for this reason, the contracts of 
more than 80 % of the staff were terminated. 
In circumstances in which an educational and 
research programme could not be maintained 
in 1975, the Director-General of the institute, 
Dr. Seetzen, resigned. Practically all of the 
fifty staff members were dismissed. 
13. When your Rapporteur visited the institute 
he was received by the interim Director-General 
who had a staff of only seven. His main tasks 
were to assist the working group established on 
6th December 1974 by the General Council of the 
institute. The working group had the following . 
terms of reference : 
(i) an agreed statement must be prepared 
on the objectives of the institute and 
the general form of its programme ; 
(ii) a review of the management and bud-
getary structure shall be carried out. 
This would be concerned, on the one 
hand, with establishing within broad 
limits the size of the permanent staff 
and reviewing the functions and com-
position of the organs of the institute ; 
and, on the other hand, with the struc-
ture of the budget ; 
(iii) to provide a realistic appraisal of the 
extent of industrial support in the con-
text of the availability of financial 
support and the provision of partici-
pants; 
(iv) to study the question of the fullest 
possible utilisation of the institute's 
building; 
( v) in carrying out its task, the working 
group should maintain close liaison 
with the governing board ; 
(vi) the working group shall provide an 
interim report to the governing board 
by 30th April and a final report by 
30th June 1975. 
These terms of reference indicate clearly in 
which field the difficulties lay. 
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14. In general it can be stated that during the 
preparatory period prior to 1971 the difficulties 
involved in creating a new academic institution 
were greatly underestimated. It was then 
thought that the institute would have to cope 
with some 350 people a year. Finally the facil-
ities prepared were for only 100 people and not 
even all of those were utilised. Industry was 
clearly not prepared to send its staff in suf-
ficient numbers to long or short courses -
one year or six weeks - or to refresher courses 
for senior managers. In this respect the situation 
was not the same in all member countries and 
certainly the Italians, having no business schools 
of their own, were and are quite willing to use 
the institute. On the other hand, no French 
firms and very few German, Austrian and Bri-
tish firms were interested; only one Netherlands 
firm was interested. 
15. Expert meetings arranged by the institute 
however had greater success than more formal 
educational programmes. In particular, a series 
of seminars on "Alternative strategies for the 
energy crisis" organised under contract to EEC 
was considered by the Commission to have been 
successful. 
16. Your Rapporteur wishes to mention in this 
connection that there was a difference of opi-
nion between the French members of the manage-
ment board and the others. From the very 
beginning the former insisted on organising 
long courses - twelve months - the pre-
paration of which naturally demanded much of 
the teaching staff's time in spite of the fact 
that the need for such courses was never estab-
lished. 
17. The French Government's attitude has 
always been one of reluctance and even today 
it has not ratified the convention on the establish-
ment of the institute. The Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the United King-
dom and the Netherlands ratified the conven-
tion in 1972 and Austria in January 1973. Due 
to parliamentary difficulties the Italian Govern-
ment ratified it only in October 197 4, by which 
time the institute's financial crisis was already 
so serious that its very existence was dubious. 
With this last ratification, the convention entered 
into force in accordance with Article 8, which 
required ratification by the State in which the 
institute's headquarters was located. 
18. These legal problems also contributed to the 
failure of the institute. 
DOCUMENT 685 
II. Future prospects 
19. After the institute's four years of existence 
it has become quite clear that there is no need 
for an international institute to promote impro-
ved performance in the management of tech-
nology. Although member countries' govern-
mental and industrial problems caused by econo-
mic and energy crises had become even greater 
than before, the institute received no requests 
for studies to help in solving them. 
20. With this fact in mind, on 21st July 1975 
the governing board of the institute adopted 
a resolution, based on the report of the working 
group, in which it requested the chairman to 
arrange for appropriate consultations to con-
sider alternative courses of action including (i) 
possible association with the European Com-
munity, (ii) the undertaking of independent 
studies of current world problems of technology 
which have socio-economic effects, and (iii) the 
transformation of the institute into an inter-
national technology management meeting centre. 
21. In 1976, the governing board will have to 
take a decision on the future course of action. 
The convention provides for the liquidation of 
the institute. The procedure for dissolution is 
as follows: if all but one party to the conven-
tion denounces the convention, the institute is 
automatically dissolved without action by its 
General Council. The General Council (and not 
the Governing Board) may decide by a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast, including the 
concurring votes of all government members of 
the institute to dissolve the institute under Arti-
cle 8(1) (m) ofthe Charter. 
22. There is a strong feeling in several coun-
tries that since the objective of the convention 
has not been achieved, its failure should be accep-
ted and the venture terminated. Even more so 
since the institute has a poor reputation which 
would be difficult to overcome in order to attract 
the competent people required. 
23. On the other hand, some authorities believe 
that the basic reasons for setting up the institute 
might still be valid and that all the work put 
into the legal structure, the convention, its rati-
fication and the headquarters agreement, should 
be taken into consideration in future plans for 
the institute. Account should also be taken of the 
political implications if one of the few interna-
tional organisations in Italy is wound up. Above 
all, the building in Milan is there, is one-third 
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ready and should be used, if possible, within an 
international European framework. 
24. There are several possibilities: 
(i) The institute could become an agency of the 
European Community either as a conference 
centre, a research centre for economic sciences 
linked to the European University of Florence, 
or as a European meeting place for representa-
tives of national institutes dealing with the man-
agement of technology. 
(ii) It could be made a centre for transferring 
technology to developing countries, especially the 
Arab and African countries. It should however 
be understood that in this case these countries 
would wish to have a say in its management. 
(iii) There might be a need for a transatlantic 
centre for the exchange of civil and military 
technology. It has become increasingly clear that 
in defence technology rationalisation and stand-
ardisation are of the highest priority in West-
ern Europe in order to cut defence costs. Several 
Ministers of Defence have already pointed out 
that defence technology and the standardisation 
of armaments should be dealt with in a Euro-
pean or Atlantic framework. The Assembly has 
often recommended that the Standing Arma-
ments Committee be used as a basis for a Euro-
pean agency for the standardisation of arma-
ments and joint production. However, the ques-
tion is whether an institute dealing with defence 
technology should be established in Italy or 
whether it would not be better to have it in or 
near Brussels in order to work in conjunction 
with the NATO authorities. 
(iv) Finally, the institute could be handed over 
to the Italian authorities to establish a national 
business school. 
25. Any of these solutions might raise objections 
and in particular one might wonder whether there 
is a real need to use the institute for any of these 
purposes. The institute has the advantage of 
being established in Milan which has an impor-
tant international business community and a 
major university, and is acceptable as a central 
meeting place to many people from the develop-
ing countries. Problems common to all countries 
- to industrialists and civil servants from 
national administration or local government and 
municipal administrations - could be usefully 
discussed in the institute in Milan. 
26. As with so many international undertakings, 
its membership does not correspond to that of 
other organisations. For instance, if the Euro-
pean Communities took over the centre the Aus-
trian Government might have objections. Fur-
thermore, countries like Belgium, Ireland and 
Denmark which were not willing to sign the 
convention in the beginning might have objec-
tions to it becoming part of the Community. 
27. Moreover, the international economic situa-
tion has forced many governments to exercise 
the utmost economy and, although the .budget of 
a Community centre would not be very large, 
governments might still feel inclined to set an 
example and refuse to contribute to an institute 
whose existence has not proved a necessity. 
Conclusions 
28. Considering the options open to the govern-
ments of member countries, your Rapporteur 
considers it unwise to continue with the institute 
in its present form. This would involve further 
expense and important new capital outlay where-
as European industry apparently has no need 
for an international institute to improve the 
management of technology. 
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29. The venture should therefore be terminated 
and Article 24 of the charter applied in order 
to dissolve and liquidate the institute. The char-
ter of the International Institute for the Manage-
ment of Technology will then cease to exist, but 
thought should be given to its material assets. 
30. Speaking politically and not juridically, 
your Rapporteur is reluctant to see a European 
venture such as this brought to an end without 
further ado. Although the OECD helped to 
create the institute, the European Community 
should consider itself as its heir, even if the 
heritage has many negative aspects. 
31. The Community is the centrepiece of every 
European edifice. It is building up the Univer-
sity of Florence, and to destroy in Milan what 
is being built in Florence would thus appear 
illogical. 
32. Several possibilities for using the institute 
as an agency of the European Community have 
been referred to and your Rapporteur feels they 
should be given serious thought. He hopes that 
Austria will accept this point of view and that 
the non-signatory countries of the charter -
Belgium, Ireland and Denmark - will give their 
consent. 
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Amendment No. 1 
2nd December 1975 
The International Institute for the Management of Technology 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by MM. Vedovato, Treu and Pecoraro 
1. In line I of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "failure" 
and insert "situation", and in line I of the second paragraph of the preamble leave out "failure" and insert 
"situation". 
2. At the end of the third paragraph of the preamble, add "and that Austria, which is not a member 
of the European Council, has signed it,". 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "study" to the end and insert : 
"to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and, finally, to the European Council for imple-
mentation". 
Signed : V edovato, Treu, Pecoraro 
1. See 11th Sitting, 3rd December 1975 (Parts 1 and 2 adopted; part 3 amended and adopted). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on second-generation nuclear reactors 
The Assembly, 
Considering the need to continue research and development for peaceful purposes in respect 
of advanced nuclear reactors ; 
Aware of the tremendous financial outlay required for the successful conclusion of this research 
and development ; 
Recognising the vast industrial complex required for the construction of these nuclear reactors 
and power plants; 
Conscious of the political and economic advantages deriving from the installation of multi-
national regional nuclear fuel centres ; 
Aware of the advantages of such installations for better guaranteeing peace, security and 
control in respect of nuclear materials, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge the member governments 
1. To formulate a long-term common nuclear energy policy, act immediately on decisions already 
taken in the Community and the OECD, and define the extent of co-operation with the United States; 
2. To promote the further development of the European nuclear power industry to meet the 
increased requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market ; 
3. To make known in national parliaments and European assemblies their opinions on the United 
States proposal for multinational regional nuclear fuel centres. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Following on the reports by Mr. Kahn-
Ackermann on nuclear policies in Europe I, Mr. 
Osborn on a European policy on nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes 2 and Mr. Small on the 
state of European nuclear energy programmes 
- security aspects 3, your Rapporteur wishes to 
pay particular attention to new techniques in 
the building of advanced nuclear reactors. 
2. Military reasons apart, the Committee's 
interest in nuclear energy is due largely to the 
fact that the prosperity and security of the free 
world depends on the availability of an adequate 
energy supply on satisfactory economic terms. 
The free world needs a realistic and economically 
manageable alternative to oil which at present is 
still meeting the major part of the world's 
energy requirements. 
3. As the Soviet Union and, for that matter, 
the People's Republic of China do not depend 
primarily on external sources of energy, the free 
world has the additional responsibility of ensur-
ing that its global defence commitments can be 
met without interference from the oil-producing 
countries. The free world simply cannot accept 
a growing dependence for its oil supplies on a 
handful of unreliable and unstable countries 
which would jeopardise its security, prosperity 
and freedom of action in foreign affairs. 
4. It is absolutely essential for all member 
countries to accelerate the development of alter-
native sources of energy, particularly nuclear 
energy. Although such alternatives may now 
seem expensive, the cost of foreign oil imports 
is likely to escalate steadily and wili certainly 
approach the cost of alternative sources of energy 
supply developed in the western hemisphere. 
5. In Western Europe in 1972, 63% of the 
total primary energy consumption was met by 
oil, 22 % by coal, 10 % by natural gas, 3 % by 
hydro- and geothermal power and less than 2 % 
by nuclear energy. 
1. Document 607, May 1973. 
2. Document 640, May 1974. 
3. Document 655, December 1974. 
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6. Since the oil crisis these figures have of 
course changed as oil consumption has fallen 
considerably. 
7. Recommendations in the Committee's 
reports since 1973 have carried proposals for co-
ordinating European energy policies in order to 
attain a fair division of resources. However, it 
has not proved possible to work out a common 
policy in the Community nor in an Atlantic 
framework. Individual European countries 
started outbidding each other in an effort to 
obtain special favours from the Middle East oil-
producing countries and to secure a privileged 
position for themselves. 
8. The OECD oil committee had some success 
as a forum for exchanging information and for 
co-ordination. It also has established policies for 
emergency stockpiling and has a function in the 
allocation of oil supplies. However, the member 
countries of the Common Market and of OECD 
are not yet convinced that a Community or 
OECD approach would add to their individual 
political and strategic bargaining strength. 
9. All member countries, disappointed by the 
lack of success in such frameworks, have turned 
to national nuclear energy programmes. These 
programmes however involve the construction of 
major nuclear power stations and this has raised 
general environmental problems such as damage 
to nature and possible threats to the health of 
animals and human beings. For that reason a 
second generation of nuclear reactors is being 
studied as a matter of urgency. 
A. Industrial aspects 
10. The Arab embargo brought home the fact 
that oil resources were not inexhaustible and that 
the world could no longer depend on cheap sup-
plies. Electricity utilities were particularly hard 
hit although the embargo placed a great strain 
on the whole economy of the developed countries. 
Funds had to be found to finance other sources 
of energy. 
11. Primary energy might be produced from 
solar, geothermal, wind and tidal power but up 
to now none of these has been able to produce the 
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output needed to feed electricity grids without 
vast, costly and usually unacceptable installa-
tions. 
12. Consequently, there was little choice but to 
turn to nuclear power for which, in spite of 
some problems of application, the advantages 
seemed to outweigh the disadvantages. Distribu-
tion of uranium, although sparse, was better than 
that of most fossil fuels. In 1974, the price of 
uranium ore doubled from $10 to $20 per pound 
but this failed to produce the investment requir-
ed for exploration. Both Canada and Australia 
were more inclined to establish processing indus-
tries in anticipation of exporting enriched fuel 
rather than cheaper ore. 
13. In Western Europe, Eurodif and Urenco 
are competing for enriched uranium proving 
once more that it remains very difficult to main-
tain international co-operation on nuclear mat-
ters once projects reach the commercial stage. 
14. In the United States a government-backed 
attempt to interest private industry in uranium 
enrichment failed. 
15. Whatever price is fixed for uranium, con-
sumption in nuclear power plants is relatively 
low and fuel costs are only a small proportion of 
the total cost of electricity. 'l'his will certainly 
be the case if breeder reactors are perfected. 
16. According to the 1973 Britannica Yearbook 
of Science and the Future, nuclear electrical 
power output in 1973 from the world's nuclear 
power stations totalled 188,000 million kWh or 
3% of the global total from all forms of genera-
tion. Of this, 62,000 million kWh were produced 
by pressurised-water reactors, 60,000 million 
kWh by boiling-water reactors, 44,000 million 
kWh by gas graphite reactors, 17,000 million 
kWh by heavy-water reactors and the balance 
by various other types. In January 1974, 409 
nuclear reactors were in service, under construc-
tion or on order. 
17. On 1st January 1974, the United States had 
42 reactors in service, 56 in various stages of 
construction and 101 on order. The total capacity 
was 204,473 MWe. In the United States as well 
as in France, nuclear power has become highly 
competitive as generating costs are half those 
of oil-burning stations. 
18. In 1974 France made the biggest new com-
mitment of any country to nuclear power and 
the EDF (Electricite de France) ordered thir-
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teen reactors and announced that an additional 
six reactors would be ordered each year for the 
rest of the decade. However, the EDF's plans 
may be modified if the French Government 
decides to prolong the purchasing schedule for 
these reactors. The reactors will be built by 
Framatome under licence from Westinghouse, 
the first twelve being pressurised-water reactors. 
19. As Mr. Osborn pointed out in his report\ 
the United Kingdom's first nuclear power pro-
gramme (Magnox reactors) began in 1956 and 
was completed in 1971. This was followed by a 
second programme of advanced gas-cooled 
reactors ; the programme has been delayed but 
may be completed by 1976. The United Kingdom 
authorities hesitated a long time before deciding 
which type of reactor should be ordered for the 
third programme. Although the Central Electri-
city Generating Board was in favour of the 
United States-designed light-water reactor, the 
government decided to base its nuclear plans on 
the British-designed steam-generating heavy-
water reactor. A capacity of only 4,000 MW will 
be generated by the reactors ordered to be built 
over the next three years. This British design 
is similar to that of the Canadian CANDU 
reactor but will burn slightly enriched as oppos-
ed to natural uranium. 
20. In the Federal Republic of Germany, eleven 
reactors were in use on 1st January 1974 and 
nine more reactors are under construction ; the 
total capacity will be increased to 12,488 MW. 
The fourth nuclear programme involves the 
construction of thirteen reactors with a total 
capacity of 15,542 MW. 
21. Italy has started with three different types 
of reactor but in the new five-year programme 
American-designed light-water reactors will be 
built. 
22. Several smaller industrial countries have 
planned to extend their nuclear capacity but 
their governments are still reluctant to develop 
their·nuclear energy programmes on a vast scale 
before the larger countries have proved the 
viability of their reactors. 
B. The high-temperature reactor 
23. In paragraph 79 of his report on the peace· 
ful uses of nuclear energy, Mr. Osborn mentioned 
1. Document 640. 
that the high-temperature reactor might hold out 
great possibilities for the future and it could 
also be used for industrial and heating applica-
tions, in particular the production of hydrogen. 
In paragraphs 85 and 86, Mr. Osborn mentioned 
the possibilities of building large steelworks 
around high-temperature reactors simultaneous-
ly yielding hot reducing gases and direct elec-
trical power. Present-day techniques with their 
high degree of pollution would thus be avoided. 
24. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that 
security and environmental problems related to 
energy-producing plants are receiving more and 
more attention in public discussions, especially 
the building of nuclear power plants which will 
increase considerably in the near future as a 
result of the rising prices of oil and fossil fuels. 
At the same time special attention will have to 
be paid to these points, especially if the economic 
return is to be equal. 
25. A major step forward in this direction is 
the development and building of gas-cooled high-
temperature reactors which in several member 
countries have had strong government backing 
from the research and development stage on-
wards. Apart from security and environmental 
aspects which, because of the nature of the 
reactor, will be satisfactorily solved, the high-
temperature reactor has a promising future due 
to its technological and energy-political pos-
sibilities and more particularly to the high 
temperature it will generate. 
26. As a result of successful work carried out 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the 
United States, the high-temperature reactor will 
soon be ready for marketing as an advanced type 
of second-generation reactor. In the United 
States it was established that a high-temperature 
reactor of 4,000 MWth would be able to compete 
on a nuclear reactor market ; in Germany this 
stage might be reached when the first 1,160 MW 
research nuclear power plant is built in a few 
years' time in the framework of the fourth 
German nuclear programme. This positive devel-
opment was based on research reactors such as 
the Dragon (United Kingdom), AVR (Jiilich, 
Federal Republic of Germany), the Peach Bot-
tom reactor (United States), the prototype 
nuclear plant at Fort St. Vrain (United States, 
330 MW e) and the Thorium high-temperature 
reactor (Germany, 300 MWe) all of which have 
been developed since 1966 1 • 
1. See Appendix I. 
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27. Contrary to existing water-cooled reactors, 
the advanced thermal reactors have helium as 
coolant and graphite as moderators. Much of 
the interest aroused by the high-temperature 
reactors stemmed from the technical prospect of 
reaching temperatures over 900°. 
28. The development of high-temperature 
reactors goes back to the mid-50s when in Har-
well (United Kingdom) and later in Germany, 
through Brown-Boveri and Company, one of the 
most important stages of development took place. 
In August 1964 the 20 MW Dragon reactor in 
Winfrith became critical. In March 1966 the 
United States 115 MWth Peach Bottom reactor 
became operational and was followed in August 
1966 by the 46 MWth A VR in Jiilich, Germany. 
The Peach Bottom atomic power station HTGR 
Unit No. 1 went into commercial operation on 
1st June 1967. Since that time, it has operated 
extremely well. The plant has been operated on 
both manual and fully automatic control. With 
excellent stability, load changes from 30 to 
100% are readily accommodated under auto-
matic control. It is the world's first nuclear 
power station to produce commercial electric 
power at modern steam conditions of 1,450 psi 
and 1,000°F temperature. The excellent record 
of this plant has been an important step in the 
demonstration of HTGR operation and perform-
ance characteristics. The other two reactors have 
also shown extremely good results since then. 
They have very favourable inherent safety 
characteristics and a very low activity in the 
primary coolant which has the merit of being 
chemically inert and non-toxic. These character-
istics should qualify them particularly for 
installation in industrial areas. 
29. In countries like Germany which have a 
limited coastline and where heat disposal prob-
lems could become very acute, these stations are 
viewed favourably. Moreover, in 1973 the A VR 
reactor had the best results of all reactors in 
Germany apart from the reactor at Obrigheim. 
In 1974 the AVR reactor reached a temperature 
of 950°C. 
30. The 330 MW e high-temperature reactor at 
Fort St-Vrain was built by General Atomic for 
the Public Service Company of Denver, Colo-
rado. This reactor may soon become critical. 
31. In Germany in the summer of 1971, the 
Hochtemperatur-Reaktorbau, together with 
Brown-Boveri and Company and NUKEM began 
building the Thorium high-temperature reactor 
(THTR) with an electrical output of 300 MW e. 
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In 1972 they offered to build a THT reactor 
with an electrical output of 1,160 MWe for the 
Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen A.G. 
Since 1972 the companies have been discussing 
with VEW the best place for building this 
reactor ; the Federal Government supports the 
building of this power plant. 
C. The fast-breeder reactor 
32. The fast-breeder reactor is fuelled with a 
mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, clad 
in stainless steel and made up into very compact 
fuel element assemblies. It relies on the nuclear 
fission of plutonium and uranium 238 atoms in 
an intense flux of high-energy - or fast -
neutrons produced in a highly-compact core 
without any moderator. 
33. All countries actively engaged in the devel-
opment of nuclear power programmes consider 
that the fast-breeder reactor offers the best 
prospects for electricity generation in the 1990s 1 • 
It has the great advantage of producing more 
plutonium than it consumes - this process being 
known as breeding. Prototype plants at an 
advanced stage of construction are being built 
in France and England, i.e. the Phenix and 
Dounreay reactors. 
34. The French project is somewhat more ad-
vanced than the British project and has experi-
enced less difficulties, but both promise a far 
more economic type of reactor. The type of fast-
breeder reactor at the most advanced stage of 
development is the liquid metal cooled fast-
breeder reactor. The liquid metal used to provide 
very efficient heat transfer from a compact high-
power reactor core is sodium. 
D. The gas-cooled breeder reactor 
35. A derivative of both new types of reactors 
is the gas-cooled breeder reactor. This concept 
is based on the advanced gas-cooled reactor and 
high-temperature reactor plant technology and 
engineering experience, as well as on liquid 
metal cooled fast-breeder reactor fuel techno-
logy. 
36. A design group has been set up in Brussels 
by the Gas Breeder Reactor Association to study 
the economics and safety of a commercial 
reactor. The association has a number of full 
1. See Appendix li. 
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members and associate members from most Com-
mon Market countries and from Sweden 1 • 
37. The reason for introducing breeder reactors 
is to minimise uranium ore c~msumption. The 
electricity companies, however, are also taking 
into consideration low operating and mainten-
ance costs. At present it is too early to judge 
how the capital cost of the different types of 
reactors will compare, but the introduction of 
competitive fast-breeder reactors will certainly 
cut back the demand for uranium ore and slow 
down further price escalation. From 1990 on-
wards this will be an extremely important con-
sideration. 
38. The gas-cooled breeder reactor has safety 
advantages inherent in its use of a gas coolant. 
Although the cost of such a reactor is still higher 
than that of current thermal reactors, it is 
generally considered that the system will become 
increasingly competitive. 
39. As research and development is still at an 
early stage, there is every opportunity for inter-
national collaboration and expensive duplication 
could thus be avoided. This would also have 
substantial financial consequences for the coun-
tries participating in the association. · 
E. Fusion power 
40. The attainment of economic and safe fusion 
power has been described as the most sophisti-
cated and difficult scientific programme ever 
attempted by mankind. The fusion research 
programme began in the early 1950s and for a 
long time firm achievements in this field were 
elusive. However, in the last five years there 
have been a number of breakthroughs in experi-
ments throughout the world and their cumula-
tive impact has been to strengthen the confidence 
of the scientific world that the ultimate goal -
1. Full members : AB ASEA-ATOM, Vii.steras, Sweden ; 
Belgo-nucleaire SA, Brussels, Belgium ; Brown-Boveri-
Sulzer Turbomaschinen AG, Ziirich, Switzerland ; Centre 
d'Etude de l'Energie Nucleaire JStudiecentrum voor 
Kemenergie, Bl'llB8els, Belgium ; Hochtemperatur Reak-
torbau GmbH, Cologne, Germany; BV Neratoom, The 
Hague, Netherlands; Nucleare ltaliana Reattori Avan-
zati, Genoa, Italy ; Technicatome, Paris, France ; The 
Nuclear Power Group Limited, United Kingdom. 
AsBOCiate members : Atomkraftkonsortiet Krangede 
AB and Co., Sweden ; Central Electricity Generating 
Board, United Kingdom ; South of Scotland Electricity 
Board, United Kingdom ; Statens Vattenfallsverk, Sweden; 
Vereinigte Elektrizitii.tswerke Westfalen AG, Germany. 
practical f~sion power - will be achieved by the 
end of this century. Research in the United 
States, the USSR, Japan and Europe has shown 
how to produce plasma fusion for fractions of 
a second. 
41. Work in Europe is concentrated on the joint 
European Torus (JET) laboratory under the 
European Community research centre. European 
Community spending on the various associated 
research projects is about $300 million. A five-
year research programme began this year with 
the particular aim of reducing European 
dependence on imported fossil fuels. The fusion 
power programme demands parallel research in 
materials in order to find new alloys and other 
compounds to withstand the extraordinary con-
ditions of such a high-temperature reactor. There 
are various ideas on the best way to heat a gas 
to more than 100,000,000°C. 
42. Advantages of fusion power as envisaged 
today are numerous. Firstly, the fuels such as 
deuterium and tritium can be found all over 
the world and in sea water. The low cost world-
wide availability of these materials would there-
~ore elimin~te international tension caused by 
Imbalance m fuel supply. In addition fusion 
power plants will be inherently safe 'in that 
nuclear leaks are not possible. As no fossil 
fuels are used there will be no release of chem-
ical combustion products. There will be no 
handling or disposal problems since no fission 
products will be formed. On the other hand the 
capital outlay required to produce the f~sion 
reactors will be enormous. New designs have to 
be studied and experiments carried out with 
new materials. Since the benefit at stake is that 
of unprecedentedly clean and plentiful power 
the obvious course is to make the effort to find 
the initial capital outlay in order to achieve 
fusion power. 
F. Regional nuclear fuel centres 
43. In his address to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on 22nd September 1975 Dr. 
Henry Ki~inger, United States Secretary of 
State, outlmed the need to collaborate in nuclear 
energy matters. He stated : 
"The world faces a paradox with respect 
to the proliferation of nuclear energy. Men 
have fashioned from the atom weapons 
which can in minutes end the civilisation of 
centuries. Simultaneously, the atom is fast 
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becoming a more and more essential source 
of energy. 
It is clear that the cost and eventual 
scarcity of oil and other fossil fuel will 
increasingly spread nuclear power around 
the world in the decades ahead. 
But the spreading of nuclear power poses 
starkly the danger of prolifera.ting nuclear 
weapons capabilities - and the related risks 
of the theft of nuclear materials, blackmail 
by terrorists, accidents of the injection of 
the nuclear threat into regional political 
conflicts. Now is the time to act. If we 
fail to restrain nuclear proliferation, future 
generations will live on a planet shadowed 
by nuclear catastrophe. 
Over the past year, the United States has 
repeatedly urged new efforts among the 
supplier States to strengthen and stan-
dardise safeguards and controls on export 
of nuclear materials. We must not allow 
these safeguards to be eroded by commer-
cial competition. We must ensure the broad 
availability of peaceful nuclear energy 
under safe, economical and reliable con-
ditions. 
The United States has intensified its efforts 
within the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and with other nations to broaden 
and strengthen international standards and 
safeguards and has proposed an inter-
national convention setting standards to 
protect the physical security of nuclear 
materials in use, storage or transfer. 
The United States continues to urge the 
widest possible adherence to the non-pro-
liferation treaty and the associated safe-
guard measures of the IAEA. 
The greatest single danger of unrestrained 
nuclear proliferation resides in the spread 
under national control of reprocessing facil-
ities for the atomic materials in nuclear 
power plants. The United States therefore 
proposes- as a major step to reinforce all 
other measures- the establishment of mul-
tinational regional nuclear fuel cycle cen-
tres. These centres wouJd serve energy needs 
on a commercially sound basis and encour-
age regional energy co-operation. Their 
existence would reduce the incentive for 
small and inefficient reprocessing facilities, 
limit the possibility of diverging peaceful 
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nuclear materials to national military use, 
and create a better framework for applying 
effective international safeguards." 
44. The idea behind reprocessing, also known 
as recycling, is to recover uranium and pluto-
nium from the spent fuel from nuclear power 
plants. The plutonium recuperated is then mixed 
with natural uranium to provide the fissionable 
element for ·refuelling nuclear power plants. 
45. Although there are several reprocessing 
plants in the world and others planned, none are 
operating commercially because of economic and 
technical difficulties. The generation of electri-
city through nuclear power has not yet reached 
a scale where it would be economically viable 
to operate reprocessing plants since these are 
extremely expensive to build and run. Even in 
the United States where fifty-five commercial 
nuclear power plants are operating, the oper-
ation of a reprocessing plant is not viable. Ura-
nium supplies are adequate and the cost of ura-
nium does not yet warrant the building of a 
recycling plant. 
46. However, countries developing nuclear pro-
grammes have been seeking reprocessing facil-
ities ; for instance, Germany agreed to sell a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle, including repro-
cessing plants, to Brazil. Other countries, like 
South Africa, want the same facilities. It is quite 
clear that co-operative centres would make it 
easier to make important savings and at the 
same time they would enhance security and 
safeguarding arrangements. To group all the 
plutonium in one region in a single centre would 
have a significant advantage in preventing its 
diversion to weapons. Although control over such 
regional centres is an open question, the United 
States would like it to be associated with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 
which currently supervises the safeguarding of 
nuclear plants. 
47. As proposed by the United States Secretary 
of State, Dr. Kissinger, the multinational regio-
nal fuel cycle centres would contain other facil-
ities besides reprocessing plants, i.e. a storage 
facility where spent fuel would await reprocess-
ing, waste disposal plants and uranium enrich-
ment facilities. If the latter were also added this 
would bring together the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle. 
48. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that this 
American proposal is of the highest importance 
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and should be studied by Western Europe. It 
could have military, political and economic con-
sequences and its adoption would have a strong 
influence on the building of second and third 
generation nuclear power plants. 
Conclusions 
49. It is evident that the European govern-
ments and the Communities must continue and 
further increase their efforts to develop 
advanced nuclear reactors - high-temperature, 
fast-breeder, gas-cooled breeder reactors - as 
well as fusion power. 
50. It is vital to hasten the development of 
these advanced reactors if Europe, which is 
almost wholly dependent on external sources of 
energy, is not to come under pressure from 
without. Europe should and will be able to safe-
guard its own security, prosperity and freedom 
of action if it unites in financing the research 
and development of the new reactors and lays 
the industrial foundations for building power 
plants. 
51. It is regrettable that at this very moment 
the British Government wishes to withdraw from 
the OECD Dragon project. This high-tempera-
ture reactor (based at Winfrith, Dorset, in the 
United Kingdom) is of major importance in the 
development of high-temperature reactors. 
52. This type of reactor has considerable poten-
tial, especially since the European Nuclear 
Steelmaking Club is of the opinion that tempera-
tures of between 800 and 850° C will be required 
for steelmaking whereas earlier assumptions had 
estimated a requirement of 1,000° C for pro-
ducing steel. 
53. Another reason for promoting advanced 
reactors is because present nuclear technology 
is within reach of such countries as Brazil, 
Pakistan, South Korea, Iran, Iraq and Israel 
which may even seek to buy plants for separat-
ing plutonium from spent fuel rods. These plants 
could enable them to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. At present the only use for plutonium 
is in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but 
in the near future it will also be required for 
fast-breeder reactors. 
54. The only way to prevent such a dangerous 
development would be to restrict plutonium 
separation plants to multinational regional 
nuclear fuel centres where plutonium could be 
extracted, adulterated against use for weapons, 
and then economically made into new fuel rods 
with maximum security against theft or diver-
sion to weapons production. 
55. Since advanced nuclear reactor develop-
ment is too costly for any one country - the 
nuclear superpowers apart - it is obvious that 
international co-operative projects will have to 
be established. Such projects would in fact 
exclude nuclear weapons development and pre-
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pare the way for the acceptance of multinational 
regional fuel centres. 
56. Your Rapporteur trusts the Council will 
concur with this view. It should be noted that a 
$500 million chemical reprocessing plant serving 
thirty giant nuclear power plants would be 
necessary to reach the economic threshold at 
which the recycling of plutonium might be com-
mercially feasible. 
57. Bearing in mind the uncertainties inherent 
in long-term planning, these points have been 
incorporated in the draft recommendation. 
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Table of HTR reactors 
Name Country Electricity First year production of operation 
In operation 
Dragon United Kingdom 8 MWe 1964 
Peach Bottom United States 40 MWe 1966 
AVR Federal Republic of Germany 15 MWe 1966 
U ruler construction 
Fort St. Vrain United States 330 MWe 1975 
TBTR Federal Republic of Germany 300 MWe 1978 
Planned 
Delmarva United States 2 X 770 MWe 1981* 
VEW Federal Republic of Germany 1,160 MWe 1983 
GIGI Federal Republic of Germany 1,160 MWe 1985 
Plants in Europe 50,000 MWe till 1995 
100,000 MWe till 2000 
• Plan liable to be withdrawn. 
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Technical data on prototype breeder reactors in Europe 
USSR United Kindom France Fed. Rep. of Germany /Benelux 
Technical data. 
BN 350 BN 600 PFR PM nix SNR 300 
Reactor output : 
thermal (~th) 1,000 1,<170 600 600 760 
electric (~e) 350 600 250 250 300 
Fuel Pu02 /U02 Pu02/U02 Pu02 /U02 Pu02fU02 Pu02/U02 
Volume of core 1,900 2,350 1,320 1,150 1,750 
Maximum output of rods (W fcm) 470 500 450 430 368 
Loading principle swivelling swivelling swivelling swivelling swivelling 
cover cover cover cover cover 
Primary heat-transmission system (type) Loop Pool Pool Pool Loop 
Coolant Na Na Na Na Na 
Number of circuits 6 3 3 3 3 
Temperature of coolant : 
at entry (OC) 300 380 400 400 380 
at outlet (OC) 500 550 562 560 546 
Number of steam generators 6 3 3 3 3 evaporators and 
3 super-heaters 
per circuit 
Condition of steam (at entry of turbine): 
temperature (OC) 435 505 513 510 495 
pressure (atm) 50 140 163 163 163 
Site Shevchenko Beloyarsk Dounreay Marcoule Kalkar 
Date of coming into service 1972 Under 1975 1973 1980 
construction 
I. j, 2.. 
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Lenzer, Lewia, Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Pecoraro, 
Schmitt, Schwencke, de Stexhe, Treu, Valleix. 
N.B. The namea of Repreaentativea who took part in the 
vote are printed in italica. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on United Statea-European co-operation 
in aduanced technology 
DOOUMlDNT 687 
Aware of the politica.l a.nd technologica.l necessity for Western Europe a.nd the United States to 
co-opera.te in such fields of advanced technology a.s space, nuclear energy, oceanogra.phy, computers a.nd 
electronics ; 
Conscious of the fact tha.t the Soviet Union has a highly-developed industry for civil a.nd military 
products of a.dva.nced technology which makes it the greatest power on the Eurasian continent ; 
Satisfied tha.t joint Europea.n-America.n space ventures undertaken to da.te ha.ve been successful 
a.nd tha.t the Spacela.b project is progressing smoothly ; 
Fearing that the space shuttle flight will constitute the end of the Europea.n Space Agency's par-
ticipation in the Spacelab programme ; 
Fearing, further, tha.t in the a.bsence of new major space programmes in the United States or Europe 
there will be no further activities for this a.ssocia.tion ; 
Considering the budgetary restrictions in both the United States a.nd Western Europe ; 
Regretting tha.t in many other fields of advanced technology Western Europe has not organised 
itself so well as in space matters and that co-opera.tion with the United States has therefore proved to be 
far more complicated, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. After reviewing the present policies and varying a.pproa.ches of member countries, promote and 
develop an overall European policy in advanced technology in order to guarantee Western Europe's place 
in the world and foster fruitful co-operation with the United States ; 
2. Give active considera.tion to Europe's need for an oceanographic authority of its own a.nd arrange 
for such a. body to be formed in the framework of an existing European organisation ; 
3. In liaison with the European Space Agency, join the United States Government in working out 
an advanced space progra.mme for future joint payload development for the Spa.cela.b a.nd the shuttle. 
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Draft Resolution 
on setting up a European technology Cl88essment body 
The Assembly, 
Considering the setting up of a.n Office of Technology .Assesi:'ment by. the United States Congress 
to provide effective means of helping its members to assess the impact and shortcomings of technological 
programmes put forward by the Administration ; 
Considering also the initial tasks of that office which were related to oceans, transportation, energy, 
materials, food and health ; 
Realising the high cost of such an office, but convinced that in a. European framework it would be 
extremely useful in assisting a. European parliamentary contribution, 
INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 
To study the possibility of setting up a. European technology assessment body accessible to all Euro-
pean parliamentarians so that they may form a. considered opinion on political decisions taken in the field 
of advanced technology. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Montesquiou, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. When the Committee visited the United 
States from 17th to 21st March 1975 it had two 
meetings with the Committee on Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences of the United States Senate1 
during which it was pointed out that one of the 
fundamental difficulties in United States-
European political relations stemmed from the 
fact that Western Europe was not yet united 
and therefore did not yet possess an effective 
overall administration and government. All 
important policy decisions have to be referred 
back to national governments which in turn have 
to satisfy the interests of many different groups 
such as industry or trades unions. 
2. In the technological field many reports 
recommendations and resolutions have been mad~ 
but the results so far have been slender. Never-
theless, with the extension of the Soviet Russian 
empire to most of the northern Euro-Asian land-
mass, "Europe" has been reduced to Western 
Europe alone and it has become evident that 
Europe has to co-operate with the United States. 
Immediately after the war, the Marshall plan 
was implemented, followed by the formation of 
a number of civil and military organisations, all 
more or less based on the need to remain free of 
Soviet Russian influence and power. 
3. As the Soviet Union now has a highly-
developed industry for the production of 
advanced technological civil or military items, the 
threat to Western Europe is more pronounced. 
In the nuclear, space, military and many other 
fields the Soviet Union has become the greatest 
power on the Eurasian continent. If Europe is 
not to fall behind, it must make a far greater 
effort to combine its resources in order to be 
able to collaborate with the United States and 
attain its goals. 
4. Your Rapporteur pointed out to the Senate 
Committee that although Europe realised the 
need for the Soviet-American dialogue which had 
led to the joint Soviet-American Soyuz-Apollo 
flight, he feared this collaboration might lead 
to a situation whereby Soviet astronauts and 
technicians would learn far more from the ex-
1. See Appendix II. 
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change than their American counterparts and 
consequently draw even further ahead of West 
Europeans in this field. 
5. In Appendix I on the visit to the United 
States, your Rapporteur has given detailed con-
sideration to the various aspects of space policy 
and wiN. therefore not go over this ground again 
here. His remarks on the space issue will be 
brief. Other issues to be discussed in the report 
are present ways and means of European-
American collaboration in advanced technology. 
This takes place in OECD and NATO and 
bilaterally between the United States and indi-
vidual Western European countries. There is of 
course, collaboration between Euratom and 'the 
United States in the nuclear field. 
A. The Community approach 
6. As soon as Euratom started its work in 
1956 it was decided that it should co-operate 
closely with the United States in the peaceful 
applications of atomic energy. By 1958, a basic 
agreement had already been concluded in which 
it was decided that Euratom and the United 
States would co-operate in programmes for the 
advancement of the peaceful apP'lications of 
atomic energy. This agreement was followed by 
a number of co-operation agreements on the 
building of reactors. In 1961 an agreement was 
concluded on the procurement of 140 kilos of 
uranium 235 from the United States. Several 
amendments to these agreements were accepted 
and in November 1974 Euratom and the United 
States agreed a convention on the exchange of 
scientific and technological information in the 
nuclear field. 
7. However, alii. these agreements and conven-
tions have not amounted to very much mainly 
because the different European countries have 
different attitudes towards the application of 
certain articles of the Euratom Treaty. The more 
the nuclear energy problems became industrial, 
the more difficult it became to find a common 
attitude, and co-operation with the United States 
lapsed with the result that several countries such 
as the Federal Republic of Germany and France 
conc1uded ·separate agreements with the United 
States. 
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8. During the 1974 meetings which the Federal 
Chancellor and the French President had with 
President Ford, it was agreed to collaborate in 
research and development in several fields, and 
particularly that of energy resources. 
9. There has not been much further develop-
ment since the initial common nuclear program-
mes concluded between the United States and 
Euratom. Present-day developments are con-
sidered particularly from an angle of security 
and are discussed more full~ in the report sub-
mitted by Mr. Lenzer on second-generation 
nuclear reactors 1 • 
B. The Atlantic AlUance approach 
10. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation was created to allow co-operation between 
its members in the event of an armed attack, 
Article 2 of the treaty also states that: "the 
parties will contribute towards the further 
development of peaceful and friendly interna-
tional relations by strengthening their free insti-
tutions, by bringing about a better understand-
ing of the principles upon which these institu-
tions are founded, and by promoting conditions 
of stability and well-being." In 1969, the NATO 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
was created in order to orient the technology and 
industry of member countries towards a better 
quality of life. In this framework eight areas 
are being followed: coastal water pollution, 
advanced heaJlth care, advanced waste water 
treatment, urban transportation, disposal of 
hazardous wastes, solar energy, rational use of 
energy and air pollution. 
11. In his May 1973 report on nuclear policies 
in Europe 2, Mr. Kahn-Ackermann proposed that 
a common energy policy should be formulated 
on a basis of equality between Europe and the 
United States and that an approach similar to 
that of the NATO Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society should be adopted. He con-
sidered that this would help to reduce the cost 
of nuclear energy and perhaps of nuclear weap-
ons. In its reply to Recommendation 235 con-
tained in that report, the Council said: "It is 
too early to predict the lines along which co-
operation with the United States will proceed 
I. Document 686. 
2. Document 607. 
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as overall European policy on the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy develops." 
C. The OECD approach 
12. The oil crisis has clearly emphasised the 
worldwide significance of energy supplies. A 
logical consequence was that the highly indus-
trialised countries co-operating in the framework 
of OECD shoUJld join together under the auspices 
of that organisation. In 1974 the OECD publish-
ed an important report on energy prospects in 
1985 which contained an assessment of long-term 
energy developments and related policies. It 
stated that international co-operation between 
OECD countries on energy and related policy 
was urgently required. The main areas for inter-
national co-operation within OECD in energy-
related fields are the following: 
- a concerted effort in conservation of 
energy; 
- accelerated development of OECD indi-
genous resources and intra-OECD energy 
trade; 
- provision of adequate mechanisms for 
lowering the risk of financial and mone-
tary instabilities related to energy 
imports; 
- co-ordination of energy research and 
development; 
- co-ordination of new efforts to overcome 
growing environmental problems. 
13. At world level is the dialogue proposed by 
France between the oil-producing countries, the 
industrialised consumer countries and the non-
oil-producing countries. Here too Europe can 
make an important contribution. 
14. OECD is conducting work on civil techno-
logical aspects which is important from the point 
of view of research and technology policy. This 
European-American co-operative structure is not 
and never was intended to be exclusive. It is a 
structure to which Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada have adhered. This col-
laboration should, however, be strengthened in 
order to withstand attempts at disruption by the 
Soviets. As is well known, every effort towards 
European unity, especially in advanced techno-
logy, has sparked off Soviet resistance and this 
is increasing with the growth of American-
European collaboration in this field. 
D. Co-operation in specific fields 
(i) Space 
15. Present-day developments in space are a 
good example of the successful division of effort 
and co-operation. It is obvious that the risks and 
costs of space technology exceed the means of 
individual European countries and on 15th April 
1975 the convention setting up the European 
Space Agency was signed in Brussels. 
16. The new agency is continuing the ESRO 
satellite programmes and has also included in its 
working programme the Ariane launcher and the 
Spacelab to go with the American shuttle. The 
agency will also elaborate and implement an 
industrial policy appropriate to its programme. 
17. This is very necessary as Europe has to stay 
in the forefront of developments in advanced 
technology. It must produce high quality indus-
trial products such as aircraft, a complete nuclear 
power plant or a communications satellite system 
in order to be able to import its necessary raw 
materials and minerals. Its position is basically 
different from that of the Soviet Union, the 
United States and China as, apart from coal, it 
has to import its materials and energy resources. 
It is not by exporting bicycles or textiles that 
the necessary funds can be raised. 
18. The new space agency has provided Euro-
peans with the chance to work together with the 
Americans in the post-Apollo programme 1 • Your 
Rapporteur will not go into further detail, but he 
wishes to point out once again that the inter-
governmental agreement on Spacelab stresses the 
importance of co-operation between the United 
States and Europe over and above the shuttle. 
However, both sides will then have to draw up 
a programme and these programmes will have to 
be co-ordinated. For the moment the Americans 
are hesitant about committing themselves and 
this for both political and financial reasons. Nor 
has there been any discussion on the European 
side, and it is regrettable that the convention set-
ting up the agency makes no mention of regular 
meetings at ministerial level, this being the only 
level at which a long-term policy can be formu-
lated. 
19. For the short term, the roles of Europe and 
America in the use of Spacelab should be speci-
fied. In the scientific field no great problems 
1. See Appendices. 
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are likely to arise, but the situation is quite 
different for applications. As far as possible, 
American industry wants to recuperate its 
investments in space in general and in applica-
tion satellites in particular. Only a short time 
ago the data collected by its earth resources 
satellites were made available free of charge 
whereas now a charge is made. This change of 
attitude shows the direction of American 
thinking. 
20. When the Committee visited Japan in 1973 1 
it became clear that the Americans would not 
provide Japan with hardware and know-how if 
the Japanese were prepared to accept them from 
European competitors too. As the Japanese had 
political reasons for maintaining special relations 
with the Americans, they avoided answering the 
Committee's questions on Japanese-European 
space co-operation. 
21. Nevertheless, the American space effort has 
been conducted openly and its results have been 
shared with many nations. More than eighty 
countries have joined NASA in co-operative 
space flights and ground-based projects. 
22. Important bilateral projects such as the 
German-United States sun probes, the Franco-
American satellite project on information on 
oceans, the aerial navigation satellite, the world-
wide meteorological programme and many others 
indicate the amount of space co-operation which 
has already taken place and which is continuing. 
(if) Oceanography 
23. In the beginning of 1970 the United States 
and the Soviet Union introduced a new draft 
treaty to prevent the deployment of nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 
on the world's seabeds. Important scientific and 
technological discoveries had made possible 
practical exploration of the seabed and ocean 
floor. The United States and the Soviet Union 
had made rapid progress in the field of oceano-
graphy and its associated technology. The fact 
that last year the American oceanographic ship 
Glomar Challenger was able to bring to the 
surface a Soviet nuclear submarine, indicates the 
military importance of oceanography. At the 
same time, mining of the ocean floor is now 
possible since new techniques have been develop-
ed for bringing polymetallic nodules to the sur-
1. See Document 617. 
DOCUMENT 687 
face. One American firm, Deepsea Ventures Inc., 
has already started exploitation. 
24. In the United States the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) co-ordinates all work in these fields. It 
operates its own satellites - the NOAA environ-
mental satellites - which provide twice daily 
global coverage of the earth's atmosphere and 
oceans. 
25. In Europe several efforts have been made 
to organise national activities. Oceanography 
and meteorology were included in the programme 
of the so-called COST group of the Communities, 
but no real progress has been made. The main 
reason is that, apart from France, the member 
countries' oceanographic activities are dispersed 
between several departments and institutions 
with the result that in Europe large sums of 
money are spent on oceanography with consider-
able duplication of effort. 
26. Co-operation with the United States is there-
fore haphazard and bilateral rather than Euro-
pean-American. 
27. The American budget is oriented towards 
exploitation of the oceans, protection of the 
environment and basic research. The 1975-76 
budget has increased 16 % compared to the 
1974-75 budget. 
28. It is regrettable that Europe has not man-
aged to achieve greater co-ordination in this 
field since most European nations have a close 
interest in the sea and oceans and the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference might basic-
ally change the present 'legal princip~es on which 
the law of the sea has been based until now. 
Without a joint European organisation in the 
framework of the Communities, it will be 
extremely difficult for Europe to deal from a 
position of strength with the Americans. 
29. As Europe is already working with the 
United States in space matters it would be most 
important to extend this co-operation to meteoro-
logical satellites, sea monitoring satellites, deep-
sea programmes, ocean pollution and the techno-
logy of buoys. Europe already has extensive 
knowledge of aquaculture and deepsea diving. 
(ill) Computera 
30. Several of the Committee's Rapporteurs 
have dealt with European difficulties in estab-
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lishing a computer programme. In 1969, Mr. 
Chapman submitted a report on European co-
operation in the field of military and civil com-
puters 1• As he then indicated, the European 
computer industry is dominated by IBM which 
has subsidiaries in practically all the European 
countries and which has dominated the market 
from the beginning. The main objective of Euro-
pean policy must therefore be to promote and 
encourage the formation of at least one major 
European grouping which is both economically 
viable and capable of maintaining a balanced 
relationship with partners in the United States. 
31. The IBM challenge remains great since it 
is making rapid progress towards providing 
customers with a total information system, in-
cluding telecommunications facilities and a very 
great variety of on-line application systems. 
32. Mr. van Ooijen, reporting on advanced 
technology in Canada - the consequences for 
Europe 2, stated that a proliferation of private 
computer systems providing for machine-to-
machine communication or for machine-to-man 
communication might not be commensurate with 
the general welfare. 
33. IBM is now able to provide mini-computers 
which can be relayed to a very wide range of 
terminals and which would allow such a prolifer-
ation of private systems to develop. It is quite 
clear that if Europe does not organise itself in 
this field and establish its own data-processing 
industry, a single company - IBM - will 
dominate not only the traditional world of 
central processors, but also the new world of 
distributed computing. It is difficult to see how 
Europe should organise itself in this field. Some 
speak of European mission-oriented institutions 
which should aggregate the research and develop-
ment effort. However, even if a special computer 
institution is considered a possibility for further-
ing European collaboration in this sector, in view 
of the failure of Euratom it is not likely to be 
accepted by the governments of member coun-
tries. The main emphasis should be put on indus-
trial policy on an inter-governmental basis to 
encourage the harmonious development of the 
industry rather than set up a new mission-
oriented institute to subsidise the users. The 
European Community should play an important 
role in promoting this harmonisation. 
1. Document 474. 
2. Dooument 649. 
34. Events have shown that Western Europe 
has difficulty in achieving independence in data-
processing resources and in fact the future of 
European data-processing is an open question. 
35. The market of the world data-processing 
industry represents about $ 25 billion annually 
with a growth rate of some 15% yearly. It has 
been forecast that, in the industrial category, it 
will be exceeded only by the motor and petroleum 
industries by 1980. 
36. Research and development in this industry 
involves very heavy expendilture which can only 
be recuperated if the production runs are long. 
About 60 % of computers are installed in the 
United States and Canada, another 24% in 
Western Europe - of which for instance 5 % 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4.5 % in 
France, 4% in the United Kingdom and 2% 
in Italy - and 5 % in Japan. Therefore, com-
panies other than IBM, which has about two-
thirds of the world market, are competing for 
only a fraction of the market. To be profitable, 
they need the support of the American 
market. This is possible only if one is associated 
with an American firm already installed in the 
United States with a good customer base and 
valid experience in data-processing. This type 
of industrial collaboration would seem to offer 
Europe a means of becoming more actively and 
more profitably engaged in the computer indus-
try - the only means by which it will be possible 
to continue the advanced research necessary for 
keeping abreast with latest developments in this 
field. 
37. It is therefore obvious that this development 
makes it difficult to maintain purely European 
collaboration, as was originally envisaged by the 
European Community which hoped that com-
puter firms such as ICL, Siemens, Philips and 
others would provide a European option in this 
field. This state of affairs will certainly have a 
negative effect on any endeavours to bring about 
harmonisation of related fields (communications 
technology and electronic components). 
(io) Electronics 
38. The United States President's visit to China 
in 1972 highlighted recent advances in elec-
tronics technology's oldest branch, telecommuni-
cations, when an Intelsat IV communications 
satellite went into service over the Pacific Ocean 
and two ground stations were installed in China 
- one in Shanghai and the other in Peking. 
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39. In the field of communications, co-operation 
between Europe and the United States is rather 
difficult as the United States Government, 
through the office of telecommunications, merely 
supervises private industry which provides the 
communications services. The private telephone 
companies are installed localily and are each 
independent. Special liaison companies are also 
formed to ensure connections between these 
companies. 
40. In the field of radio and television four 
major networks cover the whole of the United 
States. 
41. Where telecommunications are concerned, 
the American Telegraph and Telephone Com-
pany has about 85 % of the market. 
42. A new development has started since 
Comsat-IBM are proposing a data communica-
tions system with electronic computers which 
would allow conferences to be held without parti-
cipants having to travel. The situation is there-
fore changing rapidly and it is very difficult to 
predict what changes there will be in the years 
1980 to 1985. 
43. On the European side all communications 
are government-owned and this slows the intro-
duction of new types of communications. Alter-
natively many people, aware of the capabilities 
of new types of equipment, are afraid of govern-
ment agencies entering the private lives of its 
citizens. There is therefore no great pressure on 
governments to look for co-operation in this field 
with the United States. 
(o) Armaments production 
44. Your Rapporteur will not discuss arma-
ments production at great length as this is done 
in the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, but he nevertheless wishes to raise 
some points to complete his report. In this field 
co-operation with the United States has been the 
subject of many studies and conferences in the 
NATO framework and elsewhere. After being 
dormant for many years this type of collabora-
tion has again come to the fore since the Ameri-
can Defence Secretary declared on 23rd May 
1975 that the United States would be interested 
in working with the Europeans if it were a two-
way street leading to cheaper and better weapons. 
At the same time information is being exchanged 
between the United States, Britain, France and 
Germany on current and future prospects. The 
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truth of course is that for the time being the 
United States does not need to work with other 
countries while all European countries must do 
so, at least in some fields. 
45. In aircraft production, however, the enor-
mous costs of new we111pons systems might encour-
age a trend towards United States-European 
co-production. 
46. At the same time, all governments are be-
coming increasingly aware of the fact that due 
to unemployment and other economic difficulties 
they may not be able to buy their weapons 
systems abroad, although this might be cheaper. 
47. American Senators and Congressmen will 
not easily forget that Texas is the only State in 
the United States where the economy is still in 
fairly good shape because of advanced technology 
investments directed to that State in the 1960s 
by its Senator and later United States President, 
Lyndon Johnson. 
48. In a report dated 4th June 1974, the United 
States general accounting office set out the 
advantages and disadvantages of international 
collaborative programmes. Among the advantages 
it listed standardisation, lower costs due to longer 
production runs, technical and scientific advan-
tages in pooling the resources of Europe and the 
United States, and lastly the possibilities of 
access to certain geographical regions. The 
bilateral American-Canadian testing of jointly-
produced equipment near the Arctic circle is an 
example. The disadvantages, according to the 
report, are unemployment, security problems, 
balance-of-payments diffioolties and problems of 
fair return. Another difficulty is that many 
allied countries do not have the industrial infra-
structure to carry out certain parts of a col-
laborative programme. 
49. The future situation will therefore remain 
difficult, particularly since few European coun-
tries will be able to offer the Americans equip-
ment which is technically superior to American 
armaments. This does not mean that transatlantic 
eo-operative projects will not occur in the 1980s. 
The form of split programmes is unlikely where 
development and production is divided between 
countries in approximate proportion to their 
requirements for the item, with final assembly 
being carried out in each participating country. 
Instead, as in the case of space collaboration, 
complementary programmes and reciprocal pur-
chlllses might be agreed to, one country develop-
ing one type of equipment, the other country 
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another, and both buying each type. Reciprocal 
purchases are already taking place for instance 
between the United States and Germany. How-
ever, they are difficult to negotiate. There is 
seldom a point at which one country, wanting to 
buy another's weapon, has on offer a weapon of 
its own which the other country wishes to buy. 
50. The European powers are in general too 
small to make this kind of deal with the United 
States, but of course together they might be able 
to offer a whole range of weaponry. As in other 
fields, the Europeans have to agree between 
themselves, establish what the European arma-
ments industry should represent, what its pro-
grammes should be, how many employees they 
should have, what their turnover should be, 
whether the industry should be private or State-
owned, etc. The answers to these questions are 
the more urgent as the German armaments 
industry might resume its exports and therefore 
expand. 
E. Technology assessment 
51. In writing this report your Rapporteur had 
to touch on a number of technological aspects 
of modern society and he has become aware 
of the difficulties for a member of parliament 
to assess advanced technology and its conse-
quences for modern society. 
52. When in the United States, he learned that 
by act of Congress in 1972 a special office was 
installed after the fashion of the Library of 
Congress to equip Senators and Congressmen 
with "new and effective means for securing 
competent unbiased information concerning the 
physical, biological, economic, social and political 
effects" of technological applications and to 
serve as an aid "in the legislative assessment of 
matters pending before the Congress, particu-
larly in those instances where the Federal 
Government may be called upon to consider 
support for, or management or regulation of, 
technological applications". The office has a non-
partisan congressional board; the current board 
chairman is Senator Edward Kennedy. 
53. Public issues of a political nature with 
which parliamentarians have to cope are growing 
increasingly complicated. Different technological 
approaches may result in different economic, 
social and environmental consequences, not all of 
which are expected or desired. European par-
liaments have not the means for technology 
assessment as their staffs are not equipped to 
handle this type of work. 
54. The Office of Technology Assessment iden-
tifies alternative approaches to technology-
related issues and provides analyses of the prob-
able consequences of the options. It is pre-
sented in a manner suitable for use by the 
committees of Congress. 
55. The purpose of each assessment is to pro-
vide an early appraisal of the probable impacts 
and uncertainties of technological programmes 
so that ·beneficial and adverse factors alike may 
5* - Ill 
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be identified and considered in the legislative 
planning process. Both short-term and long-
term effects, whether intended or not, are exa-
mined together with the various interests and 
viewpoints of all who might foreseeably be 
affected by the technology. Technology assess-
ment is an aid to, not a substitute for, the judg-
ments which must be reached by elected offi-
cials in policy-making positions. 
56. It is the first time since the establishment 
of the Library of Congress that Congress has 
set up a new office. Last year's assessment 
activities were related to oceans, transportation, 
energy, materials, food and health. 
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Visit by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions to the United States 
11th-21st ~arch 1915 
NASA 
On Monday, 17th March 1975, the Com-
mittee was received at the NASA Headquarters 
by Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, accom-
panied by Mr. J. Lloyd Jones, Deputy Asso-
ciate Administrator for Aeronautics, Mr. Leonard 
Jaffe, Deputy Associate Administrator for Appli-
cations, Mr. Charues J. Donlan, Deputy Asso-
ciate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 
(Technical), and Mr. Arnold W. Frutkin, Assis-
tant Administrator for International Affairs. 
Dr. Fletcher welcomed the Committee and 
opened his address by indicating that NASA 
had begun in 1958 as a $100 million estab-
lishment. In 1966 it had a budget of $6,000 mil-
lion and its budget for 1975 was $2,300 million. 
In 1976, its budget would be $3,500 million 
which, because of inflation, meant less money 
would be spent than in 1975. Therefore no new 
programmes would be started except in the 
energy field. If inflation continued, further pro-
gramme adjustments would have to be made as 
the President's policy was to keep within agreed 
expenditure ceilings. The main adjustments 
would be in the training eJlement. Civil service 
employment would be reduced and some launch 
schedules changed to cover longer periods. 
On the other hand, the 1976 budget would 
permit NASA to proceed with all the present 
major progr8JII11Iles as originally planned. 
Space shuttle development would proceed 
on the present schedule which should result in 
a first manned orbital flight by mid-1979. Land-
sat-e, formerly called ERTS-C, would proceed 
normally and therefore NASA's third experi-
mental earth resources satellite would be launched 
in autumn 1977. In particular it would carry 
out experiments in crop survey and water resour-
ces management, thus continuing the experiments 
of Landsat-B which was launched on 22nd 
January 1975. 
The Apollo and Skylab progr8JII11Iles would 
be phased out and for budgetary roosons the 
reusable tug would be put into operation in 
1981. 
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NASA's policy would be to continue inter-
national collaboration and not charge for original 
research and development costs. The only costs 
charged would be real costs at the present rates. 
Canada and Europe would therefore have to pay 
only their share of the real costs. Another advan-
tage was that the reliability of the launchers had 
greatly improved. 
For 1975, the Viking programme was of the 
greatest importooce as further Congressional 
willingness to vote the budgets for future outer 
space research might well depend on its success. 
The programme would cost rubout $300 million. 
The launchings for the Viking missions were 
scheduled for August 1975 and the satellites 
would reach Mars in the summer of 1976. Viking 
was by far the most aJmbitious and complex un-
manned spacecraft ever attempted. If it suc-
ceeded, NASA would have accomplished another 
big step in space exploration. 
An important new field of study was air-
craft energy reduction. When NASA started its 
study in this field it became aware that new 
factors were playing a role in aeronautics. To the 
old ones - speed, efficiency and safety - had 
been added pollution, noise ood congestion, fol-
lowed, in 1973, by energy conservation. 
NASA had identified technologies which had 
the potential to reduce fuel requirements of 
commerciaJ. jet aircraft by 50 % in the next ten 
years. If these advances were achieved by 1985 
and could be incorporated in United States com-
mercial aircraft flying today, savings in petrol 
requirements would be nearly one-third of a 
million barrels a day. 
NASA was studying the possibility of using 
hydrogen as a fuel and different cargo aircraft 
concepts : new wings, engines over the wings, 
etc. In short-haul transportation systems the short 
take-off and landing system might give improved 
service and congestion relief could be achieved 
through traffic redistribution. NASA was study-
ing tests of a quiet short-haul research aircraft. 
NASA had also built a remotely-piloted 
research aircraft, the pilot remaining on the 
ground. The advantage of this technique was 
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that there was no risk to the test pilot during 
flight manoeuvres. High risk, more advanced 
technology could be investigruted and high risk 
manoeuvres performed very early in the flight 
test programme. Additionally, scale models of 
aircraft or spacecraft were used instead of more 
expensive experimental vehicles, and equipment 
such as the cockpit did not have to be man-
rated. Consequently, such a test flight pro-
gramme could cost less than half the full-scale 
manned programme. 
The future for hydrogen-fuelled aircraft was 
promising for very •large and long-range planes. 
Hydrogen had a much higher content per pound 
than fuel now in use. The main problem was cost, 
but hydrogen costs might full as nuclear b~er 
reactors came into being. Hydrogen could very 
easily be a by-product of this type of reactor. 
By 1985, the cost might be the same as that 
of present-day fuels. A great advantage of hydro-
gen was the absence of environmental problems 
as the principal by-product of burning hydrogen 
was water. 
The main application disciplines now being 
undertaken by NASA were earth observations, 
communications, space processing and technology 
applications. 
The EOS programme had been established 
to conduct earth observation research in the late 
1970s and 1980s. It would use a system compa-
tible with the shuttle and designed for low cost. 
Three types of surveys would be made : land 
use management, sea surveys and environmental 
surveys. 
In connection with the satellite system were 
the earth observation aircraft programme, both 
low and high flying, and balloons. For this type 
of activity NASA had been contacted by forty-
five foreign countries; Brazil and Canada had 
their own ground stations and received data 
directly. 
In the field of communications the original 
NASA programme had come to an end since 
operational communiootion satellites had come 
into being. Nevertheless, complete termination 
of the NASA effort was not acceptable and it 
had therefore set up an advanced communications 
research programme. One of the reasons was that 
the United States wanted to keep the technolo-
gical lead in saJtellite communications. NASA 
efforts included the development of microwave 
frequencies and spacecraft technology to produce 
more efficient and reUable operation. 
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In the field of space processing applications 
it was NASA's intention to initiate commercially-
oriented private utilisation of space flight capa-
bilities in fields related to material science and 
technology. The weightless conditions in space 
flight could be used to control a variety of techni-
cally important processes in novel ways. This 
related to crystal growth, metallurgy, electronic 
materials and biological preparations. During the 
Skylab experiments this road looked very pro-
mising. NASA hoped that private industry would 
participate increasingly in space research and 
development work as flight capabilities increased 
and that this work would lead directly to product 
applications. 
The NASA technology utilisation programme 
continued to measure the effectiveness of the 
transfer of aerospace technology. Special rela-
tionships had been built up, for instance with 
the city of New York for a school alarm system. 
This system, developed by NASA with its space 
technology, would greatly enhance the safety of 
the New York "high schools" which suffered from 
V'andalism. To get widespread applications of 
space technology, NASA believed commercia-
lisation had to be achieved. 
The shuttle 
One of the key aims of the space shuttle 
programme was to develop an operational system 
with low cost per flight. To accomplish this, 
design decisions were evaluated not only in terms 
of development costs but also ground opera-
tions, spares requirements and other programme 
support activities. The probability of achieving 
a cost per flight of $10.5 million in 1971 dollars 
looked feasible. 
In 1975 NASA was requesting $800 million 
to carry on shuttle activities during fiscal year 
1975. The fabrication of all major systems 
elements had started at the contractors' plants. 
The first manned flight was foreseen for 1978. 
The orbiter offered an unobstructed cylin-
drical payload bay of 4.6 metres in breadth and 
18.3 metres in length. The maximum payload was 
29,500 kilos to be launched from Cape Canaveral 
into an orbit of 390 kms round the earth. The 
fully-equipped Spacelab being developed by ESA 
could be accommodated in the orbiter payload 
bay. A normal flight crew consisted of three 
persons : the commander, the pilot and the mis-
sion specialist. Should the payload fail to operate 
satisfactorily after deployment it could be 
retrieved and returned to earth for repair. The 
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return base for the orbiter would be Vandenberg 
air base in California. 
The main advantage of the shuttle vehicle 
would be to eliminate large launchers and offer 
frequent !light opportunities and especially low 
cost payloads. The nominal design duration of 
initial missions was seven days. The mission dura-
tion could be extended to as long as thirty days 
with the necessary refuelling and restocking. 
Mr. Frutkin addressed the Committee on 
intern,ational collaboration and discussed in par-
ticular the availability of launchers. Since the 
inception of the space programme it had been 
United States policy to extend the benefits of 
space research "to all mankind", as required by 
the 1958 Space Act. The American space effort 
had been conducted openly and its results shared 
with many nations. Now NASA was giving 
advance notice of flight opportunities and it even 
gave foreigners an opportunity of participating 
in the definition of the mission. The results of 
missions were also published. 
One great advantage that the United States 
derived from the openness of its space missions 
was a free flow of information about new tech-
nologies and new products from the space pro-
gramme into the main stream of Americ:m eco~o­
mic life. This did not happen in the SoVIet Umon 
where missions were conceived and executed in a 
shroud of mystery. 
On international telecommunications, he said 
that more than ninety countries benefited from 
the communications satellite system. More than 
forty nations participated in the weaJther fore-
casting system. A great many nations were 
working with NASA on sounding rocket research. 
Cost-sharing satellite programmes - as with the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the Helios pro-
ject - were executed on a bilateral basis. The 
purpose of this mission was to provide informa-
tion about the sun which would lead to greater 
understanding of its source of life-sustaining 
energy. However, at the same time, the United 
States wanted to maintain its leadership in space 
science in the coming years. 
As far as launchings were concerned, NASA 
would not refuse to launch a satellite unless it 
was not for peaceful purposes. If a payload on 
an American satellite was offered, and this was 
of interest for the NASA programme, no launcher 
cost and no interest had to be paid. If a Euro-
pean satellite was launched, the cost would be 
the nominal cost and original research and 
development costs would not be charged. 
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As far as future space stations were con-
cerned it was not inconceivable that one day 
Western Europe and the Soviet Union would 
join in with NASA to design and develop a 
tripartite space station. However, this was for 
the more distant future. 
The State Departement and space affairs 
On Tuesday, 18th March 1975, the Com-
mittee made a special tour of the White House, 
followed by a visit to the State Department where 
it was received at the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of which was 
Mrs. Dixy Lee Ray. The Committee was received 
by Dr. Leo Packer, Director of the Office of 
Technology and Space Affairs, assisted by his 
collaborators, Mr. Ronald Stone and Mr. Arthur 
Freeman. 
Dr. Packer stated that his directorate had 
a staff of ninety and took care of the State 
Department's role in aerospace affairs. As such, 
an important part of his work was to follow the 
work of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This committee 
was handling the follow-up of the 1967 treaty on 
outer space. All major space powers except China 
were represented on this committee. 
Further to the treaty provisions, it had 
drawn up three new treaty texts since 1967. 
The 1968 agreement on the rescue of astronauts, 
the return of astronauts and the return of 
objects launched into outer space was a follow-up 
of Article V of the treaty on outer space which 
prescribed that States should regard astronauts 
as envoys of mankind and render them all pos-
sible assistance. The 1972 convention on inter-
national liability for damage caused by space 
objects was also an outgrowth of treaty pro-
visions on the responsibility of launching States 
for space activities. Until now the States had 
been very lucky as no damage had been done 
by space objects re-entering the atmosphere. 
Thirdly, the convention on registration of objects 
launched into space stemmed from concepts of 
registration and notification to the United 
Nations Secretary General which were also men-
tioned in the 1967 treaty. The line of develop-
ment of those international space agreements had 
been consistent in recognising the treaty as 
giving direction through general principles which 
had been extended into more specific measures 
as being necessary in particular circumstances. 
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In contrast to registration, less progress had 
been achieved on a moon treaty. The three out-
standing issues - expansion of the treaty's scope 
to cover the other bodies of the solar system, 
provision for advanced notification of mission, 
and provisions concerning possible future 
exploitation of natural resources of celestial 
bodies - remained unresolved. 
Due to opposition from Brazil and Argen-
tina, the Outer Space Committee could not con-
clude on the merits of establishing a facility to 
acquire earth resources data from the countries 
collecting it and to make it available to the 
specialised agencies of the United Nations as 
well as member States. Brazil and Argentina 
would restrict the rights of space powers to col-
lect and disseminate satellite information. The 
United States opposed any restriction on the 
collection of data. This activity was covered by 
Article I of the outer space treaty which pro-
vided that outer space be free for exploration 
and use by all States without discrimination 
of any kind. 
The United States saw no justification since · 
it did not accept the theory that a State's 
sovereignty over natural resources included con-
trol over all information about such resources. 
It would deeply regret any setback to the prin-
ciple of open and unimpeded exchange of infor-
mation on an international! basis. 
The USSR took a more limited view, 
envisaging no more than a collection of cata-
logues which would list data available to users 
and indicaste where they could be obtained. 
France was inclined towards the views of 
the USSR whereas Britain and the other WEU 
countries favoured an open dissemination system. 
Sweden proposed the creation of a United 
Nations space agency which would handle all 
these matters and the equipment involved. This 
proposal was not agreeable to the United States, 
although it would accept a United Nations data 
indexing system and United Nations training 
of experts and other educational aid. 
Although it would be technically possible, 
it would become extremely expensive if all data 
were hemmed in countries' frontiers, apart from 
some very big countries. Moreover, to study 
systems of waterways one could not be bothered 
by frontiers. That such data could be of great 
assistance to the countries concerned could be 
concluded from the fact that Brazil would not 
have had to build so many bridges for its Ama-
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zon highway if it had used satellite images which 
gave a better picture of the course of the Amazon 
and its affluents than could be obtained from 
observation on the ground. 
Many governments of emerging countries 
strongly wished to be the only ones to obtain 
informwtion and data on their country from 
satellites. They thought they would be more 
vulnerable if their neighbour knew about their 
resources. However, one first had to have the 
satellites before obtaining information and the 
United States did not accept restrictions on the 
outer space treaty. 
In the Outer Space Committee the United 
States wished to give highest priority to efforts 
to complete legislation on the moon treaty; the 
USSR wished to give priority to the legal • 
implications of direct broadcasting satellites. In 
the end the USSR had signed the moon treaty 
too because the problem of direct satellite broad-
casting would not be acute before 1985. 
Direct radio and television broadcasting 
Much confusion had been created by articles 
in the press that technology was now available 
that would allow the United States to broad-
cast television programmes directly from satel-
lites to receivers in homes anywhere in the world. 
However, this statement overrated the current 
state of technology and greatly underestimated 
the attendant system problems and associated 
costs and ran counter to existing international 
agreements. Broadcasting from satellites into 
community-type TV receiving stations costing 
$5-6,000 had been demonstrated technically. The 
stations were inexpensive compared to an Intel-
sat station but expensive compared to the average 
home TV receiver. The applications technology 
satellite No. 6, launched on 30th May 1974, was 
able to broadcast TV programmes over a sub-
stantial area to ground stations with a three-
metre parabolic antenna. Satellite broadcasting 
direct to present home receivers would however 
not occur as the technology was not yet deve-
loped and might not be developed before 1985. 
Individual reception was further divided 
into two parts: broadcasting into "augmented 
home receivers" and later into "unaugmented 
home receivers". The main issue in the United 
Nations Outer Space Committee was whether or 
not prior consent would have to be obtained 
fron1 States before programmes could be broad-
cast. This in fact would probably be so as the 
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ITU radio regulations required co-ordination 
regarding transmissions from broadcasting satel-
lites, especially from outside the originating 
countries. 
Of much more present-day importance was 
the satellite system for broadcasting direct to 
community-type ground stations to meet the 
telecommunications requirements of the deve-
loping countries, particularly in education. An 
experiment was now taking place in India as 
well as an experiment with the joint Canadian-
United States co-operative satellite. 
J.ntelsat 
The Committee was also briefed on the 
present position of Intelsat, the International 
• Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, 
whose final agreements entered into force on 
12th February 1973. The organisation had 
ninety-one members; the Soviet Union, the 
Eastern European countries, Cuba and China 
were not members. A ground station had been 
built near Peking. An Intelsat station was being 
built in Low in the Soviet Union which, in fact, 
enabled the Soviet Union to use the system. This 
station was also used for the so-ealled "hot-line 
agreement" between Washington and Moscow. It 
was only a question of time before the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European countries 
joined the system. Moreover, the USSR's Molnya 
system, which was supposed to be a competitor 
to Intelsat, had proved too expensive and was 
now used only for domestic service. 
Countries such as Algeria and Norway were 
considering establishing a domestic service such 
as Canada already had. 
Since the establishment of the final agree-
ments, United States preponderance was declin-
ing as was the role of Comsat, which would 
provide the technical and operational manage-
ment services only up to 1979. Thereafter they 
would be taken over by a secretariat-general 
which so far had provided financial, legal and 
administrative support. Intelsat's capital was 
divided among the ninety-one member countries 
according to their percentage use of the Intelsat 
system. Comsat held about 40 % of the capital 
as of 30th September 1973. 
Since the system had proved to work well, 
opposition to the United States lead in running 
it had disappeared. 
The relationship between NASA and the 
State Department was very close. The State 
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Department office relied on the International 
Affairs Section of NASA to provide all the tech-
nical assistance. The State Department office was 
therefore much smaller and took over from the 
NASA office only when diplomatic and policy 
decisions were involved. 
On launch assistance policy the Committee 
WaB informed that so far the United States 
had never had to delay or decline a launch for 
peaceful purposes. Ten reimbursable launches 
had taken place: two for Canada, five for ESRO, 
and one each for France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. Eleven launches were fore-
seen: five for ESRO, three for Japan and three 
for Indonesia. As far as Japan was concerned 
this country was trying to develop an indepen-
dent launch facility. 
The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences 
On Tuesday, 18th March (afternoon), and 
on Thursday, 20th (afternoon), the Committee 
was received by the Senate Committee on 
· Aeronautical and Space Sciences. During the 
discussions, the Committee was received in the 
Chamber of the Senate and presented to the 
members of the Senate during a recess of five 
minutes. Mention of this visit was made in the 
Congressional record, Volume 121, No. 44, page 
s 4256. 
142 
A separate record of the discussions 1 was 
made by the Senate Committee. 
Goddard Space Flight Centre 
On Wednesday, 19th March, the Committee 
visited the Goddard Space Flight Centre where 
it was received by Dr. Lester Meredith and his 
collaborators - MM. O'Leary, Meyer, Shehab, 
Dr. McDonald, Mr. Holweck, and Dr. Walters. 
Dr. Meredith gave an introduction to the 
centre which was established on 1st May 1959. 
It was NASA's first major scientific laboratory 
devoted entirely to the exploration of space. It 
now dealt especially with earth orbiting space-
craft. Goddard had scientific missions, space 
technology, application satellites and the tracking 
and data system. 
There was a staff of about 4,000, plus 2,000 
men working at Goddard under contract. It had 
a budget of $400 million a year. 
1. See Appendix II. 
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Spacecraft under 1,000 lbs were built at the 
centre; larger spacecraft were built by private 
industry under control of the centre. 
The management of international satellites 
- Helios, ANS, UK 4 and 5 - was also handled 
at the centre. 
Many satellite and sounding rocket projects 
gave information about the earth's environment, 
the sun-earth relationship and the universe itself. 
A satellite in orbit around the moon was register-
ing messages from outer space. 
Applications spacecraft projects concerned 
communications, meteorology, navigation and the 
detection and monitoring of natural resources. 
The centre was also the home of the national 
space science data centre. This facility, housing 
banks of high-speed computers, was the central 
depository for much of the data collected by 
space science experiments. 
As far as European satellites were con-
cerned, Dr. Meredith believed that they were 
fully comparable to the American satellites, and 
even in some respects better. The main launchers 
used by Goddard were the Thor-Delta ; it used 
the Centaur for very heavy satellites. 
One of the highest priorities for NASA 
was the earth resources technology satellite, now 
called Landsat. The results of the investigations 
by this satellite were relevant to three important 
problems : the need to accelerate the identifi-
cation of minable minerals, especially of petro-
leum, and the preservation of the environment. 
A particularly valuable use of this satellite was 
for land use mapping which was cheaper than 
conventional means. Water resources manage-
ment was also an important by-product. Many 
features on the surface of the earth could not 
be seen in pictures fr.om aircraft. The satellite 
always took pictures at the same time of day 
with the sun at the same angle so one could 
better calculate heights and distances. 
The office of tracking and data acquisition 
operated the tracking networks, the deep space 
network, the NASA communications network 
and many other operations which were being 
conducted with advanced computer methods and 
scientific equipment. In the future the office 
planned to utilise relay satellites for more effec-
tive data acquisition and to improve other elec-
tronic and optical systems. The general result 
of all the information which arrived at Goddard 
was that one always found more things un-
suspected than imagined beforehand. 
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After the briefings, the Committee visited 
the shuttle bay simulator, the high energy astro-
physics building and other installations. 
The Pentagon- space activities 
On 20th March 1975 the Committee went 
to the Pentagon where it was met by Miss Ruth 
Kirby of the Directorate of Community Relations 
and escorted to the office of the Deputy Director, 
Strategic and Space Systems, of the Directorate 
of Defence Research and Engineering. There 
the Committee was briefed by Mr. Bob Cooper 
who stated that an nnportant part of his work 
consisted of supporting research and develop-
ment. In the space-defence area the department 
wanted to retain the technological initiative. For 
that reason, the department was spending in 
fiscal year 1975 more than $2,000 million for 
its space-related programmes. This was some 
$400 million more than in fiscal year 197 4. The 
military authorities were using space systems 
more and more to support tactical as well as 
strategic military operations. The satellites for 
command and control systems as well as the 
early warning satellites, which were established 
in particular for strategic military operations, 
were now also going to be used in tactical mili-
tary applications. This meant a changing of 
military thinking. The supporting research and 
development in the areas of space surveillance, 
satellite survivability and other selected efforts 
were increasingly affecting future military capa-
bilities. This meant that the space posture had 
to be improved since the military leadership was 
increasing its reliance on satellite systems to 
accomplish functions which were important to 
military operations. The goal was to protect the 
functioning of satellite systems critical to natio-
nal defence in times of international stress. 
The goal of the research and development was 
therefore in space surveillance in order to detect, 
track and identify in a timely manner all objects 
in orbit up to 20,000 miles altitude. 
The main reasons of interest of the military 
in space were the global nature of these space 
systems ; they were much cheaper than any other 
means of communication, and space technology, 
as all advanced technology, had spin-off in many 
fields. 
The most important present-day develop-
ment was the Navstar global positioning system. 
This programme was one of the most far-reaching 
in its impact and one of the most forward-
looking in its structuring in the Department of 
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Defence. It could have a revolutionary impact 
on both strategic and technical warfare. If the 
system became operational, it would be possible 
for the military commands to have direct com-
munications with the smallest units through 
mobile terminals which would consist of a square 
black box to be inserted in jeeps, other vehicles, 
planes and ships. The system might become 
operational in the early 1980s and would be 
much cheaper than present-day communication 
and navigation systems. 
The Navstar joint programme office now 
had officers and civil service staff from the 
army, navy, air force and marines and was 
therefore a totally integrated effort. In July 
1974, the first technology confirmation satellite 
had been launched and this year four satellites 
would be put into orbit in order to test several 
aspects of the programme. 
It was clear that this capability for precise 
positioning and navigation could also prove use-
ful to the civil community. The price for civil 
user equipment might be about $10,000 ; industry 
was now developing competitive prototypes. 
These prototypes would be used in aircraft, 
ships and vehicles. For fiscal year 1976, more 
than $100 million would be used for this research 
and development. 
Early warning satellites were now operatio-
nal in geo-stationary orbits, one in the eastern 
hemisphere which provided warning of launches 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles and of 
orbital ballistic missiles, and two in the western 
hemisphere to warn of submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles. 
.AB to whether these satellites could verify 
withdrawals of troops and equipment from spe-
cific areas, respect of arms control agreements 
and give early warning of enemy troop move-
ments, Mr. Cooper said that it was not possible 
for him to give a direct answer, nor could he 
to the question of European-American collabor-
ation in this field and especially whether Euro-
pean governments had direct access to inform-
ation collected by satellites or whether they 
received information already processed by the 
Pentagon. 
In 1976, the government intended to evaluate 
a technique to expand the surveillance coverage 
of each satellite and to continue radiation-proof 
testing of satellite components and development 
of ground station modifications to accommodate 
a system of anti-jamming capaibilities. 
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According to the space treaty there should 
be no military tasks as such in space. However, 
as the space system became more and more 
important for the military command structure, 
these systems had to be protected - hardened 
to nuclear radiation against potential attack in 
order not to be destroyed. The space hardware 
had to become lasting installations and there-
fore had to be protected. 
The Soviet space activities were very sub-
stantial and the Soviets certainly allocated more 
resources to them than the American authorities 
were spending. This could be deduced from the 
great number of launches which meant that the 
Soviet military had ample resources. Even so, 
the American authorities were of the opinion 
that in their competition and management sys-
tems they were more productive than the Soviet 
Union whose budget was one and a half times 
that of the United States. However, they were 
concerned that the Soviets might be developing 
the use of man in space for military missions 
in addition to routine testing of the Soyuz space-
craft. 
On the relationship between military and 
civil meteorological satellite systems, the military 
satellite programme in this field produced spe-
cialised weather data to satisfy military require-
ments which were quite different from civilian 
requirements. The air force global weather centre 
in Nebraska for processing and use of the data 
recorded worldwide declassified the data and 
made them available to the civil scientific com-
munity. The air force was now testing a new 
series of meteorological satellites and hoped to 
complete testing in mid-1975. 
In ocean surveillance, special attention was 
being given to the Soviet and Soviet bloc naval 
forces. This increased threat was being met by 
providing the competent commanders with all the 
information they needed on the position of the 
Soviet naval forces, especially those which used 
sophisticated weapon systems. In order to 
improve the United States capability to provide 
targeting information for the launching of over-
the-horizon anti-ship cruise missiles, an overall 
study had been undertaken on the possibilities 
of all types of surveillance platforms, including 
ships, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and 
remotely-piloted vehicles. 
On the space shuttle, which the Department 
of Defence was committed to support, great use 
would be made once it became operational in 
1980. The Department would be a major user 
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after development was completed. For fiscal year 
1976, $22 million were being spent on the Defence 
Department effort on the military use of the 
shuttle. The existing upper stage might be 
modified to ensure uninterrupted military space 
operations. 
The Defence Department was also preparing 
to build an interim upper stage which could meet 
military needs over the early 1980s and as long 
as the NASA tug had not come into operation. 
One-third of all launchings of the shuttle would 
be with a military payload and this proportion 
might grow. For the moment twenty-five 
launches per year were being considered, eight 
of which would be military. 
For relations between the Defence Depart-
ment and NASA, Mr. Cooper said that there 
was a co-ordinating board. Last year the board 
had met four times and discussed the need for 
large aeronautical facilities essential to United 
States civil and military aeronautical pre-emi-
nence. It had also discussed the upper stage 
development of the shuttle in order to secure 
early effective military and civil use of the 
shuttle. 
There were great commercial interests in 
the use of navigation satellites which could help 
to determine the exact position of the ship within 
one mile. If the new satellite now being tested 
was a success, the one mile might be reduced 
to ten metres. 
If the Navstar satellite system became ope-
rational it would replace twenty-four 800 lb 
satellites with four satellites and the different 
systems would all be standardised, which meant 
a great reduction in costs. 
In conclusion, Mr. Cooper stated that as 
space systems were providing increasing support 
for tactical forces, national security would 
become more dependent on military space pro-
grammes. Soviet and, in time, other foreign space 
systems would have the potential to alter the 
strategic equilibrium and the American deterrent 
position. The space shuttle, with its new capa-
bilities for payload retrieval, re-use and more 
flexible and effective space operations, would 
play an important role in future activities. Even-
tually, as access to space became routine and less 
costly by using the shuttle, Mr. Cooper believed 
that man would have a role in military space 
operations. 
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Oomsat 
On Wednesday, 19th March 1975, the Com-· 
mittee visited the Communications SatelHte Cor-
poration, Comsat, at 950 L'Enfant Plaza, in 
Washington and was received by Dr. Joseph 
C. Charyk, Chairman of the Board of Directors, 
Mr. John A. Johnson, President of Comsat Gen-
eral, and several of their colla;borators. 
After a word of welcome, Mr. Johnson 
addressed the Committee on Comsat, its purpose 
and what had been achieved during the ten years 
of its existence. Under the Communications Satel-
lite Act of 1962, Comsat had been established 
in 1965 to be the American representative in 
the 91-nation International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organisation (Intelsat). Intelsat had 
currently eight operational satellites providing 
global commercial service between more than 
100 nations. 
Comsat was the representative of the United 
States and at the same time the manager of 
Intelsat on behalf of all the international part-
ners. Since 1973, a Secretariat-General had been 
established which dealt with Intelsat financial 
and administrative management. Comsat was the 
technical manager. Its contract with Intelsat was 
to expire on 11th February 1979 and all Comsat 
functions would then be taken over by the Secre-
tariat-General. 
Comsat derived most of its revenue from 
communication satellite services between the 
United States and a great number of foreign 
States and United States off-shore points. It 
had an ownership interest of 33 % in Intelsat 
and a 50 % ownership interest in United States 
earth stations. 
In addition to its operations in the global 
system, Comsat was engaged, through its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Comsat General, in program-
mes to establish domestic United States services 
as well as maritime and aeronautical communic-
ations satellite services. The ground network of 
the global system was, at the end of 1974, 104 
antennas at 82 earth stations in more than 
60 countries. 
Intelsat's ownership of the satellites and 
ground control equipment was made possible by 
capital contributions of its members which 
included Comsat for the United States, and 
90 foreign telecommunications organisations 
representing their respective countries. Eight 
Intelsat satellites were now in operation and since 
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the beginning only one launch of an Intelsat 
satellite had failed. Six new Intelsat IVA satel-
1ites had been ordered and they would be used 
through the 1980s. Each of the Intelsat IV A 
satellites would have a communications capacity 
almost double that of an Intelsat IV satellite, 
which meant they would be able to transmit 
simultaneously about 8,000 telephone calls and 
two television programmes. 
The commercial maritime satellite system, 
Marisat, would be established during 1975 and 
be operational from July 1975 onwards. Three 
satellites were being built, one to be stationed 
over the Atlantic Ocean, one over the Pacific 
Ocean and one to be held in reserve. The satellite 
design was adapted to military and civilian 
requirements. The navy would use the system 
for two or three years as long as its own fleet 
satellite communications system was not opera-
tional. On the other hand, in the near future 
the merchant navy would not require many 
communications by satellite. Its requirements 
would increase probably after the naval system 
had been established. 
Ever since the late 1960s the United States 
had been negotiating with ESRO, Canada and 
other countries on a proposed aeronautical com-
munications satellite system, Aerosat, to provide 
communications and navigational assistance to 
international aviation. In August 1974, the 
United States Federal Aviation Administration, 
ESRO and the Government of Canada agreed 
to a joint programme to te.<rt and evaluate the use 
of communications satellites to assist aircraft 
flying transatlantic routes. 
In September 197 4, Comsat General had 
been selected as the United States company 
to participate with ESRO and Canada in the 
provision of the space segment for the Aerosat 
programme. Under a joint agreement, signed in 
December 197 4, Comsat General and ESRO 
each had a 47% ownership interest and Canada 
a 6 % interest. The space segment would include 
two satellites ·and related ground control facilities 
and electronics equipment. The first of these 
two satellites was planned for launch in 1978. 
Under the United States domestic pro-
gramme, four satellites would be launched in 
1975-76. Comsat General would own and oper-
ate these satellites and lease their communic-
ations capacity to the American Telegraph and 
Telephone Company under the terms of a seven-
year agreement. Comsat would also provide earth 
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stations facilities for satellite control on the east 
and west coast, launch services, a system control 
centre and monitor the communications of the 
satellites. Apart from the continental United 
States, the system would also serve Porto Rico, 
Hawaii and Alaska. The earth station facilities 
for this domestic system would be located at the 
same site as those for the Marisat system. 
Since 1966, Comsat had provided technical 
services to some twenty-eight foreign countries 
interested in constructing earth stations to 
operate within the global Intelsat system. Ini-
tially, these services had included such activities 
as site selection, preparation of specifications, 
evaluation of proposals, training of personnel 
and monitoring of operations. The programme 
now encompassed a broad range of management 
and engineering services to assist countries in all 
phases of telecommunications, planning, con-
struction and operation. Since 1974, technical 
services had been provided to nine countries 
and new contracts negotiated with eight other 
countries, the most important of which were 
Brazil, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. 
Kennedy Space Centre 
On 21st March 1975 the Committee visited 
the Kennedy Space Centre where it was received 
by Mr. Miles Ross, Deputy Director. Mr. Ross 
gave an introductory welcome before the Com-
mittee visited the flight crew training building, 
the Apollo spacecraft simulator and the lunar 
modular. It also visited a number of launch 
platforms. 
Back at the headquarters, Mr. Ross 
addressed the Committee, outlining the history 
of the Kennedy Space Centre. One of his pre-
occupations now was the fact that he had had 
to dismiss a great number of the centre's per-
sonnel. At the height of the Apollo activities 
in 1968 the centre had 26,000 men whereas at 
the time of the visit only 10,000 were still 
employed there. During the coming four years 
no more important launches would take place 
until the shuttle was ready. 
In the first ten years from 1962 to 1972 
the centre launched 186 space missions employ-
ing eleven different launchers. Ten manned 
Apollo missions had been launched from Cape 
Kennedy and only one mission had encountered 
serious difficulties. Eight missions had reached 
the moon and five had made lunar landings. 
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Since then, in 1973 and 1974, the Skylab pro-
gramme had been executed. 
In the 1980s, United States accomplishments 
in space would depend on the space shuttle, 
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which would be used for civil as well as military 
purposes. NASA had planned six flights in the 
first year of shuttle operations, fifteen in the 
second year, followed by a build-up of traffic 
density to forty flights per year in the 1980s. 
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Meetings of the United States Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences with 
the Assembly of Western European Union Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
18th nlarch 1975 
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 
2.05 p.m., in room 235, Russell Senate Office 
Building, Senator Frank E. Moss (Chairman), 
presiding. 
Present : Senators Moss, Goldwater, and 
Garn. 
Also present : Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions : P. de Mon-
tesquiou (Chairman) ; Mr. Warren (Vice-Chair-
man) ; H. Adriaensens, Mrs. H. Adriaensens, H. 
de Bruyne, Mrs. H. de Bruyne, R. Carter, M. 
Cerneau, P. A. M. Cornelissen, R. Fletcher, 
R. Hengel, C. Lenzer, J. Lester, D. A. T. van 
Ooijen, J. Osborn, F. Tomney, P. Vitter, and 
G. M. A.M. Huigens (Secretary and Counsellor 
to the Committee). 
Also present: Robert F. Allnutt, Staff 
Director; Craig M. Peterson, Chief Clerk/Coun-
sel; Glen P. Wilson, James J. Gehrig, Craig 
Voorhees, Gilbert Keyes, and James T. Bruce, 
professional staff members ; Mary Rita Robbins, 
Patricia A. Robinson, Rhea B. Bruno, clerical 
assistants; Charles F. Lombard, minority coun-
sel, and Mary Ann Fay, minority clerical assist-
ant. 
The CHAIR.MAN. - Mr. Chairman (Mr. de 
Montesquiou), members of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions of the Assembly of Western European 
Union, and Counsellor Huigens ; it is a great 
pleasure to have you visit the United States 
and to welcome you to the Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences. 
We are delighted that you are here ; we 
hope you have a good visit, that our meetings 
go well and that our discussions proceed infor-
mally back and forth. 
Senator Goldwater, whom I am sure you 
all know, is the ranking Republican member of 
this Committee, and I am the Chairman at this 
time. We expect some of our other colleagues 
to get here. Typical of the untidy way that we 
arrange our work here, the Senate is in session 
at this time, and discussing legislation on the 
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floor so it may be that the bells will ring and 
we will have to leave for a short time to go to 
the floor and vote. 
Mr. Chairman you and your colleagues all 
serve in the legislative bodies of nations that 
have strong ties with the United States. Your 
visit here and these meetings are clear evidence 
of the excellent ties between our countries and 
our people. 
For many years now your nations and the 
United States, as trusted allies and good friends, 
have stood together to defend the cause of free-
dom. The Brussels Treaty, which gave birth to 
the Western European Union and to the Assem-
bly of that Union, is the cornerstone of your 
common defence. Together with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Alliance, it is the foundation of 
our common defence. 
Western civilisation has been in the fore-
front of the planet Earth's political, economic, 
and cultural development. Science and techno-
logy have played a major role in this process. 
The challenges we face today - those of defence, 
international finance, recession, inflation, envi-
ronment, energy, and equitable access to fairly 
priced resources - are difficult indeed. Though 
different from past challenges, the solutions to 
these problems depend in a major way on science 
and technology. I believe the aeronautical and 
space sciences and technologies, in which all of 
us are interested, will contribute to those solu-
tions. 
I want to say that the United States is 
fully prepared to co-operate closely with Western 
Europe and others to find appropriate solutions 
to these challenges. The goal of multilateral col-
laboration is most rewarding ; but the path to 
that goal is often difficult. We hope that these 
talks will be one more step along the path of 
understanding and of mutual confidence to help 
provide the climate for closer co-operation. 
So I say that you, Mr. Chairman, and your 
party are most welcome here. 
We understand that your meetings with 
this Senate Committee will be your only meet-
ings with the legislative branch of the govern-
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ment. So we will try to discuss and give you 
some feeling for the legislative and political 
aspects of those subjects of interest to you. 
We have been provided with a list of sub-
jects you wish to discuss. Perhaps the best way 
to introduce each subject would be for one of 
us to make a very brief statement to open an 
exchange of our views. 
To begin, I would like to say just a brief 
word about the Congress and this Committee. 
The Congress 
The legislative branch of the United States 
Government is bicameral, as you well know, 
and the Senate is one of its Houses. The Houses 
are independent of each other, and come together 
only in committees on conference to work out 
differences between the Houses on legislation. 
Occasionally we meet together to receive an 
address from the President or the head of 
another State or other dignitary. 
The Senate carries on its business in two 
principal places, on the floor of the Senate and 
in its committees. 
There are several different kinds of com-
mittees of the Senate, those having legislative 
jurisdiction being the most important. The Com-
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences is 
one of the eighteen standing committees of the 
Senate. It has legislative jurisdiction over the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
-NASA. This means that only this Committee 
can report legislation to the floor of the Senate 
dealing with aeronautics and space policy and 
the programmes of NASA. 
You are now sitting in the Committee's 
hearing room where we hold our hearings and 
mark up our bills. 
With that sort of general opening and before 
we get down to discussing any of the topics, I 
would like to know whether the Chairman has 
any statement he would like to make, and then 
I will recognise my colleague, Senator Gold-
water. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Chairman, I 
have a few words to deliver and beg your indul-
gence for my English which I do not practise 
enough, but I hope the feelings between members 
of our two houses are such, are so friendly that 
sometimes we do not need to talk. 
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I should like to begin by thanking you 
and Senator Goldwater for inviting us to the 
United States - an invitation we had great 
pleasure in accepting. 
As you know, the Committee was last in 
the United States in October 1971 when it visited 
numerous space installations. We are therefore 
particularly happy to have the opportunity on 
this occasion of holding political discussions with 
you and your colleagues as well as representa-
tives of NASA, the State Department, and the 
Pentagon, and much appreciate the two meetings 
you have arranged between our Committees. 
As an introduction to our discussions, per-
haps you will allow me to emphasise the wider 
aspect of United States-European political rela-
tions. One of the fundamental difficulties in these 
relations is caused by the fact that Western Eur-
ope is not yet fully united and therefore does not 
yet possess an effective overall administration 
and government. We fully understand why 
Americans complain about us : any negotiations 
with a body as pluralistic and lacking in poli-
tical integration as the European space organi-
sation - whether they be on Intelsat or other 
space systems - automatically assume a 
laborious character. All important policy deci-
sions have to be referred back to national govern-
ments which, in turn, have to satisfy the interests 
of many different groups such as industry or 
trade unions. 
However, in view of the fact that for many 
years the situation within the United States itself 
was not very different, and even as recently as 
last year's air navigation satellite negotiations 
the United States pluralistic attitude was quite 
clearly to the fore, we remain optimistic regard-
ing the future integration of the European 
States. 
I believe that here we shall have to be patient 
as it will take several years for our technique 
for co-ordinating sectional as well as national 
interests in Western Europe to be developed to 
the same extent as in the United States. Only 
then will it be possible to conduct straightforward 
and rapid negotiations. 
Lack of political unity in Europe is another 
source of irritation to the Americans who believe 
that a politically united Europe would relieve 
them of some of the burden and cost of world 
leadership. However, it is doubtful whether the 
European countries, having lost their colonial 
empires, will try to exercise a new political 
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influence in far-away countries. Again the 
analogy is the United States itself - its break 
with the traditions of the old world is worth 
noting. 
On the other hand, the European countries 
would like to have some influence and perhaps 
even participate in the American-Soviet dialogue. 
However, your government does not favour such 
participation which it considers would hinder the 
mobile diplomacy it employs to attain its object-
ives and which at the same time frequently 
involves secret negotiations. Dr. Kissinger put it 
quite clearly when he said that European inter-
ests are regional interests, whereas United States 
interests are worldwide. 
The Soviet-American dialogue has also led 
to a certain detente in space, now symbolised by 
preparations for the joint Soviet-American 
Apollo"Soyuz flight. In this venture the lives of 
all involved will depend upon how precisely they 
co-operate and co-ordinate every phase of activity. 
This means a high degree of collaboration. 
Of course we in Europe realise the necessity 
for this detente in space. Individually, neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union has suffi-
cient resources to do more than merely begin 
exploiting the possibilities for fruitful human 
activity in space in the decades ahead. It is there-
fore of great interest for Washington and Moscow 
to work together. However, one result of this 
collaboration will be that Soviet astronauts and 
technicians will learn far more from the exchange 
than their American counterparts - American 
space technology being far ahead of the Soviet 
Union. This also means that the Russians are 
becoming much better versed in this field than 
the Western Europeans. What is therefore needed 
is broadly based co-operation in space efforts 
taking in the personnel and talents of other 
nations, too. 
Turning now to points of special interest, 
you have received, Mr. Chairman, a list of topics 
about which the Committee would be particularly 
interested to acquire further information -
especially political information. I have just men-
tioned Soviet-American space co-operation, and 
would also like to mention European-United 
States co-operation going beyond the shuttle ; 
we would be very interested to know your opinion 
on prospects here. 
Another point which is of great interest to 
us as politicians is co-operation for launching 
satellites and especially guarantees for launching 
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satellites for commercial purposes, either for the 
European countries' own use or produced in 
Europe for third countries. 
Finally, it would be most useful if we could 
hear your opinion and that of your colleagues 
concerning European-American collaboration on 
new means of air transport, such as supersonic 
aircraft. 
We are all aware of the great knowledge at 
the disposal of your Committee and we would 
appreciate hearing your opinions since we are 
conscious of the great influence of aeronautical 
and space sciences on the military posture of the 
western world and the defence of our ideals. 
The CHAIRMAN. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Chairman. You have touched on many of the 
things that I hope we can discuss here. I think I 
can assure you that we are very anxious in the 
United States to continue with co-operative pro-
jects and to embark on additional ones with the 
countries of Western Europe. 
We are very pleased with Spacelab, Hellos, 
Ariel 5, the ANS Explorer and the other co-
operative space projects that we have, and we 
foresee that there will be many more. 
Mr. Chairman, I ~ould like to discuss the 
question of our Soviet collaboration, too, but I 
shall defer to my colleague for any remarks he 
would like to make. 
European contribution to technology 
Senator GoLDWATER.- I met these gentlemen 
before you came, Mr. Chairman. I just want to 
take this opportunity to thank you and through 
you your countries for the great contributions 
you have made to us that have enabled us in 
turn to make contributions to you. 
I am thinking of the United Kingdom and 
the jet engine, of France and lighter-than-air, of 
Italy and the preachments of General Douhet, 
and, of course, Willy Messerschmitt, who is a 
friend of mine, from Germany. 
So we who sit on this side of the ocean are 
thankful that you gentlemen have the history 
that we are now e::q>loiting and if you can gain 
anything from us, it is just a way of our paying 
you back for what we have borrowed from you. 
Senator Goldwater congratulated 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Can I say we just 
heard very good news about Senator Barry 
Goldwater. I just happened to learn of it now. 
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We heard that you have been recently elected 
an Honorary Member of the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics for your 
leadership and outstanding work in this field. 
Senator GoLDWATER.- Thank you. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Our whole Com-
mittee is happy to give you all our best congra-
tulations. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - Thank you very 
much. 
The CHAIRMAN. - We are very proud of 
Senator Goldwater, whose interest and expertise 
in aviation and space extend back beyond mine 
and that of most of us. He gives great leadership, 
and he is being recognised for it here. I am 
certainly pleased that he is so active on this 
Committee. 
I want to echo what he says. We genuinely 
consider that the aeronautics and space pro-
gramme is a co-operative venture. 
Space lab 
We are developing here in the United States 
a capacity for launching payloads into space, 
but you are proceeding with another part which 
is just as intricate and advanced in its require-
ment for science and technology as is the launch-
ing process. As I see our development of the 
space shuttle, it is to have a reliable, reusable 
system to be able to get into and out of space. 
So we are pleased that you are developing space-
lab and other payload experiments, the actual 
functioning pieces of hardware that have prac-
tical everyday effect, which we expect to be utili~ing with you. It is to be a partnership affair 
. as far as we are concerned. We are very appre-
ciative of that. 
Apollo/Soyuz 
In your remarks, Mr. Chairman, you indi-
cated that you thought that we were giving the 
Russians a lot more than we were getting from 
the Russians on the Apollo/Soyuz link-up and 
that may be so, but I do not think so. But 
whatever the trade-off is, we consider it of vast 
importance that finally we have opened it up 
to where we now can see to some extent what 
they are doing and understand it. When we stood 
apart, we did not really know and now we know, 
and I must say that they are co-operating very 
well with us now. We do not have any complaints 
151 
DOCUMENT 687 
about the degree of co-operation. We also see the 
possibility that you suggested ; that as we get 
into huge space ventures, perhaps neither of us 
would have the resources individually to do it 
alone. 
Perhaps now we can work out co-operative 
ventures where each country can contribute to 
the resources needed so we will need resources 
from other countries, too, and we will expect all 
of your countries to become involved with us. 
Space has been just barely opened up so far. 
There is so much yet to be done as we see it, so 
we hope to continue to put some of our resources 
into it. 
Space programme support 
Politically, in our country, we have a little 
difficulty in getting adequate funding for a space 
programme. We are undergoing a lot of economic 
stress as you are in your countries, too. There 
are those in political office, and out of office, 
that just seem to have a cry, cut down on all 
moneys for space. We hear rumours that we are 
going to be faced in the Budget Committee with 
a proposal to cut out entirely the funding for 
space. 
Now, I do not think that will happen. I think 
there is still a ·basic political commitment in this 
country to utilise our space capabilities and we 
have been able to keep the appropriations roughly 
up to the annual request. We are always a little 
bit behind, but close to the five-year projection 
that we made some years ago as to what we ought 
to ·appropriate and spend. 
So we feel relatively satisfied so far with 
what we have been able to do . 
I do not want to monopolise this. I want 
Senator Goldwater to break in at any time and 
if I am not accurate in any statements that I 
make, I hope he will help me out. 
I would like to ask whether in your coun-
tries there is a similar situation. Are you having 
a little trouble getting the adequate support, 
financial support, in your projects ? 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Yes. There have 
been some cuts, for instance in France, but we 
stick to our projects. We keep most of our resour-
ces for Ariane which we hope will be a success 
after an earlier failure. There is a big effort to 
be made. But there are some cuts in other parts. 
I do not know for Germany or England. 
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Mr. WARREN.- Certainly from the United 
Kingdom point of view where we face the prob-
lems of eternal doubt about the value of space. 
The CHAmMAN.- Yes. 
Mr. WARREN ... And looking at space from 
the population base of 50 million people, it is 
difficult to contemplate doing everything other 
than from the European population base, equi-
valent to your own, of 250 million. 
Tomorrow the Government of the United 
Kingdom will be announcing the defence cuts 
that it has brought in as part of its policy. In 
this Committee, the United Kingdom represen-
tatives come from both major parties, so there-
fore I could not express a partisan opinion about 
the effect of those defence cuts or their wisdom, 
but without doubt the cuts themselves must have 
a substantial effect on the aeronautical industry 
and I think everybody is concerned in Europe 
about the effect it may have, particularly on the 
seed corn end of research and development where 
the British have always produced a good perform-
ance. 
Space benefits 
Senator GoLDWATER. - We have a little 
packet of documents that each one of you is 
going to receive. One of the documents lists 
some of the contributions that space has made 
to our society so I would like to make a point 
that I have been trying to make, and I think 
it will have reference or bearing on your coun-
tries. 
We have spent roughly $55 billion in space, 
and my prophecy is that within five years we 
will be getting that much out of space from the 
developments of space, every year. 
We are not having great success right now 
in selling that idea, but I think we will. 
For example, one of our major problems in 
the United States, as it is elsewhere, is energy, 
electrical energy. We lose about 20 % of energy 
in the transmission over long lines. In skylab, 
we experimented with the growing of crystals. 
Now, crystals, as you know, are important to 
electricity and to avionics and electronics, but on 
earth you can only grow them so big, and then 
gravity begins to make them imperfect. In space, 
we hope to grow 14-centimetre crystals which is 
about the size that is needed to transform direct 
current into alternating current or vice versa, 
and also to control the transmission of electricity 
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through very cold lines underground, about 
minus 270°. 
Now, these supercold lines controlled by 
these crystals will reduce the transmission line 
loss to less than 1 %, we think. Therefore, we 
could take care of the whole power deficiency 
of the United States at the present time through 
the proper investment in spooe ; and the invest-
ment of an additional maybe $10 billion on earth 
here to make this possible. 
These are the things, and I think you will 
recognise what I am getting at when you see 
your little portfolios, that we are trying to get 
across to the American people. Not just getting 
a man on the moon. It was great, but we have 
done it. Now, from here on out it is, what can 
we do? 
The economic situation 
Mr. ToMNEY. - Senator, as far as I can see, 
we are both now floundering, both nations. That 
is the problem. But it is through no fault of 
our own. We are in an economic morass which 
will pass. The Appropriations Committee, 
whether we like it or not, will have to find 
money for outer space exploration, just as we 
in Great Britain have to find money for Rolls-
Royce, for the simple scientific fact is that 
30 % of Great Britain's scientific effort was 
contained in the aircraft industry, and so is 
yours. So, until this economic breakthrough 
comes through, whether it is in space or in 
orientation of the economy • this entire positive 
scientific labour force has to be kept as an 
entity, and this is the factor, you see, for which 
we are most concerned, because there are inter-
national pressures, economic and otherwise, and 
political pressures throughout the world at this 
stage, to break this economic western domination, 
and it is a real threat. The rewards are there 
when the economic breakthrough is achieved, 
both in your country and in France and in 
Germany. And it is these factors which impinge 
upon collaborations which are most important to 
us and to the French and to the Germans. 
You outlined the basic contribution of the 
British aeronautical industry to the jet engine 
and so forth, and developments from that. These 
industries will not live unless we in Great 
Britain maintain a separate national aircraft 
industry. There is not a large geographical 
population able to sustain it. The same is more 
or less true in France and Germany. We average 
a lot of co-operation in producing the Concorde 
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and which has been a scientific bank for our 
technology. 
Those kinds of things have to stay, but 
whether it is Lockheed - and Lockheed has 
been in trouble here, and other companies too -
whether it is them or us, there has to be some 
point where we dovetail for the sake of holding 
together during a very, very difficult economic 
situation, whether it is in energy or otherwise, 
until we can break through. We know it is some-
thing we cannot do until we have enough oil and 
until we have enough oil, we cannot have a 
foreign policy. This is a cardinal fact. You can-
not have foreign policy. And once we get that, 
we will have a different orientation in Europe. 
This will be the strategic reserve if necessary 
for NATO. 
What we are really asking for is co-operation 
through your Committee, from your scientific 
and economic industries, along with Great Bri-
tain and France. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - I agree with you 
100 %, and I think I can say, having observed 
this for many, many, many years, that where 
the United States you might say absolutely 
dominated the airframe industry twenty years 
ago, we no longer do that. 
The need for co-operation 
Now, I want to lead up to a point of 
immediate co-operation, but I will not get to it 
for another second or two. I have watched at 
various airshows in Europe, particularly in 
Paris and England, the growing ability of the 
combined manufacturing of European countries 
to meet the competition from America to the 
point that, partly from your foresight in the 
development of the A300- the A300-B airbus-
you now have an opening for a good market in 
this country because our manufacturers are just 
now - a month or so ago - beginning to get 
into the wide-bodied, short-haul aircraft. 
Where we can co-operate immediately -
and I want to kind of put your fears a little bit 
aside, if I can - is with the intertraffic of the 
Concorde with the United States. Now, you hear 
a lot of noise from this country and a lot of noise 
from the Congress about the Concorde flying 
into the United States. I do not think that that is 
going to be prohibited. The governing body has 
said it will allow it. I have flown on the Con-
corde. I have watched it fly and listened to it fly. 
It is noisy. But, where we can handle it in this 
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country, it will be handled I am sure, which will 
begin another breakthrough. 
We have very recently had to go to France 
and to Germany and to England for technical 
know-how and technical improvement to help us 
build bigger jet engines. This is the Rolls-Royce 
contribution. And contributions from France 
also. So I think it is coming, and I agree with 
you that whether any of us like it or not, it has 
to be, because we are at the same time watching 
the Soviets develop a real ability in airframes. 
In fact, I picked up one of our best weekly air 
magazines this morning, and there is an ad for 
the Tu-144, and they are selling them, or trying 
to sell them, in this country, something that 
five years ago we would have laughed at. So I 
think out of the interests of self-preservation, we 
are going to have to do this. 
You also have Red China, whether we like it 
or not, now building rather sophisticated aircraft 
and engines, so the competition to us is no longer 
just a handful. It is a lot of nations. And I 
would hope that out of a meeting like this we 
could develop a better understanding for the 
needed co-operation between our countries. I have 
often said if we could somehow get politicians 
out of the act and just get the engineers and 
the professors and the scientists and the people 
who use these things together, I think we would 
come to a faster understanding. The trouble with 
those of us in politics is that we are always 
looking for a vote, and we do not think far 
enough ahead. 
Mr. WARREN. - Can I come in there and 
say, Senator, I respect what you say, but I think 
surely it is the responsibility of politicians to 
make sure that if we have got competition, that 
it is good competition, between both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
If we have got an achievement, then the 
politicians must see that that achievement is 
allowed. 
What is disastrous, with great respect for 
the civil service and the agency authorities, is 
that they frequently stand in the way of the 
achievement which has been backed by the poli-
ticians which you know from the engineering 
point of view ought to be permitted. So I do 
think that I do not want to work us out of a job 
but I think you ought to stay in yours, sir. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - To tell you the 
truth, what I was applying that reason to was 
not your country, but I find, for example, I have 
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not been invited to the Soviet Union for reasons 
that I think could be understood ... 
Mr. ToMNEY. - That makes two of us. 
Senator GOLDWATER. - Yet I have no dif-
ficulty when I go to these air shows sitting in the 
cockpits with Russian pilots, talking with Rus-
sian engineers, through the interpreters. As I 
say, in a case like that, if we could get the 
politicians out, and let the engineers and scien-
tists talk, we would be better off. 
I agree in this country we have been bitten 
by the environmental bug, and this is pursued 
vigorously by a handful of people. Somebody 
said there was good news and bad news when 
Moses came down from the mount. There was 
going to be a parting of the waters, so people 
could cross, but first he would have to prepare 
an environmental impact statement. 
The Ooncorde 
That is what we are playing with. We are 
playing with politics in the field of the Con-
corde. Some people from New York and the other 
big cities who shudder at the thought of modern 
jet noise have appealed to the Congress as they 
have every right to do, and the resultant clamour 
makes it seem like we will not allow these flights 
to happen. Yet there have been over the conti-
nental United States in the last ten years over 
five million supersonic flights with practically 
no complaints. Moreover, the Concorde will not 
fly over the United States or near it. 
The CHAIRMAN. - Well, fortunately, the 
draft FAA environmental impact statement is 
favourable to the Concorde and unless something 
new comes up I think it will be permitted to 
land at the airports here in this country. 
Legal problem of United States-Soviet agreements 
Mr. ToMNEY. - I do not want to mono-
polise this, Mr. Chairman. There is one thing 
bugging me, and has been bugging me for a 
long time, and I mentioned it once or twice dur-
ing this visit. That is the agreements being 
arrived at between you and the Soviet Union 
over Intelsat and satellites which seem to be 
building up a doctrine of case law as between 
nation and nation in which other nations are 
not active participants in the scientific and 
mechanical sense. They may go along in terms 
of signature with the agreement. 
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Now, it is all right so far as the status quo 
is maintained, but what is to be the situation 
if in fact the Soviet Union were to break away 
from any agreement for political purposes and 
we would have a situation whereby we should 
be confronted with a case of case law of the 
International Court at The Hague where we 
would not be able to proceed on other contracts. 
This is a fascinating thing because a thing 
is being built up apparently, the inherent dan-
gers of which are not being recognised, a case 
of case law being built up out of the necessity 
for co-operation which could backfire. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - Well, that whole 
field of law is a very interesting one and one 
that I do not think has even been touched. 
Now, as far as the Soviets breaking away, 
I would like to see them keep their word just 
once. We have had fifty-two agreements with 
them formally, and they have broken fifty-one 
of them. That is the United States. 
When you get into the international use 
of satellites for photographic purposes, for infra-
red searching, and so forth and so on, then I 
think you also do get into some very, very 
troublesome areas of law. We call it in our 
country the Blue Sky Law. How far do I extend 
my property rights Y You know, some people 
contend they go right on up to Heaven and 
down to Hell, and others say no. 
I do not think we are that far along, Mr. 
Tomney, that we can discuss it - I am not 
a lawyer, unfortunately. 
Mr. ToMNEY. -Neither am I. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - Fortunately or 
unfortunately we are not. But I think it is 
something that should be put up for legal discus-
sion. 
Mr. TOMNEY. - In the context of the world 
at large, take Morocco, or Indonesia, 127 million 
Moslems who are not a political force. Direct 
transmission by satellite would have a tremen-
dous effect. It is this kind of thing which I 
do not think we are looking at effectively. 
Public scepticism of science and technology 
Mr. CARTER. - Senator Moss, I wonder if I 
could take you back to what both of you have 
said about the need to maintain the scientific 
effort at a time when there are great economic 
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pressures on just about everything at the current 
time ? In addition to that, is there not a great 
deal of scepticism generally throughout the 
developed world as far as science and technology 
generally are concerned, and therefore it is not 
just a question of compelling economic argu-
ments and forces that are causing people to 
look at scientific programmes but also an increas-
ing level of scepticism, and in that sort of dual 
context, does not something like the space 
shuttle pose your government with very big 
problems Y 
We have heard, for example, from varying 
sources, differing opinions about whether this is 
going to go ahead or not. Some people seem to 
feel very enthusiastic about it. NASA, for 
example, they are quite convinced that the whole 
programme will go ahead. But others we have 
talked to have been rather more guarded in their 
long-term projection. 
How do you feel about it 1 
The CHAmMAN. - I would like to respond 
to that. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUiou. - I would like to 
say that the United Kingdom representatives 
have made their declarations ; we would like 
other representatives - the Germans, and 
Dutch - to be able to speak after you answer. 
The CHAIRMAN.- All right; surely. 
Mr. Carter, you are correct. There is an 
element of scepticism among some people of our 
country and it is hard for us who are working 
with it on a daily basis to understand that 
degree of scepticism. 
Scepticism and the space shuttle 
Now, on the shuttle, it is going ahead on 
schedule. We have had no major problems with 
it rea1ly, although I cannot say that every 
detail has yet fallen into place. While we cannot 
say that all problems are absolutely solved, 
there is no reason to believe that NASA will not 
meet the programme laid down, or that the 
shuttle will not fly as scheduled, or that it will 
not be able to do the things that are set out 
for it. 
Now, this space shuttle is in the research 
and development phase and as this has happened 
on our other space hardware programmes it is 
coming along. There is among some, especially 
those not closely associated with technology, this 
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feeling of scepticism. I guess the Apollo pro-
gramme has the greatest scepticism of all. We did 
not have very many people who believed that 
we could land on the moon, take off from the 
moon and come back, expecially by 1969, and the 
shuttle is one great step really beyond the 
technology we developed in Apollo. 
Now, in order to combat this and that is 
another problem - it is a problem really of 
communications. People readily just sort of 
absorb something when it happens and take it 
for granted. For instance, we can send radio 
signals clear out to the edge of the solar system 
and back again ; we can make our space 
vehicles perform as required many hundreds 
of millions of miles from earth and all this 
sort of thing, and people just sort of accept that 
as though it was always done. In that respect, 
I do not know why there should be any large 
measure of scepticism on shuttle or any of the 
other programmes that we have so far approved 
but of course there is and part of our job is to 
overcome as much of that scepticism as possible. 
We would like to hear from you, if you 
know how we could better answer that scepticism 
which does indeed hamper a little bit - hamper 
us in our seeking the funds needed to carry out 
these programmes. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - I do not know if 
it is scepticism in this country, although I think 
there is an element of that. What we are faced 
with in America is the fact that, as you all are 
too, we are in a - I would not call it a depres-
sion, having lived through the big one back in 
the twenties and thirties - but we are in a 
period of increasing inflation. We do have reces-
sion and perhaps even depression in spotted 
places. So the political question, and it gets back 
to that is where can we spend the money in 
the best way to help the country. What expendi-
tures will have the most appeal to the people so 
that they feel in turn that their government is 
trying to do something ? 
Now, we have never had a question about 
our military expenditures of a serious nature 
until the last two Congresses. We are spending 
less for our military in comparison to our gross 
national product than we did when we had our 
little trouble with England nearly two hundred 
years ago. 
We are spending less in real dollars than 
we did twenty years ago. And yet the cry is out, 
cut national defence. They also want to cut up 
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NASA. We have the National Institutes of 
Health they want to cut. 
The National Science Institute - they want 
to cut that. They want to spend all the money 
in HEW - Health, Education, and Welfare -
which, when we get to it, means spending the 
money on people. 
Now, I do not know how it is in your 
different countries, but that is our problem. It is 
not so much, then, scepticism, as it is the real 
nitty-gritty of politics that we have to fight, 
even though when you get right down to it, 
NASA is responsible, directly responsible, for 
about 110 thousand jobs in this country, and that 
does not count all the sub-contractors, all 
through the different States. 
[Off the record discussion.] 
Mr. de MoNTESQUIOU. - After members of 
the United Kingdom, I would like to give the 
floor to Mr. Lenzer, the representative from 
Germany. 
The CHAIRMAN.- Mr. Lenzer. 
Concerns of Germany summarised 
Mr. LENZER. - In our country there are 
big problems as far as the aircraft industry 
is concerned ; space activities are reduced only to 
European co-operative activities. As far as the 
aircraft industry is concerned, there are doubts 
in parliament whether the airbus project will 
ever reach the break-even point and in the 
military field, there is doubt about MRCA, the 
multirole combat aircraft. For a small country, 
even though our country has a considerable 
economic basis, it is quite a bit to accept all 
multilateral projects in Europe. 
As far as space activities are concerned, after 
the foundation of the European Space Agency, 
our national priority is spacelab ; we contribute 
to the French launcher Ariane in order to keep 
up with launching capacity technology. 
Availability of space launch assistance 
We are afraid of the interpretation of the 
Intelsat treaty, you know that in a letter from 
Under-Secretary Johnson to Minister Lefevre the 
chairman of the European Space Conferenc~ is 
this sentence : ' 
"In this respect, United States launch assist-
ance will be available for those satellite 
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projects which are for peaceful purposes and 
are consistent with obligations under rele-
vant international agreements and arrange-
ments." 
I should be very glad if you could give your 
opinion on that. Do you think that there could 
be a guarantee for a launch of European satel-
lites for commercial use, telecommunications 
satellites Y That is a question debated in our 
country. 
The CHAIRMAN. - If I understand the ques-
tion, it is whether or not, and you quoted Under-
Secretary Johnson's statement of a few years 
ago, launch facilities would be available for 
launching communications satellites, for any 
legitimate peaceful purpose, for any other coun-
try. I think that this is an offer of the United 
States to utilise its launch facilities for any 
country that comes forward with a satellite that 
it would like to have put into orbit and to do 
this at just the cost to the United States to get 
the satellite up. 
Now, what I think the statement is trying 
to say is that the United States will not show 
favouritism to any country or group of countries, 
that we will do it if they come forward in a 
straightforward way and make the necessary 
arrangements. Out of this could come facilities 
for many things, many kinds of communications. 
We have been putting up communication 
satellites for the Canadians, as you know, and 
for others. 
I do not know whether that answers what 
specifically you had in mind but that is the way 
I see it. 
Mr. LENZE.R.. - May I ask an additional 
question, Senator, just to make it clear 7 You 
know that Symphonie was launched. Symphonie 
is supposed to be an experimental satellite, but 
it is not yet strictly a commercial satellite. Now, 
if the Federal Republic of Germany had the 
opportunity to come into the market, in Iran, or 
for instance, in an Arab country, for a com-
mercial telecommunications satellite, would the 
United States provide in this case launch assist-
ance for such a commercial satellite, competing 
with other satellite systems, Intelsat systems, or 
something like that Y 
The CHAIRMAN. - Let me consult with the 
staff and see if my understanding is correct. 
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Senator GOLDWATER. - In this country we 
have corporations that handle commercial com-
munications satellites. It is private money, but 
I see no reason personally why we would not 
launch a satellite to do what any of your coun-
tries wanted to do in the way of commercial 
work. 
The problem that I see, and I will let the 
Chairman have his say because he has talked 
to the brains, is keeping a situation or maintain-
ing the system so we do not have one country 
breaking the rules. Now, you know that we have 
satellites that survey the entire world. We par-
ticularly aim these at one country; they have 
the same thing, doing the same thing to us. We 
have geostationary satellites that will tell us any 
time a rocket is launched any place in this world 
where it might mean a missile coming toward the 
United States. I do not have any doubt that they 
have the same. 
Now, are these being used for non-peaceful 
purposes 1 I do not think so. Also, we have 
in development a navigational satellite system 
that will make it possible for airplanes and boats 
to navigate precisely any place on the globe or 
in the air and all countries will benefit by that. 
Did you find out anything, Ted, that would 
be contrary 1 
The CHAmMAN.- Well, what I am told by 
the staff is that we have indeed reserved the 
right to consider the usage of the satellite before 
we finally agree to launch. In every instance 
we have provided the launch service and it does 
not seem that this has been utilised. But the 
question, the very narrow question I guess this 
comes down to, is whether the United States 
would provide the launch service if that launch 
resulted in a degradation of Intelsat which we 
support. Would we not launch it because it was 
a competitor 7 
Personally I do not think it would come 
to that, but I guess we have reserved the right 
to look at it on that basis. 
I would prefer that we just said straight 
out that as long as it is for peaceful purposes 
we will put it in orbit, and I think that actually, 
as a practical matter, that is where it will come 
out. I do not think we would refuse to launch 
a satellite that was made by the Germans but 
was going to be utilised by the Iranians, for their 
own purposes. I cannot imagine our going that 
far. 
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Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - We have now the 
representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Cornelis-
sen. 
The European concern re airline flights to the 
United States 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. -Yes, Mr. Chairman. I 
am accompanied by my colleague from the 
Netherlands, Mr. van Ooijen. 
I must confess I am not very optimistic 
about the availability of the required funds for 
space activities in the near future in a country 
like the Netherlands. There is, first of all, of 
course, the economic concern, then concern about 
the environmental problems, but apart from that, 
in the Netherlands the space investigation is 
seen primarily as an American activity and I 
must say that many people feel concerned nowa-
days about the prospects of co-operation with 
the United States whenever there may arise real 
problems in your country. And I will tell you 
why. 
These people refer to the present American 
policy toward the European airlines and you 
probably are aware of the fact, that your govern-
ment has asked our government to cut down the 
number of flights of KLM of the Royal Dutch 
Airlines to the United States by some 50%. 
Now, people in the Netherlands just do not 
understand a policy like that from a friendly, 
good ally like the United States and I am afraid 
it will be very detrimental to the friendly feel-
ings between your country and the Netherlands. 
It has a much greater effect upon the future 
than many people do realise, and I must say 
I would be very grateful if you would use your 
influence to avoid a partisan, and in my opinion, 
unwise, decision in this field, not only in the 
interests of our economy but much more for 
the sake of friendship and co-operation in a 
much broader field in the future. 
The CHAIRMAN. - I understand that, and I 
am sure that although we may have curtailed 
flights somewhat, it was not intended to be any 
sort of impediment to the Netherlands or any 
other country. I think that the reduction of the 
number of flights is based on the fact that we 
have only two scheduled overseas airlines, TWA 
and Pan Am flying the North Atlantic. National 
does fly just one place overseas. Both of them, of 
course, have been losing a vast amount of money 
in the last two or three years and Pan Am was 
about to go into bankruptcy. So there has been 
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concern about restructuring their routes and 
trying to get these two airlines back into a pro-
fitable basis or at least to a breakeven point. 
I think it may have grown out of that and the 
faet that there are so many other airlines in 
the United States they could not attract enough 
passengers to be profitable. 
Now, that policy may seem not to be in 
accord with our doctrine of just, open, and free 
competition, but our airlines are not supported 
by the government and so it does serve something 
of a national interest. If we had no international 
airline functioning out of the United States, 
we would be left in a very difficult position. 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - But you are a big 
country. What would a small country do without 
an individual airline? 
The CHAIRMAN. - Yes, if we prohibited 
KLM flights entirely, you would have a good 
case, but we asked only that the number of 
flights be cut back. I do not know that I can 
give a satisfactory answer. I think that the 
strained economic conditions that obtain around 
the world create friction between countries at 
times, but we must do our best to keep things 
on an even keel and not permit the effect to fall 
heavily on any one country. Senator Goldwater 
may have a comment on that. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - I would like to 
make a comment. As I look back on the history 
of transportation, I think all of your countries 
have gone through the development of transpor-
tation by private money and then seen national-
isation move in, not necessarily because you 
wanted it that way, but because it got to be 
the only way the transportation could survive. 
Now, we are looking in the United States 
today at a railroad situation and frankly, we 
will either have nationalised railroads within five 
to ten years or, we will not have any railroads. 
Out of the great mass of railroads in this coun-
try, there are only five or six that make a profit. 
Now, in aviation, this same free enterprise, 
if you want to call it that, that same spirit that 
has built all of our systems, just got away with 
itself. Pan American had way too many overseas 
routes and flights and TWA has, too. I might 
say in the case of your airline, you run one of 
the best airlines in the whole world, and you 
are real competition. So, our airlines are faced 
with a kind of competition that private enter-
prise I think cannot meet ; and, we may be faced, 
'llthough I would hate to see it, as a great believer 
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in our economic system, we may be faced with the 
eventual nationalisation of our transportation 
systems just like in many of your countries, 
merely to have them survive. 
Iran is coming in to bail Pan American 
out and they may still go under. TWA and 
Pan American may have to merge. The happy 
days of aviation I think are over and I think 
we are facing a time now when people are going 
to think two or three times before they say well, 
"Let us fly to Brussels ; it is only going to cost us 
$600 or $700 and we will have a nice weekend". 
Things are getting a little tough. 
Now, when things get loose again, if they 
ever do, maybe that will change, but transpor-
tation in this country is in a much different 
situation than it was a few years ago, even a 
year ago, now it is in real danger. 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - I quite agree with 
looking together for solutions for a common 
problem, but I would like to ask for partial 
desistance. I think that would hurt very much 
the friendship between the nations and I think 
in an international community it would be a step 
back. I think it would be very bad for all of us. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - Before I yield, I 
would like to make one more point. It does not 
apply to your country that I know of. But we 
were faced, for example, with landing fees in 
Australia of as much as ·$2,500, where we charged 
Qantas $225 to land in our international airports. 
We are selling some of the international airlines 
jet fuel at a cost below what our airlines are 
buying it for, we are paying two and three times 
more for jet fuel in some overseas landings. The 
President was implored to talk to the countries 
that were guilty of that and he is trying to get 
some adjustment. 
We do not want to raise hell with anybody's 
airlines. We do not want to see ours go broke 
and I do not want to see them become nation-
alised, but I am afraid that is going to happen. 
Mr. WARREN. - I was just going to suggest, 
Senator, does this not illustrate the fact that the 
Bermuda agreement against which frequencies 
are determined, is now out of date as a method 
of regulating capacity which is now the problem. 
There is a need for a new style of international 
agreement, thirty years after Bermuda, to 
identify how one could tie capacity to demand 
and so a new Bermuda agreement would evolve. 
This is the real problem I think countries like 
Holland are facing. 
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Senator GoLDWATER. - Well, let me point 
out something that has developed in this country, 
it may exist in your country, I do not know. 
Here it is possible for me to go to any airline 
or any non-airline and hire an airplane, say a 
707 or 747 and I can charter that airplane to 
go any place in the world as long as I do not 
make a stop in the United States. And I can 
do this with certified crews or non-certified 
crews and I can sell the transportation at a 
terrific saving. This procedure is used here 
particularly by groups who would like to visit 
Brussels or London or Paris for some artistic 
or musical event and they will fill the whole 
airplane at a price that would be half what Pan 
American or TWA could sell. 
Now, that is hard to control as it gets back 
into politics. Are you going to make the whole 
Symphony Society of Atlanta, Ga. mad 1 No. 
You are going to let them charter that airplane. 
So it hurts KLM and it hurts Britain, France, 
and it hurts us. I do not know if you have that 
in Europe but it applies to your statement about 
the Bermuda agreement because in those days 
such charters did not exist. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. van Ooijen. 
Satellite interceptor 
Mr. VAN OoiJEN.- Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to ask a question about satellites. If I have 
been informed correctly, the United States Air 
Force is beginning to develop a small ground 
enemy satellite interceptor and also the space 
and missile systems organisation is developing 
a non-explosive interceptor which will be guided 
by a long-wave infra-red homing system. Do 
you not think that the development of these 
satellite interceptors is contrary to the idea 
expressed by the United Nations that outer space 
should not be open to warfare ? What do you 
think about that ? 
Senator GoLDWATER. - Well, you get into 
a very highly classified region here. I have tried 
to unclassify it by saying I think any country 
that can develop a satellite can develop the abil-
ity to destroy another satellite or destroy the 
other satellite's ability to perform, not necessarily 
to shoot it down as we think of that, but, by 
electronic means, to render their electronic 
equipment inoperable. I would say that could 
be done today. And I would guess, without 
knowing for certain, that the Soviets have that 
ability although I do not know that it has ever 
been used. 
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I know I am safe in saying that the United 
States has never employed anything like that, 
but it is not a difficult thing to do. It would not 
be done necessarily by infra-red or even by laser. 
It could be done by jamming designed for that 
purpose. If you have somebody spying in your 
country, and you render him inoperable, is that 
an act of warY 
Now, I think we have to admit that both the 
Soviets and ourselves are using satellites for 
surveillance purposes, we are anxious to know 
what they are doing and they are anxious to 
know what we are doing. So it is a matter of 
interpretation, we view such use of space to be 
for peaceful purposes. 
I do not think any country is developing a 
satellite that could be used for war purposes 
unless the Soviets have the ability for bombing 
from one. I do not believe they have. 
The CHAIRMAN.- I think in response to that 
I might say that there is a capability for doing 
this and it possibly could be done, but we surely 
have not done it. We have adhered very strictly 
to the space treaty of 1967. The DOD tells us 
when they come to testify that they have not 
used any of their satellites for anything but 
peaceful purposes and nothing this Committee 
has found out in its reviews would contradict 
that testimony. We are doing research and devel-
opment to be able to assess capabilities but we 
certainly have not violated the treaty and unless 
there is an act of war, as the Senator referred 
to, we will not. Somebody else will do it first. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Thank you very 
much. Mr. de Bruyne from Belgium. 
Earth resources 
Mr. DE BRUYNE. - Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to refer to item 12 on the agenda. There is 
mentioned "Earth resources.' We have already 
spoken about it. But I have a question on fishing 
activities from satellites. I am interested in that 
problem. 
The CHAIRMAN. -Well, I am not aware of 
the fact that we have been able to detect actually 
schools of fish. But we can get a readout on 
currents, we can read water temperatures and 
we can detect some pollution. So we can locate 
some of the surrounding circumstances that 
probably could point to where fishing was likely 
to be successful. We now have two ERTS satel-
lites (now called Landsats) aloft and we are now 
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fabricating the third one which will be somewhat 
more sophisticated; it will be launched about 
two years from now. I am not enough of a 
scientist to know but I would suspect that we 
can detect conditions that are conducive to 
fishing areas ; but we cannot do it on a real time 
basis always. 
Senator GoLDWATER.. - This is true. 
Mr. DE B.R.UYNE. - Thank you. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - I think one of our 
biggest steps forward in space applications will 
be the geothermal exploration of both the land 
and oceans to determine where there are big 
differences in temperature. These should be 
important discoveries. We think substantial 
amounts of electrical power can be generated 
using the high temperature water and steam. It 
is embryonic but it will certainly help in the 
location of fish. I think to some extent it has 
been employed by some of our Portuguese-
American tuna fisherman who watch these 
things. 
The CHAIRMAN. -We might say, reverting 
back to what we were talking ·about - the 
practical daily benefits of space - we have been 
able to sell this idea better to our people than 
almost anything else we have done in the pro-
gramme. The ERTS readouts - that is pictures 
- that we can give them, are used by our 
farmers, lumbermen, town planners, and many 
others, because every eighteen days you go over 
the same part of the earth and you can read it 
to see what is happening. With two of them up 
there, we will do it every nine days, so you can 
see changes just as they happen all over the face 
of the earth. The Landsats as we call them now ; 
have been immensely successful. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Thank you very 
much. We have two more gentlemen who would 
like to put questions. Mr. Cerneau, French 
Member of Parliament, and Mr. Fletcher. Oh, 
not Mr. Cerneau ? Mr. Fletcher. 
Airships 
Mr. FLETCHER. - Senator Moss, I would 
like through you, sir, to address a few remarks 
to Senator Goldwater, whom I have come a long 
way to see. I would have found you out even if 
you were not on this Committee because I want 
to turn to item 6 on the agenda, and I want to 
say I represent nobody, not my government, par-
liament, or even this Committee. For four years 
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I have been regarded as a lunatic in my own 
country for advocating the return to the airship 
in a modified form. I founded an association 
where our project is on three levels, one at a 
very advanced level indeed, one in the field of 
intermediate technology, and the third one, the 
Shell natural gas project to lift natural gas using 
the cargo as the lifting medium. 
I wonder what is the attitude generally 
speaking in the United States Y In other words, 
how successful have you been, sir, in converting 
this Congress and your colleagues to the view 
that there is something in this Y I would like to 
know, and my eyesight is getting very dim as I 
get older, what is the significance of the mark Y 
The Goodyear Corp. has offered to build an 
experimental ship which is likely to be accepted. 
In other words, what is the state of the game 
over here Y 
Senator GoLDWATER.- Well, I am glad you 
brought that up. 
The CHAIRMAN. - Quite a surprise. (Laugh-
ter) 
Senator GoLDWATER. -It has only been a 
few years ago when I was asked to address an 
aeronautical meeting. My good assistant, Charlie 
Lombard, whose father is French by the way, 
prepared a statement for me on lighter than air ; 
it carried me back to the days of Shenandoah 
and to when I was a boy and balloons and diri-
gibles were the thing. I made this speech and 
within three months I found myself an honorary 
member of five different lighter-than-air asso-
ciations in the United States. So there is a big 
interest. 
Now, this one (points to a model of an air-
ship), by the way, is one that has been developed 
by Mr. Piasecki who is one of our pioneers in 
helicopters, and the army, I understand, has just 
expressed an interest in this for heavy lift. 
Charlie, do you know the dimensions of 
that Y 
Mr. LoMBARD.- Yes, sir. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - They would get their 
forward movement from the helicopters and some 
of their up and down and lateral movement. 
Mr. LOMBARD. - This particular configura-
tion would be overall 770 feet. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - 770 feet long. 
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Mr. WARREN. - What lift would that give 
you Y 
Senator GoLDWATER.- Do you have the lift 
on there 1 
Mr. LoMBARD. -The useful load would be 
168,400 pounds. 
Senator GOLDWATER. - Now, I think you 
are talking about the Shell development in Eng-
land, 180,000 pounds ? 
Mr. FLETCHER. -Yes. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - We are watching 
that very, very closely. This is another one (points 
to a second model) that the navy is interested in 
for ship offloading. What we are interested in 
in this country - and this has a 50-ton sling 
load, just for unloading ships - we are inter-
ested in lighter than air to provide heavy trans-
portation and to augment our, you might say, 
disappearing rail freight lines and to eliminate 
the compounding of traffic jams on our highways 
by heavy trucks. We feel that lighter than air 
can carry freight between communities where 
great speed is not of importance. I am thinking 
of forty, fifty miles an hour. I am very happy to 
say that there is a great revival of interest in 
this country in lighter than air. There are a 
number of companies, including Mr. Piasecki's, 
that are interested. Goodyear, of course, is inter-
ested. I even have a man and his son building 
a 150-foot lighter-than-air vehicle out in Arizona. 
I do not know where they got the know-how, but 
they seem to have it. I would not be surprised 
that within eighteen months to two years you are 
going to see some very material demonstrations 
of this interest in this country. 
I think it has a great future. I think we can 
even see the day again of transoceanic, trans-
Pacific passenger travel, with the improved 
ability we now have for knowing what weather 
is ahead, and so forth, again, where great speed 
is not the problem. I have been very amazed by 
the interest in this in this country. I wish we had 
more time. If I had known about your interest 
we could have had somebody from NASA up 
here to speak to it because NASA is devoting 
some of its budget to this. 
Mr. FLETCHER.- Yes. We read that. 
Senator GoLDWATER. - You were told that. 
I am glad you brought it up. It is like wanting 
to talk about my grandchildren and I will talk 
about them any time. 
6- Ill 
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Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Osborn. 
The aerospace industry 
Mr. OSBORN.- Mr. Chairman, I am sorry 
I was a little late. I found it a most interesting 
discussion. We are faced in the whole of the 
western world with overoapacity in our aircraft 
industry. We are faced with overcapacity in our 
airline industry. We are faced with phenomenal 
expenditure in the western world on, shall we 
say, the shuttle programme. What can we do as 
a European ·Committee meeting you, an Ameri-
can Committee, to spread the load and do more 
to give Europe pride in joint projects, civil avia-
tion, civil airlines, and space ? We feel we are 
the poor cousins. You are faced as a nation with 
a phenomenal expenditure. You have the oppor-
tunity of spreading your hand out to us in 
Europe so we can share the load and go forward 
together. 
I would like your views on what a second, 
third, and fourth step could be, a step taken by 
members of parliaments and governments. 
The CHAIRMAN.- Thank you. I tried to say 
in the beginning, and I do not know that I said 
it well, that we hope that we could expand and 
grow in the partnership that we have begun in 
the exploration in space, all the way from plan-
etary and purely scientific exploration down to 
the practical things such as ERTS that we were 
talking about just a little while ago. 
Especially we are hopeful that in the space 
shuttle we will have such a reliable means of 
transportation that the economy of re-use will 
come into effect so that it will be used much 
more and that we could then be in co-operation 
with all of our European allies, the Japanese and 
others who want to go into space, whether it be 
for practical development of something such as 
the crystal that Senator Goldwater was talking 
about or for scientific reasons. There are many 
experiments that indicate that high purity mate-
rials such as vaccines can be made in space that 
cannot really be made here on the earth. We 
can do practical things like that. And we would 
want to have the closest kind of collaboration, 
not only to use the brains and the know-how of 
all of your scientists as well, but having you 
contribute economically in a joint venture. 
In other words, I view it, and I am sure 
that my colleagues on this Committee do too, that 
this push into space should involve all of man-
kind doing it. We are somewhat in the vanguard 
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now because we put the resources there and did 
certain things, but there is no wish of exclusivity 
on our part. We want it to be utilised by others 
as well. And the same with advances in aero-
nautics generally - in aviation. 
You alluded to the fact that we are probably 
overbuilt somewhat in the airlines and I think 
maybe we are. I think for one thing it became 
sort of a prestige thing that every country have 
an airline. So we find small lesser developed 
countries that really do not need an airline have 
one ; and they put resources into it just to 
keep it flying and that is probably a mistake. 
Now, it is going to take economic collisions 
of some kind to shake the thing down a bit, but 
I think we can survive that. Our area of effort 
is to continue to make improvements in these 
systems. 
For instance, this Committee has just urged 
NASA to increase its research and technology 
efforts to cut down the fuel consumption of 
aircraft by 50% ; that is, improve their effici-
ency by that amount. 
Now, this probably will take until 1985, but 
at that point when the technology is there in 
place, then we will probably begin to have a 
new generation of aircraft. Structurally, aircraft 
will be somewhat different than they are now. 
In this kind of research and development we 
would like you to participate. It may very well 
be that breakthroughs will be made in many 
things. 
We recently developed the supercritical 
wing, for example, and other things of that sort 
have come along. Although I cannot tell you 
on a day-to-day basis what we are going to be 
doing, I know we will be depending on this spirit 
of co-operation - this tradeoff back and forth 
with the Europeans especially and with other 
countries with whom we have interchange. 
If anything has really broken down the 
national barriers of the world, I think space 
and aeronautics have done it and national bor-
ders will become less and less important, I think 
as our techniques improve. 
The political role 
Mr. OSBORN. - Can I put a quick sup-
plementary question ? This Committee had a very 
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interesting colloquy in September 1973 when we 
had representatives of the aircraft manufac-
turers, airlines, airport authorities, and parlia-
mentarians at a seminar discussing common prob-
lems. Everyone left very much wiser as to the 
broader picture than when he arrived. Are there 
any initiatives that American and European 
politicians can jointly take to broaden the hori-
zon of men working in so narrow a field? So that 
all brains can be used and initiatives taken Y 
The CHAIRMAN.- You state it very well and 
I would hope that that can be the function of 
us politicians. We talked a little earlier about 
what the politicians' role, and the government's 
role would be as against the purely scientific. I 
heard Senator Goldwater say to some of our 
scientists when they were before us that they 
probably had the sharpest minds but the least 
communication of anybody be knew of. 
So I think it takes a mix of the two. And 
you are right, where you have very concentrated 
and narrow scientific investigation and research, 
you need to broaden that out to where they begin 
to see across the whole spectrum an interchange 
with one another. 
We need to do these things with other 
countries- other people, worldwide. We should 
not keep to ourselves the things we work on. 
We want to be sharing with you. You in turn 
can share with us because you are developing 
many things. 
If you were a little late, Mr. Osborn, you 
probably did not hear Senator Goldwater's open-
ing remarks, pointing out that we got the jet 
engine from the British where it was first devel-
oped, and our airframe largely from France 
where the early work was done. He went on 
to say that we have been heirs to and we started 
with what we learned from Europe. We have 
taken something of a lead in space, but it is 
the whole scientific mix coming together with 
the cutting edge always out there trying to 
move on as the British and French have now 
done with the Concorde. They have built the 
first supersonic commercial aircraft. For political 
reasons - or whatever else - it was shelved 
over here and so you are at the cutting edge 
there on commercial supersonic airplanes. 
We have Inilitary supersonics, of course. 
So I foresee a high degree of increasing co-
operation. 
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Landsat (ERTS) picture of east coast 
Senator GoLDWATER. - I might call you 
gentlemen's attention to the picture1• That picture 
covers the entire east coast of the United States 
from Martha's Vineyard down to the tip of 
Florida. I would say that is over two thousand 
miles. It is a composite of Landsat photographs 
that not only shows us what the coastline looks 
like but, by using the different colour spectrums 
that come out of those photographs, we can 
tell the condition of the soil, where we have 
too much water, too little water, the condition 
of crops, whether they need water, whether they 
are planted too late, too early. We think similar 
photos have discovered minerals in the far west. 
We know we have discovered water. This is the 
first breakthrough that we politicians can get 
our hands on because almost every State Gover-
nor has to have these photographs of his State. 
We have now completely mapped the United 
States from ERTS, so he can have a picture 
of his State. You may be interested in one prob-
lem we are running into out in my part of the 
country, out in the far west. When our grand-
fathers got out there, they did not have very 
good transits, so we now are finding some of 
the property lines maybe four or five miles off. 
The CHAmMAN.- If you look at the picture 
closely, you will see that you can observe a great 
amount of detail. You see the amount of sediment 
in the Potomac River and right there (pointing) 
it changes and froon there on out it does not 
carry the sediment. Here is Washington, D.C., by 
the way, and that is Baltimore. You can see 
those cities and they can be enlarged right up to 
where city planners are using them now. They 
can have before them a whole plat of the city 
as it is now and then they can see it nine days 
later and nine days later and nine days later and 
I. Since the ERTS cameras look straight down from 
very high up - about 565 miles, or nearly ten times 
higher than an airplane can :fl.y - there is very little 
distortion in the pictures. Adjacent frames, each about 
one hundred miles square, can be fitted together to form 
nearly true fiat cartographic maps. This mosaic was made 
up from parts of 38 separate colour pictures, each built 
up by photographing three black and white images of 
the area through colour filters. You will recognise such 
familar map features, coming down from the upper right, 
as Cape Cod, Long Island, Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, 
Cape Hatteras and if you look closely, Cape Kennedy. 
One of the entire United States is being assembled. 
Maps of some smaller areas made from ERTS imagery 
are already being produced by the United States Geolo-
gical Survey. 
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just keep it right up to date if they want to 
see it that often. It is of immense value. 
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ERTS is certainly one of the most dramatic 
and appreciated things by the common man, the 
State Governors, and others who utilise those 
images. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Chairman, we can go on as long as 
you want or we can recess. We do want to invite 
you over to the Senate floor and we hope you 
will have time to see something of the Capitol 
itself, and of course, we do have a reception. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Yes, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Chairman, colleagues of the Senate, we 
can tell you one thing, and it is that we are 
for the first time after our second visit in the 
United States, happy men, men who have met 
for the first time their American colleagues with 
whom we can speak the same language. We have 
submitted in a very summary way a few questions 
to which we are sensitive. We appreciated that. 
I believe we have achieved a great step 
forward in friendship and in an area of human 
relations while dealing with serious problems. 
These problems touch on technology, on the 
future of science, industry, and the economy. 
The few minutes that we have spent together 
will allow us first to know each other better and 
to wonder if it would be possible to renew this 
kind of contact in the United States as well as 
in Europe. 
We are representatives of seven countries; 
we are friends without jealousies ; we work only 
on a scientific and technological level in order 
to help our countries, its technicians, and all 
its workers who benefit from the aeronautical 
and space activities of our countries. When we 
send a machine in space, whatever it is, or we fly 
a subsonic or supersonic airplane, we compete 
with you, but we belong to each other or, if 
you want an image, we are like an engaged 
woman who does not always understand the 
behaviour of her fiance. We have to continue 
together our way forward. In the name of the 
Committee, I want to thank you. We hope that 
we can renew the discussion very often in order 
to better understand each other and to work 
for peace and for whatever we hold dear for 
mankind. 
Thank you very much. 
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The CHAmMAN.- Well, thank you·for that 
very eloquent statement, and let me say that 
it really is an inspiring thing for us in this 
Committee to meet with our counterparts who 
come from Western Europe. We are just happy 
that you are here. We, hope that we can have 
other meetings here as well as in Europe to sit 
down and talk - it is really a matter of com-
munications. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Thank you very 
much. 
(Whereupon_. the hearing recessed at 3.45 
p.m.) 
20th ~arch 1976 
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 
3.20 p.m., in room 235, Russell Senate Office 
Building, Senator Frank E. Moss (Chairman) 
presiding. 
Present : Senator Moss. 
Also present : Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions: P. de Montes-
quiou (Chairman) ; Mr. Warren (Vice-Chair-
man) ; H. Adriaensens, Mrs. H. Adriaensens, 
H. de Bruyne, Mrs. H. de Bruyne, R. Carter, 
M. Cerneau, P. A. M. Cornelissen, R. Fletcher, 
R. Hengel, C. Lenzer, J. Lester, R. Mart, D. A. T. 
van Ooijen, J. Osborn, F. Tomney, P. Vitter, and 
G. M. A. M. Huigens (Secretary and Counsellor 
to the Committee). 
Also present: Robert F. Allnutt, Staff 
Director ; Craig M. Peterson, Chief Clerk/Coun-
sel; Glen P. Wilson, James J. Gehrig, Craig 
Voorhees, Gilbert Keyes, and James T. Bruce, 
professional staff members; Patricia A. Robin-
son, Rhea B. Bruno, and Karen Ledford, clerical 
assistants; Charles F. Lombard, minority coun-
sel ; and Mary Ann Fay, minority clerical assis-
tant. 
The CHAmMAN. - Good afternoon, ladies 
and gentlemen. I think we had better begin. The 
Senate is embroiled in debating and voting and 
I am not sure whether I will have any of my 
colleagues here this afternoon or not but I am 
certainly delighted that you are here. I know 
your time is short since you must be at the 
French Embassy later this afternoon. 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, it is my great pleasure to welcome 
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you for the second of our meetings. It is my 
view that our first meeting was both successful 
and useful. I hope that today's meeting will 
follow that precedent. 
Mr. Chairman, I again want to emphasise 
that the United States is fully prepared to co-
operate closely with the countries of Western 
Europe and any of its organisations to carry 
out scientific and technical work relating to 
aeronautics and space. The co-operation we have 
had in these fields has been rewarding to both 
sides. 
As you mentioned in your statement Mr. 
Chairman, reaching agreement is sometimes dif-
ficult but the collaboration and close co-opera-
tion that we have enjoyed has made past agree-
ments worth much more than the time that they 
took to negotiate. 
I have adjusted the agenda of our first 
meeting, eliminating those items which we have 
already discussed. However, if anyone wishes to 
discuss an item not on the agenda, he should 
feel free to do so and to bring it up. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - My dear Chairman, 
I think you put our co-operation in perspective. 
Thank you very much for this offer of co-opera-
tion between you of the Senate and us the 
representatives of the Western European States. 
As we are very short of time I think we have 
to discuss quickly the items you have put on 
the agenda. We can do good work now and 
in the future and together preserve all the 
freedom of America and Europe. The more we 
understand each other, the more we know how 
to act in order to preserve what you always 
fought for, the freedom of humanity. 
The CHAIRMAN. - Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. I think we should proceed as fast as we 
can. We may not be able to complete this full 
agenda. 
First, on the launch vehicle availability. 
During our last meeting some of your members 
discussed the concern in Europe over the avail-
ability of launch vehicles. I know some Euro-
pean countries are more concerned than others 
about this matter. So I would like to make a 
very brief statement on the subject. 
To begin with, I support the policy that the 
United States provides launch assistance, on an 
appropriate reimbursable basis, to other coun-
tries and organisations where the spacecraft are 
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intended for peaceful purposes. I think that is 
our policy and I support that policy. 
In this respect I want to make several points. 
One, there has never been an occasion when the 
European community collectivity through ESRO 
or any European government singly, has been 
denied United States launch service. 
Two, the United States experience in work-
ing with the Europeans has been good and the 
launch vehicle policy to date has wide accept-
ance. 
Three, the Congress has never insisted on 
any restriction other than fair and equitable 
reimbursement. 
And four, the President of the United 
States has declared that the United States 
launcher capability is available to all nations on 
a non-discriminatory reimbursable basis to launch 
spacecraft which are intended for peaceful pur-
poses. 
President Nixon, in making his statement, 
added a series of conditions. These conditions 
relate solely to international communication 
satellite systems, separate from Intelsat. The 
conditions do not apply to domestic commun-
ications or to military communications systems. 
Even in the case of these conditions, ways are 
left open for the United States to agree to 
provide launch services for systems opposed by 
Intelsat. 
I do not foresee any situation in which a 
serious problem would arise for any of your 
countries. 
I have obtained copies of the President's 
statement on the availability of launch services 
for you (see appendix) and I will have the 
staff pass out copies of that statement so that 
you have them, and if you wish to discuss it 
further we will be glad to do it. If questions 
remain about the availability of launch services, 
we will be glad to talk about it. 
French launching site 
Mr. DE BR.UYNE. - Mr. Chairman, what 
do you think about the future of the French 
launching installation in Kourou Y 
The CHAIRMAN.- I may have to have some 
help on that. 
I really know very little about it. I see no 
problem with the French continuing to use 
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that. There is nothing that is unacceptable as far 
as the United States is concerned. We have 
declared our policy that we have available launch 
services and we intend to make them available 
to other countries if they want to use them. If 
other countries develop their own launch facil-
ities, it is not objectionable at all to us. We do 
not object. 
Mr. de BRUYNE. -Thank you. 
The CHAIRMAN.- We do not believe that it 
is necessarily good to have exclusive service. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Osborn is 
going to ask a question. I do not think that 
Kourou base is a French problem, it is more a 
European problem. Every nation can use it. 
The CHAIRMAN. -I understand. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Osborn. 
Mr. OSBORN. - I understand that it was 
Comsat who wanted a look at this site for their 
own use because it has a 15 % load advantage. 
Would it be possible in the foreseeable future 
if Europe and the United States looked together 
at their launch resources and reviewed the advan-
tages and disadvantages of Kourou as an Ameri-
can-European launch site Y It is on the Equator. 
It is not far from the United States. I gather 
inquiries were carried out at an American initia-
tive and got nowhere. When there is time, it 
might be worth looking at it as an international 
venture involving the Americans as much as the 
Europeans. 
I speak from a personal point of view, not 
a special view of my country. 
The CHAIRMAN. -I understand, and I would 
agree that it certainly should be examined and 
I would urge the United States to consider again 
whatever the advantages are in launching from 
that location because if it makes for a more 
efficient launch, more economic launch, then it 
would be to our advantage to utilise that as a 
launch site rather than staying with the ones we 
presently have at Cape Kennedy and out at 
Vandenberg on the west coast. We have only 
those two areas that we utilise in the United 
States. 
United States-European technical co-operation 
Mr. CARTER. - Senator, I wonder if I could 
ask a fairly wide-ranging political question. I 
came to the United States with the view that 
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Europe should have or try to obtain as much 
independence in aerospace as possible. However, 
it seems to me from what I have heard since I 
came here that the United States is more anxious 
probably than ever before, as you have just 
stated in your opening statement, to arrive at 
more co-operative understandings with Western 
Europe and no doubt the rest of the world, 
too. 
However, there are political and technical 
obstacles to that wish. In particular, the status 
of Comsat which is a private organisation. There 
are many others, but I wonder if you could deal 
with that one first. Do you think a private 
enterprise-based corporation like Comsat can ever 
be the vehicle for greater co-operation between 
Western Europe and the United States? 
The CHAmMAN. - Yes. I think a private 
enterprise organisation can be a vehicle for 
greater co-operation because each entity comes 
into that organisation with the same status, 
seeking the same services. There is, I believe, 
a feeling of the need for greater co-operation 
with the European countries and other countries 
in the aeronautics and space field. One thing 
that we got into earlier in our discussion was 
the immense costs that now loom as we expand 
into space stations and other new space projects. 
If those costs can be borne co-operatively by 
many nations, it will enable the United States 
to move along in company with its neighbours 
much faster in space exploration. 
The United States is constricted somewhat 
now, and we are sensitive to it because of the 
economic downturn being experienced in the 
country ; that is, we are restricted somewhat 
in the amount that we can commit to space 
exploration. So we will welcome partners, espec-
ially since our policy is that space is an area of 
neutrality, it is to be used for peaceful pur-
poses ; neither we nor others claim any sover-
eignty there. The one caveat we were talking 
about with respect to launch facilities and the 
space vehicles, whatever they are out there, is 
that they be used for peaceful purposes and that 
means for the use of all mankind. 
So I would say yes to both parts of your 
question. One, that there should be greater 
co-operation and two, that the private corpo-
ration might enhance that, might enable us to go 
ahead more readily than when we act just govern-
ment to government. 
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Aeronautical and space technology priority 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - May I ask a question 
in connection with the previous question ? Which 
priority should be given to the development of 
aeronautical and space technology Y Is that a real 
political issue Y What is the difference in that 
respect between the Democrats and the Repub-
licans, for example ? 
The CHAmMAN. -Space policy in the United 
States does not really cleave on party lines. It 
would be hard for me to say whether one polit-
ical party or the other is more inclined to any 
particular policy. The restriction that exists, the 
feeling in some is that space is an expensive 
sort of venture, that we cannot afford to put 
resources into it when we have demands for 
social services of various kinds. That is the 
breaking line. 
Now, we constantly try to make the point 
that it is not only a scientific advance, but 
really it is an economic advance, We can do 
things with our space capability that make 
life better for people and therefore when we 
put $3 billion or $4 billion into a project, we 
expect in a matter of a relatively few years 
when the economic benefits are added up that 
the cost will be more than paid back to us here 
in our own country and that people around the 
world will benefit too. That is one reason we 
talk so much about the ERTS satellite, because 
that can be shown clearly ; it can be shown 
very clearly. 
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I must leave 
for the floor for another vote. Mr. Allnutt the 
staff director, and Mr. Gehrig a senior staff 
member, perhaps can carry on a dialogue with 
you so the time will not be wasted. 
Propaganda by satellite 
Mr. ToMNEY.- I would like to be assured, 
if I can be assured, that the President's legal 
advisers took into full consideration the various 
connotations and conjectures of the word "peace-
ful". 
Mr. ALLNuTT. -Neither of us were party 
to the drafting of the President's statement 
and I would assume that those considerations 
were involved in the drafting but I do not 
know that either of us could really say. 
Jim may have some comments to make. 
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Mr. GEHRIG. - I think that what you are 
talking about is a satellite that broadcasts in 
some way or another. If you look closely at 
the technical characteristics that would be 
required for a satellite that could broadcast tele-
wsion signals into home receivers, for example, 
this is really not very practical. Moreover, this 
is governed by other treaties ; the treaties that 
are negotiated multilaterally between countries 
in the ITU, the International Telecommunica-
tions Union. These agreements control, for 
example, the use of frequencies. And the fre-
quency spectrum now is becoming - is regarded 
as a very valuable resource. 
Mr. ToMNEY. - Good point. 
Mr. GEHRIG.- It is regarded as a resource 
that belongs to each individual country, so that 
you are governed really legally by this treaty 
and technically I do not think it is possible to 
do it with television signals. There are countries, 
let me say, that are worried about broadcast 
satellites. I think if I were going to worry about 
anything, I would worry about something like 
an FM broadcast satellite. But it is not very 
likely, I think. 
Mr. ToMNEY. - That is the answer. That is 
very good. 
Mr. FLETCHE;R.. - You are satisfied, are 
you? 
Mr. ToMNEY.- Yes. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Warren Y 
Mr. W AR.R.EN. -No questions. 
Mr. FLETCHER. -I wonder if I could put 
not a question, but a suggestion. I have no 
further questions. I am going back from here 
as a completely satisfied customer or client. But 
I wonder if you could help us back in our own 
parliaments. It is quite obvious if Europe is 
going to play a larger role in a United States 
programme we have to buy the admission ticket. 
You do not get into this theatre unless you have 
a ticket, and we have to fork out the money in 
order to do so. 
How to create public awareness of space benefits 
Now, for reasons which have already been 
mentioned by Senator Moss, it is very difficult 
to sell this kind of programme both to our 
parliaments, and even more so to our electorates, 
many of whom are in a far worse condition, 
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even in the affluent belt, than the people in 
the poverty belt in the United States and I 
wonder if you have documentation in a sort 
of simplified form that we can have on the spin-
off, actual and potential, that would help us to 
talk to our colleagues back in our national par-
liaments in these terms because unfortunately, 
the occasions of technological advance are dying 
down for very obvious reasons and we have 
to sell it in terms of what is going to be the 
yield over a five-year period or a ten-year 
period. 
Now, unfortunately, democracy gives us a 
five-year span in which to think and plan. After 
four years you are electioneering again as parties 
and as governments, and I wonder if we could 
make a suggestion - I am quite sure no one 
would disagree - if we would get this kind of 
assistance because you with your technical know-
ledge are better able to give it than any other 
nation on earth. 
Mr. ALLNUTT. - I think some of the mate-
rial that was in the package you received the 
other day was designed with that in mind and 
we certainly have some other materials we can 
put together and send to each of you, I would 
be in error if I said that anyone has done a very 
good job of accomplishing that here. The great-
est difficulty here is explaining particularly the 
long-term benefits of research that do not pay 
off every day. I think those of us who have been 
involved in the space programme here for some 
years feel much better about its ability to show 
real payoffs than we did a few years ago. It 
had to be taken almost totally on faith ten 
years ago. Today there are increasingly concrete 
benefits that one can point to but still not enough. 
We are still looking to the future. 
One document that I do not think is in your 
packet that is not a sales document but has some 
interesting technical information is a hearing 
that the Committee had about one and a half 
years ago on space shuttle payloads. I think that 
with spacelab and space shuttle you are very 
much paying for your ticket and moving into 
the era when you will be able to participate, if 
the funding is there, very heavily, in activities 
that are going to have very high payoff, whether 
in high purity vaccines, space manufacturing 
or earth-looking experiments, and we have some 
materials on that which we can give you. 
But it is a difficult thing to get across in 
this country. Everyone is proud of Yankee 
ingenuity. Everyone says we have Yankee inge-
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nuity, but not everyone wants to invest a dime 
in it. So it is a difficult thing. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Thank you. Mr. 
Huigens, Secretary, wants to ask a question. 
Launch availability 
Mr. HurGENS. - I just want to make sure 
I understood you rightly. When the Committee 
accepted some years ago a report by Mrs. Walz, 
we incorporated this famous exchange of letters 
between Alexis U. Johnson, and the then Belgian 
Minister, Lefevre. If I understand you rightly, 
the position of the American Government is now 
much more liberal than indicated in the letter 
by Mr. Johnson. 
Of course, it is understood that international 
treaties, such as the Intelsat treaty which has 
been signed by European countries, and other 
treaties, will have to be kept, but in general 
the attitude of the American Government is more 
liberal. 
Mr. ALLNUTT. - I think that is fair to 
say. 
Mr. GEHRIG. - That is a fair statement. 
Mr. HUIGENS. - That is the point. Thank 
you. 
Mr. CARTE,R.. - Could I come back to the 
point that Mr. Fletcher raised ? 
You referred to ten years ago, the situation 
of the world economy was quite different. Still 
a large part of the impetus behind the space 
programme was political. 
Space programme priority 
Now, with detente, that has eased off. Is 
there a feeling within the administration which 
is perhaps equalled in American society, that we 
in the West do not need to pursue space in quite 
the same rigorous way, as in the past for purely 
political purposes 7 Is it not just a question of 
the economics but political factors, as well ? 
Mr. ALLNuTT. - Yes, I think so, and if 
indeed you look at the funding, the NASA 
funding here, it very much reflects that. All 
over those past ten years or so, the total Federal 
expenditures in dollars here have approximately 
tripled. The expenditures for NASA are half 
what they were, or with inflation, one third 
what they were ten years ago. So today in this 
country expenditures for the space programme 
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are being forced to compete with other expen-
ditures, space expenditures now are made less 
in an atmosphere of a race or fear and more on 
their own merits. 
Mr. CA.R.TER. - Given that that is the case, 
is it not one of the ironies of the situation, that 
the more peaceful the world becomes, the less in 
fact space can lay claim to resources ? 
Mr. ALLNUTT. - I think that is true, except 
for the fact that as we get further into the 
space age, the advocates of space spending are 
more and more able to point to things that have 
happened that are beneficial because of space, 
weather satellites, communications satellites, the 
ERTS satellites, oceanographic satellites, which 
in earlier times you had to say oh, but just 
wait in a few years wonderful things are going 
to happen. Some of those things have now started 
to happen, not all, but you do have more concrete 
examples to point to than a few years ago. 
Space tug 
Mr. DE MoNTESQurou. - Could I ask you 
a question about the space tug ? Do you not think 
the space tug programme should go a little faster 
instead of starting only in 1981 Y 
Mr. ALLNuTT. - Yes. I think there is no 
question that ideally the space tug should be 
ready when the shuttle is ready. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOu. - Of course. 
Mr. ALLNUTT. - Here again it is a prob-
lem of funding and the cost of developing the 
ultimate space tug is so high that NASA cannot 
afford it at this time. 
Mr. LESTER. - Could I comment on that 
point ? In the DOD this morning, it was very 
interesting to hear the priority the Department 
of Defence gave to the space tug. Are the 
considerations for expansion of the defence 
capability in space not a powerful force within 
the administration 7 
Mr. ALLNuTT.- I am not sure how power-
ful an aid that is to proceeding with the shuttle 
and the tug in the public mind - the fact that 
there is great potential for defence systems such 
as communications, warning, surveillance, etc. I 
think within the administration- in the execu-
tive branch - particularly as time goes on, it is 
a powerful aid - it will be, if it is not now, a 
powerful inducement to proceed. 
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Both in the case of defence systems, com-
mercial systems, probably European systems and 
in NASA's own systems, the first thought of the 
shuttle is, oh, it will be nice and cheaper space 
transportation. But then as people start to think 
about what the shuttle really means they come 
to understand it is a different way of using space 
and the more they think of it the more intrigued 
they become with the possibilities. 
The CHAIR.MAN. - Have you settled every-
thing now! 
You are talking about the tug. Were you 
able to get the information you wanted on that Y 
Are we ready to discuss the upper atmos-
phere, then Y 
Mr. OSBORN. - Can I ask one further ques-
tion on the tug ? We have been talking about 
what we have seen at the Pentagon this morning. 
I was interested to see in the defence budget, but 
not in the NASA budget, an estimate for the 
phased array satellites. Is not this rather pecul-
iar, that the whole programme is not co-ordi-
nated, but defence would go off on their own 
doing something that should be in NASA any-
how? 
The CHAIR.MAN. - Well, we are of course, 
meticulous in keeping NASA solely as a non-
military civilian-type agency, and for that reason 
there might be a little overlap, although they 
do meet and co-ordinate and exchange informa-
tion between defence and NASA. But, when 
something is going to be used for military pur-
poses, the policy is not to let NASA get involved 
in it. It is really a political judgment that we 
have made in this country, that NASA cannot 
get involved in military matters. We feel we 
have to be that restrictive about it so that we 
will not be falsely accused of using NASA for 
military purposes. NASA is the vehicle by which 
we hope we can reach out and co-operate with 
the whole world so we do not want any suspicion 
that it is being used for any military purpose. 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - Could I just ask a 
very small question, just to understand it better 
for myself? 
Soviet use of space 
Will it be possible for the Russians to use 
space for non-peaceful purposes 1 Has any deci-
sion been taken on that Y 
6* - Ill 
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The CHAIR.MAN. - The Russians are not 
nearly so precise about drawing a line between 
military uses and civilian uses. They probably 
do not see it quite as sharply as we do. One 
reason the Defence Department has satellites, is 
so that it can keep tab on Russian uses. 
We hope the Russians will not use space for 
a non-peaceful military purpose but until we get 
a declaration from them that we are willing to 
make, why, we must watch them. 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - How do you think 
Congress would feel about that if such a request 
came Y Would Congress be favourable to it? 
The CHAI.R.MAN.- Toward a Russian decla-
ration? 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN. - No, to a request by the 
Russians to use the space tug for peaceful pur-
poses. 
The CHAIR.MAN. - Yes, I think Congress 
would be receptive to that. Some would be doubt-
ful, perhaps, about the sincerity of the Russians, 
but we would accept that, I think, at face value 
and try to deal with them on that basis. We are 
trying to ease the relationship between us - to 
work out a detente as the word is now. 
Mr. CoRNELISSEN.- Thank you. 
Stratospheric ozone depletion 
The CHAIR.MAN. - Mr. Chairman, now a 
word or two about this matter of the upper 
atmosphere. This is something that I am sure is 
of great concern to all of the world. We have 
talked about this in our Committee here. 
There is great concern in the scientific com-
munity about the effect of the huge quantities 
of some man-made chemicals being released into 
the earth's atmosphere. These include such things 
as chlorofluoromethanes (commonly referred to as 
Freon), carbon tetrachloride, other industrial 
solvents, and nitrogen oxides. The concern centres 
around the effect of these gases on the strato-
spheric ozone. 
The layer of stratospheric ozone is essential 
to life on earth because it filters out most of the 
sun's ultraviolet radiation. It is generally believed 
that any significant reduction in this ozone could 
have drastic consequences on all life on earth. 
What is concerning the scientific community 
and the public is that huge quantities of man-
made compounds, particularly the Freons which 
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are very stable, eventually find their way into 
the stratosphere and then through a catalytic 
cyclical reaction destroy the ozone at prodigious 
rates. 
This, as you can see, is a serious problem 
demanding immediate attention. 
Moreover, it is an international problem 
because anything done in one part of the hemi-
sphere that affects the stratosphere will affect 
the other parts in a very short time. 
From what we have heard, most of the con-
cern has been generated from the results of 
theoretical studies, with some but not much 
experimental evidence. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the theory is wrong. 
What is needed is a strong programme to 
increase the understanding of the earth's upper 
atmosphere and to have such a programme as 
part of a broader programme on the study of 
planetary atmospheres. Consequently, the Com-
mittee has urged NASA to increase its research, 
technology, and monitoring efforts in this prob-
lem area. 
Some weeks ago the Committee had a hearing 
on this matter, and you are invited to take a 
copy of that hearing with you. You also have a 
bill relating to this subject which I introduced 
in the Senate a few weeks ago. 
Mr. W AR.R.EN. - Can I make a point on 
that, Senator Y 
The CHAIR.MAN.- Certainly. 
Mr. WAR.R.EN. - Obviously, I have not had 
the opportunity of seeing all that has been said 
here, but it does seem to me from what I have 
heard with respect to this that a lot of people 
are going about the problem from the wrong end. 
As I understand the situation, the ozone is 
destroyed by chlorine. Chlorine is created by the 
Freons, which are in fact derived from the pro-
pellant gas used in the aerosols, and therefore 
it is not the aerosols which are wrong. It is the 
kind of gas which is used, and there are many 
aerosols which have not got that kind of gas in 
them. 
So I am hoping that we will identify fairly 
rapidly the control measures that are needed. 
It is not that we should do away with aerosols, 
it is that we should identify the chlorine 
and its source, and I agree with you entirely, 
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this is extremely important and needs very rapid 
legislation on an international scale, but I am 
very worried about our TV programmes which 
are appearing with great scare programmes 
saying that this could be the end of the world. 
The CHAIR.MAN. - They are creating grave 
concern. 
Mr. WAR.R.EN.- Yes. 
The CHAI.R.MAN. - And as I have indicated, 
we are trying to get NASA to do research and 
direct monitoring to verify the theory. As I say, 
nobody has disproved the theory, and the theory 
seeins to be sound, but we have not measured it 
yet, and that is what we have to do. But I think 
time is of the essence. We cannot dawdle around 
for several years getting around to doing the 
monitoring work. 
Now, we also do not know how the ozone 
repairs itself, whether it is able to adjust some-
way to this Freon combination, but we should 
not wait so long that we imperil anything here 
on this earth:. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - My dear friend, we 
have a very heavy programme, and we have to 
leave here in twenty minutes. What would be 
the best way Y Going through the questions ? 
The CHAIRMAN.- Yes, perhaps we could do 
that. We talked somewhat about the earth's 
resources before, and I do not know how many 
things are left undiscussed. Are there any of 
these from No. 4 on down that you would like to 
discuss particularly Y 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Mr. Osborn. 
Mr. OSBOR,N. - I would like No. 10. 
Technical co-operation 
The CHAIRMAN. - Co-operation between 
NASA and other government agencies, No. 10 
on the agenda list. 
Mr. CoR.NELISSEN. - I still have a question 
about No.4. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU.- No.4 is finished. 
The CHAIRMAN. - Co-operation between 
NA:SA and the Department of Defence and 
between NASA and the other agencies of govern-
ment with interests in aeronautics and space is, 
in the judgment of the Committee, excellent at 
this time, and the Committee reviews inter-agency 
co-operation every year. We continually encour-
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age, and when necessary, strongly demand col-
laboration. Duplication is sometimes necessary 
on the other hand, agencies must have a certain 
amount of independence. One of the new factors 
that has come into being is the creation of what 
is called ERDA - the Energy Research and 
Development Administration. It has taken over 
some functions from NASA. But in turn it has 
sent back to NASA several missions that are 
being performed by NASA in the energy field. 
So we do not have any serious problem about 
co-operation among our agencies. We do oot have 
ooy real opposition being exhibited one toward 
the other. 
Now, there are times within government 
when you get poor co-operation between agencies, 
I know, and we have to be careful that it does 
not encroach there. 
Mr. OSBORN.- The only point I would want 
to make is on the ability of the United States, 
undoubtedly in the technological field, to co-
operate better with other countries and other 
groups of countries, the Common Market, 
Western European Union, and particularly the 
European Space Agency. It has been quite a 
revelation to me to see the new technology devel-
oped on satellite spruce communications and satel-
lites generally. 
Is there amything that we, a Committee of 
Europeans, can do to act as catalysts to bring 
about better understanding, not only at the 
government level, but between the peoples of our 
countries, as to what is going on Y I thought that 
Comsat and Intelsat were American monopolies. 
This is a fair expression of what the average 
Jitizen thinks in Europe. How can we bring about 
better co-operation and better understanding Y 
The CHAI.RoMAN. - Well, I would think that 
the greatest need is to get information out to the 
layman. I think people in your scientific circles 
understand fairly well the degree of co-operation 
required, but maybe it does not get down to the 
level of the ordinary citizen. Here I have been 
encouraging our technical societies, engineering 
societies, and others, to try to get things printed 
in the press, not only in their scientific journals, 
but written in everyday language in the press, 
and on television and elsewhere, so that some of 
the understanding of this gets down to our 
people. 
I think the biggest threat to misunderstand-
ing and lack of co-operation is when political 
pressures are brought to bear to achieve some 
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other end. If our people believe it is in their 
interest to have scientific and technological 
advances and that the best way to achieve that 
end is to be in co-operation with other countries, 
that they can make some contribution, then it is 
easier for us to do that. It is easier for the office 
holder to support it. 
It is hard to give a tight answer to your 
question but we must constantly press getting 
the message out, it seems to me. 
Mr. OSBORN. - Yes. I think I agree with 
your views on how to get this over to the people, 
but even at the political, at the parliamentary, 
say at the Western European Union level, we as 
a Committee when debating this in assembly, can, 
if we approach this the right way, insure con-
tinued co-operation by politicians. It is very 
useful to have your views and we, apart from 
telling the story that we have seen, have to think 
about new initiatives and perhaps put those to 
our European colleagues which would be creative 
and constructive. 
The CHAIR.MAN. - It would be constructive 
and we will try to respond to that by keeping 
ever better communications back and forth. 
Now we would like to talk with you about 
a few new initiatives we see coming. I could not 
resist bringing along today a tiny bubble tape 
recorder 1 that is under development. Believe 
it or not, that little thing in the middle is a tape 
recorder. 
Gil Keyes can tell you more about it. I am 
going to have to go vote again. 
1. NASA is developing a solid state data storage system 
as a potential replacement for moderate capacity (108 bits) 
tape recorders used on board many of its spacecraft. The 
solid state recorder will be about one-third the size of a 
conventional spacecraft tape recorder, weigh about halt 
as much, require only half the power and provide up to 
ten times more useful life. Technology for the recorder is 
based on the use of magnetic domains or bubbles which 
exist in special magnetic crystals. A thin pattern of mag-
netic material overlayed on the crystal is used to move 
the bubbles in a controlled fashion to store data and 
perform logic functions. The bubble memory element 
illustrated in the figure is the basic building block for the 
solid state recorder and is capable of storing 102,400 bits 
in each element. Up to 1,000 of these elements will be 
packaged in the solid state recorder system together with 
appropriate input and output electronics to obtain the 
desired data storage capacity. The bubble memory elements 
have been succeBBfully developed and tested. During the 
coming fiscal year, a computer recording system will be 
constructed and evaluated. In subsequent years, the solid 
state recorder will be packaged and qualified for space 
flight applications. 
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Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - I think our col-
league, Mr. Cornelissen, wants to ask you a 
question. 
The CHAIRMAN. -All right. 
The upper atmosphere and SS flight 
Mr. CoR.NELISSEN. - I would like to ask a 
·short question about your bill (S. 851) which I 
have read with great interest. I think it is of 
great importance that a bill like this will be 
passed. 
Under paragraph 2 you say it is the pur-
pose to maintain the chemical and physical 
integrity of the upper atmosphere. I quite agree. 
Now, I personally would like to see, after 
having heard your introduction about the many 
unknown things there still are as far as the 
ozone layer is concerned, the logical step and 
that is to be very careful with all kinds of 
supersonic flying. We should not promote super-
sonic flying. I would be very grateful if you 
would give your opinion on that. 
Personally I would say, in this very situ-
ation, if we really mean what we say, we had 
better stay at the moment far away from promot-
ing this. 
The CHAIRMAN. - What we propose and 
want to do is to measure the amount of the 
pollution in the atmosphere and to find out what 
its effect is over a long enough spectrum of 
time that we can project whether it is really 
destroying the ozone to the point of real peril. 
That is what we are trying to do. 
Now I do not thlnk it is justified at this 
point th~t we suddenly curtail our space flights 
or supersonic flights, but it is of enough con-
cern that we must move right now to put in 
place the monitoring and measuring equipment to 
tell us what is happening. 
When we do that, we owe it to the whole 
world to disclose what we find and to ask, then, 
the co-operation of other countries if we find 
things that are indeed damaging. We will have 
to ask the co-operation of all the countries 
around the world at that point. 
Gentlemen, if you have to go before I get 
back, let me say a word of appreciation for your 
coming here and offer my real apologies for 
popping in and out of here like a jack-in-the-box. 
If you have time get Gil to tell you about his tape 
recorder before you leave. 
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Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - Thank you so 
much. 
The CHAI):WAN. - Thank you. (Applause) 
Mr. W ARR.EN. - Can we talk about items 
8 and 9 T I mean I would certainly like to hear 
about the tape recorder but could we hear about 
the Viking programme and so on ? 
Mr. GE~G. - The Viking is well along 
on its way to being launched. The cost of that 
programme now is about $1 billion. Most of 
that money has been spent. NASA has told the 
Committee that they believe they have now 
solved all of the technical problems. 
The Viking programme 
Last year there were some substantial cost 
increases in the programme because they were 
having great difficulty with the biological 
experiment - one of the principal experiments 
- the purpose of which is to determine whether 
or not there is or has been life on Mars. This 
experiment has been miniaturised and squeezed 
down into about a cubic foot, something less 
than a cubic foot. If you built the three full-
sized laboratories with the men that you would 
need to run these experiments, they would about 
fill this hearing room. 
But to get it on the Viking lander, they 
squeezed it down and automated it and put it in 
this little box and they had great difficulty in 
doing that. But NASA now assures us that they 
have solved all of the problems and that they 
will be ready to launch. 
They also had some trouble with the com-
puter - in the memory. They opted to go for a 
new kind of a memory on the computer and it 
proved to be much more difficult to manufacture 
than they thought. It involved taking very small 
wires only two mils in diameter, and threading 
them by hand through very small tubes. The 
information is kept or stored on the intersection 
of the wires. But these problems are now solved, 
they tell us, and they will launch and we hope 
it is a success. 
The crucial thing I think is what happens 
after Viking. The mission the planetary scien-
tists are most interested in is a mission that 
would go to Mars and return a sample of the 
Martian surface. This is clearly a very expensive 
mission, probably well in excess of $1 billion, 
because what you have to do is put something 
in orbit around Mars. That spacecraft must 
APPENDIX II 
release another vehicle that can land on the 
surface softly, release another vehicle that can 
scoop up some of the Martian soil, package it 
properly, get it back on the lander, launch it 
with a rocket, rendezvous and dock with the 
spacecraft around Mars, then that orbiting space-
craft must launch the package back to earth 
and you have to be able to recover it here. 
Clearly it is a difficult thing to do technically. 
The question is, what would Congress think 
about such a mission 7 I think you really cannot 
answer that question until you find out what 
happens to the Viking missions. If Viking is a 
success, there is a much better chance of getting 
support for such a mission. If it is a failure, I 
think you would not get support for it for a long 
time. This is my personal opinion on it. 
Mr. WAR.R.EN. - How many Vikings are 
there? 
Mr. GEHRiiG. - There are two spacecraft 
that will be launched in August this year. You 
can only launch to Mars on these minimum 
energy trajectories about every twenty-five 
months, and there is a window in August that 
extends slightly into September in which both of 
these spacecraft have to be launched. Then the 
spacecraft will take about a year to get to Mars. 
They will land on the surface next July, about 
eleven months later. 
Conclusion of meeting 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU. - My dear friend, 
I think now we are at the end of a wonderful 
day of work and we want to thank you again 
and we hope that it will not be the last time 
we meet, either in Washington or in Europe. 
You have done really wonderful work. We 
have a better understanding and we will proceed 
again to great progress, thanks to you. 
Mr. GEHRIG.- Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman. 
Mr. Chairman, the Chairman had some clos-
ing remarks and I think if it is all right with 
you I will just hand them to you and they will 
be made a matter of record if you like. 
Mr. HUIGENS.- Thank you very much. 
Mr. GEHRIG. - There was one other thing 
that the Chairman wanted to do which I will 
take care of for him, if I may, with your per-
mission. When you visited the floor of the 
United States Senate last Tuesday, that was duly 
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and properly recorded in the Congressional 
Record and the Chairman thought that each of 
you would like a copy of that record. Miss Rob-
bins of the staff has those and she will hand 
them out to each of you now. 
Mr. HUIGENS.- Would you read the Chair-
man's closing statement out loud ? 
Mr. GEHRIG.- Certainly. This is the Chair-
man's statement. 
Chairman de Montesquiou and members of 
your Committee, the time has come when we 
must end this phase of our discussions. 
For my part, and I think on this point I 
can speak for all members of the Committee, 
these meetings have been very enjoyable, enlight-
ening, and, of course, useful in giving us a view 
of the political concerns in Western Europe. I 
hope that these meetings have set a precedent 
for future meetings and that we will meet again 
from time to time. 
I believe it is of foremost importance that 
the United States and Western Europe continue 
their close co-operation on scientific and techno-
logical matters. Personally, I would like to see 
more collaborntion and closer co-operation and 
I have every reason to believe that this Com-
mittee and Congress would support such a pro-
gramme. 
Mr. Chairman, it has been a great pleasure 
to have you and the members of your Committee 
visit with the Senate Committee on Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences. We thank you for coming 
and I hope that you will have time to visit with 
us again next time you are in the United States. 
Mr. Chairman, with your concurrence, I will 
declare the meeting adjourned. 
Mr. DE MoNTESQUIOU.- Thank you. 
Mr. GEHRIG.- The meeting is adjourned. 
(Whereupon, at 4.15 p.m., the meeting was 
adjourned) 
APPENDIX 
The White House 
9th October 1972 
The President today announced a policy 
whereby the United States will provide launch 
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assistance to other countries and international 
organisations for satellite projects which are for 
peaceful purposes and are consistent with obli-
gations under relevant international arrange-
ments. Launches will be provided on a non-
discriminatory, reimbursable basis. 
The President's decision extends to other 
countries the assurances given to the member 
States of the European Space Conference in 
September 1971. These assurances recognise the 
legiti:mad;e interests of European countries in 
being able to place satellites into space under 
non-discriminatory conditions. This action was 
in keeping with the President's recognition of 
the desirability of mutually beneficial co-opera-
tion in space and the importance of such co-opera-
tion as a new dimension in the further develop-
ment of the Atlantic partnership. 
Addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly nearly three years ago, the President 
noted particularly that "of all of man's great 
enterprises, none lends itself more logically or 
more compelling to international co-operation 
than the venture into space." 
In establishing today a global launch assur-
ance policy, the President affirms the need 
for a dependable capability which would make it 
possible for nations to have access under equal 
conditions to the advantages which accrue 
through space applications. This global launch 
assurance policy further manifests United States 
faith that, in the language of the 1967 outer 
space treaty, "... the exploration and use of 
outer space shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries... and shall 
be the province of all mankind". 
The White Bouse 
Factsheet 
United States policy governing the provision 
of launch assistance 
I. United States launch assistance will be 
available to interested countries and international 
organisations for those satellite projects which 
are for peaceful purposes and are consistent 
with obligations under relevant international 
agreements and arrangements, subject only to the 
following: 
A. With respect to satellites intended to provide 
international public telecommunications services : 
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(1) The United States will provide appro-
priate launch assistance for those satel-
lite systems on which Intelsat makes a 
favourable recommendation in accord-
ance with Article XIV of its definitive 
arrangements. 
(2) If launch assistance is requested in the 
absence of a favourable recommendation 
by Intelsat, the United States will pro-
vide launch assistance for those systems 
which the United States had supported 
within Intelsat so long as the country 
or international entity requesting the 
assistance considers in good faith that 
it has met its relevant obligations under 
Article XIV of the definitive arrange-
ments. 
(3) In those cases where requests for launch 
assistance are maintained in the absence 
of a favourable Intelsat recommendation 
and the United States had not supported 
the proposed system, the United States 
will reach a decision on such a request 
after taking into account the degree to 
which the proposed system would be 
modified in the light of the factors 
which were the basis for the lack of 
support within Intelsat. 
B. With respect to future operational satellite 
applications which do not have broad inter-
national acceptance, the United States will 
favourably consider requests for launch assist-
ance when broad international acceptance has 
been obtained. 
II. Such launch assistance will be available, 
consistent with United States laws, either from 
United States launch sites (through the acquisi-
tion of United States launch services on a 
co-operative or reimbursable basis) or from 
foreign launch sites by purchase of an appro-
priate United States launch vehicle. In the case 
of launchings from foreign sites the United Sta-
tes will require assurance that the launch 
vehicles will not be made available to third 
parties without prior agreement of the United 
States. 
III. With respect to the municipal conditions 
for reimbursable launch services from United 
States launch sites, foreign users will be charged 
on the same basis as comparable non-United 
States Government domestic users. 
APPENDIX II 
IV. With respect to the priority and scheduling 
for launching foreign payloads at United States 
launch sites, such launchings will be dealt with 
on the same basis as United States launchings. 
Each launching will be treated in terms of its 
own requirements and as an individual case. 
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When it becomes known when a payload will 
become available and what its launch window 
requirements will be, the launching will be 
scheduled for that time. Should a conflict arise, 
the United States will consult with all interested 
parties in order to arrive at an equitable solution. 
Document 688 20th November 1975 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 860 to 272 
RECOMMENDATION 260 1 
on the energy crisis and European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendation 241 on oil and energy problems ; 
Regretting that the Council did not find it necessary to give a satisfactory reply to that 
recommendation ; 
Considering that supplies of energy for Europe at stable and reasonable prices are essential 
for its security ; 
Noting with satisfaction that the Nine have affirmed their intention of working out a. common 
European energy policy ; 
Welcoming the initiative taken by the Group of Twelve to promote solidarity between the 
western countries and Japan in respect of oil supplies; · 
Expressing the hope that as many countries as poBBible, including Norway, should co-operate 
with the International Energy Agency ; 
Considering that close concerted action between the oil-producing and consumer countries is 
essential for the re-establishment of a. balanced world energy market, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Urge the Nine to define their common energy policy without delay ; 
2. Encourage the French Government to take part in the International Energy Agency ; 
3. Invite the governments of the other member countries to seek to concert the action of 
producer and consumer countries with a view to organising the world oil market on a basis accept-
able to all; 
4. Ensure that each member country constitutes or maintains strategic reserves of oil products 
at a. level it shall define ; 
5. Inform the Assembly of measures taken in the specialised international fora referred to in 
its reply to Recommendation 241. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 26th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty.First Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 656). 
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1. The Council share the Assembly's wish for the early definition of a Community energy policy. As the 
Assembly will be aware, on 17th September 1974, the Council of the Communities declared their political 
intention of defining and implementing a Community energy policy involving common objectives ; these 
objectives were enumerated in a resolution adopted by the same Council on 17th December 1974. Efforts 
are being continued in the EEC to implement such a policy and resolve the main problems involved by 
appropriate harmonisation of the varying interests of the member countries of the Community. 
2. With regard to point 2 of the recommendation, the Council refer to their reply to Recommendation 
271, A.2. In this respect, it may however be recalled that: 
(a) representatives of the Commission attend all important meetings of the lEA; 
(b) numerous meetings within the Community provide opportunities for member countries to exchange 
views. 
3. The positive outcome to the second preparatory meeting for the Conference on International Economic 
Co-operation opens the way for constructive discussions on energy questions in that forum. 
4. The Council are well aware of the problem of constituting and maintaining strategic reserves of oil 
products for civilian and military purposes. In this connection, it may be noted that member countries of 
NATO, the lEA and OECD have committed themselves to maintain their reserves at a level agreed within 
those organisations, to which they also submit regular reports on the composition of their stocks. The Council 
are also aware of the associated question of secure supply lines to the West. 
5. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of any major developments which may occur in the 
direction sought by the Assembly's recommendation. 
1. Communicated to the .Assembly on 27th November 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 261 1 
on conditions of service in the armed forces 2 
The Assembly, 
Reiterating its conviction that the existence of adequate defence forces clearly able to deter any 
likely act of aggression is essential to the maintenance of peace ; 
Believing that even in a technological age the effectiveness of allied defence depends first and foremost 
on the men and women of the armed forces, and that their morale in peacetime depends in large part on 
conditions of service being in no way inferior to those offered by civilian employment ; 
Believing that where defence policies require compulsory service, a period of at least fifteen months 
or a period considered adequate by the North Atlantic Council must be relied on to provide adequate num-
bers of service personnel ; 
Aware that unilateral changes in fundamental aspects of service conditions, especially the period 
of compulsory service, can have adverse consequences in other allied countries ; and 
Noting that the I"Ole of women in the armed forces varies widely from one allied country to another, 
REOOMMBNDS TO THE CoUNOIL 
1. That having regard to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, it communicate to the Chairman 
of the North Atlantic Council and to the Chairman of the Military Committee the analysis of conditions 
of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650 with the request that the appropriate authorities 
study: 
(a) the considerable differences in the rates of pay in the armed forces of various allied countries, 
and the desirability of military personnel from different allied countries enjoying broadly com-
parable material conditions when serving in the same country ; 
(b) the experience of those countries that permit elected representatives of the armed forces to 
participate in negotiations with the authorities on conditions of service and rates of pay ; 
(c) the experience of countries which do not rely on compulsory military service; 
(d) the possibility of nationals of one allied country serving in the armed forces of another allied 
country with the consent of the governments concerned ; 
(e) the desirability of making greater use of women in the armed forces; 
2. That it urge member countries to consult their allies in the North Atlantic Council before changing 
fundamental aspects of the conditions of service in their armed forces, especially the period of compulsory 
service; 
3. That, having regard to the fact that all countries of the European Community replied to the question-
naire circulated by the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it communicate 
to the Council and the Commission of the European Community, with special reference to the conditions 
of employment offered by the armed forces of the countries of the Community, the analysis of conditions 
of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 26th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 650). 
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The Council greatly appreciate the high level of the Assembly's study of conditions of service in 
the armed forces. 
The contribution made to this study by government departments in member States shows the 
importance which those States attach to the problem dealt with in Recommendation 261. 
1. The Council have transmitted the text of this recommendation and, as requested by the Assembly, 
the annex to Document 650 to the Secretary-General of NATO for communication to the appropriate 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
2. It will, of course, be for each member State to decide the appropriate time and subject for any con-
sultation it may wish to initiate in the North Atlantic Council. 
The Council of WEU are, however, aware of the importance for effective allied defence of the con-
ditions of service in the armed forces of all member States. 
3. Although under the terms of the Treaties of Rome and Paris the European Communities are not 
competent in defence matters, the Council, in order to meet the wishes of the Assembly, have transmitted 
Document 650 to the Community authorities. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th July 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 262 1 
on the state of European nuclear energy programmes - security aBpects 2 
The Assembly, 
Conscious of the dangers involved in the large-scale establishment of nuolea.r energy installa-
tions throughout Europe and aware that the risks out across national frontiers; 
Considering the need to protect the population of Europe against possible dangers inherent 
in the national programmes planned for execution up to 1985 ; 
Noting the uneasiness among the public a.s expressed through information media a.nd the 
press regarding the possible widespread use of nuclear energy a.nd its consequences for the environ-
ment; 
Aware of the Paris, Brussels a.nd Vienna. conventions on nuclear liability, 
RECOlrDIENDS THAT Tlllll CoUNCIL 
Urge the governments of member countries : 
1. To organise a public European conference, within the framework of the OECD, to define the 
safety and security requirements of nuclear reactors, materials processing operations and the hand-
ling of nuclear waste based on international and world-wide experience and on the liability a.speots 
of the use of nuclear energy ; 
2. To promote the a.ooession of all member countries to or the entry into force of the Paris, 
Brussels a.nd Vienna. conventions and, should they refuse, to communicate to the WEU Assembly 
the reasons for their refusal ; 
3. To keep the public in all member countries regularly informed of all plans throughout Europe 
to establish nuolea.r power plants ; 
4. To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring 
country concerned. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 26th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Small on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 655). 
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1. The member States of Western European Union are already collaborating on nuclear safety 
matters including the protection of public health within the European Economic Communities, through 
international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the OECD, and in bilateral contacts. Basic standards for the protection of public health 
have been worked out by the European Community and at the wider regional and world levels by 
the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD and the International Atomic Energy Agency respectively. 
Should any of these existing channels of co-operation reveal a need for a public European conference 
on nuclear safety, member governments will promote consultations concerning the necessary steps to 
convene such a conference. At present, the Council do not see the need for such a conference. 
2. The governments of member countries are conscious that a nuclear power plant sited near 
a frontier may cause public concern in neighbouring countries and have an environmental impact 
on those countries. Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty, Article 37, is concerned in particular with 
the prevention of the contamination of the water, soil or air space of one member State arising 
from the disposal of radioactive waste from a nuclear plant sited in another member State. It is 
important that member countries should consult closely before decisions are taken relating to the 
siting of nuclear power plants near frontiers. 
3. The governments of member countries are fully aware of the importance in the development 
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of an adequate civil nuclear liability regime. The Paris and 
Brussels Conventions were negotiated under the aegis of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD 
and are regional in scope. Both these Conventions have entered into force (the Paris Convention on 
1st April 1968 and the Brussels Supplementary Convention on 4th December 1974). France and the 
United Kingdom have ratified both Conventions. In the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy 
enabling legislation has recently been enacted. Luxembourg and the Netherlands are preparing the 
necessary domestic legislation *. The Vienna Convention was sponsored by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and has a global application, but only four non-European States - Cuba, the UAR, 
the Philippines and Argentina - have so far ratified it. The governments of member countries 
believe that at present their interests and responsibilities are adequately covered by their adherence 
to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. 
4. The Council believe that it is of the utmost importance in securing public acceptance of the 
uses of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, that information relating to the siting, construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants, including information on safety matters and on their environ-
mental impact, should be available to the public. The governments of some member countries have 
well-established procedures for making information on proposals for nuclear power plants available 
to the public and for the expression of public views on these proposals. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1975. 
* Belgium deposited her instruments of rati1ication of the Paris Convention on 3rd August 1966. The instrument 
of ratification of the Brussels Convention cannot be deposited until the national implementing law has been finalised. 
181 
DOOUMENT 688 
RECOMMENDATION 263 1 
on East-West relations 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that detente should be accompanied by a balanced reduction in the level of forces 
and armaments in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance only in the framework of reciprocal agreements 
with the Warsaw Pact countries; 
Concerned that present economic difficulties in Western Europe may tempt the Soviet Union to 
take advantage of them with a view to extending its influence ; 
Considering that the fight against inflation may incite the democratic countries to reduce their 
defence budgets to an extent which might endanger their security ; 
Welcoming the development of bilateral relations between EEC and Warsaw Pact countries; 
Recalling nevertheleBB that those trends require close and continuing consultations between the 
western countries if their joint security is not to be jeopardised ; 
Noting the Soviet Union's desire for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be 
concluded without delay ; 
Considering that to achieve this end many divergencies still have to be overcome, particularly with 
regard to the movement of persons and ideas; 
Noting that the German Democratic Republic, followed to a great extent by the Soviet Union, still 
adheres to a most restrictive interpretation of the basic agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNon.. 
I. Ensure that the development of bilateral relations between individual members and members of 
the Warsaw Pact is not allowed to undermine the positions adopted jointly by the western countries towards 
the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, trade and the attendant financial arrangements ; 
2. Ensure that the wish to bring the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to a speedy 
conclusion does not lead to the principal positions adopted jointly by the Nine at this conference being 
weakened or abandoned ; 
3. Propose that the North Atlantic Council review under present circumstances the agreements concluded 
for limiting credits granted by its members to member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the framework 
of trade agreements ; 
4. Ensure that in their relations with the German Democratic Republic its members take account of 
the special situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany and the responsibility of the 
four powers towards Germany as a whole ; 
5. Continue to consider the full application and strict maintenance of the quadripartite agreement 
on Berlin by the countries concerned a.s a condition for pursuing detente in Europe. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 26th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty.First Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the General .Affairs Committee 
(Document 668). 
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1. The Council are fully aware of the need for the members of WEU, like those of the Atlantic Alliance, 
to exchange views on their bilateral and multilateral relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. Such 
exchanges of view have been held in the North Atlantic Council and are continuing as part of the normal 
process of its political consultation. Consultations between the countries of the European Community are 
particularly important ; those held between the Nine at Geneva during the second phase of the CSCE, with 
a view to concerting their negotiating position, set an example to be followed in this respect. They are being 
continued, in a different form, to ensure that the Final Act of Helsinki is implemented. 
Apart from minor differences of emphasis which had to be expected (and which distinguished the 
members of western alliances from those of the Warsaw Pact), the jointly-adopted positions were supported 
by all during the Geneva negotiations. In return for certain concessions to the other side, as is normal in 
any negotiations, the western powers gained appreciable concessions. These relate to the first "basket", 
for which they won acceptance of formulations for the "Declaration on Principles" in line with their wishes 
as well as confidence-building measures which take account of the importance of certain military aspects of 
European security; certain subjects of the second "basket" are specially worthy of note, such as the improve-
ment of business facilities, the promotion of the exchange of economic and commercial information and 
the encouragement of industrial co-operation ; lastly and above all the western powers attach particular 
importance to the content of the third "basket": human contacts, spread of information, cultural and 
educational exchanges. 
2. The Assembly can rest assured, in any case, that a desire to bring the CSCE to a speedy conclusion 
was not an overriding concern of the members of WEU and of the other western powers and did not have 
any decisive effect on the positions they took. Indeed, it cannot be said that the Geneva negotiations, which 
extended over nearly two years, were conducted in a precipitate manner. 
3. The development of relations with Eastern European countries, particularly in the economic field, 
is one of the results which the western countries expect to obtain from the follow-up to the CSCE ; they will 
continue to deploy credit policies consistent with this aim and their other obligations. These credit poli-
cies vary ; certain governments sometimes consider it necessary to set a ceiling for the relevant credits 
through separate bilateral negotiations. 
4. The member States will continue, in their relations with the GDR, to take account of the special 
situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany and the responsibility of the four powers 
towards Germany as a whole. 
5. The Council share the Assembly's views regarding strict compliance with and full application of the 
quadripartite agreement and also consider that there is an essential link between detente in Europe and the 
Berlin situation. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 264 1 
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons 11 
The Assembly, 
Regretting tha.t despite a. certain progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of 
"essential equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons ha.ve 
continued to grow ; 
Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India. threatens the stability of relations in 
the area., undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be ma.de a.va.ila.ble by one country to another, 
while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India. ; 
Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being a.va.ila.ble to all 
countries for civil applications ; 
Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on 
which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoid-
ing total nuclear anarchy ; 
Noting with keen satisfaction tha.t, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU 
have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ; 
Aware tha.t the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of 
WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe, 
R:mooMMENDs TO THE CoUNCIL 
That it urge member countries : 
1. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit 
their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference ; 
2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty; 
3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under tha.t treaty, and to concert their policies 
with other supplying powers to ma.ke the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries 
dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their ter-
ritory or under their control ; 
4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to 
third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy ; 
5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a. view to achieving, through the various 
arms control negotiations, a. genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the 
essential basis of their security ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th May 19715 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 672). 
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I. All member countries ofWEU, whether or not parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, hold equally firmly to the principle of non-proliferation, which in their view should lead to an 
improvement in international relations. 
2. They are also fully aware of the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the economic develop-
ment of many countries, and continue to encourage exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technical information in this field, while taking appropriate steps to ensure that exports of such nuclear 
equipment and material are not diverted from their peaceful purposes. 
3. Arms control and disarmament are matters of concern to the member countries of WEU and to the 
Atlantic Alliance ; all member countries will therefore give particular attention to any measures designed to 
discourage proliferation. The balance of forces is, moreover, a vital factor in maintaining peace and all action 
of the kind mentioned above must take account of the need to safeguard member countries' security and 
stability. 
4. The Council are also convinced of the need to harmonise member countries' positions in the appro-
priate international fora. 
5. The Council stress that the problem of physical protection of nuclear material, particularly against 
loss, theft and sabotage, has until now been essentially the concern of the military nuclear States, but that 
it is in fact also the concern of other States, whether or not they have acceded to the treaty, particularly as 
such protection involves heavy expenditure which affects the economic balance and the conditions of pro-
duction and trade of nuclear material. 
A fuller examination of this problem has been undertaken by the EEC and by a group of experts 
meeting under the auspices of the IAEA, which has submitted its conclusions to the countries concerned. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1975. 
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6. To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application 
of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and 
of the IAEA; 
7. With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful 
progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty 
lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ; 
8. To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular : 
(a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States 
by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards ; 
(b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole 
nuclear fuel cycle. 
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RECOMMENDATION 265 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 2 
The Assembly, 
Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension 
scheme for the staff of these organisations ; 
Deploring nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint man-
agement body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should 
one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up ; 
Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary 
pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff ; 
Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented 
with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
I. Establish a joint management body for the pension scl,leme ; 
2. Set up a single appeals board; 
3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government with-
drawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 
250 of the Assembly ; 
4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male 
staff; 
5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those 
loans should they opt for the pension scheme ; 
6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the 
social advantages linked with the present provident fund system ; 
7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a 
pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff; 
8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security 
Act in April 1975 ; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty.First Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 666). 
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I. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations. 
1. It has not so far been possible to reach agreement within the Co-ordinating Committee to establish 
a joint management body for the pension scheme, as desired by the Assembly, since some organisations do 
not support this. 
However, as indicated in Article 31, paragraph 1 of the draft pension scheme rules, a joint adminis-
tration unit will be "responsible for such part of the work as can be centralised". 
Within this context, the Secretaries-General have proposed the establishment of a "taxation unit" 
within the Inter-organisations Section (which works at the OECD) if the present draft pension scheme rules 
are adopted. 
2. The full and uninterrupted payment of pensions in the event of a member State withdrawing or an 
organisation being wound up is guaranteed under the terms of Article 40, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft 
pension scheme rules applicable to the permanent staff of the co-ordinated organisations : 
"In the event of a merger, reconstitution or other transformation or in the event of dissolution of the 
organisation, the Council or any ad hoc body set up, where required in one of the aforementioned cases, 
shall take the necessary measures to ensure uninterrupted payment of the pension scheme benefits 
until the cessation of entitlement of the last beneficiary. 
Should a country, being a member or ex-member of the organisation, fail to comply with its obligations 
under this article, the other countries shall meet the cost thereof in proportion to their contribution 
to the budget of the organisation as fixed annually from and after the said country's default." 
3. With regard to the granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same condi-
tions as for widows of male staff, the Co-ordinating Committee was unable to make proposals to this effect, 
because some delegations did not support those who favoured such a provision. 
4. The possibility for officials who have obtained home loans from a part of their provident fund to 
continue these loans if they opt for the pension scheme is covered by Article 44, paragraph 3 of the draft 
pension scheme rules : 
"Where a staff member has exercised his right to make withdrawals from his provident fund holding 
and where, in consequence, the amount standing to his credit is less than the amount he would have 
surrendered under paragraph 2 if he had not made withdrawals, service prior to 1st July 1974 shall 
only be credited in the proportion these two amounts bear to each other. 
This provision shall not apply where a staff member has, by 1st July 1975 * at the latest, undertaken 
to repay the difference between the two amounts, plus compound interest at the rate of 4% per annum 
as from that date. 
H the staff member makes only partial repayment, past service shall only be credited in the proportion 
referred to in the first sub-paragraph above." 
5. The Co-ordinating Committee has not yet found it possible or useful to make a detailed study of 
the question of enabling serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme to continue to benefit from 
the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1975. 
* This date will ha.ve to be amended in the final text. 
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9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may: 
- hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ; 
- assess trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ; 
- examine cost-of-living trends every six months ; 
- take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as 
quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period ; 
II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as possible a first report on the 
way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in 
October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the diffi-
culties encountered in this respect and, as appropriate, ways of alleviating such difficulties. 
190 
DOCUMENT 688 
6. The answer to the Assembly's question is to be found in Articles 36 and 49 of the draft rules, which 
read as follows : 
"Article 36 
Should the Council of the organisation responsible for the payment of benefits decide on an adjustment 
of salaries in relation to the cost of living, it shall decide at the same time on an identical adjustment 
of the pensions currently being paid, and of pensions whose payment is deferred. 
Should salary adjustments be made in relation to the standard of living, the Council shall consider 
whether an appropriate adjustment of pensions should be made." 
"Article 49 
4. Benefits under this Article shall be calculated by reference to the staff member's grading when 
he left the service before 1st January 1973, but on the basis of the corresponding scales in force on 
1st January 1973, subsequently adjusted in accordance with Article 36." 
7. The problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in Apri11975 
are under consideration by the appropriate United Kingdom authorities and by the organisation. 
8. It is intended to hold a general review of emoluments every two years. In the intervening period, 
salaries could be adjusted every six months if the trend of the cost of living made it necessary. 
The Council have considered item I, 2 of the Assembly's recommendation together with the remarks 
in the explanatory memorandum in Document 666 concerning the desirability of setting up a single appeals 
board. In view of the fact that the other co-ordinated organisations were reluctant, at this stage, to pursue 
the matter, it is felt that a further invitation by the Secretary-General to his colleagues would be premature. 
However, since the jurisdiction of the appeals board within each of the co-ordinated organisations should 
normally include pension scheme matters, the Secretary-General intends once again to draw his colleagues' 
attention to this suggestion as soon as the pension scheme comes into force. 
II. The survey undertaken by the Public Administration Committee, at the Council's request, on the 
implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of 
national officials to international organisations is nearing completion. The Council will very shortly be receiv-
ing the results of this survey and will consider whether the Committee should be asked to go further into 
certain aspects. The Assembly will, at its request, be kept informed of progress in this field. 
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on the political activities of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting that the Council is holding far fewer meetings at ministerial level; 
Considering that the Permanent Council has therefore become the only body of WEU working at 
that level; 
Regretting that the member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate 
to the Permanent Council more of the duties which the Council of Ministers is not in a. position to 
carry out; 
Noting that despite repeated promises the Council fails to keep the Assembly well informed of matters 
affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular by refusing to hold a. joint meeting 
with the General Affairs Committee and also by replying evasively to recommendations and written questions 
from the Assembly ; 
Considering that in any event the Council is still responsible for supervising the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Thanking the Council for having set out frankly in its twentieth annual report the reasons for its 
inactivity ; 
Considering that the new situation gives added importance to the duties of the Secretary-General; 
Deploring, in these circumstances, that the governments have been unable to terminate the interim 
situation which has prevailed since September 1974, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Include regularly in its agenda. consideration of the various problems raised by the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. In the light of its deliberations, remind governments whenever necessary of the implications of this 
treaty; 
3. Draw up a list of problems connected with the application of the treaty over which the governments 
of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that atten-
tion be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council; 
4. Provide the Assembly with meaningful information on all matters affecting the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, even if they are dealt with in the framework of other institutions; 
5. Appoint to the Secretariat-General a. personality carrying sufficient authority with the govern-
ments of the seven member countries and terminate the present interim situation without delay. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 667). 
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1. The modified Brussels Treaty makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union 
meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives. The 
currently less frequent meetings of the Council at ministerial level do not signify any lessening of the will 
of member States to fulfil their obligations under the treaty, but rather reflect the increased frequency with 
which Ministers meet in other bodies. Meanwhile, the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Repre. 
sentatives is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty. 
2. The problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty frequently figure on the 
Council's agenda and the work the Council do in this connection is fully described in their annual report 
to the Assembly. The Assembly can rest assured that member governments remain fully aware of their 
commitments under the treaty and the relevance of these to their current defence policies. 
3. Under Article VIII of the treaty the Council is created "for the purposes of strengthening peace 
and security and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe". It is empowered at the request 
of any member "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever 
area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability". The Council are not however the only 
international body empowered to consider these matters and member governments frequently discuss them 
also in the t;Ontext of political co-operation among the Nine, and within the North Atlantic Council and the 
Councils of the European Communities and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Nevertheless, any member government can propose that a particular matter should be discussed in the 
Council of Western European Union and, as the Assembly is aware, the Council are at present discussing 
the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the stan. 
pardisation of armaments in Europe. 
4. The recommendations and written questions put to the Council by the Assembly and its members 
receive close and careful attention from member governments. Whenever possible the Council will continue 
to give the Assembly full and substantial replies which reflect the common positions of the seven member 
governments, even if they sometimes relate to matters which are dealt with primarily by other organis. 
ations. The Council are aware of the fact that for its work the Assembly needs adequate information on 
matters relating to European security and the integration of Europe. While the Council are not always 
in a position to provide full answers to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions, member 
States remain prepared to make the fullest possible use of other means of communication such as the par. 
ticipation of government members in Assembly sessions. The Council would like to remind the Assembly 
that in cases where the Council are unable to provide sufficient information, it is always open to members 
to question their own Ministers in their respective national parliaments. 
5. The member governments of WEU are well aware that European security and European integration 
raise problems on certain aspects of which efforts are being made to harmonise national views. The Council 
however appreciate the useful contribution which the Assembly makes in drawing attention to and debating 
the relevant issues. 
6. The Council regret the delay in the appointment of a Secretary-General to replace Mr. Heisbourg 
and hope soon to be able to end the interim situation. Meanwhile the Council would like to express their 
satisfaction with the way the Acting Secretary-General is carrying out his duties and to state that the seven 
member governments intend to appoint to the Secretariat-General a personality carrying authority with 
them. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th July 1975. 
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on the application of the Brussels Treaty 2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the prompt action by the Council which enabled the twentieth annual report to be 
communicated by 28th February and congratulating the Secretary-General on introducing the "appropriate 
administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current 
basis" ; 
Stressing the close interest which the Council of WEU must necessarily take in the structure of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, since all organs of WEU are required by the modified Brussels Treaty 
to work in close co-operation with it ; 
__ ware that the modified Brussels Treaty is a supranational treaty in that Council - decisions 
concerning the force level and arms control provisions of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV are not subject to 
a unanimous vote, and that no usage or agreement has formally modified the majority voting procedures 
of those protocols ; 
Aware that the credibility of any future East-West agreements on arms control, especially in the 
framework of the conference on European security and co-operation, or mutual and balanced force reductions, 
may be undermined by the failure to apply the controls provided for by the modified Brussels Treaty; 
Regretting that since 1966 annual reports have omitted the numbers of inspections, by category 
of establishment visited, that have been carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
Congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out 
in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too limited tasks assigned to it by the Council; 
Recalling its recommendation that full use be made of the Standing Armaments Committee as a 
study and review body to eliminate duplication in other international bodies concerned with the stand-
ardisation and joint production of armaments, and endorsing the proposal of the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to entrust that Committee with a study of the armaments production capabilities existing in Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNciL 
1. Apply each year the new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report ; 
2. Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ; 
3. Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear ~:~tatement 
of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied ; 
4. Continue to press for ratification by the remaining member of WEU of the Convention on the due 
process of law signed on 14th December 1957; 
5. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study and report on the arms production capabilities 
existing in the European NATO countries; 
6. Advise the North Atlantic Council to revise the terms of appointment of its Chairman and Secretary-
General, limiting it to four years in the first place. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 673). 
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l. The Council greatly appreciate the Assembly's expression of satisfaction at the early receipt of the 
twentieth annual report. The Council will endeavour to ensure that this procedure is maintained in the 
future. 
2. The annual reports of the Council do not mention the numbers of inspections by category of establish-
ment visited that have been carried out by the Armaments Control Agency because of the character of this 
information. 
The Council's views on this point have already been given to the Assembly in their reply to Recom-
mendation 213, and as stated in this reply they will continue to supply such information on the under-
standing that parliamentarians will refrain from publishing it. 
3. and 4. With regard to the control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty which cannot be fully applied, 
the Assembly's attention is drawn to the views frequently expressed by the Council on previous occasions 
and in particular to their reply to Recommendation 247. As stated in this reply, the problems which pre-
vent the entry into force of the convention on the due process of law still exist. 
5. The Council are aware of the importance of fostering European collaboration in the field of arma-
ments production and as stated in their reply to Recommendation 270 are at present studying what tasks 
could be undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee while bearing in mind the need to avoid all 
duplication. 
6. The Council are aware that in various international organisations the terms of office of their respective 
chairmen and secretaries-general are limited to a set period of time ; however the Council do not consider 
it appropriate to advise other international organisations on the management of their domestic affairs. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on lOth October 1975. 
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on the European Space Agency 2 
The Assembly, 
Congratulating the governments of the member countries of the European Space Agency on the 
establishment of a new European space organisation ; 
Aware of the need to give priority to the European space activities pursued within the Agency and 
noting governments' willingness to integrate their future national programmes in a joint European pro-
gramme; 
Considering the agreed programme on scientific and application satellites and the Ariane launcher 
and the vast sums of money involved ; 
Convinced of the need to devote the closest attention to the application of space research and develop-
ment in preparation for subsequent commercial use ; 
Considering that in the early 1980s space activities will leave the experimental phase and start a 
new era of operational utilisation ; 
Considering especially Europe's present rtlle in the new space transportation system : the American 
shuttle and the European development of Spacelab ; 
Impressed by the importance of the American military space programme and its applications which 
will revolutionise existing strategic and tactical concepts, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
I. To define Europe's common space policy for the future in world-wide application satellite systems 
and the ways and means of collaborating with the United States in the use of Spacelab and its successors; 
2. To use the good offices of ESA for concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the policies of the 
member States in all their space activities in the United Nations and other agencies, including in particular 
the United Nations Outer Space Committee; 
3. To complete the programmes already agreed to and undertake not to query their validity which 
would create uncertainty in industry ; 
4. To formulate a policy with regard to the new era of easier and cheaper access to space through 
Spacelab; 
5. To formulate an industrial policy on application satellites with a view to exporting European satellite 
systems and other space hardware especially to the developing countries ; 
6. To preserve Kourou not only as a launch base for the Ariane development phase but as a general 
launch facility for Europe in the future ; 
7. To work out a European military space programme and provide the means for its implementation 
in parallel with the United States military space programme. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 670). 
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Over the last few years, member countries of the European space community have become increas. 
ingly aware that Europe can no longer limit its ambitions in the space field to the acquisition of new scientific 
knowledge, but must provide itself also with applied space technology, both for its own use and in anti-
cipation of a large world market from the beginning of the next decade onwards. 
The member States of ESRO and ELDO, the two European space organisations founded eleven years 
ago, decided to carry out the extensive common programme approved in 1971 and 1973 within a single 
European Space Agency (ESA), the convention for which was signed on 30th May 1975. 
The agency will be responsible for a scientific programme, for application programmes (telecommu-
nications, meteorology, sea and air navigation), for a heavy launcher programme and for a manned space 
laboratory programme, as well as for ground support facilities, including a launching base at Kourou which 
is necessary for the development of the Ariane launcher. Its main emphasis will be on elaborating and imple-
menting a long-term European space policy, on co-ordinating the European space programme and national 
programmes and integrating the latter progressively, on elaborating and implementing an appropriate 
industrial policy and on concerting member States' policies with regard to other international organisations 
and institutions. 
Meetings of its Council, which can be convened at ministerial level, will assist the agency in fulfilling 
this mission, the aims of which, as its convention states, are exclusively peaceful. 
1. Communicated to the Aasembly on lOth October 1975. 
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on the state of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having debated the state of European security in the light of the report of its Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments ; 
(ii) Believing that satisfactory detente through the various East-West negotiations can be achieved 
only if the real military capability of the Soviet Union is borne in mind, if the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Alliance is assured, and if sufficient collective defences are maintained by the NATO powers through the 
allocation of adequate resources and their most rational joint use ; 
(iii) Calling for certain organisational and planning changes on the central front; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of the northern and southern flanks to the security of Europe, and the 
need for political and military measures to prevent their isolation from the centre ; 
(v) Calling for practical measures to achieve much greater joint production of armaments, especially 
tactical missiles ; 
(vi) Calling for the collective defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future 
European union, and stressing the importance of Eurogroup meanwhile, as the framework for practical 
expression of the European defence identity, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CouNciL 
1. That it bear in mind the need for greater cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance at a time when parity 
between the superpowers has made international relations as a whole more complex and less predictable ; 
2. (a) That it welcome the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at summit level to prepare the con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe ; 
(b) That all proposals advanced by NATO countries in the MBFR negotiations should be subject 
to prior agreement in NATO, and that any reductions agreed in the MBFR negotiations should 
( i) concern first the forces of the superpowers, and ( ii) be asymmetric so as to reduce the present 
Warsaw Pact conventional superiority; (iii) may include theatre nuclear weapons; 
3. That it request the North Atlantic Council to take note of the study by General de Maiziere and: 
(a) to consider the availability of new and reserve formations to make any improvements in the 
deployment pattern of forces on the central front ; 
(b) to improve political decision-making procedures to make full use of available warning time in 
the event of threatened aggression ; 
(c) to revise the dictum that logistics are a national responsibility; 
(d) to modify the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons; 
(e) to press for greater specialisation in defence tasks by country; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Sef!Bion 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duvieusart, Wall and Lemmrich 
on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 671). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 269 
1. Despite differences of interest and op1mon which may be expected between free, independent 
countries, the Alliance is maintaining its fundamental solidarity in face of the challenges of the 
modern world. This solidarity was reaffirmed by the fifteen member countries in the Ottawa Declara-
tion adopted on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the treaty. It was 
further confirmed and reinforced by the communique issued after the Atlantic suminit which proclaimed 
that the member countries would stand by "the principles and the spirit of solidarity and mutual 
assistance which brought them together as allies". 
2. It is in the same spirit of solidarity that close consultations are maintained, both in the 
North Atlantic Council and between the allied delegations taking part in the MBFR negotiations 
in Vienna. 
Reductions must not lead to a perpetuation of the present imbalance, but must result in a 
common ceiling for ground force manpower in the NATO guidelines area, to be reached by Soviet 
and American reductions in a first phase and the reduction of non-Soviet and non-American ground 
forces in a second phase only. 
France has made known her reservations about the MBFR negotiations in which she is not 
taking part. 
3. The study by General de Maiziere reviews the main problems faced by the authorities responsible 
for defence in Central Europe. It highlights questions which are undeniably of immediate concern; 
for that reason, most of them are being studied within NATO and in the capitals. 
4. The Council can assure the Assembly that the North Atlantic Council has been seriously 
concerned at the lack of progress in resolving the situation in Cyprus and at the effect of this 
state of affairs on the security of the southern flank of the Alliance. 
The North Atlantic Council has also discussed the freedom of air traffic in the area and has 
asked Greece and Turkey to lift the restrictions they have imposed. 
5. Problems relating to the standardisation of armaments are at present being dealt with by various 
bodies. 
In view of the need for intensified co-operation on armaments questions, both between Euro-
pean countries and within the Atlantic framework, consideration is at present being given to the 
tasks which might be taken on in this connection by the various bodies capable of dealing with 
this problem within the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. In these studies account is of course being 
taken of the need to avoid duplication and of the specific role of the Community of the Nine in 
the field of industrial co-operation. 
It may be noted that a working group set up by Euronad is studying possibilities of improved 
co-operation between Europe and North America in the field of armaments. 
This reappraisal should favour the establishment of effective co-ordination and thus avoid such 
problems as the development of incompatible systems within the Alliance. The aim is that the 
European countries should be able to identify their requirements and to use their own research, 
development and production capabilities. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th November 1975. 
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4. That it ask member governments to urge: 
(a) in the North Atlantic Council (i) that full support be given to all political and military measures 
necessary to prevent the isolation of the flanks, and to ensure the necessary conditions for 
maintaining a regular supply of armaments to all allied countries; (ii) that advantage be taken 
of the May summit meeting to facilitate a settlement of the differences between Greece and 
Turkey; 
(b) in the International Civil Aviation Organisation, that Greece and Turkey be invited to withdraw 
their respective NOTAMs that prevent aircraft flying freely between the two countries ; 
5. That it request the North Atlantic Council to ensure that all bodies concerned with arms production 
concentrate on the immediate need for the introduction of standardised tactical missile systems, and that 
it adopt the following procedures : ( i) make the Military Committee responsible for determining the standard 
military characteristics to be applied in deciding on the development and the procurement of weapons 
systems, beginning with tactical missiles; (ii) make initially l % of national research and development 
budgets available for NATO development projects to be decided by the Military Committee and Defence 
Support Division ; 
6. (a) That it draw the attention of all members to the importance of Eurogroup as the most appropriate 
organ at present in which to arrange practical matters of European defence co-operation that are 
not effectively dealt with in NATO, on the understanding that problems of nuclear defence are 
the responsibility of the Alliance as a· whole ; 
(b) That it instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans in time for them to be 
incorporated in his report to the European Community the views of the Council on the place 
of defence in a future European union, with the request that such union retain the mutual defence 
commitment of the Brussels Treaty ; 
7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 
in the Assembly in December 1974 on a European armaments policy and in particular: 
(a) undertake a detailed study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each member 
country; 
(b) study the possibility of pooling research work and its financing; 
(e) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration. 
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The proposal that the member countries of NATO should allocate a set percentage of their 
military budget to research projects within the organisation is an interesting one. However, as 
already stated, NATO's competence in this field is not exclusive and Europe's own capacities and 
the interests of its industry must be borne in mind. 
6. In the view of its members, Eurogroup has an important part to play in fostering European 
co-operation in the field of defence. It should also be appreciated that the setting-up of a European 
union may well have repercussions on questions of security and defence. It is too soon, however, 
to try to define exactly what powers the future European union may have in this field. 
7. Clearly the problem of standardisation is closely linked with those of the joint production of 
armaments, and the maintenance in Europe of an adequate capacity to produce armaments. 
In this context, it should not be overlooked that any discussion of production problems must 
take account of the competence of the EEC in the field of industrial policy. 
The question is therefore extremely complex. Member States of WEU have made substantial 
contributions to the study of the problem, which will be discussed by the various bodies concerned 
over the next few months. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 270 1 
on European union and WEU 8 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty is the basis of European political union in defence 
matters; 
Expressing the wish that the efforts of the Nine to achieve such a union will allow rapid progress 
to be made in this direction ; 
Noting the decision of the Heads of State or of Government to examine, in 1975, a report on 
European union ; 
Noting that the defence policies of member countries are insufficiently co-ordinated; 
Noting nevertheless that these policies pursue a common goal, that of ensuring Western European 
security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Considering that there is broad agreement between the members of WEU to plan their defence policy 
in such a way as to make Europe a true partner of the United States in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
Considering moreover that the most serious threats at present are to the northern and southern 
flanks of the western defence system ; 
Recalling Recommendation 145 adopted by the Assembly on 15th December 1966, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Propose that a future meeting of the European Council study the requirements of a European 
defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
2. With this conference in view, ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies 
now; 
3. Examine in particular the consequences for European security of the emergence of new nuclear 
powers and the agreements concluded or to be concluded between the nuclear powers ; 
4. Ensure that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it takes effective action 
in all matters of concern to it; 
5. Remind the EEC countries which have not yet acceded to it, and all the European countries with 
a democratic regime which wish to be associated with a common defence policy, that they may accede 
to the Brussels Treaty ; 
6. Consider each time that this appears necessary in the context of a European defence policy, foreign 
policy matters affecting the defence of Western Europe and the defence policies of the member States 
with a view to co-ordinating military efforts, developing industrial potential and limiting the cost of defence 
for these States ; 
7. Particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect, to bear in mind the tasks of the 
Standing Armaments Committee in respect of the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial 
potential with special reference to advanced technology. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandwn: see the Report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Docwnent 662). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 210 
1. The Council of WEU are aware of the implications of world-wide security problems for the process 
of European political unification. They believe that Europe must make adequate provision for its defence 
together with its North American partners in the framework of the Alliance. Member States will discuss 
questions arising in this connection in the appropriate fora, taking into account especially the progress 
made towards European union. 
2. The Council of WEU already are and will continue to be responsible for ensuring the full appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty. The treaty stresses, as is known to the Assembly, the undesirability 
of a duplication of effort. A number of issues of relevance to WEU are dealt with specifically by other 
bodies - European security problems within the Atlantic Alliance, and European integration in the 
Community of the Nine. This fact is of course taken into account by the Council in planning their own 
activities. 
3. As already noted in their answer to Recommendation 255, the Council are bearing in mind the 
opportunities offered by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
4. While recognising their responsibility for questions of general defence policy, the Council have 
nevertheless to take account of the work now in progress in other bodies on the same problems. 
5. Conscious of the need for intensified co-operation on armaments questions in Europe and within 
the Atlantic framework, the Council are at present studying what tasks could be taken on in this connec-
tion by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU, while bearing in mind the need to avoid dupli-
cation. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th October 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 271 1 
on co-operation with the United States 2 
The Assembly, 
A 
Considering that the WEU member countries, like most other European countries and the United 
States, are threatened by continuous, dangerous and increasing inflation, encouraged by high energy prices 
(which in themselves have negative effects on the economy), resulting in unacceptable unemployment; 
Considering that continuous and, in many countries, accelerated inflation is a challenge to all 
democratic countries and may even endanger the survival of democracy ; 
Considering that inflation is also threatening the budgetary position of western countries, thus 
having repercussions on the level of defence budgets; 
Noting that co-ordinated economic, social, financial and monetary policies are essential if imminent 
danger to our society's structure is to be tackled ; 
Questioning the will of the democratic countries to co-ordinate policies sufficiently ; 
Considering it essential for the western world to present a united front in the field of energy 
requirements ; 
Taking into account the fact that the countries concerned are already co-operating in the framework 
of OECD; 
Considering that OECD does not have adequate machinery for parliamentary supervision; 
B 
(')onsidering that the security of Western Europe is ensured by the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
integration of European and American armed forces ; 
Considering that the United States (approaching its bicentennial) and the Soviet Union (preparing 
for its Twenty-Fifth Party Congress) have achieved and will each try to maintain a military balance on 
a very high level ; 
Considering that it must be regarded as a positive factor for detente that a number of major problems 
are being discussed regularly by the two superpowers in purely bilateral negotiations ; 
Considering however that doubts must be expressed as to whether today's complex problems can 
still be handled by a small number of persons in the two countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A 
I. Urge member governments to: 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the General Affairs Committes 
(Document 669). 
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A 
1. The Council share the WEU Assembly's view that member governments should hold frequent 
exchanges of views leading to real co-ordination of long-term policy and research into the economic use 
of, and substitutes for, energy resources. In bilateral contacts between member governments the problems 
of international energy policy and long-term co-operation have already become major points of discussion. 
The activities of OECD in the energy sector have been streamlined by amalgamating, in accordance 
with a recent decision, the former oil and energy committees into a new energy policy committee. 
Furthermore, the Council recall that the International Energy Agency forming part of OECD was set 
up on 18th November 1974. 
OECD is an intergovernmental body embracing not only European but also non-European coun-
tries having a market economy system; among its members are the United States, Canada, Japan, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. In view of this fact the Council do not consider that supervisory functions in 
relation to OECD could conceivably be delegated to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
2. The question of whether or not France intends to take part in the work of the International 
Energy Agency is solely a matter for the French Government. The Council in any case deem it important 
to ensure that efforts of industrialised consumer countries in the field of energy policy are co-ordinated, 
such co-ordination taking place within the framework of both the European Community and OECD. 
B 
1. Security is a basic condition for detente. By ensuring the collective security of the countriee 
party to it during the twenty-six years of its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has enabled each of its 
members to initiate and develop the dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe, on both the bilateral 
and multilateral level. 
In this respect the allies have been aware from the outset that such a dialogue would be furthered 
by agreement on the aims to be achieved. The Harmel report of 1967 on the Alliance's future tasks 
emphasises in this context the importance of the Alliance as a clearing house for the exchange of infor-
mation and views, stating : 
"Each ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must 
not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the allies 
remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all ; their actions will 
thus be all the more effective." 
In this spirit, frequent discussions have been held within the Atlantic Council on the various 
negotiations which concern some or all members of the Alliance, such as MBFR or the CSCE. The 
United States have also kept their European allies regularly informed of the state of the strategic 
arms limitation talks (SALT). 
The Council consider that such close and frank consultation between the United States and their 
European allies are in the vital interest of the Alliance as a whole, insofar as they enable the Europeans 
to bring their influence to bear on all matters affecting their security. 
2. For this part of the recommendation, the Council refer to their reply to Recommendation 270, 
paragraph 1. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th October 1975. 
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(a) hold frequent exchanges of views leading to real co-ordination of long-term policy and research 
into the economic use of and substitutes for energy resources ; 
(b) promote the extension of OECD's activities in the energy field; 
(c) strengthen the powers of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to supervise 
OECD; 
2. Consider that western co-operation would be better ensured if France joined the International Energy 
Agency; 
B 
1. Ensure that frequent exchanges of views between member countries and the United States, 
particularly in the framework of NATO, lead to increased participation and influence of European States 
in respect of all major problems; 
2. Study the possibilities of truly European decision-making on all security matters, including the 
strategic arms limitation talks, the Middle East, Cyprus and the French nuclear deterrent. 
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RECOMMENDATION 272 1 
on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation 2 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the recession in air transport and aircraft construction has compelled governments to 
consider the economic, social and financial problems facing the industries concerned ; 
Also aware that, since they provide subsidies, governments now follow more closely the activities 
of airlines and aircraft industries in order to obtain better returns for their subsidies through more rational 
management of the firms concerned ; 
Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 257 that all aspects of European aviation 
continue to receive its fullest attention evades the question and demonstrates its complete inability to take 
the necessary political action ; 
Aware of the study undertaken within the Communities on civil aircraft production, to be ready 
by 1st October 1975 ; 
Aware that the scope of Eurocontrol's activities is shrinking, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Urge member governments : 
1. To call upon European airlines to agree on the characteristics of their future equipment and Euro-
pean manufacturers to co-operate in the manufacture of such equipment ; 
2. To ensure that the study undertaken by the Communities includes a detailed chapter on means 
of allowing effective decision-making machinery to be established in Europe, including a European aviation 
agency after the fashion of the European Space Agency. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Valleix and Warren on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 674). . 
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to Recommendation 2'12 
The Council have expressed on several occasions in the pa.st their opinion that a closer European 
collaboration in the field of civil aircraft industry, both on a. governmental and on an industrial level, is 
necessary in order that this industry should be sufficiently competitive and should acquire its appropriate 
position among others. 
The Council have noted the recent consultations in the EEC concerning a resolution about aircraft 
industrial policy among member nations which was agreed upon by the ministerial EEC Council on 4th March 
1975 and will be followed by a first report on the functioning of the European aircraft industry. 
The Council furthermore took note of the fact that three European airline companies have, on the 
request of their governments, decided to consult each other with the purpose of determining possible com-
mon specifications for their future aircraft requirements. The European aircraft industry has reacted in a 
positive way to this significant initiative. Six major companies have decided to co-operate in order to provide 
the airline compa.nies with a strong industrial basis. 
The Council wish to express their satisfaction on these various initiatives, and are waiting with inter-
est for further results. Finally, the Council would recall their extensive reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 244. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on lOth October 1975. 
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Introductory note 
In preparing this report your Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
Federal Republic of Germany : 
Dr. Siegfried Mann, Secretary of State for Armaments, Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 22nd 
September 1975; 
Mr. Josef Hort, Managing Director, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm, Bonn, 23rd September 1975. 
NATO, BruBsels: 
Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support, 25th September 1975; 
Lt.-General Gerd Schmiickle (German Army), Director of the International Military Staff, MC, 25th 
September 1975; 
Lt.-General Colladai (United States Air Force), Deputy Chairman, Military Committee, 25th Sep-
tember 1975 ; 
Sir Edward Peck, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, 25th 
September 1975; 
Brigadier Schiinemann (German Army), Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany 
to NATO, 25th September 1975; 
Brigadier John W. Seigle (United States Army) and Commander Miles (United States Navy), United 
States Mission to NATO, 26th September 1975. 
France: 
Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 8th 
October 1975 ; 
General Paul Assens, Head of the International Division, Ministerial Delegation for Armaments, 
Ministry of Defence, 8th October 1975. 
United, Kingdom: 
Mr. Frank Judd, MP, Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Navy, 9th October 1975; 
Mr. Robert Brown, MP, Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army, Ministry of Defence, 
9th October 1975; 
Mr. G. C. B. Dodds, Assistant Under-Secretary for International and Industrial Policy, 9th October 
1975; 
Lt.-Colonel H. Lacy (Secretary to NIAG), British Aircraft Corporation, 9th October 1975. 
The Committee as a whole met at HQ Allied Forces Northern Europe, at Kolsa.as, near Oslo, on 
22nd September 1975 where it was briefed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir John Sharp, and by 
Mr. E. Berdal, Public Relations Officer. On 23rd October it met in Copenhagen with the Military Committee 
of the North Atlantic Assembly under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Thyness, Chairman of the Military 
Committee, and was addressed by Professor L. W. Martin, Department of War Studies, King's College, Lon-
don, and Mr. R. Shearer, Director of Nuclear Planning, NATO International Staff. 
The Committee met subsequently in Brussels on 20th and 21st Oct,ober when it was addressed by Mr. 
Altiero Spinelli, member of the Commission of the European Communities responsible for industrial policy, 
and discussed an outline of the present report. The Committee discussed a draft of the report at a subsequent 
meeting at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on lOth November, and discussed and adopted the present 
report at a final meeting in Paris on lst December. 
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The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers 
who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise 
attributed, are those of the Committee. 
* 
* * 
The Rapporteur gratefully acknowledges the assistance in the preparation of this report and appen-
dices provided by Dr. Walter Schiitze, of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere in Paris, who was 
appointed by the Clerk as an outside expert at the request of the Rapporteur. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having considered the present situation of research, development and production in the field of 
armaments in the light of the report by its Defence Committee ; 
(ii) Informed of the important statements made to it in Paris on 5th December 1974 by Mr. Van Elslande, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on a joint European armaments policy ; 
iii) Aware that, despite progress made in this field in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, for instance 
the principles on co-operation in the field of armaments laid down by Eurogroup on 23rd May 1972, new 
concrete possibilities exist, particularly among the member countries of WEU, for a decisive improvement 
in co-operation where the active collaboration of France would be a great advantage ; 
(iv) Noting that the serious economic situation affecting most member countries of the Alliance and the 
ensuing budgetary difficulties have repercussions on the defence potential ; 
(v) Underlining consequently the urgent need to rationalise the defence effort of all the member countries 
in order to avoid waste due to the multiplication of projects for weapons or weapons systems and the wide 
diversity of models produced for one and the same defence task ; 
(vi) Aware that, in view of the geographical situation of Europe, deterrence, if it is to be credible, al~o 
requires conventional forces and that national armed forces should be able to operate jointly to achieve a 
strong defence potential with chances of success ; 
(vii) Considering that a growing awareness is developing among governments, parliaments, public opinion 
and national and international groups and that a flow of ideas is developing which should allow the necessary 
measures to be taken in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ; 
(viii) Aware of national interests in the field of armaments and their importance for security of employment, 
but convinced that they do not preclude either bilateral or multilateral co-operation and, on the contrary, 
make it appear far more rational ; 
(ix) Noting the initiatives and suggestions from across the Atlantic seeking to establish new means of 
co-operation between the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the field of armaments; 
(x) Noting also the proposals made by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on 
European union dated 26th June 1975; 
(xi) Aware of the agreement in principle reached by the defence ministers of ten European countries on 
5th November 1975 to establish a European defence procurement secretariat open to aJl European members 
of the Alliance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Recognise that the aims which member countries are committed to pursue in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance on a basis of equal rights and obligations are: 
(a) to strengthen the defence potential of the Alliance as a whole, especially in Europe, so as to 
establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance 
of forces which is essential to the security of free Europe and the progress of East-West relations ; 
(b) to maintain a technical potential in the countries of Western Europe and develop a competitive 
European armaments industry with sufficient means for research and production ; 
(c) to seek a better balance between the means available on both sides of the Atlantic and establish 
reciprocity in respect of the procurement and production of armaments ; 
(d) to promote a European identity and the idea of European union by implementing effective and 
lasting co-operation in the fields of research, development, production and logistics which are 
still a national responsibility and hence require governments to take decisions based on defence 
requirements and the joint interest of the Western European countries; 
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2. Welcome the decision of the North Atlantic Council that, at its spring meeting, a special meeting 
should be held at ministerial level to study Atlantic and European co-operation in the field of armaments, 
and give it its full support ; 
3. (a) Take up on behalf of WEU the declaration on principles of equipment co-operation adopted 
on 27th May 1972 by the Ministers of Defence of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom; 
(b) Organise the development of new weapons allowing a high return to be ensured and economic 
solutions to be found ; 
(c) Establish within the Atlantic Alliance detailed political guidelines covering the following fieldR 
and take a decision on them : 
- harmonisation of military tactical concepts ; 
- definition of military requirements of the Alliance ; 
- alignment of equipment, calibres, fuel, etc., in order to ensure the interoperability of arms and 
equipment and improve logistics in the armed forces of the Alliance ; 
- the standardisation of future armaments and equipment programmes ; 
(d) Pay particular attention to the problem of destanda.rdisation of armaments due to the prolifera-
tion of projects in each country and above all to the creation of new weapons systems accompanied by the 
use of older systems : 
(e) Examine the means of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee; 
4. Urge member governments : 
(a) with regard to research, development and production, to endorse fully the measures necessary 
for carrying out joint undertakings with as many partners as possible ; 
(b) to seek means to avoid the economy of a country being affected by giving up an armaments 
programme in favour of a joint undertaking; to this end, consideration might be given to setting 
up a burden-sharing body ; this should be decided with other appropriate bodies ; 
(c) to draw up a list of programmes for armaments which might be procured jointly both by European 
countries and by the North American allies; WEU should launch this idea and the decision 
should be taken with the Atlantic Alliance ; 
(d) to give active consideration to the practical possibilities in Western Europe of establishing in the 
long term a two-way transatlantic flow of trade in armaments, ensuring that this becomes possible 
only when the countries of Western Europe co-operate in the development and production of 
armaments as real partners carrying the same weight as the United States ; 
(e) to pay particular attention to the export of armaments to non-member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance and endeavour to ensure an early settlement of outstanding questions ; 
5. Report to the Assembly on the results of its study on the possibility of giving WEU additional tasks 
connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe ; 
6. Give absolute priority at political level to problems of co-operation in the field of armaments and 
the standardisation of armaments and not become discouraged in the short or long term by the difficulties 
involved; 
7. Transmit the present recommendation to the North Atlantic Council. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1 The WEU Assembly has always been con-
cerned with the question of improving co-opera-
tion in the field of military equipment and at 
its last session in Bonn reports were adopted 
on specific aspects of this general problem1• An 
overall study not confined to the position of the 
European partners but setting armaments co-
operation in the Atlantic context appeared neces-
sary for two main reasons : first, new armaments 
projects have attained such dimensions in terms 
of both cost and forward planning that the best 
solutions can be found only if all efforts are 
combined ; second, the deterioration of the 
economic, financial and social position in all the 
countries of'the Atlantic Alliance makes it essen-
tial to calculate down to the last penny how much 
money can be allocated for defence in the future. 
There is no need to stress the disturbing fact 
that the governments of most member countries 
of the Atlantic Alliance have had to accept un-
precedented budget deficits in the last thirty 
years in order to meet reduced economic activity 
and unemployment due to anti-inflationary meas-
ures. Moreover, rising prices and salaries have 
swollen expenditure on personnel and services in 
military budgets to the detriment of expenditure 
on research, development and manufacture of 
weapons and military equipment which ofte.n 
nowadays receive only one-third of defence 
budgets. Since this trend may continue and even 
worsen, it is essential to increase the yield of 
sums allocated for military equipment if a valid 
defence capability is to be maintained against 
the members of the Warsaw Pact. 
1.2 The eastern countries are not evading the 
crisis which, although not wholly due to the 
fourfold rise in oil prices in autumn 1973, was 
at least accelerated and heightened by this spiral-
ling of energy costs, and they too have to grapple 
with economic and social difficulties. But the 
system of socialist planning practised in the East 
allows the wave of wage claims to be resisted and 
strong measures can be taken to hold down price 
increases, priority being given to sectors con-
sidered as essential. Thus, armaments are still 
given priority. The Warsaw Pact countries can 
1. Document 671. 
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allocate a far larger part of their budgets to the 
production of military equipment than the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Quantitatively, the East will probably retain an 
advantage over the West, but at great cost in 
economic and social terms and, particularly in 
the Soviet Union, this constitutes a real handi-
cap for the improvement of the standard of living 
of the people. 
1.3 In the West, the wide diversity of arma-
ments reflects the attitude of a pluralist society 
which rejects planning as a be all and end all 
and continues to rely on competition and the 
inter-play of advanced scientific and technical 
development. The risk of wastage and ineffi-
ciency inherent in this philosophy is realised in 
all cases where free competition does not com-
pensate for these shortcomings and where State 
protected sectors are concerned. But the solution 
is not to be found by imitating the Marxist-
Leninist system and the oft-invoked argument that 
NATO would do better to adopt the discipline 
and forced centralism which are features of the 
Warsaw Pact does not hold water. 
D. Research and production 
of miUtary equipment today 
2.1 Since the creation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, i.e. for more than a quarter 
of a century, there have been two contradictory 
trends: on the one hand, the progressive harmon-
isation of joint political and strategic decision-
making in the institutional framework of the 
Alliance and, on the other hand, growing divers-
ification of activities linked with defence support, 
which remains a national prerogative. In the 
fifties, the NATO armed forces had fairly 
homogeneous weapons and equipment systems 
thanks to offshore supplies from the United 
States and other supplies in the framework of 
military assistance to the European allies. This 
fairly favourable situation deteriorated with time 
as the economic and financial vitality of the 
Western European countries picked up. The 
prosperity of the sixties led to the recovery and 
creation of national arms industries which were 
to replace overseas suppliers and equip first and 
foremost the national forces or even ensure co-
production with other nations. This development 
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was probably inevitable, for if the countries of 
Western Europe had renounced advanced teclmo-
logy and the means of production they would 
have been relegated to the status of customers 
or at best subcontractors. 
2.2 From the outset, NATO policy was to leave 
each country responsible for equipping its own 
forces. As a consequence, armaments programmes 
and research and production capabilities were 
set up, at least in the countries with an adequate 
industrial scientific basis. For the Alliance as 
a whole, this had resulted in a progressive destan-
dardisation of equipment, making joint operations 
by forces of different nationalities difficult; 
expensive and not very efficient maintenance and 
supply systems since (particularly in the Central 
Europe sector) each army has to have its own 
logistics and could not depend on those of neigh-
bouring forces ; duplication or even multiplica-
tion of basic research and programmes, leading 
to a waste of human and financial resources ; not 
very rational production (except in the United 
States) because of short production runs and a 
corresponding rise in production costs ; and 
finally the need to encourage exports of military 
equipment in order to overcome the disadvan-
tages of national markets being too small 1• 
2.3 It is difficult to aBBess the consequent 
economic losses ; the Pentagon estimated that the 
amount wasted each year in the Alliance as a 
whole (excluding nuclear forces) was $6-7,000 
million, and a private American expert even 
found a total of $11,000 million per year. The 
latter estimate goes a little too far since it is 
based on the oversimplified idea that all research 
and development expenditure by the European 
allies and a large part of military procurement 
were superfluous and should therefore be includ-
ed under the heading of money wasted. It is true 
that duplication is particularly obvious at the 
planning and research stage, where a European 
industrial estimate gave about $1,900 million as 
compared with the $7,600 million spent each year 
by the Alliance as a whole on research and 
development. The analysis of the American expert 
mentioned above is appended 2• 
2.4 This negative trend raises very serious 
problems for the NATO political and military 
authorities and in the long run is liable to affect 
the balance of forces between NATO and the 
1. See Appendix I. 
2. See Appendix m. 
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Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact's continuously 
increasing armaments are directed towards 
improving weapons systems and other equipment 
rather than increasing troop levels. The introduc-
tion of new military techniques is certainly not 
proceeding without difficulty in the eastern 
armies for it also requires a considerable improve-
ment in the educational level of the troops, 
particularly in the Soviet army. Furthermore, 
the monolithic, slow-moving nature of the Soviet 
system hardly allows for the weaknesses in design 
of the most advanced weapons (e.g. the MiG-25) 
being corrected in time. However this may be, 
in the race for quality the complete standardisa-
tion of equipment and support is a considerable 
asset for the Warsaw Pact forces and allows 
expenditure to be rationalised. On our side, the 
constantly rising cost of research and production 
(out of all proportion with rising costs in the 
civil sector) may bring us to a point where, for 
financial reasons, it will no longer be possible 
to reap the full benefits of our technical supe-
riority and produce the number of weapons and 
equipment required to establish the military 
balance in Europe. 
In. Awareness in the Atlantic Alliance 
3.1 The political will now exists to change this 
state of affairs. The governments of member 
countries and the NATO authorities realise that 
in spite of a real financial effort throughout the 
Alliance the yield in relation to costs is still 
deteriorating and, being unable to increase to any 
great extent the sums allocated to defence, the 
only answer to the dilemma is to rationalise 
armaments programmes. 
3.2 Since these problems affect primarily the 
European allies, the Eurogroup Ministers have 
made new efforts to co-ordinate their countries' 
activities on the basis of the 1972 declaration 
on the principles of co-operation in the field of 
armaments. A special meeting of Eurogroup 
Defence Ministers was held in The Hague on 
5th November 1975 in order to adopt the first 
measures to this end, and in two respects: greater 
intra-European co-operation and initiation of a 
real flow of trade with the United States. The 
undertaking thus assumes a new dimension since 
the United States, free from the restraints of 
Vietnam which had been a burden for almost 
ten years, is reviewing its concepts with regard 
to the production of armaments. It is not by 
chance that for almost a year studies and pro-
JX>Sals have been reaching us from across the 
Atlantic, if only to mention the steps taken by 
the United States Congress to liberalise trade 
in arms, particularly the Culver-Nunn amend-
ment, the abovementioned study by the Amer-
ican expert, Mr. Callaghan, and the recent visit 
by the Secret!lry of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, 
to Europe. It IS planned to hold a special session 
of the Atlantic Council, probably in spring 1976, 
to consider all the problems raised by more 
effective co-operation in every aspect of defence 
support. 
3.3 The Americans have launched the idea of 
a two-way street for armaments. The idea ap-
parently originated in Britain, and was put 
forward by Mr. Mason, British Secretary of State 
for Defence, in Eurogroup. Mr. Schlesinger took 
it up at the last ministerial meeting of the 
Atlantic Council, specifying that to strengthen 
NATO's conventional capability in Europe the 
United States was considering defining, together 
with its allies, the basis of a joint policy for the 
long-term production and procurement of arma-
ments. However, such co-operation should not be 
a pretext for maintaining inefficient and costly 
industries in Europe ; in all cases the criterion 
should be competitiveness between European and 
American programmes and there could thus be no 
question of setting up preferential armaments 
markets on both sides of the Atlantic. What is 
significant in Mr. Schlesinger's and his succes-
sor's approach is the desire to tackle protection-
ism in his own country and bypass the Buy 
American Act where military equipment is con-
cerned. The Secretary of Defence, moreover, has 
the backing of the Senate, whose Armed Services 
Committee unanimously adopted the Culver-
Nunn amendment on 19th May 1975. According 
to this amendment : 
"It is the policy of the United States that 
equipment procured for the use of person-
nel of the armed forces of the United States 
stationed in Europe under the terms of the 
North Atlantic Treaty should be standard-
ised or at least interoperable with equip-
ment of other members of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organisation." 
Consequently, the Secretary of Defence would 
be authorised to refuse procurement of equip-
ment manufactured in the United States if it 
failed to meet the criteria of standardisation 
and interoperability. Although the Culver-Nunn 
amendment will presumably be further modified 
before becoming law after adoption by Congress 
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and although it is Congress which will finally 
determine these two criteria, it must be recognised 
that this is a very far-reaching initiative. The 
European allies are thus required to adopt a posi-
tion and define the elements of a reply jointlv 
in order to establish a true flow trade across the 
Atlantic. 
IV. Aims of armaments co-operation 
4.1 Here priority is given to strengthening the 
defence potential of the Atlantic Alliance as a 
whole, particularly in Europe. In the area of the 
Central Europe Command, it is absolutely essen-
tial for the various national contingents to be 
able to operate together at the level of command, 
communications, operational forces and logistics. 
The report which General de Maiziere prepared 
for submission to the WEU Assembly at its ses-
sion in May 1975 underlined the weaknesses 
existing in this respect in the central region 
and a fortiori as regards joint operations by the 
mobile forces of the Supreme Command in 
Europe. The absence of standardisation and insuf-
ficient interoperability cause a loss of 30 to 
40 % in combat effectiveness. This is at least the 
opinion of the Armed Services Committee of the 
United States Senate, and it may even be con-
sidered that in certain sectors such as tactical 
aviation the loss is still greater. Recent inter-
allied manoeuvres revealed that about half the 
aircraft involved were put out of operation by 
their own side for lack of a system of identifica-
tion. 
4.2 Transatlantic trade in military equipment 
would remain illusory if the European arma-
ments industry proved incapable of being a valid 
partner for American industry. This calls for the 
maintenance and development of scientific and 
technical potential in the Western European 
countries and firms which are competitive and 
have the whole spectrum of research and produc-
tion facilities. This is the most difficult problem 
to solve at national and particularly European 
level. How can an industry be viable if it depends 
on erratic State markets with frequent cancella-
tions at the prototype stage and orders which are 
limited both in time and number of units Y The 
ever-rising cost of armaments programmes re-
quires ever wider outlets extending beyond 
national frontiers but not dependent on the 
hazards of exports to countries of the third 
world. To ensure a profitable industry working 
for defence, national markets must be opened to 
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all the partners of the Alliance, protectionist 
practices must be terminated and the conditions 
of fair competition within the Alliance accepted, 
and the regrouping of firms on a multinational 
basis must be facilitated. 
4.3 A third aim is to seek a new balance 
between capabilities on each side of the Atlantic. 
Thanks to its vast domestic market and the size 
of its industry, the United States has a dominant 
position in the field of armaments. It bears about 
70 % of the cost of the Alliance's conventional 
equipment and theoretically would alone be 
capable of providing all the equipment needed 
by the Alliance. Europe must therefore gather its 
forces and mobilise its potential resources to meet 
the American challenge and start a two-way 
flow of trade such as has always existed in 
advanced sectors of civil industry. 
4.4 Finally, the medium-term aim is to help 
to shape a European identity in security matters 
by implementing real co-operation in the essential 
fields of research, production and all the activ-
ities linked with defence support. The security 
of Europe demands a viable and efficient arma-
ments industry. It would be illusory to believe 
that the concept of European union could be 
brought to fruition without agreement in speci-
fic fields based on the joint military requirements 
of partners which, where their security is con-
cerned, are in the same position in regard to the 
Warsaw Pact. 
V. Means of achieving these aims 
5.1 It must be acknowledged that there can be 
no question of changing the structure of NATO 
by a transfer of sovereignty and that national 
parliaments and governments therefore retain 
responsibility for decisions. There is no point in 
deploring the lack of efficiency of NATO bodies 
(and in this respect the reasoning also applies 
to the EEC authorities) if those who hold poli-
tical power are not prepared to give these bodies 
the means they need to carry out their duties. 
To this end, the Ministers meeting in the Atlantic 
Council and Eurogroup and the permanent repre-
sentatives must make their directives to sub-
ordinate bodies more precise and detailed. So far, 
these directives have only too often been so 
general that it has been difficult if not impossible 
to draft firm recommendations. Care must also 
be taken that such recommendations, once made, 
are not filed away by national administrations or 
overlooked at the various levels of interallied 
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military commands. Such habits in themselves 
lead to an enormous waste of energy and are 
a source of discouragement to those responsible 
for conducting this work, with the result that in 
almost twenty-five years of existence NATO has 
had only partial and scattered success in ration-
alising defence efforts. Here parliamentarians 
have an important role to play and first and 
foremost those of the WEU Assembly which is, it 
must be recalled, the only representative elected 
body in the Alliance with responsibility for 
defence matters. 
5.2 Rationalisation of decision-making processes 
and the application of recommendations is a prior 
condition for the implementation of rationalisa-
tion measures in all fields relating to defence 
support. 
5.3 The keystone of this effort is standardisa-
tion, i.e. all measures intended to ensure (a) the 
definition of military requirements on the basis 
of the Alliance's tasks ; (b) the harmonisation 
of tactical concepts, for the choice of equipment 
depends essentially on doctrines - which are 
still very varied - on the best use of forces 
on the battlefield; (c) the possibility of joint 
operations, which means that weapons systems 
and supplies must be, if not joint, at least com-
patible ; (d) the adoption of joint procedure ~nd 
criteria for determining specifications governmg 
the procurement of equipment. 
5.4 There are various forms of standardisation, 
the most difficult being from the top. This implies 
introducing a complete weapons system in the 
maximum number of member countries of the 
Alliance and therefore long-term programming 
' . which means the countries concerned co-operatmg 
as from the planning and research stage with 
a view to joint procurement. 
5.5 Standardisation from the bottom means 
unifying equipment components (ranging from 
apparently minor questions such as coding and 
radio frequencies and plugs for recharging batte-
ries to gun-calibres, munitions and fuel used by 
interallied forces). Many of these measures can 
be taken fairly quickly by adjustments at the 
production stage. In cases where such standard-
isation is not possible or necessary, weapons and 
support systems must hP. made intervperable and 
at least compatible. 
5.6 In practice, this standardisation is not felt 
to be an essential req11irement at the level of 
national commands. Th~ Yinister of Defence of 
the Federal Republic, Mr. Leber, has frequently 
said _he would do without the best weapons sys-
t~m m _f~vour of a jointly-produced system, a'nd 
his British counterpart, Mr. Mason, has just 
demonstrated that he is prepared to act in like 
manner, but it is difficult to make those who 
ar~ respon~ible for using the equipment accept 
th_I~ reasonmg. There is no lack of examples of 
military perfectionism leading in fact to the 
de~tandardisation of joint systems, instances 
bemg the German version of the F-104 Star-
fighter and the American wish to improve the 
Franco-German anti-aircraft missile Roland. But 
ev.e~ more pronounced than the tendency of 
military staff and technicians to adapt equipment 
to their specific needs is the tendency of head-
quarters staff to assign to joint systems missions 
which in themselves may be justified but which 
do not always correspond to the missions of other 
national forces in the same theatre of operations 
(this applies to Starfighter, as mentioned above 
the Franco-British Jaguar, the Franco-Germa~ 
Alpha-Jet, the Panavia 200, etc.). It is therefore 
essential for senior NATO military bodies in this 
case the Military Committee and its inter~ational 
headquarters staff, to have efficient means of 
assessing the missions on which major (future) 
programmes of standardisation from the top are 
based 1 • It should be added that over-frequent 
changes in strategic goals are detrimental to the 
efficiency of combat forces and a serious handi-
cap for manufacturers. Programmes abandoned 
~t the prototype stage have, in the past, resulted 
m losses of thousands of millions of dollars. 
5. 7 Standardisation from the top involves mili-
tary, technical and political stringencies since the 
prog:ammes in 9-uestion are generally very wide-
rangmg, stretchmg over ten to fifteen years, and 
very often whole sectors of armaments in the 
countries concerned depend on them. Without 
reverting to the deal of the century which caused 
so much agitation last spring, it must be said 
that we can no longer proceed in this manner if 
pro~ress is to be made in armaments co-operation. 
It IS no longer sufficient in the medium and 
long term to sell a weapons system - in this 
case a fighter aircraft - to allied countries ?Y giving them a share of the production. At 
mdustri3;l level, such American offers may be 
worthwhile, but practices of this kind would 
in. th~ ~ong run. detract from Western Europe's 
scientifiC pot~ntial resulting in a one-way street 
from the Umted States to Europe, which also 
runs counter to the intentions of the United 
States Administration. Although in the past 
1. See Appendix II. 
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large industrialised nations have been able 
to develop armaments in parallel, the enorm-
ous cost of modern systems, budgetary constraints 
and, hypot~etically, agreements on limiting forces 
and arms m Central Europe (Vienna talks on 
MBFR) will limit the number and scale of anv 
major projects which may still be implemented. 
5.8 It is therefore essential for co-operation 
to begin at the planning stage so that on the b~~is ?f NATO-defined requirements ~nd spe-
cifiCatiOns, research centres in the various coun-
tries may work out solutions and, at the proto-
type stage, firms - ideally in a European frame-
work - will co-operate (which means solutions 
being found for patents, exchange of know-how, 
etc.). These prototypes wouJd then be placed in 
competition to determine which best met militarv 
requirements. Such a procedure has alread~ 
been applied recently : tests were held in England 
to choose the gun to equip the Alliance's future 
main battle tank, and soundings are now being 
made i~ the -q-nited States, the Federal Republic, 
the Umted Kmgdom and France to find the best 
formula for the main battle tank of the eighties 
(FMBT). Similarly, there must be immediate con-
c~rtation. between governments and industry on a 
fighter aircraft to replace the American F-14 and 
~-15 and the Panavia 200 (MRCA) in the nine-
ties. 
5.9 In this connection, there are two specific 
problems: (i) the need to compensate firms or 
industrial consortia whose model is not adopted : 
and (ii) sharing out production. In the first 
case, c?nsideration will probably have to be given 
to settmg up procedure for compensation in the 
form of a fund for equalising the expenditure of 
the industries concerned or intergovernmental 
settlement of export-import balances. In the second 
ease, experience has shown that co-production in 
its various forms (on an equal footing, by sub-con-
tracting, etc.) is in itself expensive and fairly 
complicated, particularly in the absence of a 
prime contractor, and the more so as the number 
of participants grows. The only justification for 
co-production is the hope of widening the market 
and being able to launch long production runs 
which, by lowering unit costs, will eventually 
offset initial losses. In the aircraft industrv it 
is particularly difficult to achieve long pro.duc-
tion runs in the framework of Europe alone, 
and unfortunately there are hardly any examples 
of co-production being profitable. Where second-
generation tactical missiles are concerned t, the 
1. See the report by Mr. Wall, Document 671. 
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~xperience to date has been far more encourag-
mg : the Franco-German Euromissile consortium 
- with which the United Kingdom is to be 
am~ociated - proves the success of an undertak-
ing which starts co-operation between firms at 
the planning and research stage. Other national 
industries are taking part in this effort, including 
those of the United Kingdom, Italy and the 
Netherlands, and it is transpiring that a pro-
gramme has the best chances of success if pursued 
in a multinational framework from the very be-
ginning of the technical stage. The NATO Indus-
trial Advisory Group (NIAG), in which all the 
main European and American manufacturers are 
taking ~art, is endeavouring to lay down lasting 
foundations for such ad hoc co-operation, i.e. 
centred on specific research and production pro-
grammes. It does not seem possible to regroup 
firms working in the same armaments sector 
by purely and simply merging them because of 
the major structural differences, particularly in 
Western Europe, as regards their status (private 
or nationalised firms), output and the proportion 
of turnover devoted to armaments proper. The 
proportion is about 62 % in the aeronautical 
industry but is much lower in other sectors 1 • The 
system of setting up consortia on an ad hoc basis 
therefore see~s more practicable, but changes 
are necessary If the consortia are to work more 
efficiently. The project groups must be able to 
deal with joint bodies at European or Atlantic 
level and no longer with national administrations. 
5.10 The question of the framework for co-
operation thus arises. In his speech to the WEU 
Assembly on 5th December 1974, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Van Elslande, 
underlined this aspect which is certainly the 
most difficult of rull, for it has very important 
political implications. France, one of the biggest 
producers in Europe and the world, is not a 
member of Eurogroup and is represented only 
by observers. On the other hand France plays 
a full part in the work of the NATO Conference 
of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and 
it is well known that France plays an 
important part in the co-production of arma-
~ent~. A. priori, the problem of French parti-
cipatiOn m the common effort does not arise at 
the level of the equipment used by many land 
and air forces in Europe, and insofar as the 
F:ench Government has concluded agreements 
With SACEUR on the possible use of its conven-
1. See Appendices V and VI. 
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~ional forces, standardisation or even compatibil-
Ity between French units and allied forces in 
Centra;! Europe becomes a necessity. But indus-
trial and operational requirements have not vet 
moved through to the institutional level. · 
5.11 However, there is no concealing the fact 
that as long as France does not play a full part 
in Eurogroup, the essential intergovernmental 
discussion will reinain fragmentary. Here the 
instruments of WEU and, at technical level 
its Standing Armaments Committee, can as ~ 
the past play a useful and necessarv role as 
go-between, but such efforts cannot ·solve the 
problem of the cohesion of the European mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance in face of its North 
American partners. Priority should therefore be 
given to strengthening Eurogroup's dual task of 
co-ordinator in the European framework and 
valid partner on the two-way street between 
Europe and North America. In the field of arma-
ments, Eurogroup, despite partial and biased 
criticism, has played a pioneering role, proof of 
which, if proof were needed, is that NATO 
adopted the principles on co-operation drawn up 
by the Eurogroup Ministers in 1972. But at 
operational level it is clear that present methods 
are not giving full satisfaction. Some three hun-
dred committees, commissions, sub-groups, etc., 
deal with ~tters relating to defence support, 
and the Assistant Secretary-General of NATO 
responsible for these matters alone has co-ordin-
ated more than 150 of these groups. Rationalisa-
tion is therefore urgently required and various 
projects have already been put forward for re-
organising these activities ; the creation of arms 
procurement agencies has been proposed or is 
being discussed at the level of NATO, Euro-
group (EDPO) and the EEC. At their meeting 
in The Hague on 5th November 1975 the Defence 
Ministers of the Eurogroup countries decided to 
create a "European Arms Procurement Secre-
tariat". This new body, which does not come 
under Eurogroup, is open to all European mem-
bers of the Alliance, and it is desirable that 
France should take part. One thing must be 
said : such bodies would be meaningful only if 
they put an end to present duplication, confusion 
and overlapping, and conversely they would be 
of no use if they merely became offshoots of 
existing bodies. 
5.12 Without going into the political precondi-
tions raised by the EEC Commission's proposal 
on the creation of a supranational military aero-
nautical agency and while admitting the need 
for the nine members of the EEC to take con-
certed action in this essential field, such a pro-
posal does not seem compatible with the Rome 
Treaties which exclude military matters from 
the terms of reference of the Community. A 
realistic solution might on the other hand be to 
create: (a) a steering body of the European 
members of the Alliance responsible for imple-
menting and following armaments programmes 
in the member countries; (b) a similar North 
American body within NATO; (c) a joint body, 
under the most senior NATO military and poli-
tical authorities to co-ordinate the activities of 
these two regional bodies. 
VI. The Atlantic dimension 
6.1 In a fallacious analogy, American experts, 
including Mr. Callaghan, propose solutions which 
may be summed up as an armaments common 
market on an Atlantic scale. The expression 
common market may at a pinch be applied to the 
liberalisation of trade between members and thus 
to lowering and removing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and, taken in this sense, may be valid 
for trade in military equipment too. Conversely, 
the organisation of EEC agricultural markets is 
an example which it would be better not to 
follow. Consideration should also be given to the 
following proposal in Mr. Callaghan's study: 
" ... the United States would offer to match 
every defence dollar Europe spent in the 
United States with a dollar spent in 
Europe; and offer to match the cost of 
every system developed in Europe for 
NATO use by an American defence 
development, also for joint use." 
6.2 The table at appendix1 shows clearly that 
the balance of American-European trade in 
military equipment has always been tipped 
sharply against the European countries. At best 
the present ratio is 1 : 15 in favour of the United 
States, and it would be wishful thinking to 
believe that even by combining all our efforts we 
should be able to achieve a ratio of 1:1 in the 
foreseeable future. All that can be done there-
fore is to correct transatlantic trade by medium-
and long-term planning. Moreover, there is 
absolutely no reason to take account of the prob-
lem of offsetting the cost in foreign currency 
of stationing American troops in Europe. So far, 
this thorny problem has always had to be settled 
I. Appendix VII. 
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on a bilateral basis (Federal Republic/United 
States) failing a multilateral solution acceptable 
to the other European allies. Furthermore, the 
trend of trade - not to speak of the trend in 
the balance of payments - has been very favour-
able to the United States for the last two years. 
Last year, EEC exports to the United States 
amounted to about $19,000 million, but EEC 
imports from the United States reached $23,000 
million. The NATO authorities concluded (in 
connection with the Jackson-Nunn amendment 
on the level of American forces in Europe) that 
there was no longer any point in offsetting costs 
in foreign currency. 
6.3 The starting point is the Culver-Nunn 
amendment which, without wishing to prejudge 
the volume of transatlantic trade in armaments, 
clearly establishes that Europeans may sell to 
the United States only if they reach prior agree-
ment on the procurement or co-production of a 
given system. 
6.4 To this end, the governments of the Euro-
group member countries have submitted, or are 
about to submit, to Eurogroup lists of arms and 
equipment which might be jointly procured and 
also offered therefore to the United States 
Government. As stated above, in order to guar-
antee the smooth operation of the two-way street, 
the NATO bodies must be able to play an active 
role at the stage of assessment and choice of 
equipment. To this end, the importance of 
Recommendation 269, adopted by the WEU 
Assembly on 28th May 1975, should be under-
lined and particularly paragraph 5, recommend-
ing that 1 % of national research and develop-
ment budgets be made available for NATO 
development projects to be decided by the Mili-
tary Committee and Defence Support Division 
(through bodies such as AGARD, the SHAPE 
Technical Centre, the anti-submarine warfare 
research centre, etc.). 
6.5 As for practical means of planning the 
flow of trade, package deals should be considered 
on the lines of the memorandum of understand-
ing drawn up last September between the British 
Secretary of State for Defence and the United 
States Secretary of Defence. This agreement 
stipulated that the United Kingdom would 
renounce the production of two weapons systems 
then being developed in favour of two standardis-
able systems, i.e. the American sea-to-sea missile 
Harpoon and the Franco-German anti-tank mis-
sile Milan. In compensation, the British author-
ities hope that allied countries will in turn adopt 
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a British weapons system (the helicopter-borne 
air-to-sea missile Sea Skua). On the basic issue, 
the British example thus shows the course to be 
followed, and the British Secretary of State for 
Defence, Mr. Mason, is to be congratulated on 
this courageous decision which involves sacrifices 
for his country in terms of employment and the 
balance of payments. As for the framework, it 
would have been desirable for such a package 
deal to be worked out in a multilateral frame-
work rather than bilaterally. 
6.6 Since the priority aim is to establish a 
new balance in transatlantic trade in armaments, 
a number of principles must be clearly set out: 
work-sharing must not lead to specialisation to 
the extent that Western Europe henceforth 
supplies low technology items (lorries, support 
equipment) in exchange for the procurement 
of high technology items (including precision-
guided munitions (PGM)). To give a specific 
example : the European programme for develop-
ing a supersonic long-range sea-to-sea missile is 
not being chosen by the American partners, who 
argue that such a weapons system should have 
a speed of Mach 3 and not Mach 2 ! It is evident 
that raising the technological bids in this way 
will not facilitate movement along the two-way 
street. Moreover, there must be strict reciprocity 
between North America and Western Europe in 
this field. If the procurement of European 
systems by the United States is based on the 
criterion of standardisation, it goes without say-
ing that the European countries can consider 
only the American equipment which is likewise 
standardised, i.e. which is procured or produced 
jointly on this side of the Atlantic. This rule 
of the game implies that bilateral intergovern-
mental negotiations must make way for consulta-
tions and agreements between all the countries 
concerned. 
VD. Arms sales abroad 
7.1 As already indicated, the narrowing of 
markets for major equipment and weapons will 
increase the tendency to prospect and sell abroad, 
i.e. in non-member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance1 • Moreover, it must be stressed that this 
is not just a question of sales as such but complex 
undertakings involving the commitment to train 
crews, set up very costly after-sales services in 
the purchasing country, supply spare parts, ete. 
1. Appendix VIII. 
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In view of the very different laws and regula-
tions governing arms exports by member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance, one cannot exclude 
the risk of developments which, within the Euro-
pean countries, might completely thwart the free 
play of competition and penalise the industries 
of countries which impose severe restrictions in 
their policy of sales abroad. 
7.2 The consequences are obvious : equal oppor-
tunities for national industries will no longer be 
guaranteed. Apart from economic considerations, 
mention must also be made of political factors : 
arms sales outside the North Atlantic Treaty area 
have direct and sometimes significant repercus-
sions on the foreign policies of the selling coun-
tries, and unconcerted action might therefore 
affect the possibilities of harmonisation among 
the nine EEC governments. A third aspect must 
not be left unmentioned. The more or less hap-
hazard dissemination of the most highly-perfected 
and sophisticated weapons systems throughout 
the world involves a risk of unauthorised techno-
logical transfers to third countries, which is a 
source of serious concern for the military security 
of the Alliance as a whole. 
7.3 It is therefore both necessary and urgent 
to concert intra-European and transatlantic 
approaches to the sales and export of war equip-
ment. The EEC authorities cannot fulfil this role 
for, although it is a question of trade, the Com-
munity has no responsibility for matters relating 
to defence. But in view of the very important 
implications of this problem for the foreign poli-
cies of the member countries of the Community, 
it would be desirable to discuss it during the 
regular consultations on political co-operation 
held by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
Nine and their representatives with a view to 
progressively harmonising their views. Such 
action is particularly necessary in that in the 
case of co-production programmes likely to be 
made available outside the NATO area, the lack 
of agreement between participating governments 
and industries may jeopardise the continuation 
of such joint projects. 
VW. Minority opinion 
(presented by Mr. Riviere) 
8.1 This report was modified after the meeting 
on lOth November. However, although the modi-
fications take account of the views expressed by 
the members of the French Delegation present. 
they make the report even more ambiguous 
because it argues cases which are often incompat-
ible or even contradictory. 
8.2 Moreover, contrary to practice, the Rappor-
teur makes no reference to views which differ 
from his own. He draws no distinction between 
the Committee's views and his own personal views 
and consequently attributes to the Committee 
views which are his alone. 
8.3 For these two reasons, I have asked the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
to add the following comments to the explanatory 
memorandum submitted by Mr. Lemmrich: 
(i) The idea of a balance between the conven-
tional forces of the Atlantic Alliance and those 
of the Warsaw Pact is mentioned in paragraph 
2.4. However, the concept of the defence of 
Europe being based on deterrence and not on a 
balance of forces is still essential. This in no wav 
signifies that Europe must dispense with coti'-
ventional weapons but only that such armaments 
must be adequate to thwart and consequently 
deter partial and limited attacks, not to allow 
a conventional war to be waged against the 
Warsaw Pact forces as a whole, as is suggested 
by idea of balance. It must not be forgotten that 
a war conducted on a conventional basis or in 
which tactical nuclear weapons are used may 
seem satisfactory to our American allies but it 
implies almost total destruction for Europe. 
The aim of nuclear deterrence is to make 
war unacceptable. The search for a balance of 
conventional forces on the other hand makes it 
conceivable. 
(ii) Paragraph 5.11 is hard to understand ; it 
is stated that France does not play a "full" part 
in Eurogroup. It plays no part at all, even if 
it is co-operating on an ad hoc basis in certain 
technical sub-groups. It may be said that France 
·'does not play a full part in NATO since its 
Minister attends meetings of the North Atlantic 
Council, but this is not so for Eurogroup. 
Moreover, the Rapporteur underlines that 
WEU cannot "solve the problem of the cohesion 
of the European members ·of the Atlantic 
Alliance", without giving any indication why. 
Perhaps it is because some governments do not 
wish Europe's defence to be considered in this 
framework. But in that case the same might be 
said of Eurogroup, which is in the same position. 
(iii) Paragraph 6.3 of the report informs us 
that with regard to the trade in armaments in 
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the Alliance "the starting point is the Culver-
Nunn amendment". Yet paragraph 3.3 does not 
conceal the fact that this amendment has been 
adopted only by the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and consequently in no way commits the 
United States Government. It is even added that 
this "amendment will presumably be further 
modified". 
The search for a policy for the procurement 
of armaments by the various partners in the 
Alliance is therefore based on a text of no juri-
dical value. 
(iv) If the present wording of this amendment 
is studied, it can be seen that it concerns only 
United States armed forces stationed in Europe 
in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty. 
In other words, it in no way commits the Amer-
icans for forces stationed outside Europe, i.e. 
about four-fifths of their forces. But it seems 
hard to imagine the United States procuring 
really large quantities of weapons from the Euro-
peans to equip their forces stationed in Europe 
if they do not equip their forces stationed out-
side Europe with the same weapons. There is 
every reason to think that American military 
leaders will always select weapons in the light 
of overall requirements and not the specific 
requirements of a given theatre of operations, 
and the policy of procurement in Europe will 
thus have only very limited effects. 
Moreover, in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2, Mr. 
Lemmrich shows that he does not believe in a 
balance between weapons procured by Europeans 
in America and those procured by Americans in 
Europe. But this does not stop him recalling in 
paragraph 5.11 that the creation of a European 
arms procurement secretariat would be meaning-
ful only if it "put an end to present duplica-
tion, confusion and overlapping". This means that 
what already exists in Europe in the way of 
co-operation in the joint production of arma-
ments must be terminated and made subject to 
a policy of procuring armaments in America, 
without the least guarantee that the Americans 
will offset such procurement in purely economic 
terms. 
(v) But the main danger is set out in para-
graphs 5.7, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 3.3 of the report. 
The Rapporteur has endeavoured to take a 
strictly technical and economic stand and show 
that it would be worthwhile for Europe to give 
up producing most of its armaments and pro-
cure them in America instead. As indicated in 
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paragraphs 4.2, 4.3 and 6.6, the result would 
inevitably be an even greater technological gap 
between Europe and the United States and in 
the long run Europe might be no longer able 
to continue producing some of its equipment. 
Such a trend would in the future make Europe 
wholly dependent on the United States since it 
would no longer be capable of producing of its 
own accord the weapons necessary for its defence. 
If, therefore, at some future date the United 
States were to withdraw its forces from Europe, 
Europe would be left without the necessary means 
of ensuring its own defence. 
(vi) Paragraphs 6.3 to 6.6 have not been modi-
fied although they were the centre of French 
objections. 
(a) Paragraph 6.4 seeks to have all arma-
ments research, studies and develop-
ment conducted in NATO, i.e. in a 
non-European framework dominated 
by America. This means giving up the 
development of European military 
technology. 
(b) The memorandum of understanding 
between the United Kingdom and the 
United States is presented as a model 
for planning trade between Europe 
and the United States. It indeed con-
tains the elements of co-operation as 
envisaged by the Rapporteur: "the 
United Kingdom would renounce ... " 
and "in compensation the British 
authorities hope ... ". If the two-way 
flow of trade is to be based on an 
exchange of renunciations and hopes, 
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it would be wiser to give up straight 
away. 
(c) In fact, it is a bilateral agreement 
which is presented as a "model" for 
an undertaking which is claimed to be 
European. 
(vii) Such a report is probably not the right 
place to discuss the EEC common agricultural 
policy. But in that case it should not be condem-
ned in paragraph 6.1. 
(viii) Thus, behind Mr. Lemmrich's explanatory 
memorandum, there emerges a political view 
whose end result would be the total and per-
manent subjection of Europe to the United States, 
which would run counter to the dominating aim 
of European union as set out, for instance, in 
the June 1975 report of the Commission of the 
European Communities. 
When Mr. Lemmrich states in paragraph 
5.12 that "the Rome Treaties ... exclude military 
matters from the terms of reference of the Com-
munity", he is saying exactly the opposite of the 
Commission's report, which includes defence 
among the potential responsibilities conferred on 
the Community by the Rome Treaty. He urges 
that the European body proposed by the Com-
mission in Brussels for the military aeronautical 
industry be replaced by an Atlantic body. Despite 
the concessions made to French positions, Mr. 
Lemmrich's report therefore remains fundament-
ally anti-European. It appears inconceivable for 
the WEU Assembly to receive from its Defence 
Committee an explanatory memorandum whose 
only aim, in the name of security, is to make the 
future of Europe fully and permanently depend-
ent on the United States. 
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APPENDIX I 
Report by Senator John Culver to the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, 
June 1975 
In the Central Europe area, NATO forces have: 
23 different types of fighter aircraft 
7 » » » main battle tanks (MBT) 
8 » » >> light tanks 
23 >> » » anti-tank missiles. 
NATO naval forces have : 
100 different types of surface ships (destroyer-size and above) equipped with: 
36 different types of targeting radar 
8 >> >> » sea-to-air missiles 
6 » » >> sea-to-sea missiles 
21 >> >> » guns of 30 mm and above. 
Cf. also Appendix II to WEU Assembly Document 671 (report by Mr. Patrick Wall), which lists 
the following conventional tactical missiles in service or being developed : 
Naval Army (sea-to-sea (surface· Anti.tank Air· to· Air·to·air Total 
or to-air) surface 
sea· to-air) 
Western Europe 17 9 15 15 9 65 
United States 9 8 9 5 9 40 
Soviet Union 10 5 3 2 5 25 
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8- Ill 
Systems Belgium 
Figlder aircraft 
MRCA 
Jaguar 
Mirage F-1 
Mirage 5 X 
F-104 G JS /CF-104 X 
F-4 (Phantom) 
F-5 
F-16 X 
Battle tanks 
Leopard X 
AMX 30 
Missile8 
Lance S-S X 
Nike-Hercules S-A 
Hawk S-A X 
TOW anti-tank 
HOT anti-tank 
Milan anti-tank 
Roland I, II /S-A 
Exocet M-M 
Canon M-109 155 mm X 
APPENDIX II 
Main weapons systems in the Alliance: 
procurement, co-production, subcontracting 
Fed. Rep. Nether-Denmark France of Italy Norway lands Germany 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X X X X X 
X 
X X 
X X X 
X X X X X 
X 
X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X 
X X 
X X X 
X X 
X X 
Source: The military balance 1975-76, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
United United 
Kingdom States Greece Turkey 
X 
X 
X 
X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
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APPENDIX III 
Estimated wastage on research and development and procurement expenditure 
The table below summarises the estimates 
of annual allied waste in billions of dollars : 
General purpose United Europe Estimated force expenditures States waste 
Annual research 
and development $ 5 $ 2.6 $ 2.61 
Annual 
procurement $ 12 $ 7.0 $ 2.952 
Annual support, Un- Un- Un-
Europe known known known8 
Total $ 17+ $9.6+ $ 11.24 
Notes: 
1. Estimated at 100 % of the European 
research and development expenditure. 
2. Estimated at 10 % of the American pro-
curement expenditure ($1.2 billion) plus 25 % 
of European procurement ($1.75 billion). 
3. Estimated at 10 % of the $4 billion 
direct American annual NATO cost ($400 mil-
lion) plus 15% of the $35 billion European 
general purpose force expenditures per year 
($5.25 billion). 
4. Rounded down to "more than $10 bil-
lion" throughout this report. 
(i.e. all armed forces except strategic nuclear 
forces.) 
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Source: Report on United States-European economic 
co-operation in military and civil technology prepared by 
Thomas A. Callaghan Jr. for the Department of State in 
August 1974. Second edition, Ja.nua.ryJ1975, Ex-Im Tech. 
Inc., Arlington, page 35. 
At current budget lev~ls, the United States 
will spend $50 billion on conventional arms 
development in the next decade. Europe will 
spend $26 billion. 
Source: Op. cit., page 27. 
Adding Canada's research and development 
and procurement to the table of United States-
European waste shows that the potential North 
Atlantic general purpose common defence market 
would total at least $37 billion per year : 
$ billion 
North American research and 
development and procurement 17.3 
European research and develop-
ment and procurement 9.6 
United States-Europeam. waste 10.0 
Total $ 36.9 
Assuming all allied waste were converted 
into either development or procurement, this 
would be a market 40 % larger than the present 
market. But the waste ean only be converted by 
trade. In turn, this requires that the entire North 
Atlantic defenee market be aggregated. '!'his 
because the largest volume of waste (European) 
is in the smallest part of the market (residual 
European). 
Source : Op. cit., page 63. 
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APPENDIX IV 
St<mdardisation of armaments programmes in the Alliance 
The major programmes now at the nego-
tiation and/or technical testing stage include the 
following: 
1. Surface-to-air missile (man-portable and 
-operated) Stinger (United States) to replace the 
Redeye-Stinger (infrared homing) now in service 
in four NATO countries; estimated cost of 
development : $660 million. 
2. Surface-to-air missile (medium-range) 
Improved Hawk (United States). Eight NATO 
countries have Hawk missiles. France, the Fed-
eral Republic, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United States have set up a consortium for the 
joint production of Improved Hawk. Two rival 
systems have been abandoned. 
3. Surface-to-air missile (long-range) Sam D 
(United States) to replace Nike-Hercules. In 
service in nine NATO countries. Co-operation 
between the United States and the Federal Repu-
blic, which together have 75% of all Nike-
H ercules missiles. 
4. A W AOS (airborne warning and command 
systems) Boeing 707 aircraft (United States). 
Consultations are being held in the Atlantic 
Council on an A WAC system for Europe ; a 
decision is expected by the end of 1975. 
5. Air-to-air missile AIM-9L (United States) 
to replace the Sidewinder missile. British and 
German projects have been cancelled to allow 
co-production of AIM-9L by a consortium with 
the participation of the Federal Republic, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the four 
countries which have adopted the F-16 fighter 
aircraft (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Nor-
way). 
6. Standardised munitions for 155 mm howit-
zers. Programme based on the American M-549 
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shell. Participants : Federal Republic, Italy, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
7. Main battle tank gun. Firing tests have 
been conducted in the United Kingdom since 
February 1975 to select a standardised gun for 
the future generation of heavy tanks. (In com-
petition : American 105 mm ; British 110 mm ; 
German 120 mm.) 
8. American/German tests (with British obser-
vers) to choose the future main battle tank 
FMBT XM-1 or M-80, to come into service in 
the eighties. 
9. ASH helicopter (advanced Scout helicopter) 
for the army. Multinational project (Federal 
Republic, United Kingdom, United States, etc.). 
10. Fighter aircraft A V SA (vertical or short 
take-off and landing) (V/STOL). Programme for 
modernising the British Harrier, in service in the 
American and British navies. 
11. PHM (patrol hydrofoil missile boat). 
Jointly-financed programme: Federal Republic, 
Italy and United States, for developing the 
Boeing model. 
Source: Intemationak Wekrrewe, Interavia SA, Geneva, 
April 1975, page 156. 
Intra-European programmes 
Frigate. NATO: Federal Republic-Nether-
lands specification. All the countries of the 
Alliance will take part in the standardisation of 
the frigate sub-systems except Iceland, Luxem-
bourg and Portugal. 
Minesweeper (non-metallic hull). Belgium 
France, Netherlands, United Kingdom specifica-
tion (possibly other countries). 
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APPENDIX V 
Defence-related industries 
United Kingdom France Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Industry 
Defence % of total Defence %of total Defence % of total 
output output output output output output 
Airframes and missiles 
aero-engine 815 52.9 540 46 275 70-80 
Shipbuilding 398 34.3 18 4 72 5-10 
Motor vehicles 104 2.1 72 1.2 140 5-10 
Ammunition, etc. 246 2.9 162 47 322 1 
Ordnance 
Electronics 600 9.1 396 45 317 5-10 
Source: The Alliance and Europe: Part III: Weapons procurement in Europe - capabilities and choices, Roger 
Facer, Adelphi Papers, No. 108, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1975. 
Aerospace industries: share of military equipment 
Turnover of military sector in relation to 
total turnover (average for 1968-69) 
Country 
Total of military Domestic market Exports 
sectors % % % 
Belgium 34 1 ~ 
France 46 27 73 
Federal Republic of Germany 97 - 97 
Italy 1 1 68 
Netherlands 21 1 ~ 
United Kingdom 41 13 54 
United States 75 4 79 
Sowrce : EEC Commission. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Government support in the aeronautical sector 
(i) Breakdown of government support by type of contract 
(% of total contract) 
EEC United States 
Purchase and maintenance contracts 
Civil 2.6 -
Military 57.3 72.8 
ReBearch and development contracts 
Civil 10.9 -
Military 29.2 27.2 
Total 100.0 100.00 
(ii) Estimated public financing of research and development in the EEC 1 
($ million (1973) for 1972 and 1973) 
Aeronautical indUBtry 
Civil 620 
Military 1,675 
1. For the six countries with an aeronautical industry. 
Source : EEC Commission : Action programme for the European aeronautical sector, 1st October 1975. 
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APPENDIX VII 
Sales of military equipment 
(i) United States sales of military equipment to Western Europe 
$ million - United States fiscal year 
% of total 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 military procurement 
(1972) 
Belgium 9.3 6.4 0.6 7.9 6.2 7.4 5 
France 15.7 12.6 25.1 12.4 15.8 3.7 1.5 
Federal Republic of Germany 309.1 156.3 207.5 226.2 333.3 430.8 27 
Italy 29.3 50.1 50.4 50.4 50.2 41.6 6 
Netherlands 5.7 18.2 12.6 6.4 10.2 7.5 2 
United Kingdom 156.9 270.5 369.5 221.5 II8.6 79.9 3 
Totals in Western Europel 575.3 561.6 750.2 639.4 610.5 650.1 6 
% of total United States sales 
throughout world 62.7 55.1 57.1 44.5 41.9 43.5 
I. All Western European countries except Greece and Turkey. 
Source: United States Department of Defence, Security Assistance Agency, May 1973. 
(ii) European sales of military equipment in North America 
The only producer country able to export a significant quantity of equipment to North America 
(directly or manufacturing under licence) was the United Kingdom: 
United Kingdom sales for the period 1972-74 (US $ million) 
to Canada 28.0 (Blowpipe tactical missile) 
to the United States lll.8 (Harrier V/STOL aircraft) 
Total in North America 139.8 
S()f.l,fU: SIPRI Yearbook 1975. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Trade in armaments 
(i) Third world imports of war equipment 
(i.e. all countries except North America, Europe and the Soviet Union) 
US $ million at constant prices (1973) 
1950 1960 1970 1973 1974 
294 1,159 2,247 2,773 3,911 
(ii) Exports of war equipment to countries of the third world 1 
US $ million at constant prices (1973) 
Country 1950 1960 1970 1972 1973 1974 
Canada 14 11 28 30 3 0.5 
China 23 125 6 101 21 80 
Czechoslovakia - 45 24 10 1 11 
France 3 35 156 269 411 343 
Federal Republic of Germany - 23 1 28 2 88 
Italy 7 7 33 39 43 106 
Netherlands 35 1 7 20 30 25 
Soviet Unions 25 138 786 570 1,175 1,467 
United States1 91 530 724 360 749 940 
United Kingdom 96 196 142 283 242 481 
1. Military supplies to South and North Vietnam are not included in this table. 
2. During the period 1961-71, just over one-third of the total exports of the United States and the Soviet Union were 
to the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. 
Sour~: World armaments and disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1975, Stockholm. 
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Amendment No. 1 
4th December 1975 
European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: "establish, in the face of the contin-
uously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance of forces which is" and insert: "maintain 
the forces which are". 
Signed : Rivi~re 
I. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1975 (Amendment negatived). 
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Air forces on the central front 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 11 
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur 
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1st December 1975 
1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Substitute: 
Miller) (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch (Substitute : BUc:hner), 
Dankert (Substitute : de Niet) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Averardi, Beauguitte, Bizet, Boulloche, Buck (Substitute: 
Spautz), de Koster, Laforgia, Lemmrich, Mt!nard, Pawelczyk 
(Substitute: Ahrens), Pendry (Substitute: Sir John 
Rodgers), Prescott (Substitute: Lord Peddie), Pumilia, 
Reale (Substitute: Magliano), Richter, Riviere, Roper 
(Substitute : Lord Duncan-Sandys), Schugena, Tanghe, 
V edovato, Cornelissen. 
Sir Harwood Harrison), Haase (Substitute: Vohrer), 
Kempinaire (Substitute : Breyne), Konen (Substitute : 
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Introductory note 
In preparing this report your Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
18th March 1971) 
London: Mr. Brynmor John M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force 
and Senior Staff. 
13th November 1971) 
MiJnchen-Gladbach: Air Marshal Sir Nigel Maynard, RAF, Commander, Second Allied Tactical 
Air Force, Major-General Cescotti, German Air Force, Chief-of-Staff and Senior Staff. 
Brunasum: Brigadier Maurer, United States Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Headquarters Allied 
Forces Central Europe; Brigadier Plowden, United Kingdom Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff Intelligence; 
Group Captain Jeffrey, RAF, Lt.-Col. Palladino, United States Air Force and Wing Commander Appleyard, 
RAF. 
14th November 1975 
Bonn: German Air Force Planning Staff: Major-General Kerscher, Chief-of-Staff; Colonel Fischer; 
Colonel Peters ; Colonel Oldigs ; Lt.-Col. Pickert. 
27th November 1971) 
Ramstein: Air Vice-Marshal A. C. Davies ; Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations and Intelligence. 
The Committee as a whole met at Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, at Kolsaas, near 
Oslo, on 22nd September 1975 where it was briefed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir John Sharp, 
and by Mr. E. Berdal, Public Relations Officer of the North Atlantic Assembly, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Paul Thyness, Chairman of the Military Committee, and was addressed by Professor L. W. Martin, 
Department ofWarStudies, King's College, London, and Mr. R. Shearer, Director of Nuclear Planning, NATO 
International Staff. 
The Committee met subsequently in Brussels on 20th and 21st October when it was addressed by 
Mr. Altiero Spinelli, member of the Commission of the European Communities responsible for industrial 
policy, and discussed a preliminary draft of the present report. The Committee met subsequently at the 
seat of the Assembly in Paris on lOth November and discussed and adopted the present report at a final 
meeting in Paris on lst December. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers 
who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise 
attributed, are those of the Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on air forces on the central front 
The Assembly, 
Aware that both organisational shortcomings and the lack of interoperability in equipment still 
prevent the aircraft now available to Allied Commanders on the central front from being used to optimum 
effect; 
Welcoming, however, the establishment of the new command Allied Air Forces Central Europe which 
has already resulted in some organisational improvement, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments, through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To recall the provisions of the resolution to implement the Final Act of the London Conference, 
adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd October 1954, which "confirms that the powers exercised 
by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in peacetime, extend not only to the organisation into an effective 
integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; " to ensure that this resolution is 
effectively applied, in respect of both training and command integration, especially to ensure that the deci-
sion of the Defence Planning Committee of 14th June 1974 to establish a new air force command structure 
headed by Commander AAFCE is applied at all levels ; 
2. To foster arrangements, bilateral if necessary, to make all appropriate airfields available to assigned 
and earmarked central front air forces ; 
3. To call for substantial improvement in the interoperability of assigned and earmarked air forces on 
the central front, the further development of common tactical concepts and, in the longer term, the 
establishment of an integrated logistics system ; 
4. To give urgent consideration to the multilateral financing of improved communications and appro-
priate early warning systems. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In the course of briefings at Headquarters 
Central Army Group (CENTAG) on 5th Novem-
ber 1974, the Committee became aware that the 
air forces on the central front were faced with 
a number of problems. It accordingly decided to 
prepare a special report on the subject, as 
General de Maiziere's study on the rational 
deployment of forces on the central front had 
tended to concentrate more particularly on the 
problems of the land forces. 
Warsaw Pact air capabilities 
2. This report is concerned essentially with the 
problem of the NATO central front in Europe, 
and does not take account of strategic aircraft 
and missiles, although these weapons systems 
could, in certain circumstances, be used against 
targets in the central front area. Apart from the 
strategic forces, however, the high mobility of 
air forces makes it very difficult to answer the 
question: "How many aircraft are deployed by 
either side in the area of the central front f' 
Numbers believed to be present on airfields in 
the area in peacetime may bear no relation to 
the numbers that could be flown in at only a 
few hours' notice in a period of tension. 
Estimates of Warsaw Pact air strength from 
various sources are assembled at Appendix I (a). 
3. More significant perhaps than the numbers 
of Warsaw Pact aircraft has been the progres-
sive improvement in capability of aircraft intro-
duced since the early 1960s. Whereas the great 
bulk of Warsaw Pact tactical air forces originally 
consisted of relatively short-range air defence 
fighters with little or no all-weather capability, 
increasing numbers of aircraft in the Soviet 
air force are now dual-purpose Mach 2 strike 
and ground attack aircraft capable of reaching 
further into NATO territory. Combat radii 
have increased from some 300 n.m. to 500 
to 600 n.m. 1 At the same time the improvement 
in Soviet surface-to-air missiles makes it neces-
1. e. g. London, Paris and Marseilles are in range of 
such aircraft, compared with Cologne and towns on the 
Rhine hitherto. 
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sary to assume that a greater proportion of the 
dual-purpose aircraft can now be assigned to 
offensive tasks. Some details of the capability 
of Warsaw Pact aircraft are given in Appen-
dix I (b). 
4. Equally important to the deployment of the 
aircraft is the availability of airfields. An 
unofficial study 1 claims that "East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland alone provide the 
Pact with 220 airfields that are capable of 
handling high-performance aircraft, plus another 
140 runways suitable for less sophisticated 
planes". The Committee understands, however, 
that this estimate is far too high. Like NATO, 
the Warsaw Pact air forces are tending to con-
centrate on fewer airfields, built to higher 
standards, and have constructed between 1,000 
and 2,000 aircraft shelters. Even so, the number 
of airfields available to the Warsaw Pact air 
forces is still several times the number available 
to NATO. 
Allied air forces 
Command and control 
5. Command of all land and 1 air forces on the 
central front - i.e. those between the Elbe and 
the Alps - is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, 
Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) 
whose peacetime headquarters is at Brunssum 
in the Netherlands. The air forces under him 
are commanded by the Commander, Allied Air 
Forces Central Europe, under whom come the 
two allied tactical air forces - 2nd AT AF in the 
north, covering the area of Northern Army 
Group, and 4th ATAF covering the area of 
Central Army Group - the boundary between 
the two being roughly the east/west line through 
Gottingen and Cologne. Belgian, German, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom units are 
assigned to 2nd AT AF ; Canadian, German and 
United States to 4th ATAF. The following 
diagram shows the command structure : 
1. "United States force structure in NATO - an 
alternative", Lawrence and Record, Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, May 1974 ; quoting Nevil Brown, 
"European security 1972 to 1980", London RUSI 1972. 
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Allied air forWI on the central front and the N .A TO military command structure 
North Atlantic Council 
Defence Planning Committee 
Military Committee 
I 
~ (Minister or Permanent Representatives) (Brussels) 
(Chiefs-of-Staff or Permanent Military Representatives (Brussels) 
I 
Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT) 
(Norfolk, US) 
I 
Commander-in-Chief 
Channel (CINCHAN) 
Northwood, UK) 
I 
Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) 
(Casteau, Belgium) 
various subordinate various subordinate 
commands commands 
I I I 
Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief 
Northern Europe Central Europe 
(CINCNORTH) (Kolsa.as, Norway) (CINCENT) (Brunssum, 
Southern Europe 
(CINCSOUTH) (Naples, Italy) 
various subordinate 
commands 
' 
' Commander Allied Air Force 
Central Europe (temporarily 
at Ramstein, to move to 
Brunssum) 
Netherlands) 
I I 
various subordinate 
commands 
I 
2nd Allied Tactical- •• - -. - Commander Northern 4th Allied Tactical • -Commander Centra.] 
Air Force (Monchen- Army Group (Monchen- Air Force (Ram- Army Group 
Gladbach) Gla.dba.ch, Germany) stein, to move to (Seckenheim, 
Seckenheim) Germany) 
I I I 
Subordinate air defence 
and tactical operational 
commands 
National army commands Subordinate air National army 
defence and tactical commands 
operational 
commands 
( · · · = headquarters co-located, or planned to be co-located) 
6. Allied Air Forces Central Europe is a new 
command established by the Defence Planning 
Committee on 14th June 1974 : 
"12. Ministers approved recommendations 
by the NATO military authorities on the 
integrated command structure to ensure the 
more effective use and joint operation of 
allied air forces in the central region. They 
agreed that the new headquarters of Allied 
Air Forces Central Europe should be 
established initially at Ramstein, Germany, 
and that its permanent location should be 
collocated with the existing AFCENT head-
quarters at Brunssum, Netherlands." 
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The recomml:}ndations approved included details 
of the subordinate command structure below the 
two ATAFs and originated in proposals put 
forward by the United States in December 1971. 
The purpose of the new headquarters, according 
to NATO documents, is "to co-ordinate and direct 
operations of" the two ATAFs and to establish 
"operating procedures so that pilots will have 
no difficulty shifting between units of the 
Second and Fourth Tactical Air Force Com-
mands". The peacetime headquarters of AAFCE 
has been provisionally established at Ramstein, 
but will eventually move to be co-located with 
headquarters of AFCENT at Brunssum. These 
two headquarters are to share an underground 
war headquarters now being constructed near 
Ramstein. 
7. The history of the establishment of the 
new command structure reveals one of several 
instances where national considerations have 
distorted effective command arrangements, and 
led to a considerable loss in efficiency in the 
application of NATO's limited military resources. 
When headquarters AFCENT was first estab-
lished in Fontainebleau in the early 1950s, it 
comprised three separate subordinate service 
commands, the Air Command (AIRCENT) 
being held by a British Royal Air Force officer. 
At about the time of the transfer of the AFCENT 
headquarters to Brunssum in 1967, there was a 
global streamlining of the command structure, 
the three separate service commands were 
abolished, and CINCENT acquired instead a 
Deputy CINCENT, a post again held by a 
(British) Royal Air Force officer. Second ATAF 
has always been commanded by an RAF officer 1, 
and the RAF in the early days no doubt con-
tributed the bulk of the aircraft to 2nd ATAF. 
Fourth ATAF, for similar historical reasons, 
was always commanded by a United States Air 
Force officer who was concurrently the (national) 
Commander of United States Air Forces 
Europe 2 , and the United States still contributes 
the bulk of the aircraft available to this com-
mand. 
8. Split between the two ATAFs and AIR-
BALT AP, the new Luftwaffe at first found its 
squadrons trained and equipped in two divergent 
manners under the guidance of the RAF and 
USAF respectively, but standard training for all 
German air force squadrons has now been 
introduced. The Committee has been given to 
understand that 2nd ATAF operating proce-
dures have relied heavily on individual pilot 
navigation with possible use of forward air 
controllers in the last stages of ground support 
missions. Second AT AF pilots are said to require 
familiarity with the terrain of their areas 
through long-term training. Fourth ATAF has 
placed much more reliance on continuous ground 
control of aircraft in flight, a procedure offering 
advantages in particular for pilots rotated 
frequently from the United States, who may be 
1. With the exception of a three-year period in the 
mid-sixties when it was commanded by a Belgian general. 
2. Commander 4th ATAF became a German appointment 
on the creation of AAFCE commanded by an American 
officer, the latter being the Commander United States Air 
Forces Europe. 
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less familiar with local terrain. Other differences 
in tactical doctrine are mentioned in the section 
on deployment and interoperability below. The 
Committee understands that Commander AAFCE 
has already taken steps to introduce standard 
uniform operating procedures throughout his 
command, but implementation of the new com-
mand arrangements at subordinate level has still 
to be carried through despite their promulgation 
by the Military Committee. 
9. The introduction of the new command 
structure has inevitably taken some time and 
led to some misunderstanding of the responsi-
bilities of the different levels of command. Your 
Rapporteur has detected three interpretations of 
the command arrangements subordinate to 
AAFCE. The first imagines a highly-centralised 
control of operations in headquarters AAFCE, 
relying on sophisticated communications direct 
to individual squadrons: the ATAF headquar-
ters having a secondary or stand-by role. Critics 
of this view claim that such centralised command 
would break down amid the destruction and 
confusion of actual operations; its advocates 
claim that such centralised control is essential 
given the speed of today's aircraft (the whole 
central front from Hamburg to the Alps is less 
than twenty minutes' flying time) and other 
factors. The second interpretation sees opera-
tional control concentrated in the two AT AF 
headquarters which would be able to communi-
cate directly with squadrons, while headquarters 
AAFCE had a co-ordinating role. The third 
envisages an enhanced wartime role for existing 
national tactical operations commands coming 
under the ATAFs and corresponding to the air 
defence sector operations centres which already 
operate on a NATO basis in peacetime. Those 
taking this view claim that all NATO head-
quarters are too remote from operational 
squadrons to have the understanding of status 
and capability that is necessary for the most 
effective tasking of forces; although proper 
NATO authority is vested in appropriate exist-
ing national subordinate commands augmented 
by liaison teams of other nations, its critics see 
this as a retrograde departure from allied inte-
gration ; purely national headquarters being 
envisaged at the lower level. For the first inter-
pretation the role of the ATAF headquarters is 
less clear. 
10. It is clear that it will take some time for 
the new command structure to settle down, and 
for a full understanding of its operations to be 
achieved at all levels. Nonetheless it provides, 
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at the level of AAFCE, a central command 
function which will channel intelligence down-
wards and, in the light of the overall situation, 
allot squadrons between the ATAFs. At the level 
of the ATAFs, responsibility remains for co-
ordination with the land forces in the Northern 
and Central Army Groups and for allocating 
particular targets and tasks. Below this the tac-
tical operations commands, which will be pri-
marily national, deal directly with squadrons. 
It is clearly important that although this level 
of command is primarily national, these com-
mands should have an international element, 
reflecting the nationality of squadrons most 
likely to be controlled by them. Overall the new 
structure appears to provide a coherent frame-
work for the air effort on the central front, but 
it will be necessary for the Military Committee 
to keep its operation and effectiveness under 
review and to make changes as necessary in the 
light of experience. 
11. The Committee has insufficient information 
and expertise to make a detailed recommendation 
concerning the command structure subordinate 
to AAFCE, but recognises that the very nature 
of air operations requires the area to be con-
sidered as a whole. The Committee recommends 
that arrangements approved by the Military 
Committee be implemented urgently. The co-
location of the peacetime headquarters of AAFCE 
with AFCENT at Brunssum, which requires 
common funding of a new building, should be 
expedited to facilitate the personal contact 
necessary for the full implementation of the new 
command arrangements at all levels. 
Allied aircraft 
12. Operational tactical aircraft available to 
NATO in Central Europe amount to some 1,450, 
including United States (but not British) aircraft 
based in the United Kingdom. Details of types 
and their allocation between 2nd and 4th ATAF 
are given in Appendix II. If the central and 
northern regions are considered as a whole for 
air purposes, if British tactical aircraft based 
in the United Kingdom and the United States 
aircraft based in Spain (about 70) and in the 
United Kingdom are included, the total amounts 
to some 2,000 and, on this basis, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies' "Military Balance 
1975-76" gives the following comparison with 
the Warsaw Pact countries' aircraft based in 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the 
western military districts of the Soviet Union : 
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Northern and Central Europe 
Tactical aircraft in 
operational service NATO Warsaw (of which Pact USSR) 
Light bombers 150 225 200 
Fighter /ground 
attack 1,250 1,325 900 
Interceptors 350 2,000 950 
Reconnaissance 300 475 350 
13. There are in addition over 100 United States 
dual-based tactical aircraft usually stationed in 
the United States but with essential stores pre-
stocked in Europe, which can redeploy very 
rapidly. The French air defence command and 
tactical air force, if available, could add a 
further 460 aircraft. If the airfields were avail-
able, the total numbers of tactical aircraft that 
could be deployed, relying on the whole weight 
of United States' augmentation forces, could out-
number those available to the Warsaw Pact ; 
their mean capability is certainly superior. Such 
a build-up would be very difficult to achieve in 
the short time likely to be available. 
Airfields 
14. Perhaps the most serious limitation on the 
deployment of tactical aircraft on the central 
front, especially on the capability for reinforce-
ment, lies in the small number of airfields 
available, and their relatively exposed position 
within 160 to 200 n.m. of the Warsaw Pact 
boundaries. Of the total of some thirty airfields 
available in Belgium, the Netherlands and Ger-
many, most are in the 2nd ATAF area. A few 
more in the AFNORTH area of Baltic 
approaches are also available. 
15. Prior to the withdrawal of France from 
the integrated military structure, Canadian and 
United States forces had the use of eleven air-
fields in France, the construction or improve-
ment of which had been financed either through 
the NATO infrastructure programme or by the 
United States, while the United States air force 
had at least partial use of a further ten French 
airfields for various purposes including training. 
Some eighteen other airfields used by French 
air force units had also been financed through 
the NATO infrastructure programme. While 
many of these airfields are currently used by 
the French air force or army, the Committee 
understands that the following are unused : 
Dreux; 
Chaumont; 
Chambley; 
Laon. 
The following are used as standby fields only : 
Broye-les-Pesmes ; 
Lure; 
Damblain; 
Marigny-le-Grand ; 
Chalons-Vatry; 
Vouziers-Sechault; 
Cambrai-Niergnies ; 
St. Simon-Clastres. 
Other airfields are in partial or civilian use. Not 
all runways are now serviceable. 1 
16. There is an urgent need to make available 
airfields outside the immediate area of the two 
ATAFs, possibly in Britain and the northern 
Europe area, as well as for the more numerous 
2nd ATAF airfields to accept the larger number 
of aircraft earmarked for 4th ATAF. The 
need for access to airfields outside a particular 
ATAF area is particularly acute for the accom-
modation of reinforcement aircraft which can 
be flown in from the United States. Some pro--
gress is being made through bilateral arrange-
ments. 
17. The importance of the airfields in France 
has lessened slightly since the withdrawal in 
1967 because they are now in range of the more mod~rn Warsaw Pact aircraft in the MiG-21 
Fishbed series and the MiG-23B Flogger, 
whereas hitherto they were considered almost 
immune to attack by tactical aircraft. Moreover, 
NATO has concentrated on an aircraft shelter 
programme as a partial alternative to ~ policy 
of dispersal in an emergency. However, If agree-
1. On the withdrawal of allied air units from France 
in 1967 NATO claimed from France a total of £120 million 
in res~ect of NATO-financed infrastructure including 
airfields in that country, while the United States claimed 
$720 million in respect of United States-financed _airfields 
and other infrastructure. In the latter connection, the 
communique issued after the meeting between Presidents 
Ford and Giscard d'Estaing in Martinique on 16th 
December 1974 stated: 
" ... The President of France indicated that his govern-
ment was prepared to reach a financial settlement in 
connection with the relocation of American forces and 
bases committed to NATO from France to other 
countries in 1967. The French offer of $100 million 
in full settlement was formally accepted by President 
Ford ... " 
9 - Ill 
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ment could be reached with France for only 
half a dozen of these airfields to be available 
and provided with shelters for the use of aug-
mentation squadrons, in clearly defined circum-
stances covering exercises and periods of tension 
as well as possible hostilities, the dangerous over-
crowding of 4th ATAF airfields could be 
significantly reduced. While these airfields may 
now be in range of hostile aircraft, they are still 
far less vulnerable because at the ranges involved 
Warsaw Pact aircraft could not deliver a large 
bomb-load and would suffer much higher losses 
because of the greater depth of defended airspace 
they would have to penetrate. 
18. With the introduction of more modern and 
sometimes heavier aircraft, the standards to 
which NATO runways were constructed are not 
always adequate to sustain permanent operation 
in peacetime. An airfield improvement pro-
gramme had had to be financed to prevent 
deterioration in use. 
Employment and operations 
19. The NATO tactical air forces have four 
main roles which are described in different ways 
by different authorities: (i) air defence ; (ii) 
strike (i.e. attack with nuclear capability) ; (iii) 
attack (i.e. conventional close air support of 
ground forces, interdiction and counter air) ; 
and ( iv) reconnaissance. 
Air defence 
20. The units allocated to the air defence task 
comprise HAWK surface-to-air missiles deployed 
well forward in a continuous defensive belt, the 
NIKE S.A.Ms for area and high-level defence 
further to the rear, and the interceptor aircraft 
squadrons. Air defence is an exception to the 
normal practice whereby the peacetime tasks 
of the NATO military command structure are 
limited to planning and training functions : 
NATO air force headquarters exercise control, 
in peace and war, of the air defence units and 
the operational radar warning and control sys-
tems. They are manned 24 hours a day, and 
some interceptor aircraft are always ready to 
take off ; duty officers in the sector operations 
centres (SOCs) have authority to order fighter 
aircraft into the air to intercept and identify 
any unidentified aircraft penetrating NATO air 
space. 
21. The Bonn convention of 1952 provides for 
three-power responsibility (France, the United 
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Kingdom, the United States) for peacetime 
security of German air space. Because of this 
only British or United States officers may ini-
tiate orders for intercept missions in Germany, 
and duty officers from these countries have to 
be permanently available in the command cen-
tres, and aircraft of these countries have to 
perform intercept identification missions in 
peacetime. France has reserved its right to parti-
cipate. These arrangements undoubtedly have 
a deterrent effect, as any airborne encounter 
must thereby involve NATO countries other than 
Germany. At a specified stage of alert respon-
sibility for the security of German air space 
passes to the NATO command as such. 
Other roles and specialisation 
22. As far as the strike, attack and reconnais-
sance roles of its tactical air forces are concerned, 
NATO assumes command only at a specified 
level of alert. As with all other forces NATO 
peacetime functions are concerned with planning, 
exercises and the supervision of training. 
Whereas the peacetime control by NATO com-
manders of the air defence function should 
ensure a smooth transition in the event of hosti-
lities, control of the tactical roles is practised 
only during exercises. Decisions concerning 
subordinate command arrangements mentioned 
in paragraphs 9-11 above are urgent. 
23. Not all NATO countries will be able to 
provide aircraft types and aircrew training to 
cover all tactical air roles on cost-effective terms. 
This is brought out in the Netherlands Defence 
White Paper- "Our very existence is at stake 
- defence policy 1974 to 1983" of July 1974 
which states : 
"The DPC 1 also accepted the recommenda-
tion that the Netherlands air force should 
gradually concentrate on the attacking of 
ground targets near the scene of fighting 
with conventional weapons, using an aircraft 
which could hold its own in airfights in its 
field of operations, but which would also be 
capable of being used for nuclear purposes, 
to the extent that this was consistent with 
its range as determined by the first two 
requirements. With the replacement of the 
Starfighter, the Netherlands will, therefore, 
leave unrestricted air defence and long-range 
nuclear tasks to her allies. It is also the 
1. NATO Defence Planning Committee. 
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intention in the future to replace the lighter 
tactical NF -5 aircraft by the new type of 
aircraft. This concentration on a single type 
of aircraft offers considerable advantages 
as regards training, maintenance and logis-
tics, and in this way it will be possible for 
operating costs to be reduced. 
In addition to this advantage to the Nether-
lands, NATO will also benefit from a 
reduction in the number of different types 
of aircraft. Consultations are now taking 
place with those countries which are faced 
with similar decisions with regard to replace-
ments." 
I nteroperability 
24. One of the chief problems facing the allied 
air forces on the central front is the still limited 
interoperability of aircraft between ATAFs or 
even between airfields occupied by units of 
different nationality within the same ATAF. The 
problem arises in part from the parochial manner 
in which the two AT AFs were organised in the 
past, and is compounded by the fact that some 
60 % of total aircraft assigned to AAFCE belong 
to 4th ATAF - because the United States is 
the major contributor. When all reinforcement 
aircraft have been made available to the Central 
Europe Command, the lack of balance is worse 
- about 80 % of all aircraft would then be 
primarily assigned to 4th ATAF. In operational 
terms this imbalance has been alleviated by the 
establishment of AAFCE which has the right 
to allot squadrons throughout the central front, 
irrespective of the ATAF to which they belong. 
25. Limitations on interoperability have arisen 
in part from different tactical doctrines, reflect-
ing differences between United States and Euro-
pean units, rather than differences between the 
ATAFs. United States doctrine in the attack 
role provides for a comparatively high-level 
approach using first a defence suppression 
attack with aircraft will equipped with electronic 
counter-measures to destroy the opponents air 
defence systems, followed by attack on the 
primary objective. European units prefer direct 
attack on the primary target, relying on a very 
low level approach to penetrate hostile air 
defences; their ECM equipment has been less 
effective or non-existent in the past. United 
States aircraft in attack rely on the 407L radar 
control system, which other aircraft are not 
equipped to use. The co-ordinating role of 
AAFCE has already made some improvement to 
the situation. 
26. A further important obstacle to full inter-
operability arises from the lack of standardisation 
among aircraft in service in AAFCE. At present, 
twenty different types or variants are identified 
in Appendix II for only four principal roles ; 
no fewer than six different types are operated 
by the RAF alone. It should be noted that the 
procurement of apparently the same aircraft by 
two different countries has not always led to 
standardisation. The Phantom FGR-2 operated 
by the RAF has a British engine, and cannot 
therefore be serviced on the same airfield as the 
Phantom F-4F for example in service with the 
German air force. 
27. This lack of standardisation among aircraft 
restricts their ability to operate in or out of 
airfields other than those assigned to squadrons 
of the same nationality, or accommodating air-
craft of the same type. There is non-standard 
ammunition - even where NATO has produced 
agreement on a standard bomb, bomb-racks 
themselves have become non-standard as new 
types of aircraft have been introduced. Oil, oxy-
gen, even some fuel and many other special 
items may not be available in the particular form 
required by an aircraft visiting a strange air-
field. A recent study 1 claims that : 
"The 2nd ATAF also has five different 
types of gun ammunition, four different 
bombs, six different napalm containers, and 
sixteen different drop-tanks. 
Four different short-range air-to-air missiles 
are in development. Efforts are being made 
to reduce this to one or (at the most) two 
separate developments." 
28. Although there has been some improvement 
recently and German air force units act as a 
homogenous bridge between the AT AFs, there 
is still an urgent need to improve interoperability 
which has not yet achieved, on all airfields, the 
basic "get you home" refuelling and other essen-
tial services to recover an aircraft and permit 
it to return to a base with compatible stores 
for rearming for another mission. While a 
"get you home" service is satisfactory in peace-
1. "United States-European Economic Co-operation in 
Military and Civil Technology". Thomas A. Callaghan Jr., 
Georgetown University Centre for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, revised September 1975, page 22. 
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time, a rearming capability is what is required 
in war. The study quoted 1 concludes : 
"Tactical air forces should be able to con-
centrate wherever a major attack or break-
through occurs. Warsaw Pact air forces have 
that capability, through standardisation. 
Allied tactical air forces do not. Logistically, 
it is not possible. 
While aviation fuel has been standardised 
throughout NATO, the nozzles and rapid-
fuelling equipment have not. Nor have air-
craft munitions. Standardised auxiliary 
power units (APUs) have yet to be supplied 
to all national and NATO airfields. Thus 
allied tactical air forces are tethered to their 
own national fields (and even some NATO 
airfields) unable to be . . . . rearmed or 
repaired at other airfields ; unable to con-
centrate when and where required ; unable 
to continue the battle should their own fields 
be knocked out. 
In November, 1971, Air Marshal Sir Harold 
Martin, Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air 
Force Germany, told a House of Commons 
Committee (putting on, as he said, his Com-
mander, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force hat) : 
'If one of our airfields, or two or three, 
were taken out by enemy action of some 
sort and we had forces from those air-
fields airborne at the time, if we could 
divert them to a Dutch airfield or a 
German airfield and they could then 
be rearmed, weapons put on them and 
guns reloaded and they could then be 
tasked to take off on another sortie, 
the operability of the force as a whole 
would be increased by 200 to 300%.' 
There are 24 different types of combat air-
craft in NATO. Including modifications, 
there are actually 39 different combat air-
craft models. The inability to refuel, rearm 
and service these aircraft has a serious 
effect on allied military readiness. Dr. 
Tucker 2 estimates that only one-third to 
one-half of the 2,800 tactical aircraft NATO 
maintains in Western Europe could be 
brought to bear in a conflict.'' 
1. Callaghan op. cit., pages 34, 35. 
2. NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence 
Support. 
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A.ir space management 
29. In theory, the problems of air space manage-
ment - the ability to control a large number 
of aircraft and ground-based anti-aircraft sys-
tems operating simultaneously at high speed in 
a limited space - can be solved when the new 
command arrangements are implemented 1 at all 
levels, but better communications and more auto-
matic data processing are needed. Serious prob-
lems have arisen from the existence of new short 
range air defence systems in the hands of army 
units - which may lack instantaneous com-
munications with air control centres - and the 
limitations and incompatibilities of IFF (identi-
fication friend or foe) systems and of short-range 
air defence procedures installed on aircraft. 
Evidence given to the United Kingdom House 
of Commons Expenditure Sub-Committee 1 is 
revealing: 
"Can you say how long it will be before 
there will be improvements in the means of 
identifying friendly aircraft and when is 
it expected that a new NATO identification 
system will be fully operating Y Is it likely 
to be much before the 1990s Y - (Air Vice-
Marshal Cairns). The Americans and Ger-
mans and many other people, of course, 
have gone to the Mark 12 IFF system. We 
did not consider that sufficient improvement 
of our own Mark 10, in which we invested 
a great deal of money, to go common at this 
stage ... " 
Incompatibility of IFF systems, and of short-
range air defence procedures, could involve very 
heavy costs in a war situation. 
Airborne warning and control system (A. W A.OS) 
30. According to the communique published 
after the Ministerial Meeting of the Defence 
Planning Committee on 23rd May 1975, "Min-
isters also endorsed a proposed joint study of the 
possibilities of acquiring and operating an air-
borne early warning and control system on a 
co-operative basis to improve the effectiveness 
of NATO's air defences." The United States, 
according to the Defence Department annual 
report for financial years 1976 and 1977, is to 
acquire two squadrons of E-3A aircraft, a total 
of seven aircraft, to become operational by 1977, 
and a total of 34 aircraft in three squadrons by 
1. Minutes of Evidence, Defence and External Affairs 
Sub-Committee, 22nd July 1975, paragraph 529. 
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the end of 1981. Total proposed budget costs for 
financial years 1974 to 1977 inclusive are 
$2.16 billion. 
31. Following a dispute between the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and the United States 
Department of Defence on the immunity of this 
system to electronic counter-measures, a panel 
of independent experts in the United States has 
reported on the three proposed roles for the 
A WAC system : 
"1. to provide the NATO Command with 
timely information of significant aircraft or 
ECM (electronic counter-measures) deploy-
ments prior to hostilities, i.e. early warning ; 
2. to provide surveillance information 
required for effective direction of the air 
battle over NATO-held territory, i.e. the 
defensive mission ; 
3. to provide the information required for 
effective direction of strikes into enemy-held 
territory, i.e. the offensive mission." 
32. The panel reported AWACS " ... to be an 
impressive technical accomplishment that has 
met its design goals and in so doing is less 
susceptible to ECM than ground surveillance 
radars now employed in Europe." It appears 
that the defensive role of AWACS would not 
be degraded by ECM, but that the offensive role 
would be degraded to some extent. As existing 
NADGE equipment has virtually no capability 
to control allied aircraft in hostile territory (only 
the United States 407L facility provides this), 
this latter function is of most interest to some 
NATO countries. Moreover, one study suggests 
that in roles involving flying in forward areas 
the E-3A AWACS aircraft flying at Mach 0.9 
could be vulnerable to the Mach 3 MiG 25 Foxbat 
estimated by Jane's All the World's Aircraft 
to have a combat radius of 610 n.m. 
33. The Department of Defence report con-
tinues: 
"We are now working closely with our 
NATO allies in defining a NATO A WACS 
programme in which most of the costs would 
be borne by nations other than the United 
States. A NATO decision on the eventual 
procurement of AWACS could be made as 
early as November 1975. In the absence of 
such a NATO decision our ultimate AWACS 
force level is uncertain ... this aircraft is 
expected to remain in the force for twenty 
to thirty years and during that time it will 
undoubtedly undergo essential configuration 
changes as the threat and operational 
requirements dictate." 
The Committee understands, however, that a 
NATO decision on AWACS is unlikely before 
May 1976. The problem of funding is made more 
difficult because of the inevitable lumpiness of 
the spending on the AWACS project. It would 
be concentrated in one or two years, and could 
not be spread. 
34. Some estimates of the cost to the NATO 
countries of an AWACS system of 36 aircraft 
have been published 1 : 
"All that can be given here... are four sets 
of 'ball park' figures, as provided to the 
International Defence Review. It will be 
seen that they are all from United States 
sources, and that they are slightly lower than 
the costs of the USAF AWACS programme : 
- US DoD March 1975 estimates for a 36 
aircraft NATO buy, based on a NATO-
specified configuration, were $48-53 mil-
lion per aircraft, or a programme total 
of $1,728-1,908 million ; 
- Boeing Vice-President Mark Miller, talk-
ing to the IDR at end-April, quoted a 
'system flyaway cost, including spares 
and training, but excluding operating 
costs' of $50 million per AWACS for a 
36 aircraft NATO buy, giving a total 
programme cost of $1,800 million ; 
- Boeing engineering manager for 
AWACS, John Schmick, talking in June, 
estimated that the cost to NATO could 
be in the range of $45-65 million, or a 
total of $1,620-2,340 million for 36 air-
craft. These figures are also believed 
to have been quoted at the CNAD meeting 
in April 1975 ; 
- for comparison, the NATO target price 
for the original NADGE programme was 
$264 million, and the highest programme 
cost quoted above ($2,340 million) is 
similar to the total 1974 defence expen-
diture of the Netherlands ($2,303 mil-
lion)." 
The same source suggests the following contribu-
tion from NATO countries: 
I. "Can NATO afford AWACS" R.D.M. Furlong, 
International Defence Review 5/1975. 
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Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
$ 66.21m 
$156.69m 
$ 40.07m 
$513.38m 
$183.36m 
$ 2.93m 
$ 84.51m 
$ 27.20m 
$ 14.73m. 
$ 28.53m 
$234.97m 
$450.00m 
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35. The United Kingdom has claimed that a 
simpler airborne early warning system (AEW) 
could be developed with the Nimrod maritime 
patrol aircraft for $22 to $24m per aircraft. 
There is also the carrier-borne United States 
Grumman E-2c which could presumably be 
developed for land use and is significantly 
cheaper, although its range and endurance may 
be inadequate. 
36. Because of its high cost your Rapporteur 
found air force staffs somewhat unenthusiastic 
about AWACS, unless it could be provided over 
and above all other equipment requirements -
an unlikely event. The Committee is not con-
vinced that the case for AWACS has been made 
at the present time. 
NATO pipelines 
37. The NATO-financed pipeline system, run-
ning from Atlantic and Channel ports to NATO 
airfields in France and Germany, is still operated 
by one of the three NATO agencies still located 
in the Paris area - the Central European 
Operating Agency in Versailles. Improvements 
to this system, in particular to improve fuel 
storage on NATO airfields, are still being carried 
out. 
Over-flying rights 
38. NATO aircraft are able to operate, within 
prescribed limitations, over the territory of 
NATO countries other than France, subject only 
to the usual requirements of air safety, involving 
the filing of a flight plan before take-off. Prior 
to the withdrawal of France from the integrated 
military system in 1967, total NATO air traffic 
over that country, by non-French aircraft, 
amounted to 100,000 flights a year. The Com-
mittee understands that bilateral agreements now 
exist between certain NATO countries and 
France covering military overflights, but it is 
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generally true that all flights across France, 
even routine training schedules, require diplo-
matic clearance before being allowed to proceed. 
The right to overfly French territory is vital 
to NATO tactical aircraft that may be required 
to reinforce the Mediterranean area in a period 
of mounting tension, when Swiss and Austrian 
air space would not be available to NATO combat 
aircraft. Overflight is also important for training 
purposes, including access to the Mediterranean. 
A.ircrew training 
39. It is not clear to your Rapporteur precisely 
how adequate are the present arrangements for 
aircrew training. The amount of fuel and flying 
hours that can be allocated have in some cases 
been reduced, and access to some air firing 
ranges has become more restricted. The continued 
availability of low-level training areas is impor-
tant. 
Future generation of aircraft 
40. It is still unclear whether the next genera-
tion of aircraft, as presently planned, will 
improve standardisation, or worsen the present 
situation. The jointly-produced Franco-British 
Jaguar is now in service in 2nd ATAF with the 
RAF in a dual capability nuclear/conventional 
attack role, and is also in service with the French 
tactical air force with a similar capability. There 
are differences in the navigational systems how-
ever. The Franco-German Alpha Jet will be in 
squadron service in 1978 (first deliveries at end 
1976), but France will be using it as a trainer 
only, while it will replace the G-91 in the close 
ground support and battlefield reconnaissance 
roles in the German air force. The British-
German-Italian MRCA now in advanced develop-
ment still awaits final agreement on production 
at the end of 1975. In the German Air Force 
it will replace the F-104G. Its introduction into 
RAF units will certainly reduce the number 
of different British aircraft types operating and 
in addition it is planned to develop for the RAF 
alone an air defence variant. The F-15 air 
superiority fighter, with a speed in excess of 
Mach 2.5 and a ceiling in excess of 70,000 feet, 
a counter to the MiG-25 Foxbat, is shortly to be 
introduced into United States squadrons, as is 
the A-7 close support aircraft. 
41. The decision of Belgium, the Netherlands 
Denmark and Norway to acquire a single replace-
ment aircraft, F-16, will improve standardisa-
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tion, especially because a similar number of F-16s 
will be introduced into the United States air 
force. The five countries will acquire an identical 
aircraft, as no destandardising national modifica-
tions may be introduced without the unanimous 
agreement of all participants. The Committee 
regrets, however, that none of the jointly-
developed and produced European aircraft, such 
as those mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
was found to meet the requirements of these four 
countries. 
Tactical nuclear weapons and mutual and 
balanced force reductions 
42. The United States is currently reviewing, 
under instructions from Congress, the deploy-
ment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 
About 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads have been 
said by successive Secretaries of Defence from 
Mr. McNamara onwards to be stockpiled in 
Europe (Mr. Clark Clifford, who held the office 
in 1968, at one point stated there were 7,200). 
These include warheads for tactical missiles such 
as the Honest John, Sergeant, Lance and Per-
shing ; warheads for the Nike SAM, nuclear 
bombs for tactical aircraft ; nuclear artillery 
rounds for the 8-inch and 155-mm. Howitzer, and 
atomic demolition munitions. 
43. With growing emphasis in NATO on the 
need for an adequate conventional response to 
any initial conventional attack, and the need for 
close political control of any initial use of nuclear 
weapons by the NATO forces, there is now less 
emphasis on the delivery of nuclear bombs by 
tactical strike aircraft on interdiction missions. 
It has been argued that any initial use of tactical 
nuclear weapons by NATO forces in Europe 
is more likely to be the precisely delivered battle-
field use of a surface-to-surface missile such as 
the Lance, Sergeant or Pershing. It is likely, 
therefore, that agreement will be reached within 
the NATO countries to put forward proposals 
in the MBFR negotiations based on their willing-
ness to implement such a reduction, and to 
demand some corresponding reduction in Soviet 
forces in exchange - in all probability in the 
numbers of Soviet tanks. 
44. NATO is now preparing proposals for a 
reduction of 1,000 tactical nuclear bombs and 
possibly some delivery systems by NATO in 
exchange for the withdrawal from Central 
Europe of one complete Warsaw Pact tank army 
- about 1, 700 tanks. In considering this, careful 
attention must be given to the effect of reducing 
delivery systems, e.g. aircraft which have an 
important non-nuclear role. 
Conclusions 
The draft recommendation 
45. The Committee's conclusions are set forth 
in the draft recommendation. The preamble 
draws attention to the past failure of the NATO 
command structure to integrate the various air 
forces on the central front effectively but wel-
comes recent improvements - the problem is 
described in paragraphs 5 et seq above. 
46. Substantive paragraph 1 of the draft recom-
mendation quotes from the resolution to imple-
ment the Final Act of the London Conference, 
adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd 
October 1954. The nine-power London Confer-
ence from 28th September to 30th October 1954 
prepared the ground for the admission of Ger-
many and Italy to NATO and the subsequent 
modification of the Brussels Treaty. 
24:7 
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47. Under the terms of the North Atlantic 
Council resolution referred to, NATO assumed 
responsibility for implementing certain decisions 
of the London Conference including the integra-
tion of forces and logistics in NATO on the lines 
originally intended in the stillborn European 
Defence Community, albeit in a less far-reaching 
form. Had this resolution been fully applied in 
practice, the serious shortcomings discussed in 
paragraphs 7 and 8 above would not have arisen 
in the first place. The Committee call for the 
implementation of new command arrangements 
at all levels - see paragraph 11. 
48. Substantive paragraph 2. The problems of 
the airfields are discussed in paragraphs 14 to 
18 above. 
49. Substantive paragraph 3. The problems of 
interoperability are described in paragraphs 24 
to 28. 
50. Substantive paragraph 4. Problems of com-
munications are mentioned in paragraph 29 ; 
the early warning systems proposal in para-
graphs 30 to 36. 
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APPENDIX I 
(a) Estimates of Warsaw Pact aircraft 
1. Official publications give few details of 
Warsaw Pact air force deployments. The United 
States' annual Defence Department report for 
financial years 1976 to 197 .. (transitional) reports: 
" ... about two thousand tactical aircraft ... " in the 
area of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary. The same report for the previous 
year estimated : " ... that the forces which the Pact 
could launch against the centre (that is, the 
Federal Republic of Germany) with very little 
warning consist of : ... about 2,800 aircraft, of 
which the majority are primarily air-to-air 
fighters." The same report for financial year 
1973, when Mr. Melvin Laird was Secretary of 
Defence, referring to Warsaw Pact tactical avia-
tion facing NATO, states: " ... So far as we can 
determine, the forces at the beginning of this 
year [1972] consisted of some four thousand 
aircraft in combat units with about 1,800 more 
in training units. Approximately 2,000 aircraft 
at the present time are assigned to units that do 
not have a primary ground attack mission." That 
report drew attention to the expected entering 
into service of more modern Soviet tactical air-
craft such as the variable geometry MiG-23 
Flogger and the MiG-25 Foxbat, which would 
extend the operating range of Soviet tactical 
aviation ; but a smaller force was expected to 
result at the end of the decade - a view not 
now shared by NATO headquarters which find 
total numbers substantially the same. 
2. Officially published German estimates, 
which include aircraft in the western military 
districts in the Soviet Union, are, of course, 
significantly higher. The 1973-74 Defence White 
Paper, issued by the FRG Ministry of Defence 
in January 1974, estimates Warsaw Pact tactical 
combat aircraft, based in the non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact countries and the western air defence 
regions of the Soviet Union, to be 7,400, made 
up of 800 reconnaissance, 1,800 fighter-bombers 
and 4,800 fighters. The United Kingdom White 
Paper "Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1975" is not particularly informative, showing 
only a ratio of 1 to 2.3 in the tactical aircraft 
available to NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the 
central front, accompanied by a number of air-
craft symbols to which numerical values are not 
assigned. 
3. The most commonly quoted unofficial 
figures are those provided by the International 
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Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual 
"Military Balance", the latest version of which 
(1975-76) is reproduced in paragraph 12 of the 
explanatory memorandum. 
4. Another unofficial recent study 1 draws 
attention, however, to the obsolescence of many 
of the aircraft in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
countries. It points out that : " ... about one-half 
of non-Soviet Pact tactical combat aircraft (no 
Eastern European country has strategic aircraft) 
are Il-28s, MiG-15s, or MiG-17s - all of which 
represent designs that are two decades old or 
more. The contribution of these subsonic 
machines to the Pact's overall tactical air 
capabilities is certainly less than that provided 
by the more modern MiG-19, MiG-21, and Su-7 
aircraft, which constitute the core of Eastern 
European combat air power. It is significant 
that, as far as is known, no continental ally of 
the USSR has yet acquired the formidable single-
seat tactical fighter Su-11 or the two latest 
models in the MiG series - the MiG-23 and the 
MiG-25." 
The study provides the following table of 
Eastern European tactical combat aircraft, first-
line and obsolescent : 
Country First· line Obsoles- Total cent (a) 
East Germany 390 40 430 
Poland 220 525 745 
Czechoslovakia. 400 220 620 
Hungary 140 40 180 
Romania. 100 150 250 
Bulgaria. 84 180 264 
TOTAL 1,334 1,555 2,489 
Source : Dupuy and Blanchard, "The Almanac of World 
Military Power", pages 131-145. 
(a) Includes all llyushin-28 tactical light bombers and 
MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters, first introduced into service 
in 1949-50, 1948, and 1953, respectively. 
1. uUS Force Structure in NATO- An Alternative", 
Lawrence and Record, published by the Brookings Insti-
tution, Washington, May 1974. 
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5. Other reliable information on the Commit-
tee's files provides the following breakdown of 
Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft confronting NATO 
in Central Europe, as of November 1975 : 
Soviet air force based in Total of TOTAL 
Czechoslovak, Warsaw Pact 
Type Czechoslovakia, East German aircraft facing 
East Germany, Western and Polish central 
Poland USSR
8 air forces region 
Air defence fighters 65 7204 635 1,420 
Tactical fighters1 595 340 335 1,270 
Fighter-bombers 460 300 405 1,165 
Reconnaissance and electronic counter 
measures 180 145 165 490 
Assault helicopters 120 60 - 180 
Bombers2 - approx. - approx. 
550 550 
TOTAL 1,420 2,115 1,540 5,075 
1. i.e. dual role aircraft, both air defence fighter and fighter-bomber such as MiG-21 Fishbed J, K, L and MiG-23 
Flogger. 
2. Excluding naval aviation, although some of these aircraft could be expected to be employed against the 
central region. 
3. Excluding Moscow military district. 
4. Soviet home air defence (APVO) in the three western air defence districts. 
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(b) Characteristics of Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft 
In service Speed knots Range Payload tonnes J Name Role B Endurance 
Date Country max jcruise cr Combat radius armament 
IlyuBhin 
Il-28 Beagle 1950 USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, Tactical bomber, 500J390kt r 1,300 km 5.5 
Romania, Hungary, reconnaissance 4 X 23 mm guns 
Czechoslovakia and non WP 2,000 kg bombs 
Mikoyan 
MiG-15 Fagot 1949 obsolete Bulgaria, Air defence fighter 570kt e 2 hrs. 3 cannons 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania 
MiG-17 Fresco 1953 USSR, Bulgaria, GDR, Air defence fighter 650kt r 450 n.m. 3 cannons 
Hungary, Poland, Romania 500 kg bombs 
MiG-19 Farmer 1955 Bulgaria, Hungary, Air defence fighter Mach 1.3 r 520 n.m. 3 cannons, AAMs 
A and B Poland, Romania 
MiG-21 Fishbed 1956 USSR, Bulgaria, 
1970 Czechoslovakia, GDR, Dual role Mach 2.1 r 590 n.m. cannons, AAMs 
Hungary, Poland, Romania 1,500 kg bombs 
MiG-23 Flogger 1971 USSR Dual role Mach 2.3 cr 520 n.m. guns,AAMs, bombs 
MiG-25 Foxbat 1971 USSR Fighter Mach 3.2 cr 610 n.m. AAMs 
reconnaissance 
Sukhoi 
Su-7B Fitter A 1961 USSR, Czechoslovakia, Ground attack Mach 1.6 cr 170-230 n.m. cannons 
Poland 2,500 kg bombs 
Su-15 Flagon 1970 USSR Interceptor Mach 2.5 cr 390 n.m. AAMs 
Su-17 J 20 Fitter 1971 USSR, Poland Ground attack VGW Mach 2.1 cr 325 n.m. 3,500 kg bombs, 
Band 0 guns 
Su-19 Fencer 1975? USSR Ground attack VGW claimed to be comparable to F-lU 
Yakovlev 
Yak-28 Brewer E 1961 USSR Ground attack bombs 
Yak-28-P Firebar USSR AWX Mach l.l cr 500 n.m. AAMs 
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APPENDIX II 
Aircraft available to allied air forces central Europe 
2nd ATAF 4th ATAF 
Country 
Air defence Fighter- Air defence Fighter-Reooe bomber Reece Interceptor bomber Interceptor 
all roles 
Belgium 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 18 Mirage 
54 Mirage VBR 
VBA 
Nether- 36 F-104G 36 F-104G 18 RF-104G 
lands 72 NFSA[B 
United 12 Phantom 20 Jaguar 18 Phantom 
Kingdom FG-1 36 Harrier FGR-2 
18 Phantom 
FGR-2 
30 Bucca.-
neer 
Germa.ny1 30 F-4F2 30 F-4F2 - 30 F-4F2 30 F-4F2 30 RF-4E 
42 G-91 108 F-104G 
18 TF-104G 36 F-104G 36 G-91 
Canada. 48 CF-
104D 
United 60 F-lUE 80 RF-4C 
States3 Grand 
360 F-4CfD{E Total 
Total 144 408 54 736 110 1,452 
1. Germany: also provides 30 RF-4E reconnaissance and 42 G-91 fighter-bombers for AFNORTH (Air Baltap). 
2. To be equally employable in the air-to-air and air-to-ground r6le. 
3. Estimate includes United States aircraft in United Kingdom. 
(Staff estimates from the following and other sources: IISS Military Balance 1975-76: Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft 1974-75; Flight, 6th February 1975) 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the European aeronautical industry 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the action programme for the European aeronautical sector submitted by the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers ; 
Likewise welcoming the activities of the European Civil Aviation Conference, the Association of 
European Airlines and the Association Europeenne des Constructeurs de Materiel Aerospatial ; 
Aware of the formation of the Group of Six by the main European aircraft manufacturers; 
Regretting that the range of Eurocontrol's activities is being diminished, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Call upon member countries to recognise : 
1. That it is essential to ensure the unified civil and military aerospace manufacturing and user market 
without which divergent national policies will continue to prevail ; 
2. That a European military aircraft procurement agency as proposed by the Assembly and later by 
the Commission requires the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
3. That the weakening of Eurocontrol would be detrimental to Europe and that the organisation should 
be developed in accordance with its Charter and that there is no point in defining European air space if a 
European organisation which is working effectively is downgraded to the task of co-ordinating national 
air traffic services. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Resolution 
on a colloquy 
on the formulation of a civil and 
military aeronautical policy for Europe 
Considering that the development of European co-operation in the field of civil and military aviation 
remains one of its main concerns ; 
Considering that the future of the European aeronautical industry may be jeopardised if a concerted 
policy providing a. broad basis for co-operation between governments, manufacturers and airlines is not 
agreed upon; 
Considering the positive results of the colloquy held in Paris on 17th and 18th September 1973, 
INsTRUCTS its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a colloquy 
on aeronautical questions in 1976 on the same basis as the one it organised in 1973. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur) 
General remarks 
1. In December 1974 your Rapporteur had the 
honour to present to the Assembly of Western 
European Union a report on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions entitled "State of European 
aviation activities". In the twelve months which 
have passed since the presentation of that report, 
which was adopted unanimously by the Assem-
bly, there has been no action by any member 
government to implement any of the report's 
recommendations 1 • Thus we have an illustration 
of Western Europe's extraordinary inability to 
take political action, which everyone agrees is 
essential, because the issues involve technology 
and result in a paralysis of political action. The 
sole exception is the start of the European Space 
Agency which, even if small compared with the 
size of the European aerospace market, proves 
that action agreed can be action taken. The 
establishment of Eurogroup to consider some of 
Western European military procurement policies 
is also a useful initiative which has yet to demon-
strate it can stem the tide of American sales-
manship. 
2. During the debates in Bonn in May 1975 on 
the report your Rapporteur submitted together 
with Mr. Valleix 2, his part thereof as well as 
corresponding paragraphs in the substantive text 
of the draft recommendation were not voted 
upon. The Committee decided to have it brought 
up to date for the December 1975 session. Your 
Rapporteur has therefore discussed this subject 
anew with competent authorities in member 
countries and also with representatives of the 
Commission in Brussels. 
3. He again wishes to underline that several 
events which have occurred in the Western Euro-
pean aerospace sphere in 1975 have clearly 
illustrated the great difficulty of taking joint 
political action. Although many governments are 
aware of the need to act, the paralytic process 
of 1974 has continued in 1975. 
4. Another symptom of our problems concerns 
our continued inability in Western Europe to 
1. See Recommendation 257 and the Council's reply 
st Appendix I. 
2. Document 674. 
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see our aerospace industry as a European entity 
and not as a series of separate national aircraft 
industries. Whereas every nation in Western 
Europe still has the right to make its own deci-
sions affecting its industrial policy, one would 
have expected Western Europe to have measured 
the effect on its economy which was likely to 
arise from political action being taken within an 
individual country which could affect the 
security and industrial power base of all of us. 
5. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
other European countries believe that the defence 
charges agreed to within the NATO framework 
are heavier than they can afford at present. 
Reductions in current programmes have been 
decided and research and development is being 
curtailed. 
6. No one can quantify the effect of the British 
Government's proposed nationalisation of the 
airframe manufacturing resources of Hawker 
Siddeley, British Aircraft Corporation and Scot-
tish Aviation. Although the bill has been delayed 
several months in its presentation to the British 
parliament, it is the government's plan to carry 
out this nationalisation during 1976. 
7. Your Rapporteur would be failing in his 
duty if he did not state his belief that Western 
Europe must make such arrangements as it feels 
necessary to ensure that there is a sufficient 
design and manufacturing capability for mili-
tary aircraft in Europe. 
8. Europe has a remarkable inventiveness and 
genius in the construction of aircraft. But if 
Europe is ever to develop its own foreign policy 
then it has to learn how to maintain and 
encourage strategic industries such as those 
required for the defence of Western Europe 
before it can assure itself it has the power to 
make its own policy. 
9. On 1st October 1975 the Commission of the 
European Communities submitted to the Minis-
terial Council an action programme for the Euro-
pean aeronautical sector 1• This programme 
closely follows the principles propounded by 
WED. Whilst it is an important source docu-
ment, it has yet to be translated into action to 
1. See Appendix II. 
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impart the essential political momentum to 
secure the unified civil and military aerospace 
manufacturing and user market without which 
divergent national policies will continue to be 
generated. Indeed the wide discussions started 
in the latter half of this year between the French 
airframe manufacturers and United States 
companies are a symptom of the lack of a visible 
solution to the key problem of a unified Western 
European market. 
10. To seek to challenge the American manu-
facturers whilst Europeans, with all their compe-
titive capability, are still isolated as island powers 
within their various political alliances (EFTA, 
EEC) is unrealistic and ensures that the Ameri-
cans can continue to make the rules of compe-
tition. 
11. It is extraordinary that the revelation of the 
obvious should blind us into inaction. Our 
manufacturers, given a unified home market, 
protected as the Americans protect their own 
domestic market from foreign sales, are perfectly 
capable of using the resources at their disposal 
on the scale and with the efficiency necessary 
to secure home orders and compete successfully 
in their territories. But until the basic political 
initiatives are taken the Americans can continue 
to count on Europe as a "soft sell". 
12. Proof of this was demonstrated this year 
when the F-16 was sold to four European NATO 
nations through a competition which stressed 
the urgency of the need to reach a decision on 
a winner, rather than to argue out the need 
for a decision in 1975 at all. On this basis Europe 
lost its chance to compete, no matter how good 
a package of European manufacturers' solutions 
could have been put up for study given more 
time. The Americans stole a key market in our 
midst. 
13. Now the same thing appears to be happen-
ing again with the NATO study of a Boeing E3A 
as an airborne early-warning vehicle. It is under-
stood that other United States products were 
kept out of the competition to concentrate all 
United States resources on promoting one pro-
duct. This has been done so successfully that a 
NATO military sub-committee is destined to 
take a major industrial decision of considerable 
impact on the long-term interests of European 
science and industry without a single European 
aircraft project being considered as an alter-
native to the enormously expensive United States 
proposal. It would appear to be essential for 
WEU to discuss this IJl.atter urgently. It epi-
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tomises the need for a political agency in parallel 
with, or part of, the EEC, to consider the poli-
tical, industrial and social consequences of our 
military procurement policy. 
14. In discussions your Rapporteur had with 
the Brussels authorities, it became clear that the 
Commission hopes that the Communities' pro-
posals will go to the European Council where the 
main decisions will have to be taken. This is the 
more necessary as the Commission included in 
its report a draft resolution of the member States 
of the European Economic Community meeting 
within the Council relating to the purchase and 
development of aircraft weapons systems. They 
also made it clear that they needed a juridical 
base and that the Brussels Treaty, although not 
perfect, could certainly serve as such. A conside-
ration is that although Ireland and Denmark 
have not signed the Brussels Treaty they have 
no weapons industry either. 
15. In this context your Rapporteur was struck 
by the fact that in the document of the Com-
munities, although following in great detail the 
report prepared by Mr. Valleix in 1973 on guide-
lines for an aviation policy for Europe drawn 
from the colloquy on 17th and 18th September 
1973 \ no mention was made of WEU and of 
this and earlier reports submitted by Mr. Val-
leix and others. The same is true where Euro-
control is concerned. Although the Community 
document speaks about the creation of Euro-
pean airspace, it does not mention the Euro-
control convention and the work which this 
organisation has done for air navigation and air 
traffic services. 
16. As far as the content of the document is 
concerned, your Rapporteur appreciates the fact 
that it will promote discussion on aeronautical 
problems at the highest level. He agrees with the 
Commission that, given the scale of the problems, 
national action is no longer capable of ensuring 
the harmonious development of the aircraft 
industry and the aviation sector. 
17. On the other hand, he believes that in 
several fields more concrete problems should 
have been discussed. It is for instance quite clear 
that the European aircraft industry will be 
unable to find its feet if presently produced air-
craft are not sold on the European home market. 
Special action should for instance be undertaken 
for the European airlines to accept Airbus in 
1. Document 618. 
their fleets, especially since this aircraft is a 
true European venture and not just built by 
French and German industries - the British, 
Netherlands and other industries were all invol-
ved in building this aircra:ft and governments 
should put pressure on the airlines to acquire a 
certain number o:f them. I:f the European air-
cra:ft industry is to :find a sound :financial and 
economic basis, this aircra:ft has to be sold. The 
problem is more di:f:ficult with Concorde, but the 
same approach should be adopted. Moreover, 
governments have already declared several times 
that they see a decision in this direction as the 
beginning o:f a solution. 
18. Developments in civil air transport since 
December 1974 have been chiefly marked by 
:further substantial increases in air :fares. 
Europe's passengers continue to remain in the 
hands o:f airlines which, with the backing o:f 
bilateral agreements between governments and 
the safety net of lATA, are virtually free to set 
any fare levels they want to. Air fares on the 
London-Paris sector, for instance, have been 
increased by 25 % since last December and it 
now costs each passenger 12.5 pence per mile to 
be carried over this sector. This story of high 
charges persists throughout Western Europe 
with the persistent excuse that conditions in 
Western Europe are not as favourable as those 
available to airlines operating the same types of 
aircraft in the United States. The recommenda-
tions of the last report indicated several clear 
actions which Western European governments 
could take immediately to establish Western 
Europe as a single unified air transport market. 
One would have expected initiatives to be taken 
promptly by our governments to offset the 
effects of inflation by the simple legislative 
actions which are required to do so. The pas-
senger who also happens to be the voter has not 
yet, luckily, appreciated what is being done to 
him! 
19. Civil air transportation in our member ter-
ritories is still subject to antiquated regulations 
:founded in the days before jet airliners. The 
absence of :federal agencies like the United States 
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Avia-
tion Agency hampers aircraft, engine and equip-
ment sales in the separated States of the 
European market and the air traveller and cargo 
shipper pay :fares beyond reason. 
20. The United Kingdom Civil Aviation Agency 
could well prove a model on which Europe could 
build, but build it must without delay. Here the 
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EEC and WEU are in sympathy and partner-
ship. 
21. Europe's civil air transport manufacturing 
capability is still suffering and regretfully will 
continue to suffer from the slowing down in 
demand for air transport 1• There are clear 
indications however that recovery in this demand 
is appearing on a wide scale throughout the 
world and it could well be that aircraft such as 
the European Airbus will prove, fortuitously, to 
be ideal vehicles for the changed pattern of 
demand. 
22. At the beginning of next year Europe will 
see Concorde brought into passenger service. 
Objections from the other side of the Atlantic 
now seem to be based more on nationalistic than 
realistic grounds. It is worth reflecting that the 
total cost of getting this magnificent aircraft 
into service will be equivalent to that which the 
Americans spent on producing a wooden mock-up 
of their proposed SST before it was cancelled. 
23. European engineers have proved that they 
can meet the most stringent tasks set :for them. 
As politicians we still have to match their deter-
mination and their vision. 
Eurocontrol 
24. During the colloquy held on 17th and 18th 
September 1973, the Director-General of Euro-
control, Mr. R. Bulin, discussed the organisation 
and its goals. He expressed the hope that an air 
traffic control organisation covering the whole 
of the upper and lower European air space 
would be established. If this were the case, 
savings in terms of effort and cost could be made. 
25. Since then, however, the authorities in 
several member countries have been considering 
reverting more to national systems. Instead of 
gradually transferring air traffic control to 
Eurocontrol in Brussels, they are tending to 
deal with it on a national basis. The Netherlands 
has developed a new radar system called SARP 
and wants to resume control of its air space, with 
the exception of overflying aircraft ; Germany 
is considering taking over the Eurocontrol centre 
in Karlsruhe .when this becomes operational; 
France also wishes to keep control over nearly 
all its air space :for military reasons, and the 
1. See Appendix II. 
DOOUMJDNT 691 
British Government is opposing the joint pur-
chase of European control and navigation equip-
ment. 
26. Your Rapporteur expressed the hope that 
this tendency would not be allowed to grow as 
it would seriously affect the Europeanisation of 
aviation. 
27. Since the middle of this year the situation 
has deteriorated. The Eurocontrol Council will 
have to decide whether its centre at Maastricht 
which took over responsibility for air traffic 
services in the Belgian and Luxembourg upper 
air space will continue its work. Increasing pres-
sure is being exerted for national services to 
resume responsibility in this respect. The new 
centre in Karlsruhe, due to become operational 
in 1976, might be manned with a national service, 
just as in the case of the centre which Euro-
control built at Shannon in Ireland. The task of 
Eurocontrol will then be reduced to co-ordination 
of the national services. 
28. In 1983 the Eurocontrol convention will 
have to be reconsidered and the member coun-
tries might well take this opportunity either to 
strengthen or to weaken the organisation. It is 
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therefore important for this issue to be discussed 
in time. 
29. If Eurocontrol is to be weakened, how can 
Europe hope to shape a sound organisation for 
the aeronautical industry and aviation ? 
Moreover, Eurocontrol is one of the few organi-
sations in Europe which since its creation was 
able to conclude a number of co-operation agree-
ments and add to its original six members -
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom- two new members, Portugal 
and Ireland, with Spain and Italy as potential 
new members. 
30. Sadly, Eurocontrol is suffering from a lack 
of political commitment at government level and 
is threatened with disintegration. When human 
safety comes second to political differences the 
member nations need to ask themselves if their 
priorities are in the right order. Those who may 
claim that lives have not been lost should add 
the suffix "so far". 
31. As usual, all we need in Europe is the 
political will to do the obvious. Political power 
to take the decisions is with us all. Let us delay 
no longer! 
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APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 257 1 
on the state of European aviation activities 2 
The Assembly, 
Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and 
hence for the aviation industry; 
Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced 
technology ; 
Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Invite the member countries to : 
I. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ; 
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equip-
ment capability of European aviation companies; 
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ; 
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories 
so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be 
retained in Europe ; 
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import 
of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such 
agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to 
protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ; 
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations 
and aircraft sales ; 
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, 
financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales. 
* 
** 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 3 
to Recommendation 257 
The Council refer to their earlier replies to Recommendation 244 on an aviation policy for Europe, 
and to Written Question 151. 
The views expressed in Recommendation 257 have been brought to the notice of member govern-
ments. The Council can assure the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it 
is concerned continue to receive their fullest attention. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session (lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 658). 
3. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975. 
259 
DOCUMENT 691 APPENDIX II 
APPENDIX II 
Summary of the action programme for the European 
aeronautical sector 
(Commission report and proposal to the Council) 
1st October 1975 
With more than 400,000 employed and an 
annual turnover of some six thousand million 
dollars, the European aircraft industry occupies 
a very important place in the Community's 
economy. Yet Europe, although it represents 
some 20 % of the world's civil aircraft market, 
built only 7 % of world production in 197 4. This 
was not for lack of ambitious programmes : over 
the past ten years Europe has put in hand as 
many projects as the United States. But the 
greater part of them stopped short: on average, 
an American model is ,built and sold five times 
as often as a European one. The financial impli-
cations for the two industries are clear to see. 
The Commission is, therefore, sounding a 
real alarm in its recent communication to the 
Council of the European Communities: if the 
Community countries continue to pursue national 
policies they will lead to the disappearance of an 
independent European aircraft industry. 
The member States must go beyond the stage 
of intergovernmental co-operation, which has 
proved its ineffectiveness, and set up for the 
aircraft industry a true common policy and 
provide the European Community with the 
means to implement it, both at industrial and 
commercial level and in terms of air transport. 
The proposals from the European Commis-
sion (based on a study of the situation in the 
aircraft sector, summarised in the Annex) define 
what a future common European aircraft policy 
should look like and set out a development pro-
gramme for it, taking account of market realities. 
1. The market for the European aircraft industry 
Although evident, it is all too often forgot-
ten that the European aircraft industry cannot 
base its future only on its ability to satisfy 
users' needs. Moreover, it cannot hope to pene-
SO'IJA'ce: Industry and Society No. 34/75, Brussels 
7th October 1975. 
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trate export markets (which are essential to it) 
unless it occupies an important place on its own 
market. Finally, since this is an industry which 
serves both the military and civil markets, and 
since the military market takes over 60 % of its 
production, an aircraft policy which confined 
itself to the civil market and excluded the mili-
tary market would be quite pointless. 
(a) The civil market 
The adoption of a European aircraft policy 
presupposes the existence of a genuine European 
market and, therefore, the implementation of a 
common air transport policy. This does not exist ; 
instead there are rigidly demarcated national 
markets in which access to air traffic is mainly 
allocated on the basis of the air transport com-
panies' nationality. In the opinion of the Euro-
pean Commission, a common air transport policy 
should pursue the following general aims: 
- the creation of a European airspace, to 
be managed on a Community basis and 
involving the establishment in respect of 
intra-Community traffic of a system of 
regulated competition, whose aim will be 
to provide the public with services bet-
ter tailored to its needs, at the best 
prices possible, through the introduction 
of new services and the diversification 
of existing services and the rationalisa-
tion of route networks, particularly in 
interregional traffic ; 
- joint negotiation of agreements with non-
member countries, particularly as regards 
landing rights, with the twofold result 
of strengthening the European Commu-
nity's negotiating power and optimising 
international routes and services. 
A common air transport policy of this kind 
would enable the air carriers to play their part, 
together, in defining European aircraft con-
struction programmes. They would act as a neces-
sary and valid talking partner for industry and 
APPENDIX II 
could well propose programmes with a view to 
increased competitiveness on world markets. 
(b) The military market 
The wide variety of aircraft types and 
equipment used by the European air forces is a 
keavy burden on public finance. Though the 
short-term interests of American arms suppliers 
may benefit from the divisions of Europe, which 
have enabled them to win contracts like that 
for the F-16 which has been bought by four 
European countries, the Americans' long-term 
interests, like those of Europe, lie in the estab-
lishment of a coherent European weapons' pro-
curement system which will enable European 
industry to make a more economic contribution 
to the joint defence effort. 
The Commission is therefore requesting the 
governments of the Community member States to 
decide to create a joint military aircraft procure-
ment agency responsible for joint development 
and procurement of weapons systems to meet the 
needs of the European armed forces. Initially it 
could be an ad hoc body working in liaison with 
the relevant national ministries and in close co-
operation with the Commission. The agency 
would become an organ of European union once 
this takes shape. 
The agency should, in particular : 
- co-ordinate the requirements of Euro-
pean air forces to ensure systematic and 
standardised use of existing European 
military aircraft for similar missions ; 
- identify common future requirements 
necessitating new joint development pro-
grammes. 
A European policy for the procurement of 
airborne weapons systems would have to be 
accompanied by discussions with the United Sta-
tes to obtain a mutual opening-up of markets on 
both sides of the Atlantic and ensure that Eu-
rope's role is preserved in all major sectors of 
technology. 
2. A European programme for civil transport aircraft 
The analysis made by the Commission in 
collaboration with the European Aerospace 
Manufacturers Association (AECMA) led to the 
following three conclusions : 
(a) The need to maintain a European pre-
sence in the sector of short and medium 
haul aircraft of less than 100 seats. This 
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requires further support for existing 
programmes and guarantees for their 
future development in order to maintain 
and even increase their already excel-
lent penetration on the world market 
and to counter the competition which 
is likely to result from new American 
projects in this sector. 
(b) The need for joint study of the various 
solutions whick will enable the Euro-
pean industry to occupy a major posi-
tion in the market for other short- and 
medium-haul aircraft. The choice is dif-
ficult and in the sector of two-engined 
aircraft of 140-150 seats European 
industry has three projects for develop-
ing existing aircraft (Mercure, BAC-111 
and Trident). There is also the problem 
of Italian co-operation with Boeing for 
a three-engined aircraft of 200 seats 
(the Boeing-Aeritalia 7 x 7) which may 
well compete with the B-10 reduced 
capacity version of the European Air-
bus. 
(c) Finally, care must be taken to widen the 
opportunities for a European initiative 
in the field of long-haul aircraft. The 
only current European project is 
Concorde ; however, its prospects are 
difficult to assess until it actually comes 
into service. The problem at present, 
which requires a joint European answer, 
is whether to launch a new pro-
gramme for a 200-seat four-engined 
aircraft to replace the 707 and DC-8. 
Here again the Airbus seems capable of 
providing the most probable basis for 
study with its B-11 version. 
If it is to succeed, such a European civil 
transport aircraft construction programme must 
comply with a number of jointly determined 
principles. It must form part of a coherent Euro-
pean aircraft programme. Such a policy is what 
the European Commission is asking the Council 
of the European Communities to adopt. 
3. A common policy for the aircraft industry 
If the Community's aircraft industry is to 
have any future, we must go beyond the stage 
of intergovernmental co-operation between dif-
fering, and still national, aerospace policies. 
To this end, sponsorship of the aircraft 
industry should be exercised by the European 
Community. 
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The eventual :framework :for the manage-
ment o:f the Community's policy :for the aircraft 
industry should be that to which the Community 
is already accustomed : namely that, acting on 
a proposal :from the European Commission, after 
consulting the European Parliament, the Council 
o:f the Community would make the major policy 
decisions on programmes, Community :financing 
and international agreement in this sector. On 
the basis o:f these decisions, the Commission 
would assume the necessary management o:f the 
common aerospace policy, and would take the 
necessary steps to consult users, producers, trade 
unions and national authorities. 
The Commission would organise the manage-
ment of the aircraft policy in such a way as to 
use to the maximum existing national structures 
and to seek the greatest possible decentralisation. 
Community financing of the aircraft policy 
would not be superimposed on national financing 
but would replace it as the policy is implemented. 
This policy would include, in particular : 
- bringing aU large civil transport aircraft 
construction activities o:f the Community 
countries into a coherent programme and 
optimising the use o:f resources ; 
- close co-operation between industry, air-
lines and public authorities about the 
decisions required in executing the joint 
programme; 
- a joint basic research programme ; 
- the establishment of a system of Com-
munity financing ; 
- conduct of relations with non-member 
countries : not only collaboration between 
Community industries and those o:f other 
countries, but also a commercial strategy 
:for penetrating export markets ; 
- harmonisation of laws or administrative 
provisions regarding certificates o:f air-
worthiness, noise and other nuisances 
and standardisation generally. 
Such a programme should also promote a 
permanent industrin,l structure, at least :for large 
civil aircraft, particularly in sales and after-
sales service, based on experience in co-operation 
so :far ; this would enable the European aircraft 
industry to increase productivity and reap the 
full benefit of rationalisation. 
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The :first decision which the Council is asked 
to take on the basis o:f the Commission's proposals 
concerns the adoption of the principle of a Euro-
pean programme backed by joint :financing. This 
European programme should be prepared toge-
ther with the manufacturers and the airlines of 
the Community. 
The situation in the aircraft industry 
1. Reasons for the current problems in this sector 
All the most recent civil developments 
(Concorde, Airbus, Fokker-VFW 614, F-28, 
Mercure) have involved European collaboration 
in one :form or another. Yet in the area o:f intra-
Community co-operation limitations have been 
:felt. Programmes carried out in co-operation on 
a bilateral or a trilateral basis have not :formed 
part o:f a single and coherent framework. More-
over, co-operation has mainly been in the develop-
ment phase or in series manufacture rather than 
in marketing. As a result o:f this :fragmentation 
of efforts, programmes have generally been 
oriented towards technological rather than 
marketing objectives. Because they have wanted 
to maintain commercial competitivity and mili-
tary independence, the manufacturers have often 
decided to retain their own research programmes, 
to develop the same expertise and to create, with 
the backing of the governmental authorities, the 
same research infrastructure. 
During the 1960s two major opportunities 
were lost: 
The :first was in the civil aircraft field : the 
Airbus, the only major modern technology pro-
ject in Europe in the market for medium-haul 
aircraft, was launched without the participation 
of the British Government and with an American 
engine, even though Hawker Siddeley provided 
industrial participation; at the same time, the 
largest European engine manufacturer, Roils-
Royce, supplied the RB-211 engine :for the 
Lockheed TriStar. Thus a severe conflict o:f polit-
ical and commercial interests divided the Euro-
pean industry, Airbus with its American CF -6 
engine and TriStar with its European RB-211 
engine competing throughout the world market, 
including that of British Airways itself. 
The second was in the military field, in the 
parallel major divergence o:f interests created by 
the absence of France from the MRCA projects. 
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2. The importance of the aircraft industry 
In 1973 the Community's turnover aerospace 
was 5,990 million units of account, that of the 
United States 16,368 million (1 u.a. = approx. 
us$ 1.30). 
From 1969 to 1973 the turnover of the Euro-
pean industry rose annually by an average of 
6.6 % ; over the same period United States turn-
over fell by 27 %. While in 1969 European turn-
over was 16 % of that of the United States, the 
figure reached 29 % in 1973. The importance of 
military sales is shown by the fact that they 
represent 62.6 % of the total turnover of the 
Community aerospace sector as against 70.2 % 
in the United States. The improvement in Euro-
pean turnover figures is due to military sales, to 
government contracts for research and develop-
ment and to the sales of spares and equipment 
for civil aircraft already in service for many 
years, as weU as of engines. So far it has not 
been due to substantial sales of new civil aircraft. 
The breakdown of aerospace turnover by 
main categories of customer gives 58.3% for the 
State, 11.4 % for the internal civil market and 
30.3 % for export ; the corresponding figures 
for the United States are 51.5 %, 20.9 % and 
27.6 %. 
The State is therefore an important 
customer for the European aircraft industry. It 
should be noted, however, that in the Com-
munity, governments intervene in the civil and 
military sectors by purchases and R & D con-
tracts, whereas in the United States the Federal 
Government intervenes primarily by means of 
military purchases and military R & D contracts. 
In 1973, the aerospace sector in the Com-
munity employed 406,605 people, whereas in 
1969 this figure was 435,553. This fall in the 
work-force of approximately 7 % is primarily 
due to a reduction in numbers employed within 
the British industry and overall reflects an 
improvement in productivity. During this period, 
the number of jobs in aerospace activities drop-
ped in the United States by 32.3 % and in 
Canada by 31.9 %, but rose in Japan by 12.6 %. 
Productivity expressed in terms of added 
value or turnover per head employed in the 
European industry averages half that of the 
American industry. 
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3. The aircraft industry's activities and programmes 
The table below of numbers of jets built 
shows: 
- on the one hand the length of the produc-
tion runs of the American aircraft and 
their in-service life ; 
- on the other hand, the large number of 
programmes launched by the European 
industry, sometimes in competition with 
each other and always with production 
runs which even under the best assump-
tions only just enable amortisation of 
costs to be achieved. 
American jet aircraft European jet aircraft 
Boeing 720 Caravella (278) 
and 707 897 BAC-111 219 
Boeing 727 1,195 HS Trident 117 
Boeing 747 283 VC-10 (47) 
Boeing 737 407 Comet (51) 
DC-8 (556) Mercure (10) 
DC-9 802 Concorde 9 
DC-10 240 Airbus A-300 23 
TriStar 150 F-28 95 
Convair (83) VFW-614 10 
Total 4,613 Total 859 
In brackets : aircraft out of production. 
There is also American superiority in 
respect of other types of aircraft. In the field 
of general aviation, in 1973 approximately 14,000 
aircraft were produced in the United States 
compared to 1,200 aircraft produced in Europe 
(of which 350 were produced by the French 
subsidiary of an American company). In the 
field of commercial turboprop aircraft, the Euro-
pean manufacturers have experienced consider-
able success, notably with the Fokker F-27 and 
the Hawker Siddeley 7 48. 
The European industry has shown a remark-
able degree of competitiveness and dynamism in 
the field of executive jets (about 730 aircraft 
have been produced to date in Europe against 
1,300 in the United States). There is a similar 
situation in the field of helicopters. 
European industry has produced competi-
tive engines, although the increasing cost of 
development has led the principal European 
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manufacturers to create co-operative links with 
the two major manufacturers in the United 
States for the new 10-ton engines. 
The military field has seen the development 
of a series of collaborative European projects. 
Yet in the 1960s Europe did not adopt a joint 
policy and consequently in the key area of 
advanced combat aircraft, Europe is still engag-
ed in ruinous competition. When the time came 
to consider the development of a joint European 
successor to the existing generation of jet combat 
aircraft, negotiations between the United King-
dom and France on a possible Anglo-French 
variable-geometry aircraft broke down. The 
United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy then 
combined to develop the MRCA, which, with 
production orders of some 800 aircraft, is 
Europe's major current joint military project. 
The absence of the French from the MRCA 
caused a fundamental divergence of interests 
within Europe. The absence of a solidarity of 
interests has been reflected in other areas : the 
development of two separate trainer aircraft (the 
Dassault-Dornier Alphajet and the Hawker Sid-
deley Hawk) and the fact that the jointly deve-
loped Anglo-French Jaguar (BAC and Dassault-
Breguet) has found itself in competition with 
Dassault's own F-1. 
When the time came in 1975 for Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to decide 
on a replacement for their F-104s, the choice of 
an American aircraft was, quite apart from all 
technical and operational considerations, a logical 
consequence of these divisions of interest. 
Through the absence of a systematic European 
procurement policy, a significant market oppor-
tunity for European aircraft now and in the 
future has been lost. 
4. The market for civil transport aircraft 
The general trend has been the increased size 
of the Community market at the expense of that 
of the United States. Between 1970 and 1973 the 
share of the European market increased from 
14.7% to 18.2% of the western market, while 
that of the United States fell from 63.9 % to 
53%. Between 1973 and 1975 the share of the 
market filled by the rest of the world has con-
tinued to expand rapidly ; that of the United 
States has shrunk to 45.8 % while that of the 
Community has stabilised at 17.6 %. 
European production has benefited from 
this general trend which should in theory have 
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been favourable to manufacturers outside the 
United States. In fact the percentages for the 
share of European products on the various 
markets fell substantially between 1970 and 1975 
as shown in the table below : 
1970 1975 Change 
Community 33.0% 21.9% -11.1 
Other Western 
European countries 23.1% 5.8% -17.3 
Europe 30.1% 16.9% -13.2 
United States 2.1% 0.3% - 1.8 
Rest of the world 12.2% 12.0% - 0.2 
Western world 9.5% 7.9% - 1.6 
The net result of the growth in the Euro-
pean air transport market and the reduction in 
the share of all the markets held by the Euro-
pean manufacturing industry has been a negative 
trade balance over the period 1968-73, amounting 
to $4,521 million in 1974 ($ 2,695 for long haul 
aircraft and $ 1,826 million for short and 
medium haul aircraft). 
Estimates of the value of the western civil 
transport aircraft market for 1975-85 show that 
the United States will account for about one 
third, the rest of the world for 40 % and Europe 
for one quarter. 
The supply capacity of the European 
industry will obviously depend on political and 
commercial decisions taken in respect of aircraft 
programmes. Various hypotheses have been put 
forward : all indicate that the European balance 
of trade will be negative and, in the most pes-
simistic hypothesis, this negative balance may 
well exceed five thousand million dollars. 
5. The potential of the aeronautics sector 
The current operation of the European air-
craft sector shows that considerable potential 
exists which could be made use of. It is incon-
testable, firstly, that an overall judgment on the 
state of the Community aerospace sector cannot 
be a negative one. Activity in this sector is con-
stantly expanding (even when calculated at 
constant prices and exchange rates), the level of 
technology is excellent and the level of know-
how and design capability is certainly not infe-
rior to that of American industry. It can there-
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fore be said that the technological infrastructure 
and the human and even financial resources 
(taking into account the funds devoted to this 
sector) are sufficient for the European industry 
to regain an important role on the world market, 
provided that an effort is made towards rational-
isation of which it is certainly capable. 
Moreover, market forecasts exhibit a trend 
which can be of great importance for the future 
of the European industry : growth of the Euro-
pean market, growth of the market in the rest 
of the world, and fall in the American market. 
If one considers the scale, in value terms of the 
world market as forecast for the next ten years, 
this trend opens sufficient market prospects for 
a satisfactory development for the industry to 
be mapped out. 
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Finally, the structure of the world industry 
favours a major effort to maintain activity by 
the manufacturing industry in Europe. Already 
in the market for civil transport aircraft the 
United States is left with only three large 
manufacturers, and of these a single company, 
Boeing, holds 72 % of the world market for long 
haul aircraft and 49% of the market for short-
and medium-haul aircraft. Moreover, the pres-
sure towards even greater concentration remains 
strong within American industry. The best 
guarantee, ensuring that European users will be 
able to make their purchases in competitive con-
ditions, would be the existence of a viable Euro-
pean industry capable of developing co-operative 
ventures with other industries such as those of 
Japan and the United States on a basis which 
is not one of dependence. 
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Amendment No. 1 
The European aeronautical industry 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
1st December 1975 
At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add: "on which the Standing Arma-
ments Committee is also based ;". 
Signed : V alleix 
I. See 13th Sitting, 4th December 1975 (Amendment adopted). 
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Document 692 1st December 1975 
Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 10th Nouember 1976 
The Assembly, 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
tabled by Mr. Radius and others 
with a reql'lat for argent procedure 
Underlining the importance for European security of maintaining peace throughout the Mediter-
ranean basin ; 
Alarmed by the threats to peace arising from the recent increase in hostilities in the Middle East 
between various national and religious communities ; 
Noting that the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on lOth 
November 1975 can but contribute to the deterioration of the situation in that area; 
Disturbed at the possible consequences for international peace of the presence of large numbers of 
forces from countries from outside the area, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
I. Ensure that its members consult each other, either in the framework of WEU or in that of the 
European Community, in order to define a joint policy to prevent the vote in the United Nations General 
Assembly having any effect and to prevent any sectarian use of the second decade for action to combat 
racism; 
2. Promote the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe 
and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries with a view to helping these countries progressively to ter-
minate their division into opposing blocs with the encouragement of certain outside powers. 
Signed: Radius, Leynen, Burckel, Rodgers, Richter, Treu, Menard, Valleix, Piket, Margue 
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Document 693 3rd December 1975 
Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 10th November 1975 1 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 8 
The Assembly, 
Underlining the importance for European security of maintaining peace throughout the Mediter-
ranean basin ; 
Alarmed by the threats to peace arising from the recent increase in hostilities in the Middle East 
between various national and religious communities ; 
Noting that the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on lOth 
November 1975 can but contribute to the deterioration of the situation in that area, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Ensure that its members consult each other in the framework of WEU, without prejudice to their 
action in the framework of the European Community or the Council of Europe, in order to define a. joint 
policy in the United Nations and prevent any sectarian use of the second decade for action to combat 
racism; 
2. Promote the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe 
and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries with a. view to helping these countries progressively to termi-
nate their division into opposing blocs. 
1. See Document 692 : Motion for a Recommendation 
tabled by Mr. Radius and others with a request for urgent 
procedure. 
2. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 3 with 2 
abstentions. 
3. Members of the Oommittu: Mr. Siegkrschmidt 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-
Chairmen) ; MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mrs. txm Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Cermolacce (Substitute: 
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Grussenmeyer), Fioret, Fletcher (Substitute : Lewis), 
Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute : de Bruyne), MM. 
Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, 
Peijnenburg, P6ridier, Portheine (Substitute: Reifnen), 
Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt (Substitute: Schwencke), Steel, 
Urwin, Van Hoeylandt (Substitute: Hulpiau). 
N. B. The names of Representati'IJ68 who took part m 
the rote are printed in italics. 
Document 693 
Amendment No. 1 
Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 10th November 1975 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Faulds and others 
4th December 1975 
l. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a paragraph 
as follows: 
"Noting that Israel has consistently failed to comply with UN resolutions requiring her to abandon 
occupied Arab territories ;" 
2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "without prejudice" to the end 
of the paragraph and insert: 
"and through contacts with the Council of Europe and the EEC find means of conveying to the 
Israeli Government the necessity both of withdrawal to the 1967 borders in compliance with UN 
resolutions and the ending of attacks by its armed forces on the territory and people of Lebanon;" 
Signed: Faulds, Urwin, Darling 
l. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1975 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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